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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF MULTILATERAL 
SANCTIONS REGIMES UNDER GLOBALIZATION: 
THE CASE OF IRAQ 
by 
Manuel De Leon 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Ronald Cox, Chair 
This dissertation examines the effectiveness and limits of multilateral sanctions 
regimes as instruments of foreign policy, particularly when trying to prevent the 
acquisition, development and proliferation of weapons of mass destructions. I 
hypothesize that globalization undermines the overall effectiveness of sanctions regimes. 
I analyze the agents and means of globalization. Agents are nation-states, corporations, 
non-state actors and organizations, and individuals. Means are the global import-export 
industry, global banking and investment, global corporate models, and global 
manufacturing industries. They all have contributed to vast increases in transnational 
economic activity and, furthermore, to more political tensions between nation-states, all 
of which jeopardize the implementation and enforcement of multilateral sanctions 
regimes.   
To test this thesis, I examine how those factors impacted the multilateral sanctions 
regime imposed against Iraq from 1991 to 2002. This multilateral sanctions regime was 
conceived, approved and enforced by most nations in the United Nations. 
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Indeed, evidence collected for this dissertation suggests that Iraq did manage to 
consistently circumvent the UN sanctions regime, and that it did it by astutely utilizing 
the agents and means of globalization. Evidence also indicates that Iraq managed to 
rebuild parts of its military infrastructure, and that Iraq was on its way to rebuild its 
missile capability, for which it purchased large quantities of parts, components, 
technologies and manpower in the global market.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, I will study the limits of multilateral sanctions regimes as 
instruments of foreign policy. I argue that the political economy of contemporary 
globalization jeopardizes the overall effectiveness of multilateral sanctions regimes in 
two important ways. The first is the competing global agendas of states and non-state 
actors with respect to sanctions regimes. The second is growing transnational economic, 
political and civic activities linked to the process of globalization. To test this thesis, I 
will examine how those two factors impacted the UN sanctions regime against Iraq.  
The UN sanctions regime makes an excellent case study. First, the UN General 
Assemble approved it, meaning that a majority of nation-states voted for it. Second, a 
vast majority of nations stopped trading with Iraq. Third, UN inspectors monitored it 
while the American and British armies enforced it. Finally, the sanctions included: trade 
and military blockages, military occupation of northern and southern Iraq, autonomy for 
the Kurdistan, enforcement of two no-fly zones, random inspections of military and 
civilian facilities, random bombings and raids. The sanctions lasted for almost 12 years, 
isolating the Iraqi government and causing hundreds of thousands of deaths among the 
Iraqi people. Sanctions were so intense that at some point the Iraqi regime almost 
collapsed. But it did not. Iraq suddenly began to evade the sanctions, and the Iraqi 
economy began to grow. It required another American led invasion to bring down the 
Iraqi regime.   
In the Iraqi case, I hypothesize that there were several important contradictions 
between the strategic and economic objectives of the five permanent members of UN 
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Security Council and the implementation and enforcement of the sanctions. For instance, 
the American unilateralism toward Iraq clashed with the mandates of the UN and with the 
strategic objectives of European states. The U.S. switched its goals from finding and 
dismantling weapons of mass destruction to regime change, undermining the overall 
legitimacy of the sanctions regime. Besides, American, Chinese, French and Russian 
corporations kept selling military technologies and hardware to Iraq and neighboring 
states. They at times did it with the consent of their governments.    
Second, I will study the relationship between globalization and efforts in UN to 
establish viable and enforceable sanctions against Iraq. I will explore two issues. The first 
concerns non-state actors like transnational corporations, financiers, and speculators 
competing for Iraqi oil during the 1990s, a process that states, mainly industrial nations, 
encouraged in their quest for global access to oil. Competition for global access to oil 
intensified in the 1990s when oil became a national security concern for most nations, 
thereby jeopardizing UN sanctions against Iraq. The second issue concerns the power of 
states and international institutions relative to those of non-state actors. The core premise 
is that states and international institutions have been losing power and influence to non-
state actors, a process that globalization accelerated during the 1990s. Drastic changes in 
global trade and politics have led to a more profound trans-nationalization of economic 
and political activities in detriment of national interests. As William I. Robinson states, 
“Globalization represents a new transnational phase in the development of the world 
capitalist system” (Robinson, 2004, p. 9), often in frank contradiction with states’ 
political and military goals, including the enforcement of a sanctions regime.  
In all, I argue that due to the factors mentioned above, sanctions regimes have 
3 
become inefficient instruments of foreign policy. This was apparent in the case of Iraq, 
where the UN conceived and enforced a sanctions regime to prevent the acquisition, 
development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  In order to test 
my hypothesis, I will study four main points.  
The first is the central question of whether or not Iraq violated the sanctions 
regime. It is important to go beyond whether or not Iraq circumvented the sanctions for 
economic survival in favor of examining whether or not Iraq acquired and developed 
weapons of mass destruction despite the UN sanctions regime. The second issue is about 
how Iraq circumvented the sanctions regime. I aim at identifying what I call the agents 
and means of globalization that Iraq employed to evade UN sanctions. For instance, I 
want to detect trade relations established for the sole purpose of acquiring goods, services 
and technologies prohibited by the sanctions regime. I also want to find linkages among 
corporations, banks, and other non-state actors with specific economic interests in Iraq 
and the Middle East. A third issue to study is, in comparative terms, the state of the Iraqi 
economy and trade relations with the rest of the world before and after the imposition of 
UN sanctions. The goal is to determine how much of the economic decline was due to the 
sanctions and not to factors such as world market conditions, economic policies, climatic 
changes, etc, inherent or intrinsic to the Iraqi economic and political systems.    
 
The Case Study 
This dissertation tackles the following questions: Did the sanctions regime 
imposed against Iraq reflect the development of thriving international cooperation among 
states, global institutions and corporations? Or did the sanctions regime break apart due 
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to conflicts among nation-states and/or the deepening of globalization? Why choosing 
Iraq instead of other nation-states like North Korea, Libya or Iran, which were subjected 
to sanctions during the 1990s?  
Three main points qualify Iraq as a sound case study. First, the sanctions regime 
imposed upon Iraq constitutes the most extensive and intensive effort among nation-
states and international institutions to cooperate for the enforcement of a sanctions 
regime. For the strength of the sanctions, for the commitment that the United Nations, 
United States and other nations showed when enforcing the regime, and for the 
consistency with which the international media, NGOs and international organizations 
scrutinized it, the UN sanctions regime against Iraq has no parallel in the history of 
international politics. This has important theoretical implications because if I find enough 
evidence to confirm the central argument of this dissertation, then my thesis may have 
validity against other cases not so rigorous as the case of Iraq.  
Second, Iraq is a case worth studying because there seems to be an important 
contradiction between the central question of this dissertation –to what extent multilateral 
economic sanctions prevented Iraq from acquiring and/or developing weapons of mass 
destruction- and the argument made to justify the latest American invasion of Iraq: the 
illegal acquisition and/or development of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. This 
contradiction suggests that, despite the sanctions regime and despite the support 
expressed by the international community of nations and institutions with respect to the 
sanctions, some credible sources affirmed that Iraq acquired and/or developed WMDs. If 
this was correct, then I must conclude two things: first, that Iraq somehow managed to 
evade UN sanctions and, second, as the thesis of this dissertation suggests, sanctions 
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regimes are not effective means of foreign policy in the global economy.        
The third aspect to consider is that this dissertation is time sensitive, meaning that 
it only focuses on the 1991-2002 period. This is not arbitrary. First, it was during the 
1990s that the world consolidated itself as unipolar and the United States secured its 
position as the sole world superpower. This new structural configuration and the resulting 
balance of power had significant implications for world politics. Some scholars soon 
began to argue that the United States alone could not guarantee peace and stability in the 
world, and that a unipolar world was more unstable than a bipolar one (Waltz, 1993.) 
Next, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the second world nuclear 
superpower, the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction occupied most 
of the agenda of the United States, its allies and international institutions such as UN, 
NATO and the EU. Also, it was during the 1990s that proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction suddenly became a serious concern as nations like Pakistan, India, and North 
Korea resumed building nuclear weapons or, at least, increased their nuclear capabilities. 
In fact, all throughout the 1990s, economic, political, and diplomatic sanctions of all sorts 
were imposed upon North Korea, Libya, Pakistan, India and other nations for attempting 
to acquire and/or develop nuclear capabilities and WMD.  
Finally, it was also during the 1990s that globalization gained momentum in 
academic circles as a phenomenon worth observing for its influence in culture, religion, 
economics and, more broadly, world politics. Although there seems to be no consensus 
on a definition of globalization, I can summarize it according to three main schools. For 
instance, some scholars describe globalization as a socio-cultural phenomenon defined by 
Tomlinson (1999) as complex connectivity. This school argues that even though 
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globalization has been around for many years, it became more evident during the 1990s 
thanks to new technological trends such as computerization, communication and 
transportation. But scholars like Gowan (1999) and Negri and Hardt (2000) see 
globalization as a political process related to power and world domination through 
militarization, institutionalization and trans-nationalization of international relations. In 
that respect, Huntington (1990) argues that globalization will bring about confrontations 
among civilizations, and that the next wars will be fought along religious lines.   
Still, for Fukuyama (1992) globalization marks the beginning of an era in which 
the principles of liberalism and capitalism dominate world politics. Robinson (2004) 
agrees, but he predicts more conflicts among social classes while Fukuyama sees a great 
opportunity for cooperation. For Robinson, globalization represents an epochal shift in 
world politics and economics. It is a transition toward a more severe systemic economic 
interdependency. This transition entails three aspects: fragmentation of production, the 
ascendance and dominance of transnational capital, and the consolidation of global 
circuits of accumulation (Robinson, 2004, p. 9). The result is the substitution of national 
markets for a global one that integrates the flow of capital, goods and services. It means 
that a nation under a sanctions regime still have access to some alternative niches where 
it can allocate its exports. It allows nations to import goods and services, technologies 
and materials needed to stabilize their economy, sustain their military apparatus, and 
safeguard their territorial integrity.  
Based on those points, I define globalization as political and economic, highly 
interconnected and interdependent relations between the agents and means of 
globalization. I will elaborate more on such a definition, but first I like to examine the 
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theoretical approach for this dissertation.   
Theoretical Framework  
Liberal Institutionalism, Realism, and Historical Structuralism 
 Three important theoretical approaches to international relations frame the central 
question of this investigation: liberal institutionalism, realism and historical structuralism  
First, I pay special attention to liberal institutionalism for one main reason: this 
dissertation examines a sanctions regime promoted, enacted and enforced under the 
auspices of the United Nations, arguably the most important international political 
institution in the world.   
Even though a final definition of institution is still in debate, most institutionalists 
focus on the whole range of societal, state, and institutional settings that shape how 
political actors define and protect their interests with respect to institutions. Liberal 
institutionalism favors institutions as a forum for political debate, negotiation and, 
conflict resolution. Institutionalism focuses on institutional structures that frame self-
interests, behaviors and outcomes. Included in the framework are: institutional rules, 
procedures, conflicts among institutional actors, and relations of power between 
bureaucracies and between them and non-institutional actors. 
Most institutionalists are interested in what Peter Hall (1986) defines as the 
relational character of institutions, meaning how a given institutional configuration 
shapes political interaction not only with other institutions but also with respect to 
individuals, businesses, and group interests. For example, Hall defines institutions in 
terms of “Formal rules, compliance procedures and standard operating practices that 
structure relationships between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” 
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(Hall, 1986, p. 14). Most of all, Hall is concerned with how institutional structures offer a 
comparative advantage to a particular nation. This approach has implications for: 1) how 
institutions fit in the analysis of policymaking; 2) how institutional advantages affect 
worldwide treaties and trade accords; 3) how corporations set macroeconomic strategies 
with respect to international institutions in the context of the world economy.   
For his part, Ikemberry (1988, 2000) concedes that institutions do matter in 
international politics when trying to prevent conflicts, bring about peace, and promote 
multilateralism among nations. Ikemberry breaks down institutions in “Three distinct 
levels that range from specific characteristics of government institutions to the more 
overarching structures of the state, to the nation’s normative social order” (Ikemberry, 
2000, p. 27). His goal is to study intermediate institutional levels and compare them 
across nation-states. He assesses how state-level institutions and assessments of states’ 
interests contribute to the creation of lasting and effective international institutions. In 
line with Ikemberry, scholars like Katzenstein (1985) study structures and organizations 
of key economic actors. Skocpol (1979) and Axelrod (1981) focus on public policy and 
interest-group behavior.  
Liberal institutionalists are prompt to question the overall effectiveness of a 
sanctions regime under globalization. For example, they inquire about whether the 
sanctions regime imposed against Iraq effectively grappled with the geopolitical realities 
of the 1990s, mainly the emergence of a unipolar world and the subsequent consolidation 
of liberalism and capitalism across nations. They ask whether institutional frameworks 
conceived to facilitate international cooperation kept pace with new global economic and 
political trends. They also refer to the increasing participation of global non-state actors 
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and global civic societies in global institutions and politics. Consequently, based on those 
assumptions, in the case of the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq, I can argue that if the 
sanctions were effective, I should find enough evidence of institutional coherence that 
would indicate some success related to the primary goals of the sanctions. Specifically, I 
would be able to illustrate that the regime succeeded in its two most basic tasks: 1) the 
prevention of weapons flowing into Iraq; 2) the prevention of exports to Iraq that would 
have allowed the country to rebuild its WMD program.  
Realism is the second theoretical approach to the central question of this 
investigation. Realists are particularly skeptical about the overall effectiveness of 
international institutions in world politics. For example, in the case of Iraq, realists would 
argue that the UN sanctions regime was doomed to fail for two main reasons. First, 
because it was promoted, enforced and monitored by international institutions that lacked 
any independent legal authority and enforcement mechanism. Second, the conflicting 
interests among great powers did not allow an institution like the UN to define a common 
policy toward Iraq.     
For realists, the problem of international politics rests with the true nature of 
nation-states themselves. Realists consider nation-states as the single biggest obstacle to 
the efficacy of institutions, multilateralism and a sanctions regime. Nation-states are 
unitary actors, always concerned with their physical survival in an anarchic world 
(Morgenthau, 1948; Viotti & Kauppi, 1999). In fact, it is national security and the 
security dilemma that set the political agenda of nation-states at domestic and 
international levels. Not surprisingly, nation-states spend many resources on the military, 
the use of force, how to attain and maintain peace, and the prevention of violations of 
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territorial integrity.  
 The concept of power is central to Realism, but there is no consensus among 
realists on how to define it. As a whole, they agree that power is an attribute of states, and 
that it is the sum of all the military and strategic capabilities of a state with respect to 
other states. Realists define military capabilities as a strategic issue of high politics, 
whereas economic and social issues are considered low politics. The terms are not 
arbitrary for they are directly related to the concept of power and what it means to 
Realism and the hierarchy of its geopolitical agenda. Finally, realists define nation-states 
as rational self-interested actors, focused on their own political and economic wellbeing. 
It means that I should expect from nation-states a rational foreign policy derived from a 
unitary decision-making process which includes clear objectives, consideration of 
alternatives, discussion of vulnerabilities vs. capabilities, and cost-benefit analysis. 
However, some realists acknowledge some inconsistencies when defining nation-states as 
rational actors. Gilpin (1981), for example, finds a contradiction between cost-benefit 
analysis and the quality and quantity of information that governments utilize to engage in 
decision-making. Jervis (1976), for his part, affirms that information is not always 
accurate enough, that it may lead to faulty policy formulation and even misperceptions 
about key issues in international politics. Faulty information can take nations to war and, 
in some cases, to a military defeat.  
Overall, the effectiveness of institutions depends on the extent to which the 
interests of nation-states enforcing those institutional norms, rules and regulations are 
consistent. But realists believe that they are not consistent. If realists are correct, I should 
expect that strategic and economic interests of states would affect the level of cooperation 
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and conflict in the development, oversight and implementation of the sanctions regime 
that UN implemented against Iraq. Especially, I should expect national security issues, 
not economic ones, to dominate the political agenda of nations in the UN. Also, I should 
expect a high degree of skepticism by great powers in regard to the efficacy of 
international institutions in world politics. 
            Finally, historical structuralism is the third theoretical approach to the central 
argument of this dissertation. Three major assumptions are central to this framework. 
First, the level of analysis in international relations is the global context within which 
nation-states, businesses, and international institutions behave and interact. The rationale 
here is that domestic politics is not the only factor shaping nation-states’ behavior. It is 
rather the overall configuration of international politics and the international economic 
system which determines political behavior.  
 The second assumption is that international politics must be seen from both 
historical and economic standpoints. That is, history and economics are linked, so that in 
order to understand the current configuration of world politics, I must look at the 
historical evolution of the world economy. Here, historical structuralists, Marxists and 
non-Marxists alike, affirm that capitalism is the defining historical feature of international 
economic and political systems. Historical patterns of global capitalist production and 
development frame the modern global political economy. In particular, historical 
structuralists analyze a sanctions regime within a larger context of global capitalism and 
the structural problems sustained and exacerbated by it. The analysis includes unequal 
development and distribution of wealth, widespread poverty fierce competition for 
market shares, cheap labor, and scarce natural resources. According to historical 
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structuralists, those are the true causes of international tensions, conflicts and wars. If that 
is correct, then I should examine how globalization affects international institutions and 
multilateral regimes created to develop and enforce sanctions.  
 The last assumption is that, like liberal institutionalists, historical structuralists 
acknowledge the roles that states and global non-state actors play in world politics. Yet, 
they above all pay attention to how a minority of nation-states, businesses and elites 
concentrate economic and political power and benefit from the preservation of the status 
quo. Structuralists want to know how such a concentration of power came about. They 
study the structural nature of relationships among states which they see as hierarchical, 
based on economic exploitation and domination. For historical structuralism, dependency 
is the most common relationship among nation-states, especially between developed, 
developing, and underdeveloped nations. In fact, dependency is for historical 
structuralism what interdependence is to liberal institutionalism and what balance of 
power is to realism.  
  With respect to the Iraqi case, historical structuralists would argue that the 
emergence of a global economy and transnational capitalism made it extremely difficult 
for nation-states and international institutions to enforce a sanctions regime. Sanctions 
regimes and global capitalism are incompatible. They cannot coexist. Sanctions regimes 
alter the natural course of capitalism, which is toward expansion and dominance of global 
markets. Sanctions regimes are irreconcilable with five fundamental features of global 
capitalism: open markets, free trade, competition, free flow of capital, and profits. Also, 
historical structuralists see sanctions regimes as a significant source of conflict within 
nation-states and between transnational firms and nation-state actors. They argue that 
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business interests are in frank contradiction with political ones; therefore, transnational 
firms and state actors would disagree in their orientation to sanctions regimes. In fact, 
historical structuralists tend to be skeptical about the ability of nation-states to enforce a 
sanctions regime under globalization. They consider that sanctions regimes are 
unenforceable not so much for the lack of commitment from nation-states but due to the 
powers that non-state actors have gained with respect to state actors. In the era of 
globalization, non-state actors such as banks, corporations and NGOs are more visible 
and influential than ever. They seem more resolute than ever to seize power from state 
actors. They have developed legal, financial and political powers to do so. 
      
Regimes and Multilateralism 
 I utilize the term sanctions regime when referring to multilateral economic, 
political, and diplomatic measures imposed against Iraq by the international community 
of nation-states under the auspices of the UN from 1991 to 2002. The objectives then 
were to isolate Iraq, weaken it economically and politically, and prevent it from acquiring 
hardware and technologies that would allow it to develop weapons capabilities. Why do I 
use the term regime and not simply economic sanctions, or embargoes? 
Two key concepts are central to this argument: regime and multilateralism. First, 
the term regime derives from domestic politics where it refers to an existing 
governmental order, meaning monarchical, democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian in a 
particular nation. A regime is a specific set of rules, laws, procedures and institutions 
conceived and established to govern unilateral and multilateral relations among 
individuals, groups, businesses and even social classes within a particular nation-state. 
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Laws, procedures and institutions usually constitute the rules of the game, and in time 
they become intrinsic features of the cultural and social configuration of a people. 
Stephen Krasner (1983) too defines regime as a set of rules, but one conceived to regulate 
multilateral relationships between nation-states, international institutions and 
nongovernmental organizations. Nation-states recognize and promote rules voluntarily to 
create some sense of order and certainty in global relations, which is very important 
given the absence of a supranational authority in world politics.  
The term regime also refers to “implicit or explicit principles, conventions, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations” (Krasner, 1983, p. 49). A regime may be associated with 
international and nongovernmental organizations, but an international regime is not the 
same as, or does not refer to, an international organization. Three schools of thought 
address this issue. The first is power-based realism, with its emphasis on the role of 
anarchy and relative distribution of capabilities in international politics. Within this 
school, the theory of hegemonic stability argues that a regime is established and 
preserved when a state dominates in terms of power. As power declines, so would do the 
state and the regime it established. The second is the interest- based school. It focuses on 
the role that international regimes play when states try to realize common interests. 
Neoliberal institutionalism is a common approach in this school, which sees state and 
non-state actors as key players in international politics (Keohane, 1984). The third is 
knowledge based cognitive school. This school argues that actors of diverse backgrounds, 
not states, create states’ interests. In order to understand politics, it is necessary to 
examine preferences of actors and those who participate in the decision-making process. 
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In sum, states can redefine their interests without altering the overall balance of power. 
They can do it through regimes, institutions, and multilateralism.           
Next, some scholars associate regimes with specific issue areas such as the 
environment, genocide, economic development, nuclear proliferation as well as 
proliferation of WMD and others. In recent years, the concept of regime has been 
stretched out to move from the mere notion of international cooperation to 
multilateralism, which is a much broader, more inclusive framework. But for Ernst B. 
Haas (1990), multilateralism is an agent of change, a process tied to power, interests, 
knowledge and access to information, decision making, and structures of international 
organizations. Yet, voluntarism is the basis of multilateralism because, in the end, it is up 
to the sovereign nation-state to engage in multilateral relations. And as for Ruggie 
(1993), he defines multilateralism not as a theory of international politics in itself but as 
concept, an organizing principle, an institution arranged in a multilateral form to 
coordinate multilateral relations among nation-states on the basis of generalized 
behavioral principles, always conditional to an already existing institutionalized 
relationship. The main characteristics of multilateral relations are indivisibility, 
nondiscrimination of issues, and dispersed reciprocity.  
In all, multilateralism should be seen as a tool for compromising and/or 
accommodating potential conflicting differences. It aims at finding common interests 
through institutions and organizations acting as intermediaries or trustees. With the end 
of the Cold War and the advent of a unipolar world, this yearning for finding common 
interests through international norms and institutions became, more than a necessity, a 
strategic maneuvering of second class world powers as they sought to counterbalance the 
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might of the US, by then the world’s sole superpower. For example, Ruggie (1993) 
argues that it was a common interest among nation-states, arguably a common fear 
toward international political destabilization with the consequent smuggling and 
proliferation of nuclear weapons that ultimately brought nations together to help stabilize 
international politics after the collapse of the Soviet empire. A common interest brought 
nation-states together to conceive, establish and enforce economic, political and military 
sanctions against Iraq for most of a decade.  
 
Defining Sanctions Regime 
 Generally speaking, sanctions regimes establish four forms of sanctions (Carter, 
Chaves, Damrosch, and Lori, 1997). The first form is purposeful sanctions. They intend 
to inflict economic hardship in order to force the targeted nation to change its overall 
behavior with respect to another nation. A second form is palliative sanctions. These are 
mild sanctions, imposed to publicly articulate the disapproval of the international 
community, or supranational actors, for the reckless behavior of a nation. A third type of 
sanctions is punitive, and they aim at inflicting actual economic damages upon the 
sanctioned nation. The objective here is to retaliate against a specific action of the 
targeted nation or reaffirm the status quo. Lastly, partisan sanctions target a specific 
region or community of a nation. They are mainly employed in ethnic and religious 
conflicts, and their attempt to affect specific commercial activities in a particular 
community, religious group or entity. What about the specifics of those sanctions?  
A first set of sanctions could suspend, limit, condition, terminate and/or prohibit 
foreign assistance to a nation. A second round of sanctions might end all non-profit and 
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NGOs programs as well as terminate all financial support to private organizations 
operating within the sanctioned nation. A third level of sanctions could target both public 
and private institutions by cutting off access to profits, trade, financing and even assets 
deposited in foreign banks and investments firms. A more drastic round of sanctions 
would restrict imports and exports of some or all goods, commodities and technologies 
by revoking licenses, strengthening shipping stipulations and related commercial terms. 
On top of all that, sanctions could terminate all governmental contracts and trade 
agreements as well as restrict or deny access to international air and maritime corridors. It 
could later become an air and naval blockade of low, moderate or high intensity. Other 
mechanisms may include: deny visas to travel to sanctioned nations; increase fines and 
years of imprisonment to individuals who violate the sanctions; prosecute corporations 
suspected of breaking the sanctions regime; and arrest and prosecute political and 
businessmen from sanctioned nations in international courts. Finally, it is worth noting 
that economic sanctions do not necessarily include suspensions of diplomatic contacts 
and relations, cut off of diplomatic and military attachés, and closing of embassies. Also, 
direct military actions are not considered part of economic sanctions although enforcing 
them may require some military involvement such as espionage, surveillance, patrolling, 
and other low-intensity military means.  
In all, I can affirm that the multilateral mobilization against Iraq included all the 
features described above. It certainly included military occupations, raids and bombings.  
 
Globalization and the Circumvention of Sanctions Regimes  
Nation-states have historically circumvented sanctions regimes by establishing 
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new chains of supplies and alternative markets, including the black-market. That is easier 
under globalization because the global economy opens up domestic markets and 
facilitates the flow of goods, services and capital. Likewise, globalization accelerates 
economic competition, which in turn creates an excess of failing corporations seeking for 
alternative ways of survival. In that respect, Wallenstein (1974, 1981) would recommend 
examining the role played by corporations located in the semi-periphery and periphery. 
They usually pick up economic opportunities left behind by more prosperous 
corporations or winners of global capitalism.    
There are specific features of globalization that facilitate the evasion of sanctions 
regimes. The first is the nature of the global banking system and the widespread use of 
offshore accounts, electronic money, transnational capital and indirect investments. The 
second is the fragmentation and globalization of production, which stimulates the 
proliferation of subsidiaries, parent companies and intermediaries with multiple layers of 
management and administrative bodies with no recognizable legal relations and 
obligations. In general, the nature of the global banking system and global business 
structures facilitate illegal operations and the emergence of black-markets, making it 
easier for a sanctioned nation-state to break a sanctions regime.      
The high cost of enforcement versus the problem of funding also helps nations to 
evade sanctions regimes. Two different trends conflict here: while nations promoting a 
sanctions regime are not always willing to commit enough funds to enforce sanctions, 
nations under a sanctions regime tend to commit themselves to economic survival at any 
cost. Monitoring and enforcing sanctions regimes depend on the funds that nations 
commit for the task. Not to mention that sanctions regimes also affect finances and 
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economies of nations promoting the sanctions, mainly those already affected by global 
competition and other features of globalization. As result, it is not unusual to see nations 
and corporations resenting sanctions regimes, against which they lobby governments and 
international institutions with all kind of arguments, from environmental to humanitarian. 
On the other hand, sanctions regimes actually benefit some nations and corporations, 
which find it advantageous to maintain economic contacts with the sanctioned nation. 
This became a serious issue in the case of Iraq as Russia, France, Germany and other 
nations were frequently accused of having business interests there.  
Finally, the size of the market also affects monitoring and enforcement of a 
sanctions regime. Flow of money, goods and services occur more frequently in larger 
markets than in smaller ones. Hence, I would argue that the larger the market, the harder 
it is to monitor and enforce a sanctions regime. Also, monitoring and enforcing sanctions 
regimes become sensitive in nations such as North Korea, Libya and Iraq due to their 
centralized political and economic systems, and closed societies.  
 
Testing the Hypothesis 
A key aspect of this dissertation is how to test the hypothesis, namely how to 
establish that globalization allowed Iraq to circumvent the UN sanctions and rebuild its 
economy and military infrastructures.  
First, I define globalization as high, intense interrelations and interdependencies 
among agents and means of globalization. Agents of globalizations are nation-states and 
non-state actors. Whereas nation-states’ actors include governments, states’ agencies and 
states’ officials, non-state actors refer to corporations, financiers, interest-groups, NGOs, 
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empowered individuals and others. For their part, the means of globalization are: global 
access to raw materials, global trade (the import-export industry), the global banking 
system, corporate models, the global manufacturing system and/or global assembly line. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the two groups. 
 
Figure 1.1 – Agents and Means of Globalization 
  
 
Second, I find that six key features of globalization jeopardize the efficacy of 
sanctions regimes as instruments of foreign policy. They are: 1) intense global 
competition among nation-states for strategic raw materials; 2) the nature of global trade, 
or the import-export industry, fragmented by regional and bilateral trade blocs and/or 
agreements; 3) the emergence of a global civic society and proliferation of global non-
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state actors such as NGOs, religious denominations, interest-groups, and empowered 
individuals equipped with -and interrelated through- global means of communication, 
mass media, and transportation; 4) the nature of the global banking system built on 
transnational capital and credit, electronic money, offshore accounts, and other financial 
instruments conceived to move capital at high speed throughout global markets; 5) 
proliferation of global corporate models such as joint ventures, subsidiaries, dormant, 
shell, and parent companies; 6) the global production process, reconfigured around a 
global assembly line linked to contract manufactures (CMs) and regional manufacturing 
centers.  
 Those six features of globalization create a high level of interrelation and 
interdependency among nation-states and their actors, and between them and non-state 
actors. Thus, I study each one of them but separately, in six chapters structured as follow.  
In chapters II and III, I focus on nation-states. In Chapter II, I explain how global 
demand for oil affects national security. This is not arbitrary. Oil is a key commodity for 
world superpowers, to the point that they have defined it as a national security issue. But 
Iraq holds one the largest oil reserves in the world. It has so much oil that it built its 
national security on it. Still, the UN sanctions regime specifically targeted Iraqi oil, 
creating a conflict of interest among the world superpowers and triggering competition 
for access to Iraqi oil. I explain in Chapter II that both securitization and competition for 
oil allowed Iraq to circumvent the UN sanctions regime. Then, in Chapter III, I analyze 
nation-states within the context of global, regional and bilateral trade. I argue that global 
trade is in fact fragmented into multiple regional trade zones and bilateral trade 
agreements. This fragmentation allowed Iraq to access global markets where it purchased 
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not only goods and services for civilian ends but also components, equipment and 
technologies to rebuild its military infrastructure, including its WMD Program.  
After that, I move away from nation-states to focus on global non-state actors, on 
how they interact in a global civic society and affect global politics. Thus, in Chapter IV, 
I analyze NGOs, interest-groups, religious organizations, exiled communities, political 
parties and empowered individuals. I study how they facilitated circumvention of the UN 
sanctions regime. In Chapter V, I focus on financiers, speculators, banks and global 
banking. Here, the underlying assumption is that whereas global banks and financiers 
finance global trade, the global banking industry guarantees the rapid circulation of 
money in a secured and efficient manner throughout global markets. I argue that Iraq 
utilized regional banking to access global banking and conceal it from the UN. 
Afterwards, in Chapter VI, I examine yet another non-state actor and a means of 
globalization. I analyze the corporation and corporate models. Corporations design 
corporate models to go global, evade states’ laws, avoid accountability and maximize 
profits. I discuss how nation-states, non-state actors and Saddam Hussein employed 
corporations and global corporate models to circumvent the UN sanctions regime.  
Lastly, in Chapter VII, I study another feature of globalization: global productions 
for local assembly lines. I recreate the strategy Saddam Hussein employed to rebuild its 
military apparatus and WMD Programs. I show how Saddam went around the world 
purchasing technologies and components of all sorts to assembly them in Iraqi and non-
Iraqi military plants. Saddam’s strategy was so novel that the UN had to conceive and 
enforce a second sanctions regime, known as the embargo on goods of dual use, meaning 
goods designed for one purpose but that could be used for other ends, in the Iraqi case for 
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military weapons.   
In all, my findings should explain the hypothesis of this dissertation: that agents 
and means of globalization undermine a multilateral sanctions regime. How they do it is 
represented in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2 – Circumvention of a Multilateral Sanctions Regime under Globalization 
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Another important aspect in this dissertation is the research methodology. I 
employ two methods: the follow the money approach and the comparative approach.  
In the follow the money approach, I research three bodies of sources: the UN, the 
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that some states, non-state actors and even Saddam Hussein utilized “the Programme” to 
circumvent the UN sanctions regime, profiting hundreds of billions of dollars. Following 
this money is essential to determine how it was done, where the money originated and 
where it ended up. Thus, I follow transactions and wire transfers. I review bank accounts, 
statements, and ledgers. In addition, I employ the comparative method to compare data 
and sources. I utilize two main sources of data. One source is the Volcker Report, 
prepared by the IIC. The other is the Duelfer Report, prepared by the CIA. The goal here 
is threefold: analyze the organizational coherence of UN sanctions, examine mechanisms 
for enforcing them, and detect potential contradictions between both the Volcker and the 
Duelfer Reports.   
The Volcker Report owes its name to Mr. Paul Volker, Chairman of the IIC. The 
U.S. Congress mandated and sponsored the IIC, but independent institutions collaborated, 
including the Anglo-American Security Policy, the Institute for International Peace 
Studies, University of Notre Dame, and the Middle East Research Institute. The objective 
of the IIC was to investigate violations of the UN sanctions regime. Alternatively, the 
Duelfer Report compares the Iraqi economy before and during the UN sanctions regime 
as well as the structures of the Iraqi government and its multiple agencies. The Duelfer 
Report also analyzes how Iraq purchased components and technologies to rebuild its 
weaponry, including its WMD Program. The Report discusses cases of money laundering 
in Iraq by banks, corporations, and other non-state actors.   
Next, I use several independent sources as part of the comparative research. For 
instance, the Stanley Foundation financed various research projects on sanctions regimes 
as instruments of foreign policy. It held two conferences that explicitly discussed the 
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Iraqi case and how American corporations and banks at times jeopardize American 
economic sanctions against targeted nations. Panels included representatives from 
Microsoft Corp., Caterpillar Corp., Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank One, Conoco Inc, 
Exxon-Mobil, and others. Also, I include investigations from the British and Australian 
Parliaments, the Heritage Foundation, the Michigan Project, and the Iraq Watch Project.  
Finally, it is imperative to assess and compare Iraq’s weapon arsenals before and 
after the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The goal is to survey Iraq’s military hardware 
and weaponry, as well as goods with weapons-related utility that Iraq acquired during the 
sanctions regime. I want to trace their manufacturing origins, determine how they were 
obtained and smuggled into Iraq. For that end, the U.N. and its several agencies are 
important sources. Among them are the International Atomic Energy Agency Iraq Action 
Teams, also known as Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO), the UN Special 
Commission (UNSCOM), which consists of multinational teams responsible for 
inspecting chemical, biological, and nuclear arsenals in Iraq, and the UN Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Also, taking into account that the 
state of Israel is a key ally of the U.S. and arguably the most threatened of all Saddam 
Hussein’s enemies, it will be potentially informative to study what Israeli’s intelligence 
agencies have to say about Iraq’s attempts to circumvent the sanctions regime in order to 
acquire and/or develop nuclear capabilities and WMDs. The rationale is that Israel’s 
intelligence services are among the most effective and credible in the world, so their 
findings could be a reference to compare with findings form UNMOVIC and intelligence 
service agencies of other nations.    
One important aspect to observe is that, in the years to come, I should expect 
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more independent investigations on the topic being conducted by universities, academic 
institutions and even journalists from different parts of the world. The fact that there were 
so many violations of the UN sanctions against Iraq and that no weapon of mass 
destruction were there makes this kind of research an attractive one, appealing to scholars 
of all schools and tendencies. Moreover, “the problem of Iraq” is being replicated in the 
case of Iran as I speak, presenting a new challenge to the UN in terms of how to inspect 
Iran’s arsenals, how to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear materials and technologies 
from other nations, and whether or not a UN’s embargo will be enough to deter Iran from 
acquiring and/or developing nuclear capabilities. Again, these kinds of questions will 
probably trigger an array of research and analysis about the topic in the years to come.    
In conclusion, in this dissertation I examine the overall effectiveness of sanctions 
regimes in today’s global economy. I analyze whether or not sanctions regimes are 
enforceable and how efficient they are as instruments of foreign policy, chiefly when 
trying to prevent the acquisition, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
WMDs. I study national and transnational interests and how they affect, and are affected 
by, non-state actors, institutions and multilateralism. This is of great relevance for 
international relations since, as I speak, the UN, the U.S. and other world powers attempt 
to cope with Iran’s ambitions for nuclear technologies. Some policymakers are already 
proposing a sanctions regime against Iran led by the UN. Some scholars see sanctions 
regimes as the main mechanism to prevent Iran from acquiring and developing nuclear 
technologies. Others consider that globalization is an obstacle. The debate will remain 
open for years to come, and this dissertation could shed some light on it. 
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II. AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: NATIONS, NATIONAL 
SECURITY, GLOBAL DEMAND OF RAW MATERIALS AND SANCTIONS 
REGIMES 
 
 “The real culprit in the Oil-for-Food scandal is not the UN but members of the Security Council such as 
the United States, United Kingdom, France, China and Russia… Most of the oil smuggling was condoned 
by the United States and other Security Council members”.  
                                      Mr. Mark M. Brown, Kofi Annan’s Chief of Staff 
        
“At a minimum, Saddam wanted to divide the five permanent members and foment international public 
support of Iraq at the UN and throughout the world by a savvy public relations campaign and an extensive 
diplomatic effort”. 
                    The Duelfer Report 
 
 “…the billions which went missing were because of that kind of realpolitik calculation by governments”.  
                                The Volcker Report 
 
“In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized trough politicized 
to securitized, meaning that the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures”. 
                      Buzan, Waever and Wilde 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I examine a key agent and an important means of globalization: 
nation-states and their quest for global access to raw materials under globalization. I 
argue that there is a fundamental contradiction between globalization and the security 
interests of nation-states imbedded in the concept of securitization. This contradiction too 
often leads to geopolitical tensions when states attempt to come together to enforce 
multilateral foreign policies such as a multilateral sanctions regime. This is particularly 
problematic when it comes to natural resources like oil. Oil is so important for national 
economies that most nations have defined it as a national security issue. If globalization 
triggers global demand for oil, national security interests restrict access to it. In this 
chapter, we will see that such a contradiction allowed Iraq to circumvent the UN 
sanctions and allocate large quantities of oil in regional and global markets.  
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The problem is that Iraq possessed so much oil that the Iraqi regime built its 
national infrastructure on revenues obtained from the sale of oil. Then, there were the 
world superpowers, five of which sit permanently at the UN Security Council. They had 
securitized, or defined, global access to oil as a national security issue due to two main 
factors: 1) their high imbalances between oil consumption, production, and reserves; 2) 
the importance of oil for their economies and defenses. For its part, the UN conceived the 
sanctions regime against Iraq around restricting Iraq’s oil sales, hoping that it would 
prevent Iraq from rearming and resuming its WMD program. But such a rationale failed. 
Instead, it created a conflict of interests among the five nations sitting at the UN Security 
Council and between them, Iraq and UN itself. 
To illustrate my argument, I divide this chapter into two parts. In the first section, 
I discuss the concepts of sectorization and securitization. I discuss how nation-states 
attach issues such as demand for oil to national security. The discussion has two 
perspectives: one is from the world superpowers’ perspectives; the other is Iraq’s 
perspective. In the second section, I explain how nation-states performed under the UN 
sanctions regime against Iraq in terms of oil purchases. I explore how macroeconomic 
features such as GDP and oil consumption influenced oil purchases from Iraq. I also 
examine how non-macroeconomic features such as geopolitics, regional trade, and 
traditional trade relations affected the overall efficacy of the sanctions regime. Chiefly, I 
explore how the American unilateral political position with respect to Iraq clashed with 
the economic interests of world powers such as France, Russia, Germany, and China. For 
the discussion, I rely on the IIC, GAO and Duelfer Reports. 
Sectorization and Securitization 
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The concept of national security is not rigid but flexible. As Katzenstein argues, 
“The domain of national security issues is variable” (Katzenstein, 2006, p.10) and 
policymakers often redefine it according to the interests of the state and the always 
changing demands of global politics. Still, I would argue that, in general, there are two 
main approaches to national security: one is narrow, and the other is broad.  
Realists and Liberals have a narrow definition of national security (Buzan, Waver 
& Wilde, 1998, p. 2). Realists like Gilpin (1981) focus on material capabilities, what 
some scholars call hard power or tangible resources such as the military and the 
economy. Liberals too toy with the Hobbesian Doctrine, the base of security studies. 
They do not ignore material capabilities since, according to Grotius’ approach to it, 
“Material power matters, but only within a framework of normative expectations 
embedded in public and customary international law” (Japperson, Wendt & Katzenstein, 
2006, p. 44). Both Realists and Liberals, some more than others, look at institutions, 
cooperation, international law, and diplomacy as collateral to military power. Conversely, 
a broad definition of national security would include culture, norms, religion, language 
and national identity among others in the national security agenda. According to this 
broad definition, the concept of statehood implies a notion of national identity, a people 
united within a territory by a common history, language, culture and norms. It is a 
concept born out of the Westphalia statehood system and reinforced under the post-Cold 
War globalization process. This approach measures power in terms of intangible 
resources such as culture, ideology, identity and others. Either way, narrow or broad, the 
definition of national security is directly related to two concepts: securitization and 
sectorization.  
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For Realists and Neorealists, security is inherently related to the nature of global 
politics. They measure security in terms of power, meaning vulnerabilities vs. capabilities 
(Buzan, 1991, p. 19-20; Weaver, 1993, p. 21; Katzenstein, 1996, p. 2-6; Huntington, 
1991, p. 7; Wendt, 1996, p. 31-36.) Liberals, Structuralists and Constructivists take a 
broader notion to include systems, structures, religion, norms, culture, identity, language, 
and other unconventional factors (Buzan, 1991, p. 19-20; Weaver, 1993, p. 21; 
Huntington, 1991, p. 7; Wendt, 1996, p. 31. But they all accept that security is about 
surviving and existing despite manifested existential threats, vulnerabilities, uneven 
capabilities and unbalanced power in an unstable world (Buzan, Waver & Wilde, p. 27). 
Security concerns arise when a threat is directed to the very existence of the state, to 
society in general and to a government explicitly. Security threats justify the use of 
special security measures, which include –but are not limited to- the use of force. 
Security measures focus on preparing for war, the very first step to deterring one. In fact, 
deterrence begins with sectorization and securitization.  
Sectorization is, more than a method, a practical approach to analysis. It aims at 
simplicity through disaggregation of a system from the top to the bottom. The core 
assumption is that we can dismember the whole into pieces, the system into subsystems, 
units into sub-units, and so on. The idea is to “Confine the scope of inquiry to more 
manageable proportions by reducing the number of variables in play” (Buzan, Waver & 
Wilde, 1998, p. 8). Sectorization looks for patterns, differentiations, similarities and 
relations. Yes, there is a bit of Waltz’s systemic theory and structuralism in this concept, 
but the focus is on sectors because “Sectors are views of the international system through 
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a lens that highlights one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all 
its constituent units” (Buzan, Jones & Little, 1993, p. 31). 
There are five main sectors according to Buzan, Waver and Wilde (1998). The 
first is the military. It deals with national security and the ability to defend the nation-
state in case of aggression. The second is the political sector. It focuses on issues related 
to sovereignty. It deals with existential questions like survival, legitimacy, recognition, 
and authority. The third sector is the economy. Here, it is important to say that economic 
and political sectors often converge because the economy is politically strategic when it 
comes to national security. For instance, the defense industry is politically important for 
national defense. Whereas a strong defense industry is central for deterrence, dependency 
on foreign oil makes nations vulnerable to global political instability. The fourth sector is 
the environmental. Its advocates claim that a healthy natural environment is vital for the 
existence of any state. Pollution, exhaustion of natural resources, poor quality of water, 
worn-out land and other environmental issues could eventually lead to health crisis, 
political instability and mass migration. It can affect, at the long run, not only national 
security but the very existence of the state.  
Finally, there is the societal sector, which deals with questions of national 
identity, of what constitutes a nation-state. It includes religion, race, culture, history and 
even language. Indeed, Hitler’s Germany defined the German state in terms of common 
blood and language. Israel calls itself the Jewish state while Iran is the Islamic state. Both 
Israel and Iran define religion as a raison d’ eta. In Germany, Israel and Iran national 
identity led to strong states, but in Spain religion, language and culture have fragmented 
the state into various autonomous regions, each having its own government and even 
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national flag. Presumably, national identities are vulnerable to external influences, chiefly 
to new religious and cultural trends. Still, a “well managed” national identity can unite a 
people in case of a foreign aggression. It is a very good reason for securitizing national 
identity.  
Sectorization assumes, first, that each sector has distinctive characteristics and 
values, so we should not treat them equally. Second, each sector is vulnerable to specific 
threats, so survival must be approached differently across sectors. Securitization is a 
further measure. It is a complement, an escalation of sectorization (Buzan, Waver & 
Wilde, 1998). Securitization is the process by which governments declare an issue a 
concern of national security. Securitization means that an “Issue is presented as an 
existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the 
normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan, Waver & Wilde, 1998, p. 23-24.) For 
Katzenstein (2006), securitization aims at maximizing capabilities and minimizing 
vulnerabilities. The process can be ad hoc or institutionalized, depending on the severity 
and urgency of the threat relative to national security. Some threats come and go. In those 
cases, security measures can be temporary. But some threats are recurrent, and in time 
they become permanent. Those are institutionalized. They have priority in the national 
security agenda. They absorb large portions of the military and economic sectors.      
The concept of securitization can be manipulated to respond to prefabricated 
ideological, economic and political interests. Securitization is “A self-referential practice 
in which the issue becomes a security issue not necessarily because a real existential 
threat exits but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan, Waver & Wilde, 
1998, p. 24). In that sense, securitization is basically “A more extreme version of 
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politicization” (Buzan, Waver & Wilde, 1998, p. 25). As Buzan, Waver and Wilde put it: 
it is “Either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan, Waver & Wilde, 
1998, p. 24). It means that once an issue belongs to the realm of national security, it is not 
political anymore but a security issue. It is a raison d’ eta. Based on this rationale, 
Realists and Neorealists emphasize the securitization of the economy and the military. 
They do it to fortify the physical integrity of the state.  
For their part, Liberals and Constructivists securitize issues that may weaken the 
physical integrity of the state, including social unity, religion, ethnicity, culture, tradition 
and even language. For instance, minority groups keep challenging traditional national 
identities in Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and other European nations. As result, 
national identity has been moved to the national security agenda in those nations. In 
Spain, separatism constitutes a direct threat to the Spanish state and Kingdom. Lacking a 
cohesive national identity, Spain has moved national unity to the top of the list of the 
national security agenda.  
The problem is that “Securitization creates a scale of chain reactions” (Buzan, 
Waver & Wilde, 1998, p. 25), meaning that securitizing an issue often leads to the 
securitization of other issues. It could mean the securitization of issues across sectors 
and/or an entire one. The classic case is the securitization of oil by world superpowers 
early in the 20th century. It drove world superpowers to securitize access to oil far beyond 
their natural borders. It triggered competition for oil wells across the world, a new wave 
of Western expansionism, an armaments race, political polarization of entire regions, and 
interventionism.  
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In the end, it all has made oil not only the most expensive but also the riskiest 
commodity politically speaking. For example, Mexicans related oil to American 
interventionism, so they nationalized oil and declared it a national security issue, defined 
as such in the Mexican Constitution. Mexico expelled all foreign oil companies, 
especially Americans, from its territory. In Iran, oil was the reason for deposing the pro-
American regime of the Shah, expelling American oil corporations from Iranian 
territories, and declaring oil a national security issue. In Iraq too, oil was used as the 
reason for expelling American and British oil firms from Iraqi territories. Oil was 
nationalized and securitized. We will see in coming sections of this chapter that the Iraqi 
regime used oil to circumvent the UN sanctions regime, and as a means of survival.   
In sum, securitization and sectorization link national security to “Intersubjective 
threats with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (Buzan, Weaver & 
Wilde, 1998, p. 25). In this dissertation, I relate it to global trade, global civic society, 
global banking industry, transnationals, and the global production line. In this chapter, I 
argue that sectorization of oil and securitization of global access to it created political 
disagreements among nation-states, mainly between world powers, affecting the efficacy 
of the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq. In the next section, I discuss how the oil industry 
became a strategic sector, how access to global oil wells became a national security issue, 
and how it all affected the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq.  
 
Sectorization of the Oil Industry and Securitization of Access to Oil Wells 
 The turning point in the geopolitics in the Middle East was the discovery of oil 
around 1908 in Persia, specifically in the territories of what is Iran and Iraq today (Klare, 
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2004). By then, oil was already a solid, profitable industry in the West, crucial for 
Western economies and armies. In fact, the sectorization of oil had began in the early 
1900s when the armies of the world superpowers –U.K., France, and Germany in 
particular- started to use it as energy to move their tanks, planes, and warships (Klare, 
2004). Securing access to oil became a national security issue, the foremost reason for 
further Western intervention in the Middle East.  
The British and French governments conceived the Sykes-Picot Agreement to 
basically partition and control the Middle East. In an act legitimized by the League of 
Nations, France took control over Syria and its coastal lands, known as Lebanon, and the 
U.K. took over Iraq and Palestine. The U.K. kept a stronghold on most of the Arabian 
Peninsula, leading to the creation of Saudi Arabia and what are today the states of Persian 
Gulf. Soon, oil was found there too, mobilizing even more Western attention toward the 
region. By the end of WWII, the U.S. too had made access to global oil wells an issue of 
national security and declared the Middle East a strategic region. According to Klare 
(2004), it was the rationale for the meeting between President Roosevelt and Ibn Saud, 
King of Saudi Arabia, in 1945. There, President Roosevelt stamped what became the 
Roosevelt Doctrine, the core of the American foreign policy post-WW II toward Saudi 
Arabia and the entire Middle East.  
The end of WWII brought a new structure to global politics. On one hand, there 
were the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the two new world superpowers immersed in a cold 
war. On the other hand, there was the end of Colonialism, through which colonies 
became sovereign nations-states. The new nation-states rapidly allied to either the Soviet 
Union or the U.S., engaging in proxy politics and wars (Ray & Kaarbo, 2005, p. 72).  The 
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Soviets attempted to influence nations around the Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean 
basin, mainly Turkey, Greece and Iran where they had historic and strategic interests. 
Wary about the Soviets’ intentions, the U.S. legitimized Roosevelt’s policy toward the 
Middle East with a series of presidential doctrines.   
President Truman issued the first Doctrine. For Klare (2004), it was twofold; 1) in 
tune with Kennan’s doctrine of Containment, the U.S. must support political regimes in 
Greece, Turkey and Iran to contain Soviet expansionism in the region; 2) the U.S. must 
provide military assistance to Saudi Arabia, so it could defend itself from foreign and 
domestic threats.  
Next, President Eisenhower’s Doctrine went a step further. It authorized 
American Presidents to use military force to protect American interests, namely access to 
oil, in the Middle East. The American Senate and House of Representatives approved it 
in a joint resolution. Under the Doctrine, President Eisenhower sent American troops to 
Lebanon. Later, the Nixon Doctrine constituted a shift in American policy toward the 
Middle East by authorizing a greater flow of military aid to American allies in the region, 
so they could protect the flow of oil to the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. was committed, 
more than ever, to the Middle East. After all, the U.S. was by then importing more oil 
than what it produced. It had become dependent on Middle East’s oil. Yet, the U.S. 
restrained itself from directly engaging in armed conflicts in the region.  
The West learned the hard way about its dependency on foreign oil. First, oil 
producers in the Middle East united themselves under OPEC and boycotted production 
and deliveries; then, the Shah of Iran fell and Iranians assaulted the American embassy in 
Tehran; next, oil prices became volatile and Western economies fell into hyperinflation, 
37 
stagnation and political instability. In sum, those events showed the inadequacy of the 
Nixon Doctrine, so President Carter expanded the number of American military bases in 
the Middle East and increased military aid to “friendly” regimes there. More notably, he 
recommitted American combat forces to conflicts in the Middle East. President Reagan 
ratified the Carter Doctrine and pledged to protect not only Saudi Arabia but the Saudi 
Royal family too. Lastly, President George H. Bush claimed all those Doctrines, from 
Roosevelt’s to Reagan’s, to legitimize the American led invasion of Iraq in 1990.    
The unexpected collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991 created a new world order 
based on two new features: unipolarism and globalization. In geopolitical terms, the 
world became unipolar; in economic terms, capitalism consolidated itself as global 
capitalism, or globalization. In both, the U.S. was hegemonic. Most of the Soviets’ 
political “satellites” were up for grab and the U.S. seized the occasion to shape the new 
world order according to its geopolitical interests, oil included.  
The invasion of Iraq in 1991 was an advance of what came thereafter: the 
consolidation of American military presence in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, 
United Arab Emirates and Oman; the expansion of NATO toward Russian frontiers; the 
establishment of long-term American military bases in Bosnia, Rumania, and Kosovo; 
and American military expansion to Central Asia, mostly Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. By 
2003, the U.S. had almost completed its military expansion toward the Caspian Sea, 
dominating the Russian-European and the Russian-Central Asian borders and completing 
what Klare calls the “encirclement” of Iran, a key oil producer in the Middle East from 
where, as I stated, American and European oil firms were expelled. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
the American military presence in the Middle East and encirclement of Iran.  
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Figure 2.1 – U.S.’s Military Encirclement of Iran 
 
 
Source: Centre for Global Research on Globalization 
 
Note that the U.S. has flanked Iran with military bases in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan from the west, Turkey, the Kurdistan and Iraq from the East, Kuwait, Qatar and 
the Arabic Peninsula from the south, and Georgia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan from the 
north. The Map also indicates that the distribution of American military bases in and 
around the Middle East coincides with the distribution of oil reserves in the region, as 
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shown in Chart 2.1. 
 
Chart 2.1 – Largest Oil Reserves per Nation Relative to World’s Oil Reserves 
                    
 
Source: “Blood and Oil” by Michael T. Klare 
 
Chart 2.1 shows nations that hold the largest oil reserves in the world. The red 
bars indicate their proven oil reserves. The blue bars indicate the percentage of oil 
reserves they hold with respect to world total oil reserves. Red and blue bars use barrels 
of oil as their measure.  
Chart 2.1 reveals that five Middle Eastern nations hold the largest oil reserves in 
the world, including Iraq and Iran. The U.S. ranks seventh and the Caspian Sea states 
ranks eighth. These states include Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which are chiefly 
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important because: 1) they have borders with Iraq and Iran; 2) they have historically fell 
under the geopolitical interests of Russia, but the U.S. has manifested strategic interests 
in the region since the collapse of the Soviet Union; 3) the U.S. has established several 
military bases in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Yet, the main observation here is the 
following: overall distribution of American military bases in the Middle East coincides 
with distribution of oil reserves in the region. The U.S. has military bases in the oil rich 
nations of South Arabia, the EAU, Kuwait, Iraq, and some of the Caspian Sea States. Not 
to mention that it is in the Gulf state of Bahrain where the U.S. houses its Fifth Fleet. The 
U.S. had accomplished two strategic goals by establishing military bases in the Middle 
East during the 1990s: a) it controls access to oil wells in the Middle East; 2) it had 
encircled Iran and Iraq.     
Some scholars see the so called encirclement of Iran from two angles. One group 
argues that the American presence in the Middle East is to contain Iran. Another group 
speculates that the U.S. needs to control oil reserves in the region not for its own 
consumption but to beef up its hegemonic status.  
Henry Kissinger, a balance of power Realist, leads the first approach. He proposes 
“A more plausible alternative explanation which would assign greater significance to the 
regional context and American actions in the Middle East” (Kissinger, p. 1). Kissinger 
refers to Iran and three events that lessened American influence in the region: the fall of 
the Shah, the invasion of the American Embassy in Iran in 1979, and Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions. Yet, the U.S. led invasion of 1991 and the UN sanctions regime left Iraq too 
weak to counterbalance Iran. Kissinger implies that deposing Saddam Hussein was a 
geopolitical error because Iraq was the one nation in the region strong enough to deter 
41 
Iran. Kenneth Pollack agrees with Kissinger when suggesting that once Saddam was 
removed, the balance of power shifted toward Iran and “Security problems in the Persian 
Gulf are likely to get more challenging instead of less” (Pollack, 2003, p. 27). Kissinger 
and Pollack argue that Iran’s nuclear ambitions and continued threats to Israel legitimize 
the long term American presence in region. They see the U.S. as the balancing power in 
the region.   
The second approach comes from the hegemony school. It states that the 
American attempts to control oil riches in the Middle East is not for the American own 
consumption but to beef up its power. There are three points here. First, the U.S. utilizes 
oil as a geopolitical tool in world politics. Second, the U.S. must secure the flow of oil for 
its allies in Europe and East Asia. Third, the U.S. must restrict Chinese and Russian 
access to Middle Eastern oil.  
For instance, Joseph Gerson sees that “The American presence in the region has 
military and geostrategic objectives; the motive of oil is not meant for the U.S. market but 
rather as an instrument of power and control” (Gerson, 2007, p. 4). Klare adds that “By 
remaining the dominant power in these areas, the United States can achieve more than 
just the safety of its future oil supply; it can also exercise a degree of control over the 
energy supply of other oil-importing countries” (Klare, 2004, p. 150). For their part, 
Chalmers Johnson (2003) and Ikemberry (2006) support such a hegemony-based 
rationale as an analytic outline, only that they define it in malign-benign terms. 
For Johnson, the U.S. is a malign empire still fighting the Cold War. He says that 
“What the U.S. wanted in Iraq was the deployment of some more permanent military 
bases there to prevent Russia from establishing a stronghold in the region. The fall of the 
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Soviet Union did not mean the end of Russia as a world superpower. Russia’s economic 
and political crisis of the 1990’s was temporary; Russia would eventually rebound as a 
key geopolitical player” (Johnson, 2003, p. 24). Johnson, as well as Klare (2004) and 
Grossman (2002),  points to the fact that by 1998 Russia was already rebuilding its 
military in the Caspian basin and Central Asia. In contrast to Johnson, Klare and 
Grossman, Ikemberry sees American hegemony as “Benevolent, institutionalized and 
infused with reciprocal processes of political interactions, quail-rule-based and open” 
(Ikemberry, 2006, p. 145). Europe and East Asia were “Attached to the exercise of 
American power in the 1940s when the U.S. sought to build an order that would avoid the 
return to the antagonist regional blocs of the 1930s” (Ikemberry, 2006, p. 152). 
Controlling those two blocs “Required the building of an elaborate system of forward 
bases in Asia and Europe” (Ikemberry, 2006, p. 152). It became part of the containment 
policy, which, as Robert Gilpin argues, was built on two pillars: “The American military 
and the American dollar” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 32). The U.S. provided security to Western 
Europe and East Asia and allowed them to prosper at the expense of huge trade and fiscal 
deficits.  
Noam Chomsky sees it in a curious way. He states that “Since the 1940s we know 
that one of the best ways to control your enemies is by controlling their access to oil. The 
main enemies of the United States are in Western Europe and East Asia, the two world 
regions that could move toward economic and political independence; one of the best 
ways to prevent it is by controlling oil wells around the world” (Chomsky, 2005, p. 14).  
Indeed, the European Union and East Asia are highly dependent on oil. To 
explain it, Nile Gardiner led a congressional commission sponsored by U.S. Congress 
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and the Heritage Foundation in 2004. The study found, first, that the European Union was 
gravely reliant on foreign oil, especially from Russia. In fact, the EU is the world largest 
importer of oil and gas. It imports 82% of oil and 57% of gas and expects to increase 
them in 93% and 84% respectively in the next 25 years (Gardiner Commission, 2004, p. 
61). The EU imports 25% of oil and 25% of gas from Russia (Gardiner Commission, 
2004, p. 61). In contrast, Russia holds 27% of the world's oil and gas reserves. Gazprom, 
a Russian state owned-company, owns 25% of the world’s gas reserves and produces 
16% of the global output, just behind Saudi Arabia and Iran, and ahead of Iraq and 
Kuwait; Gazprom produces 94% of Russia’s gas and 60% of Russia’s oil. Russia exports 
7 million barrels daily, of which 85% goes to the EU through Ukraine and Belarus’ 
pipelines (Gardiner Commission, 2004, p. 63).  
This dependency on Russian oil goes back to the 1980s when, at the peak of the 
Cold War, Europe and the former Soviet Union saw in oil and gas supplies a means to 
cooperation and constructive politics. Western Europe financed and provided the 
technology to build the pipes while the Soviet Union carried on the construction and 
guaranteed steady supplies. Cooperation continued and consolidated during the 1990s, 
and by 2003 Europe found itself highly dependent on Russian’s oil and gas supplies. 
During the Ukraine-Russian political crisis of the 2005, Russia threatened the EU with 
cutting off oil and gas supplies if it sided with Ukraine. Russian oil and gas pipes cross 
through Ukraine toward Europe, and Russia could either raise the price of deliveries of 
just cut them off completely. After it, as the price of energy rose, President Putin began to 
use oil and gas as a political instrument against the EU, just what the U.S. had been trying 
to prevent.   
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East Asia presents serious issues as well. First, there are unsettled disputes in the 
region. There are disputes between North and South Korea, China and Taiwan, China and 
Vietnam, China and Japan, Japan, South and North Korea, and between Japan and 
Russia, just to mention a few. Also, we should not ignore the unsolved nuclear issue 
between the U.S. and North Korea, which threatens American allies and makes the entire 
region more volatile. Second, East Asia has a population of 1.5 billion. It is 40% of the 
Asian population and a quarter of the world (Gardiner Commission, 2004, p. 127). In 
terms of economics, East Asia constitutes the fastest growing economy in the world. In 
2006, it had a combined GDP of $8,433,888 million dollars, the third largest in the world 
just after the EU and U.S. (Gardiner Commission, 2004, p. 127). East Asia has a cheap 
well-trained labor force and a high-tech approach to productivity, making it a very 
attractive market for the European and American firms. Third, East Asia confronts a 
major energy dilemma: it depends on foreign oil for 90% of its energy needs. China and 
Japan are now the second and third largest oil importers in the world, but the economies 
of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore rank 12th, 22nd, 36th and 44th, 
which, along with the economies of Indonesia and Thailand, are among the strongest in 
the world (Gardiner Commission, 2004, p. 134). They all have taken regional oil 
demands to new historic highs. This is essential since East Asia has two main sources of 
oil: Russia and the Middle East. According to Ji Guoxing, of the Shanghai Institute of 
International Strategy Studies, “The Asia-Pacific region’s dependency on Middle Eastern 
oil may exceed 90% by 2010, and while oil fields in Russian Siberia and Central Asia do 
offer some short-term energy relief, the lack of existing infrastructure to facilitate the 
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transport of this oil poses costly political and economic challenges” (Guoxing, 2005, 
p.4).  
The issue is that American control over Middle East’s oil makes the East Asian 
Bloc dependent not only on foreign oil but also on American dollar. Five nations form 
this bloc: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. The bloc has close 
economic, military and geopolitical relations with the U.S. It, along with China, pays for 
their oil imports with American dollars and Treasury securities, de facto financing the 
American federal deficit. It is more problematic as the value of the Nikkei and other East 
Asian currencies increase while the American dollar weakens. Chart 2.2 shows the 
amount of American currencies held by East Asia Bloc.   
 
Chart 2.2 – American Currency Held by Nations of East Asia Bloc 
      
Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, 2003 
According to the Chart, in 2003 those six nations alone held $1,163 billion dollars 
in American securities. Japan led the group, but China had already surpassed South 
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Korea and Taiwan, two key American allies. On the other hand, the rest of the world held 
$1,960 billion. Comparatively, it held less than the East Asia Bloc, revealing the 
influence that the East Asia Bloc has for the American economy. The East Asia bloc must 
prevent the U.S. from defaulting. Otherwise, it will collapse, jeopardizing the political 
stability of the region. In fact, it is in that sense that we should interpret China’s approach 
to its currency and investments in oil fields around the world, in Africa in particular 
(Klare, 2004, p. 161-169). Oil has become a matter of national security for China, which 
must secure the flow of it into its voracious economy. China must secure access to global 
oil wells if it is to become independent in terms of oil consumption. It must secure access 
to global oil wells if it is to challenge American hegemony over Asia’s economy and 
politics.      
 
France, Russia and China  
The fall of the Soviet Union meant the end of the bipolar world and the beginning 
of American hegemony over world politics. The two events raised key questions related 
to global politics. For example, how do other world powers counterbalance American 
hegemony? Could France, Russia and China challenge it in the Middle East? In Iraq, why 
did the U.K. side with the U.S. while France, Russia and China did not?  
 Klare explains it through the context of oil. He argues that “The United States, 
France, Russia China are competing for the energy riches of these areas” (Klare, 2004, 
p. 147). Some events on the ground seem to confirm it. For example, in September 2007, 
France announced the opening of a branch of its Saint Cyr Military Academy to train 
Qatari army officers (The New York Times, March 6th, 2006). In March, 2008, France 
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declared that it was establishing a permanent military base in UAE with about 500 
military troops stationed there permanently (New York Times, March 6th, 2008). It was 
the first Western, non-American military base established in the region since the British 
gave up its military presence there in 1971. France has also been conducting military 
exercises in the Persian Gulf since 1995 when it signed a defense agreement with UAE. 
Among other things, the agreement called for conducting 25 simulated maneuvers per 
year and engaging in at least one actual military maneuver every two years. Actual 
maneuverings were conducted in 1996, 2000, 2005, and 2008. They have consistently 
been expanded to the point that in 2008, 4000 French troops took part and Qatari soldiers 
were invited (New York Times, March 6th, 2008). The maneuvers always take place at 
UAE's western region, near the Saudi border and the Persian Gulf where 40% of the 
world's oil is shipped (New York Times, March, 6th, 2008). Also, France is a leading 
military supplier to the UAE, Qatar, Arab Saudi and other nations in the region. France’s 
arm sales to Middle East nations amount to $20 billion dollars annually (New York 
Times, March, 6th, 2008). France also signed a deal to develop peaceful nuclear energy 
with UAE, Qatar and other Arab nations. With respect to Iraq, France challenged the U.S. 
by pulling out from the enforcement of the two-no fly-zones over Iraq, opposing “smart 
sanctions” in the UN, and opposing the invasion to Iraq in 2003. Even under the UN 
sanctions regime, France negotiated oil deals with Iraq such as the Majnoon and Nahr 
Umar oil field projects. The fields hold 25% of Iraqi oil reserves, nearly 26 billion barrels 
and $650 billion dollars in revenues to France (New York Times, March 6th, 2008).   
 Like France, Russia had challenged the sanctions regime that the U.S. proposed 
against Iraq in the UN. Despite the sanctions regime, Russia signed a 23-year contract in 
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1997 to revitalize the 15 billion barrel oil field of West Quarna (www.iraqiwatch.com). 
This oil field holds the comparable of all proven oil reserves of Exxon-Mobil, the largest 
oil company in the world. In 1997 too, Gazprom, a state-owned Russian conglomerate, 
signed a contract for $18 million dollars to repair gas stations in Iraq. In 1998, the 
Russian-Belarus conglomerate Salvneft negotiated a $52 million dollar contract to drill at 
Tuba oil field in Southern Iraq (www.iraqiwatch.com). In 2000, Russian companies 
Zaruezhneft and Tatneft obtained contracts to drill Saddam, Kirkuk and Bai Hassan oil 
fields. The deal was for $13.2 million, not much, but it had a collateral contract for $900 
million to explore for new oil wells in Iraq (www.iraqiwatch.com). If oil was found, the 
two companies would exercise full ownership for 10 years. The contract included: 1) 67 
new oil-related projects in southern Iraq and its Western Desert, including Suba, Luhais, 
West Qurna, and Rumaila; 2) reconstruction of the pipeline that runs from southern to 
northern Iraq; 3) drilling gas wells throughout Iraq. Curiously, the U.S. cancelled all 
those contracts in June 2007, alleging that they violated the UN sanctions regime against 
Iraq (New York Times, April 8th, 2007).  
 China is, as Klare (2004, 2006) states, already a rising world superpower and a 
new actor in the Middle East. Its voracious demand for oil has pushed it into world 
economics and politics with resources committed to it only comparable to the 
American’s. China has successfully invested in nations such as Kuwait, Egypt, Yemen 
and Saudi Arabia, not to mention Latin America, traditional “partners” of the U.S. In 
keeping with its increasing involvement in “conflict zones” for oil, China ranked second 
in oil purchases and exports to Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. In terms of arms 
sales, China has consistently increased its exports to the region. According to IraqiWatch, 
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from 1995 to 2002, China sold $1.6 billion in arms, and by 2006, China had sold $27 
billion, including war planes and missile technologies. Some of them had American 
technologies (www.iraqiwatch.com).  
In contrast, the American and British’s oil shares in Iraq were not as solid as 
France, Russia and China’s. American and British oil companies dominated three-quarter 
of the Iraqi oil production until 1972, when Iraq nationalized its oil industry. But the U.S 
and U.K. were forced out while the French and Russians managed to stay in. American 
companies did not sign any oil contract with Iraq until 2003, and Iraq was only the sixth 
largest oil provider to the U.S. from 1980 to 1990 (www.iraqiwatch.com). Likewise, the 
U.K. did not sign any oil contract with Iraq from 1972 on, but it did obtain Iraqi oil 
through investments made in oil traders or subcontractors which, from 1972 to 1991, 
represented 7.4% British oil purchases. U.K.’s commitment to have a presence in the 
Middle East sharply increased during the 1990s (www.iraqiwatch.com). 
 In all, the historical evidence suggests that there is a contradiction between 
globalization and demand for access to oil, securitization of oil by world superpowers, 
and enforcement of the UN sanctions against Iraq. The contradiction led to geopolitical 
conflicts among world powers. It led them to intervene in oil rich nations, in the Middle 
East in particular. Their acts still resonate in world politics. The UN sanctions regime 
upon Iraq illustrates it.    
 
The Iraqi Response  
Securitization almost always has political consequences across regional and 
global levels. When a nation-state securitizes an issue, it is basically sending a message to 
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neighboring nations. Securitization constitutes a shift in terms of policy for it alters the 
balance of power among neighboring nation-states (Buzan, Waver & Wilded, 1998, p. 
27). For Realists like Carr (1939) and Kissinger (1957), it is the typical security dilemma, 
in which security actions in one nation constitute existential threats to others. Hence, we 
can argue that the securitization of the oil industry in oil rich nations created security 
concern in nations of high oil consumption, which in turn securitized access to oil and 
their relations with oil rich nations.  
 The sectorization and securitization of Iraqi oil began in 1970 when Iraq 
nationalized its oil industry. This was done in the name of Iraq’s sovereignty, its right to 
self-determination, and its will to control its national resources. It was a bold move to end 
almost 60 years of Western control over Iraqi oil, which often translated into corruption, 
abuses, and political control over Iraqi political institutions and processes. Iraq expelled 
all foreign companies from Iraqi soil. It then established criteria to grant oil contracts 
based on Iraq’s priorities, arguably its national interests. Under the new regime, Iraq 
granted most contracts to Soviet and French companies since the Soviet Union and 
France were the main economic partners to Iraq at the time. Conversely, Iraq denied any 
participation to American and British oil Firms. There were some contacts between Iraq’s 
Oil Ministry and American companies at some point during the Iraq-Iran War, but for the 
most part American and British companies were forced out of Iraq’s oil riches.   
 Sectorization and securitization of Iraqi oil took a new meaning with the UN 
sanctions regime for it presented a direct threat to Iraq’s national security. Saddam argued 
that “The UN sanctions regime undermined the sovereignty and security of Iraq” (Meyer 
& Califano, 2006, p. VIII). The CIA agreed by stating that “UN sanctions hindered his 
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ability to rule Iraq with complete authority and autonomy. In the long run, the UN 
sanctions also interfered with his efforts to establish a historic legacy. According to 
Saddam and his senior advisors, the UN, at the behest of the US, placed an economic 
strangle hold on Iraq. The UN controlled Saddam’s main source of revenue (oil exports) 
and determined what Iraq could import” (Dulfer Report, Regime & Finance, p. 3).  
In turn, the  Heritage Foundation affirmed that “Saddam considered UN sanctions 
as a form of economic war and the UN’s OFF program and Northern and Southern 
Watch Operations as campaigns of that larger economic war orchestrated by the US and 
UK” (Heritage Foundation, Report On Iraq, 2005, p. 61). In fact, we should not ignore 
that UN sanctions included: a) occupation of northern and southern Iraq by American and 
British armed forces; b) autonomy for Kurds, de facto fragmenting and debilitating Iraq’s 
territorial integrity; c) two no-fly-zones over Iraqi skies; d) the presence of UN’s 
inspectors on Iraqi soil; e) control over Iraqi ports, roads and borders to inspect the Iraqi 
import-exports operations. I must add a dozen military bases that the U.S. had around 
Iraq, which made of Iraq a besieged nation. All those measures constituted direct security 
concerns to Iraq. They all threatened Iraq as a nation-state.   
Still, Iraq did not limit its security concerns to the UN sanctions regime and 
“Western threats.” Iraq feared others. And I am not talking about Israel, which for many 
Muslims and Arabs it is just another American military base in the region. Rather, I am 
talking about Iran, Iraq’s strong neighbor to the East and archenemy. In that regard, the 
CIA found that “Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability —in an incremental 
fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks— but he 
intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities. 
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Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials 
considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel 
and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also in considerations, but 
secondary” (Dulfer Report, Regime Strategic Intent, p. 1). The FBI confirmed Saddam’s 
concerns about Iran in a report published in The New York Times. The FBI reported that 
“In a series of interrogations before his execution, Saddam Hussein told a F.B.I agent 
that, on the eve of the 2003 American invasion, Iraq was trapped between United 
Nations’ orders to demonstrate that it had disarmed and a fear that appearing too weak 
would invite attacks from its powerful neighbor and foe, Iran” (New York Times, July 
3rd, 2009). Saddam went on to reveal that “He was more concerned about Iran 
discovering Iraq’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities than the repercussions in the United 
States for his refusal to allow UN inspectors back into Iraq” (New York Times, July 3rd, 
2009). Saddam thought that “UN inspectors would have directly identified to the Iranians 
where to inflict maximum damage to Iraq” (New York Times, July 3rd, 2009). 
 For those reasons, the UN sanctions regime posited a security concern to Iraq, a 
threat that required urgent security measures. Iraq’s response was the securitization of oil 
to new levels. Oil was Iraq’s main commodity for “Oil accounted for more than 60% of 
the country’s GDP and 95% of foreign currency earnings” (Dulfer Report, Regime & 
Finance Procurement, Sources of Revenues, Annex D, p. 3). Given the high global 
demand for oil, it became Iraq’s main weapon. Oil became a means to circumvent the UN 
sanctions regime. Oil and evading the UN sanctions regime became a national security 
measure of high priority for the Iraqi state.  
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Indeed, the CIA, the IIC and the Michigan Project found that Iraq securitized the 
sanctions regime. The CIA stated that “Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to 
have UN sanctions lifted while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to 
balance the need to cooperate with UN inspections — to gain support for lifting 
sanctions” (Dulfer Report, Regime Strategic Intent, p. 1). For its part, the IIC confirmed 
that “Throughout the Sanctions, Saddam continually directed his advisors to formulate 
and implement strategies, policies, and methods to terminate the UN’s sanctions regime 
established by UNSCR 661. The Regime devised an effective diplomatic and economic 
strategy of generating revenues and procuring illicit goods utilizing the Iraqi 
intelligence, banking, industrial, and military apparatus that eroded United Nations’ 
member states and other international players’ resolve to enforce compliance, while 
capitalizing politically on its humanitarian crisis” (IIC, p. 227). And the Michigan 
Project noted that “Saddam’s security measures included unhinging the UN’s sanctions 
against Iraq, centered on Saddam’s efforts to influence certain UN permanent member of 
SC such as Russia, France, and China and some nonpermanent (Syria, Ukraine) 
members to end UN sanctions. Under Saddam’s orders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at these UNSC members and public 
opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent OFF 
program by diplomatic and economic means” (www.iraqiwatch.com). 
 Those findings corroborate my argument here, that Iraq sectorized and securitized 
its oil industry as a reaction to the UN sanctions regime to strengthen its national security 
and to guarantee the survival of the Iraqi state. Nonetheless, several events gave Iraq 
some comparative advantage in that sense: Iraq had enough oil reserves to meet global 
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demand for oil. First, there was an intense, growing global demand for oil during the 
1990s as result of intense global economic growth. On one hand, Western industrial 
economies, the U.S. in particular, demanded more oil to satisfy their high oil 
consumption and dependency on foreign oil. On the other hand, there was China, India, 
South Africa and other “emergent” nations, which demanded more oil to sustain their 
intense economic activities. Most of them turned to the Middle East as a potential 
supplier of oil. The second event was the collapse of the oil industry in former Soviet 
Republics, on which European economies depended for oil and gas. Declining oil exports 
from ex Soviet Republics meant that European nations had to seek new suppliers. They 
too turned to the Middle East, intensifying competition in the region, and competition 
among nation-states usually carries a great deal of political confrontation. But what is 
relevant here is that those events increased the demand of oil across the world, especially 
from the Middle East. It guaranteed some sound business opportunities for Iraq.  
 In all, new trends in global supply-demand for oil represented a sound source of 
revenues for Iraq and its regime. The globalization process of the 1990s constituted, 
among other things, intensification of global trade resulting from rapid economic growth 
in numerous nations. Oil was a key commodity, and access to oil supplies a prerequisite 
for economic growth and political instability. Therefore, global demand for oil opened 
the doors for the Iraqi oil industry. It allowed Iraq to sustain its economic, military and 
political infrastructures to acceptable levels. And here “acceptable” refers to Iraq’s image 
as a sovereign, independent, strong, aggressive nation-state, a leader in the Arab world. It 
was the image that Saddam Hussein wanted to expose to the rest of the world in order to 
straighten Iraq’s national security. As Buzan states, “We should not ignore that, when it 
55 
comes to securitization, image is crucial” (Buzan, Waver, and Wilded, 1998, p. 32). It is 
vital how nation-states see a particular nation in terms of vulnerabilities and capabilities. 
The CIA argued that “Throughout the 1990s and up to March 2003, Saddam focused on 
one set of objectives: the survival of himself, his Regime, and his legacy. To secure those 
objectives, Saddam needed to exploit Iraqi oil assets, to portray a strong military 
capability to deter internal and external threats, and to foster his image as an Arab 
leader” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 3).  
It is worth noting that image is limited by reality and perception by facts. For 
despite all Iraqi oil, Iraq suffered the crushing impact of the UN sanctions, to the point 
that it almost collapsed, mainly during the first 3 years of the sanctions. Yes, oil allowed 
Iraq to boost its image as Iran’s strong counterbalance and America’s challenger. Both oil 
and image allowed Saddam to prolong his regime for a few more years. The U.S. led 
invasion proved that Iraq was a weak nation, and its regime was in decay. 
 
How Iraq Circumvented Sanctions 
 In this section, I present evidences of how both global demands for oil and 
securitization of global access to oil were important factors that motivated the 
circumvention of the UN sanctions regime by Iraq. Explicitly, I explore how nations 
reached Iraqi oil wells and how Iraq reached global markets. I also study economic 
factors such as GDP relative to oil purchases and oil consumption per nation. I discuss 
traditional trade relations, geopolitics, and how politics among the members of the UN 
Security Council affected the sanctions. But first I present Table 2.1, which summarizes 
Iraq’s total oil sales under UN sanctions. The Table has three blocks, each with three 
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columns. In Block I, column I shows nation-states that purchased oil from Iraq under the 
UN sanctions. Column II contains the number of contracts that those nations received 
from Iraq. Column III includes percentages of number of contracts received. Block I is 
sorted by number of contracts. In Block II, Column I includes nation-states that 
purchased oil from Iraq under the sanctions regime. Column II represents the number of 
oil barrels those nations actually lifted, and Column III shows the percentages of oil 
barrels lifted per nations with respect to total oil sales per nation as well. Block II is 
sorted by number of barrels of oil lifted. For its part, Block III reproduces the total value 
of contracts that nation-states received from Iraq. The contracts are represented in US 
dollars. Column I tally all nation-states that obtained contracts from the Iraq. Column II 
shows the value of all contracts obtained. Column III accounts for percentages of oil sales 
per nation with respect to total Iraq’s oil sale.  
 
Table 2.1 – Iraqi Oil Sales 
  Block I    Block II    Block III
    Countries    # of    % of     Countries barrels % of barrels   countries Barrels % barrels
Contracts contracts    lifted     lifted lifted lifted 
Russia 244        21.57 Russia 1,011,356,506   29.70 Russia 19,300,618,432  30.70    
France 69          6.10 France 252,001,935      7.40 France 4,248,213,159    6.62      
Switzerland 62          5.48 Turkey 182,814,102      5.37 Switzerland 3,434,083,024    5.35      
Italy 58          5.13 UK 170,559,574      5.01 UK 3,350,739,850    5.22      
Turkey 55          4.86 Switzerland 165,115,918      4.85 Turkey 3,343,252,936    5.21      
UEA 40          3.54 Italy 143,777,071      4.22 Italy 2,718,083,135    4.23      
Spain 38          3.36 China 127,991,479      3.76 China 2,624,806,812    4.09      
UK 38          3.60 Liechtenstein 120,025,880      3.32 Liechtenstein 2,467,770,768    3.84      
China 35          9.00 Spain 87,723,077        2.58 Spain 1,643,749,098    2.56      
Syria 32          2.83 Malaysia 73,558,738        2.16 Malaysia 1,485,199,149    2.31      
Jordan 28          2.48 UEA 71,215,261        2.09 Vietnam 1,405,961,742    2.19      
Pakistan 22          1.95 Vietnam 68,901,134        2.02 UEA 1,371,407,184    2.14      
Ukraine 22          1.95 Argelia 62,155,862        1.83 Syria 1,134,317,406    1.77      
Liechtenstein 20          1.77 Monaco 54,734,724        1.61 Argelia 1,109,337,575    1.73       
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Source: IIC and FMI 
Panama 20         1.77 Syria 52,981,902      1.56 Cyprus 1,048,437,558   1.63      
Cyprus 19         1.68 Cyprus 50,959,316      1.50 India 872,678,344      1.36      
Malaysia 18         1.59 Aruba 47,888,047      1.41 Morocco 742,838,933      1.16      
Vietnam 18         1.59 India 45,415,198      1.33 Jordan 735,728,580      1.15      
United States 15         1.33 Morocco 42,392,022      1.24 Aruba 713,492,385      1.11      
Belarus 14         1.24 Jordan 35,351,738      1.04 Panama 703,170,873      1.10      
South Africa 14         1.24 Netherlands 34,180,002      1.00 Belarus 613,877,735      0.96      
Argelia 12         1.06 Panama 32,424,699      0.95 Ukraine 538,411,832      0.84      
Austria 12         1.06 United States 29,675,585      0.87 Netherlands 532,184,460      0.83      
Egypt 12         1.06 Bulgaria 29,178,829      0.86 Egypt 506,657,165      0.79      
India 12         1.06 Belarus 28,289,438      0.83 Pakistan 490,181,751      0.76      
Indonesia 12         1.06 Ukraine 26,264,430      0.77 United States 482,825,657      0.75      
Morocco 12         1.06 Egypt 24,189,974      0.71 South Africa 397,692,624      0.62      
Lebanon 11         0.97 Pakistan 23,503,987      0.69 British Islands 394,853,212      0.62      
Yemen 11         0.97 British Islands 22,284,374      0.65 Greece 347,836,069      0.54      
Greece 10         0.88 Hong Kong 21,513,207      0.63 Bulgaria 333,739,464      0.52      
Nigeria 10         0.88 South Africa 17,569,792      0.52 Thailand 330,192,170      0.51      
Qatar 10         0.88 Austria 16,840,773      0.49 Belgium 301,953,188      0.47      
Thailand 10         0.88 Greece 16,161,428      0.47 Austria 262,883,339      0.41      
Tunisia 10         0.88 Belgium 15,713,607      0.46 Singapore 262,123,492      0.41      
Aruba 8           0.71 Singapore 13,548,632      0.40 Indonesia 255,138,745      0.40      
Netherlands 8           0.71 Thailand 13,319,531      0.39 Yemen 251,116,047      0.39      
Bulgaria 7           0.62 Indonesia 13,266,555      0.39 Bermuda 247,261,893      0.39      
Kenya 7           0.62 Yemen 11,917,999      0.35 Lebanon 241,763,377      0.38      
Other nations 7           0.62 Other nations 11,830,982      0.35 Hong Kong 227,838,241      0.35      
Belgium 6           0.53 Lebanon 10,752,535      0.32 Cayman Island 207,859,782      0.32      
Canada 6           0.53 Bermuda 10,218,507      0.30 Other nations 197,127,047      0.31      
Hong Kong 6           0.53 Qatar 8,390,797        0.25 Tunisia 180,361,361      0.28      
Oman 6           0.53 Cayman Island 8,104,258        0.24 Nigeria 179,040,409      0.28      
Namibia 4           0.35 Kenya 8,016,945        0.24 Sudan 173,784,987      0.27      
Singapore 4           0.35 Namibia 7,975,587        0.23 Qatar 161,646,541      0.25      
Ireland 3           0.27 Sudan 7,812,818        0.23 Oman 149,377,008      0.23      
Japan 3           0.27 Nigeria 7,394,498        0.22 Romania 138,376,912      0.22      
Romania 3           0.27 Tunisia 7,170,739        0.21 Brazil 137,860,626      0.21      
Sudan 3           0.27 Canada 6,589,991        0.19 Namibia 132,363,487      0.21      
Bahamas 2           0.18 Oman 6,104,617        0.18 Kenya 123,891,238      0.19      
Bermuda 2           0.18 Romania 6,023,119        0.18 Finland 107,331,748      0.17      
Cayman Island 2           0.18 Bahamas 5,673,263        0.17 Japan 105,587,299      0.16      
Finland 2           0.18 Japan 5,518,277        0.16 Venezuela 103,313,147      0.16      
Germany 2           0.18 Ireland 4,925,580        0.14 Bahamas 102,326,624      0.16      
Portugal 2           0.18 Finland 4,426,915        0.13 Ireland 92,406,127        0.14      
Slovakia 2           0.18 Venezuela 4,005,435        0.12 Canada 78,252,230        0.12      
Venezuela 2           0.18 Gambia 3,967,591        0.12 Gambia 72,112,479        0.11      
Yugoslavia 2           0.18 Slovakia 2,832,863        0.08 Monaco 54,734,724        0.09      
Brazil 1           0.09 Portugal 2,815,877        0.08 Denmark 52,933,910        0.08      
British Islands 1           0.09 Denmark 2,257,853        0.07 Portugal 34,118,051        0.05      
Denmark 1           0.09 Germany 1,890,657        0.06 Germany 33,288,119        0.05      
Gambia 1           0.09 Hungary 999,529           0.03 Slovakia 30,544,942        0.05      
Hungary 1           0.09 Yugoslavia 990,745           0.03 Philippines 27,858,288        0.04      
Monaco 1           0.09 Philippines 982,692           0.03 Hungary 17,476,765        0.03      
Philippines 1           0.09 Brazil 717,374           0.02 Yugoslavia 17,102,041        0.03      
Total 1,131    100.00 Total 3,405,152,370 100.00 Total 64,183,493,296 100.00  
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I draw several conclusions from Table 2.1. First, 64 nations purchased Iraqi oil 
under the UN sanctions regime. If we consider that they were rich and poor nations, oil 
exporters and importers, of large and small populations, and of all sorts of political and 
economic systems, then we can say that UN sanctions had a global, multilateral character. 
But the UN has 192 members, so 64 accounts for just 33.3% of UN’s membership 
(www.un.org). It is way below 50%. Thus, I argue that the sanctions regime was not so 
multinational in terms of participation by nation. Second, Bloc I shows the number of 
contracts obtained per nation. Iraq granted a total of 1,131 oil contracts under the UN 
sanctions regime. By comparing Blocs I and II, we see that large numbers of oil contracts 
did not always translate into large numbers of oil barrels lifted. It was so because oil 
contracts varied in terms of amounts of oil barrels. So in Bloc I, Switzerland ranked third 
in terms of number of contracts obtained, above Turkey and U.K., but in Bloc II 
Switzerland ranked fifth, right behind Turkey and U.K. Although Switzerland obtained 
more contracts than Turkey and U.K., it actually lifted less oil barrels than the other two 
nations. The same discrepancies arise in Bloc III. In Bloc II, the UEA obtained more oil 
barrels than Vietnam, but in Bloc III Vietnam surpassed the UEA, profiting more from 
the total value of its contracts. The same occurred with Switzerland, Turkey and other 
nations. In Bloc II, Switzerland obtained fewer contracts than Turkey, but in Bloc III it 
outperformed Turkey for its contracts had more value in terms of US dollars.  
 Also, demand for oil per nation did not justify their oil purchases. If not, then how 
to explain that, as Bloc I shows, rich industrial nations, highly dependent on oil imports, 
purchased less oil than nonindustrial, smaller nations? Bloc I shows that the U.S., Japan 
and Germany, the most industrialized nations in the world, purchased less oil than Syria, 
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Jordan, Panama, and Cyprus. And in Bloc II nonindustrial nations like Liechtenstein, 
Panama, Cyprus, Monaco and Aruba lifted more oil barrels than the U.S., Germany, and 
Japan! Similarly, in Bloc III, Russia, France and Switzerland ranked first, second and 
third respectively while the U.S. fell to the 19th position, far behind Syria, Algeria, 
Vietnam and Morocco. The case of Russia is notable. Russia ranked first in all Blocs; yet, 
its GDP is smaller than the GDP of the U.S., UK, and France. Russia is the 7th largest oil 
producer in the world. Russia holds 7.4% of the world’s oil reserves, which means that it 
does not need to import oil, not the quantities it imported under the UN sanctions regime. 
Besides, Russia was under an economic crisis during the period I analyze, so its oil 
consumption dropped to a 0.84 GDP-oil consumption rate. That is, Russia required 0.84 
barrel of oil to produce $1000 dollars of its GDP while the U.S. and UK produced $1000 
with 1.65 and 3.75 barrels of oil daily during the same period (www.energy.gov).  
 Why using GDP as a comparative measure? There are two main ways to measure 
oil consumption per nation: population and GDP. The measure by population assumes 
that large populations consume more energy than smaller ones, but this assumption is not 
always true for it does not account for macroeconomic factors. GDP is more reliable in 
that regard. GDP is one of the most researched macroeconomic indicators. GDP refers to 
the total output of goods and services in a nation. GDP accounts for macroeconomic data 
like efficiency, industrial and agricultural outputs, employment and investment among 
others. Most economists agree that economies of larger GDPs require more oil to output 
more goods and services. Since the economies of the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Japan 
and China are dependent on oil imports, I expect them to have purchased large volumes 
of oil under the sanctions regime. I test that assumption in Table 2.2.     
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Table 2.2 – Oil Purchases by GDP      
   Bloc I     Bloc II
Countries      Average GDP     Barrels lifted       Countries      Average GDP Barrels lifted % barrels
        1992-2003         1992-2003    lifted
USA 5,776,984,615,385         482,825,657            Russia 200,521,192,308             19,300,618,432       30.46     
Japan 2,609,043,615,385         105,587,299            France 911,806,923,077             4,248,213,159         6.70       
Germany 1,321,445,846,154         33,288,119              Switzerland 168,780,315,385             3,434,083,024         5.42       
France 911,806,923,077            4,248,213,159         UK 897,155,538,462             3,350,739,850         5.29       
UK 897,155,538,462            3,350,739,850         Turkey 117,111,376,923             3,343,252,936         5.28       
Italy 754,663,692,308            2,718,083,135         Italy 754,663,692,308             2,718,083,135         4.29       
China 733,042,869,231            2,624,806,812         China 733,042,869,231             2,624,806,812         4.14       
Canada 422,199,107,692            78,252,230              Liechtenstein 1,780,000,000                 2,467,770,768         3.89       
Spain 397,681,161,538            1,643,749,098         Spain 397,681,161,538             1,643,749,098         2.59       
Brazil 383,365,623,077            137,860,626            Malaysia 56,140,118,462               1,485,199,149         2.34       
India 285,186,946,154            872,678,344            Vietnam 18,921,695,385               1,405,961,742         2.22       
Netherlands 262,389,930,769            532,184,460            UEA 38,904,620,000               1,371,407,184         2.16       
Russia 200,521,192,308            19,300,618,432       Syria 10,865,513,846               1,134,317,406         1.79       
Switzerland 168,780,315,385            3,434,083,024         Argelia 32,845,419,231               1,109,337,575         1.75       
Belgium 158,395,000,000            301,953,188            Cyprus 6,056,231,385                 1,048,437,558         1.65       
Austria 132,536,369,231            262,883,339            India 285,186,946,154             872,678,344            1.38       
Turkey 117,111,376,923            3,343,252,936         Morocco 22,173,945,385               742,838,933            1.17       
Indonesia 111,173,834,615            255,138,745            Jordan 5,188,421,231                 735,728,580            1.16       
Denmark 108,524,361,538            52,933,910              Aruba 2,250,000,000                 713,492,385            1.13       
Hong Kong 101,042,161,538            227,838,241            Panama 6,956,038,462                 703,170,873            1.11       
South Africa 83,725,600,000              397,692,624            Belarus 8,749,721,538                 613,877,735            0.97       
Thailand 82,679,707,692              330,192,170            Ukraine 25,382,237,692               538,411,832            0.85       
Finland 80,705,923,077              107,331,748            Netherlands 262,389,930,769             532,184,460            0.84       
Greece 80,214,423,077              347,836,069            Egypt 53,065,439,231               506,657,165            0.80       
Portugal 75,439,438,462              34,118,051              Pakistan 42,274,733,846               490,181,751            0.77       
Ireland 63,148,556,923              92,406,127              USA 5,776,984,615,385          482,825,657            0.76       
Venezuela 58,452,143,846              103,313,147            South Africa 83,725,600,000               397,692,624            0.63       
Malaysia 56,140,118,462              1,485,199,149         Virgin Islands 1,570,000,000                 394,853,212            0.62       
Singapore 54,842,733,846              262,123,492            Greece 80,214,423,077               347,836,069            0.55       
Egypt 53,065,439,231              506,657,165            Bulgaria 8,281,049,308                 333,739,464            0.53       
Philippines 47,343,123,846              27,858,288              Thailand 82,679,707,692               330,192,170            0.52       
Pakistan 42,274,733,846              490,181,751            Belgium 158,395,000,000             301,953,188            0.48       
UEA 38,904,620,000              1,371,407,184         Austria 132,536,369,231             262,883,339            0.41       
Hungary 33,390,502,308              17,476,765              Singapore 54,842,733,846               262,123,492            0.41       
Argelia 32,845,419,231              1,109,337,575         Indonesia 111,173,834,615             255,138,745            0.40       
Nigeria 25,956,688,462              179,040,409            Yemen 5,102,082,308                 251,116,047            0.40       
Romania 25,453,282,308              138,376,912            Bermuda 4,500,000,000                 247,261,893            0.39       
Ukraine 25,382,237,692              538,411,832            Lebanon 10,442,206,923               241,763,377            0.38       
Morocco 22,173,945,385              742,838,933            Hong Kong 101,042,161,538             227,838,241            0.36       
Vietnam 18,921,695,385              1,405,961,742         Cayman Island 1,93,000,000 207,859,782            0.33       
Slovakia 14,045,603,846              30,544,942              Other nations 197,127,047            0.31       
Tunisia 12,659,013,846              180,361,361            Tunisia 12,659,013,846               180,361,361            0.28       
Oman 10,971,586,923              149,377,008            Nigeria 25,956,688,462               179,040,409            0.28       
Syria 10,865,513,846              1,134,317,406         Sudan 7,751,802,615                 173,784,987            0.27       
Lebanon 10,442,206,923              241,763,377            Qatar 9,323,203,846                 161,646,541            0.26       
Qatar 9,323,203,846                161,646,541            Oman 10,971,586,923               149,377,008            0.24       
Belarus 8,749,721,538                613,877,735            Romania 25,453,282,308               138,376,912            0.22       
Bulgaria 8,281,049,308                333,739,464            Brazil 383,365,623,077             137,860,626            0.22       
Kenya 8,107,111,538                123,891,238            Namibia 2,164,295,077                 132,363,487            0.21       
Sudan 7,751,802,615                173,784,987            Kenya 8,107,111,538                 123,891,238            0.20       
Panama 6,956,038,462                703,170,873            Finland 80,705,923,077               107,331,748            0.17        
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Cyprus 6,056,231,385          1,048,437,558    Japan 2,609,043,615,385   105,587,299       0.17     
Jordan 5,188,421,231          735,728,580       Venezuela 58,452,143,846        103,313,147       0.16     
Yemen 5,102,082,308          251,116,047       Bahamas 2,883,384,615          102,326,624       0.16     
Bermuda 4,500,000,000          247,261,893       Ireland 63,148,556,923        92,406,127         0.14     
Bahamas 2,883,384,615          102,326,624       Canada 422,199,107,692      78,252,230         0.12     
Aruba 2,250,000,000          713,492,385       Gambia 536,513,985             72,112,479         0.11     
Namibia 2,164,295,077          132,363,487       Monaco 986,000,000             54,734,724         0.09     
Cayman Island 1,930,000,000          207,859,782       Denmark 108,524,361,538      52,933,910         0.08     
Liechtenstein 1,780,000,000          2,467,770,768    Portugal 75,439,438,462        34,118,051         0.05     
Virgin Islands 1,570,000,000          394,853,212       Germany 1,321,445,846,154   33,288,119         0.05     
Monaco 986,000,000             54,734,724         Slovakia 14,045,603,846        30,544,942         0.05     
Gambia 536,513,985             72,112,479         Philippines 47,343,123,846        27,858,288         0.04     
Other nations 197,127,047       Hungary 33,390,502,308        17,476,765         0.03     
Yugoslavia 17,102,041         Yugoslavia 17,102,041         0.03     
Total 16,997,210,595,141 64,183,493,296  Total 16,995,280,595,141 64,183,493,296  100.00  
Source: the IIC and FMI  
 
 Table 2.2 contains two blocs. Bloc I has two columns and Bloc II has three. In 
Bloc I, column I records nations that purchased oil under the sanctions regime. Column II 
reports average GDP per nation from 1992, when the sanctions regime began, to 2003 
when it ended. Column III accounts for oil barrels lifted under the sanctions regime. Bloc 
I was sorted by GDP. Bloc II contains the same columns and data as Bloc I, with the 
exception of column IV, which shows the percentage of oil barrels lifted per nation with 
respect to Column III, number of barrels lifted in USD. Bloc II was sorted by Column III.  
 Table 2.2 shows mixed results. First, the size of a GDP did not really influence oil 
purchases under UN sanctions. For instance, In Bloc I, U.S., Japan, and Germany have 
the largest GDPs; yet, Bloc II shows that the U.S. ranked 26th, Japan 52nd, and Germany 
61st in oil purchases. Russia, France and Switzerland ranked 13th, 4th, and 14th 
respectively in terms of GDP, but they led oil purchases in Bloc II. Here too the case of 
Russia is notable. It purchased 30.7% of the oil Iraq sold, ranking 13th in GDP. The case 
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of Switzerland is interesting too for it ranks 14th in GDP and still surpassed Japan, 
Germany, UK and Italy despite their higher GDP. The same occurred with Malaysia, 
Vietnam, UEA, Syria, and Cyprus. They outperformed the U.S., Japan and Germany, the 
three leading industrial and oil consumers in the world. The most striking case is 
Lichtenstein, a non-industrial nation with an average GDP of just $1.78 billion. This tiny 
nation surpassed the U.S., Japan and Germany by purchasing 3.84% from Iraq. The next 
Table shows the same discrepancies but from a different angle. It lists nations that lifted 
over $1 billion worth of oil under the UN sanctions and their respective GDPs. 
 
Table 2.3 - Nations That Lifted Over Billion Dollars Barrels of Oil  
 
                   Block I                  Block II
  Countries Ave. GDP 1992-2003 Barrels lifted Countries Ave. GDP 1992-2003 Barrels lifted % lifted
  in USD billions    in USD billions   in USD 
France 911,806,923,077          4,248,213,159         Russia 200,521,192,308           19,300,618,432      38.08      
UK 897,155,538,462          3,350,739,850         France 911,806,923,077           4,248,213,159        8.38        
Italy 754,663,692,308          2,718,083,135         Switzerland 168,780,315,385           3,434,083,024        6.78        
China 733,042,869,231          2,624,806,812         UK 897,155,538,462           3,350,739,850        6.61        
Spain 397,681,161,538          1,643,749,098         Turkey 117,111,376,923           3,343,252,936        6.60        
Russia 200,521,192,308          19,300,618,432       Italy 754,663,692,308           2,718,083,135        5.36        
Switzerland 168,780,315,385          3,434,083,024         China 733,042,869,231           2,624,806,812        5.18        
Turkey 117,111,376,923          3,343,252,936         Liechtenstein 134,000,000                  2,467,770,768        4.87        
Malaysia 56,140,118,462            1,485,199,149         Spain 397,681,161,538           1,643,749,098        3.24        
UAE 38,904,620,000            1,371,407,184         Malaysia 56,140,118,462             1,485,199,149        2.93        
Argelia 32,845,419,231            1,109,337,575         Vietnam 18,921,695,385             1,405,961,742        2.77        
Vietnam 18,921,695,385            1,405,961,742         UAE 38,904,620,000             1,371,407,184        2.71        
Syria 10,865,513,846            1,134,317,406         Syria 10,865,513,846             1,134,317,406        2.24        
Cyprus 6,056,231,385              1,048,437,558         Argelia 32,845,419,231             1,109,337,575        2.19        
Liechtenstein 134,000,000                 2,467,770,768         Cyprus 6,056,231,385               1,048,437,558        2.07        
Total 4,344,630,667,541       50,685,977,828       Total 4,344,630,667,541        50,685,977,828      100.00     
Source: The IIC Report and FMI 
 Two Blocs form Table 2.3. They contain a list of fifteen nations, their average 
GDP from 1992 to 2003, and the amount of barrels they purchased from Iraq. Bloc I was 
sorted by average GDP. Bloc II was sorted by barrels lifted. Note that 15 nations lifted 
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over $1 billion worth of oil, but the U.S., Japan and Germany are not among them despite 
their larger GDPs. Those 15 nations obtained 758 contracts, 67% of all contracts Iraq 
granted under the UN sanctions regime. They lifted $50,393,714,531 billion, 78.89% of 
the total oil Iraq sold. Note in Bloc I that GDP varies sharply with respect to oil barrels 
lifted. France, U.K., Italy, China, Spain, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey are among the 
15 highest GDPs. They, with the exception of Spain, are also in Bloc II, as the 15 largest 
oil purchasers. In those cases, GDPs correlated with oil purchases, but we cannot say the 
same of Liechtenstein, Cyprus, Syria, Vietnam, Algeria and Malaysia. They lifted over 1 
billion worth of oil although their GDPs were much smaller. Once again, Russia led oil 
purchases with 30.07% and a GDP rather small. Here, demand for oil did not justify oil 
purchases. But let us see from a different perspective.   
 
Table 2.4 – Fifteen Largest Oil Purchasers and Fifteen Highest GDPs 
           Block I   Block II
  Countries Ave. GDP 1992-2003 Barrels lifted % lifted Countries  Ave. GDP 1992-2003 Barrels lifted % lifted
  in USD billions in USD    in USD billions  in USD 
Russia 200,521,192,308           19,300,618,432      30.07   U.S. 5,776,984,615,385         482,825,657            0.75
France 911,806,923,077           4,248,213,159        6.62     Japan 2,609,043,615,385         105,587,299            0.16
Switzerland 168,780,315,385           3,434,083,024        5.35     Germany 1,321,445,846,154         33,288,119              0.05
UK 897,155,538,462           3,350,739,850        5.22     France 911,806,923,077            4,248,213,159         6.62
Turkey 117,111,376,923           3,343,252,936        5.21     UK 897,155,538,462            3,350,739,850         5.22
Italy 754,663,692,308           2,718,083,135        4.23     Italy 754,663,692,308            2,718,083,135         4.23
China 733,042,869,231           2,624,806,812        4.09     China 733,042,869,231            2,624,806,812         4.09
Liechtenstein 134,000,000                  2,467,770,768        3.84     Canada 422,199,107,692            78,252,230              0.12
Spain 397,681,161,538           1,643,749,098        2.56     Spain 397,681,161,538            1,643,749,098         2.56
Malaysia 56,140,118,462             1,485,199,149        2.31     Brazil 383,365,623,077            137,860,626            0.21
Vietnam 18,921,695,385             1,405,961,742        2.19     India 285,186,946,154            872,678,344            1.36
UAE 38,904,620,000             1,371,407,184        2.14     Netherlands 262,389,930,769            532,184,460            0.83
Syria 10,865,513,846             1,134,317,406        1.77     Russia 200,521,192,308            19,300,618,432       30.7
Argelia 32,845,419,231             1,109,337,575        1.73     Switzerland 168,780,315,385            3,434,083,024         5.35
Cyprus 6,056,231,385               1,048,437,558        1.63     Belgium 158,395,000,000            301,953,188            0.47
Total 4,344,630,667,541        50,685,977,828      78.96   Total 15,282,662,376,925       39,864,923,433       62.72  
Source: the IIC Report and FMI 
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 Table 2.4 compares the 15 largest oil purchasers with the 15 highest GDPs in the 
world. Two Blocs form Table 2.4. Bloc I shows a list of 15 nations that purchased over 
$1 billion dollars worth of oil from Iraq. It also shows their average GDP from 1995 to 
2003, the amount of barrels lifted expressed in USD billions, and the percentage of 
barrels they purchased with respect to the total Iraq sold. Bloc I is sorted by Column III. 
On the other side, Bloc II shows the 15 highest GDPs in the world, the amount of oil 
barrels they lifted, and the percentage they represented with respect to all oil purchases 
under the Program. Bloc II is sorted by Column average GDP. 
 Now, observe in Block I that that only seven nations that purchased over $1 
billion of oil barrels made it to Bloc II as nations with largest GDPs. They were Russia, 
France, Switzerland, U.K., Italy, China, and Spain. But Liechtenstein, Cyprus, Syria, 
Vietnam, Algeria and Malaysia spent over $1 billion in oil despite their smaller GDPs. It 
would be worth finding what Liechtenstein did with so much oil because Liechtenstein is 
a nation with a population of just 35,322, with a service oriented economy, no heavy 
industry and no even intense agriculture. Why would it need so much oil? Conversely, 
the U.S., Japan and Germany did not make it to Bloc I although they led Bloc II with the 
highest average GDPs. Why did they not purchase much more oil from Iraq under the UN 
sanctions regime?  
 Whatever the reasons, it seems that GDP did not drive oil purchases under the UN 
sanctions regime against Iraq, and that further testing from different perspectives is 
essential. For instance, Table 2.5 shows members of the European Union, the second 
largest economic bloc in the world but highly dependent on oil imports, mainly from 
Russia, the leading oil purchasers under the UN sanctions regime.  
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Table 2.5 – European Union Bloc 
   Bloc I        Bloc II
Countries Ave. GDP 1992-2003  barrels lifted Countries Ave. GDP 1992-2003 barrels lifted  % of
   USD millions   USD millions barrels
Germany 1,321,445,846,154       33,288,119             France 911,806,923,077           4,248,213,159        27.78
France 911,806,923,077          4,248,213,159        UK 897,155,538,462           3,350,739,850        21.91
UK 897,155,538,462          3,350,739,850        Italy 754,663,692,308           2,718,083,135        17.77
Italy 754,663,692,308          2,718,083,135        Spain 397,681,161,538           1,643,749,098        10.75
Spain 397,681,161,538          1,643,749,098        Cyprus 6,056,231,385               1,048,437,558        6.86
Netherlands 262,389,930,769          532,184,460           Netherlands 262,389,930,769           532,184,460           3.48
Belgium 158,395,000,000          301,953,188           Greece 80,214,423,077             347,836,069           2.27
Austria 132,536,369,231          262,883,339           Bulgaria 8,281,049,308               333,739,464           2.18
Denmark 108,524,361,538          52,933,910             Belgium 158,395,000,000           301,953,188           1.97
Finland 80,705,923,077            107,331,748           Austria 132,536,369,231           262,883,339           1.72
Greece 80,214,423,077            347,836,069           Romania 25,453,282,308             138,376,912           0.90
Portugal 75,439,438,462            34,118,051             Finland 80,705,923,077             107,331,748           0.70
Ireland 63,148,556,923            92,406,127             Ireland 63,148,556,923             92,406,127             0.60
Hungary 33,390,502,308            17,476,765             Denmark 108,524,361,538           52,933,910             0.35
Romania 25,453,282,308            138,376,912           Portugal 75,439,438,462             34,118,051             0.22
Slovakia 14,045,603,846            30,544,942             Germany 1,321,445,846,154        33,288,119             0.22
Bulgaria 8,281,049,308              333,739,464           Slovakia 14,045,603,846             30,544,942             0.20
Cyprus 6,056,231,385              1,048,437,558        Hungary 33,390,502,308             17,476,765             0.11
Czech Rep. -                               -                         Czech Rep. -                                 -                          
Estonia -                               -                         Estonia -                                 -                          
Latvia -                               -                         Latvia -                                 -                          
Lithuania -                               -                         Lithuania -                                 -                          
Luxembourg -                               -                         Luxembourg -                                 -                          
Malta -                               -                         Malta -                                 -                          
Poland -                               -                         Poland -                                 -                          
Slovenia -                               -                         Slovenia -                                 -                          
Sweden -                               -                         Sweden -                                 -                          
Total 5,331,333,833,771       15,294,295,894      Total 5,331,333,833,771        15,294,295,894      100.00  
Sources: the IIC Report and FMI 
  
The Table has two blocs. Bloc I accounts for members of EU, average GDP from 
1992 to 2003, and their oil purchases. Bloc I is sorted by average GDP. Then, Bloc II 
shows the same data only that it has a fourth column to reflect percentages of barrels 
lifted with respect to the total of oil sold under the sanctions regime. Bloc II is sorted by # 
of barrels purchased.    
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 Table 2.5 indicates that France, U.K., Italy and Spain have the four largest GDPs 
in the EU, and they ranked first, second, third and fourth in oil purchases under the 
sanctions regime. The Netherlands ranked 6th in oil purchases, but it then fell behind 
Cyprus, a nation of much smaller GDP. Belgium, Austria and Denmark have large GDPs; 
however, they purchased less oil than Cyprus, Greece and Bulgaria. Germany, the leading 
GDP in the E.U, ranked 16th. Germany purchased less oil than nations of much smaller 
GDPs such as Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania, which are the poorest nations in 
the E.U. Consequently, in Table 2.5, GDP did not predict oil purchases under the UN 
sanctions regime. Let us then test the third largest economic bloc in the world, the East 
Asia Bloc.   
 
Table 2.6 - East Asia Bloc   
 
 
Source: the IIC Report and FMI 
 
Table 2.6 is divided into two blocs. In Bloc I, Column I accounts for nations from 
           Bloc I                     Bloc I
Countries Av. GDP 1992-2003 # barrels lifted Countries Av. GDP 1992-2003 # barrels lifted % Barrels
In USD millions in USD millions In USD millions  in USD millions  lifted
Japan 2,609,043,615,385       105,587,299         China 733,042,869,231           2,624,806,812      49.35
China 733,042,869,231          2,624,806,812      Malaysia 56,140,118,462             1,485,199,149      27.92
Indonesia 111,173,834,615          255,138,745         Thailand 82,679,707,692             330,192,170         6.21
Hong Kong 101,042,161,538          227,838,241         Singapore 54,842,733,846             262,123,492         4.93
Thailand 82,679,707,692            330,192,170         Indonesia 111,173,834,615           255,138,745         4.80
Malaysia 56,140,118,462            1,485,199,149      Hong Kong 101,042,161,538           227,838,241         4.28
Singapore 54,842,733,846            262,123,492         Japan 2,609,043,615,385        105,587,299         1.99
Philippines 47,343,123,846            27,858,288           Philippines 47,343,123,846             27,858,288           0.52
S.  Korea S. Korea 0 0
Taiwan Taiwan 0 0
Total 3,795,308,164,615       5,318,744,196      Total 3,795,308,164,615        5,318,744,196      100.00
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South East Asia. Column II shows their GDPs, and Column III accounts for their oil 
purchases under the UN sanctions regime expressed in USD. Bloc I is sorted by average 
GDP from 1992-2003. For its part, Bloc II has the same columns as Bloc I, but I added 
Column IV to reflect percentages of oil purchases. Bloc II is sorted by number of barrels 
lifted expressed in American dollars.  
In the Table, we can see that nation-states in East Asia have a total GDP of 
$3,795,308,164,165, second only to the European Union. Yet, they imported just 
$5,318,744,196 million worth of Iraqi oil. A large percentage of it went to China, which 
led purchases with $2,624,806,812 million. Malaysia outperformed Japan, Indonesia and 
Hong Kong. Japan performed poorly in terms of oil purchases, behind Hong Kong and 
only better than the Philippines. However, Japan invested $660 million dollars in oil 
infrastructures in Iraq from 1996 to 2000, and it signed several “protocols of intention” 
for further investments in the Iraqi oil industry. Japan also had investment interests in 
three oilfields: the East Baghdad camps, which are said to hold reserves of 18 billion 
barrels; and Gharraf and Tuba, both located in southern Iraq. They have oil reserves for 
2.6 billion barrels. So in terms of oil investments, Japan outperformed all other East Asia 
nations, including China. Taiwan and South Korea did not purchase oil from Iraq.  
Consequently, Table 2.6, like previous Tables presented here, shows that GDP did 
not justify oil purchases under the UN sanctions regime. Perhaps non-macroeconomic 
factors like religion, ethnicity, family and tribal relations, illegal trade and geopolitics 
played a more important role. Examining performance of Middle East nations may lead 
to new findings.   
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Table 2.7 – Middle East Nations 
     Bloc I     Block II
Countries GDP1992-2003 Barrels Countries GDP 1992-2003 Barrels % barrels
 in USD millions lifted in USD millions lifted lifted
Turkey 342.0 3,343,253   Turkey 342.0 3,343,253 45.25      
Saudi Arabia 289.0 -              UAE. 112.0 1,371,407 18.56      
UAE 112.0 1,371,407   Syria 26.4 1,134,317 15.35      
Syria 26.4 1,134,317   Jordan 13.5 735,729    9.96        
Oman 23.0 149,377 Yemen 12.7 251,116 3.40        
Lebanon 22.1 241,763 Lebanon 22.1 241,763 3.27        
Qatar 15.0 161,647 Qatar 15.0 161,647 2.19        
Jordan 13.5 735,729      Oman 23.0 149,377 2.02        
Yemen 12.7 251,116 Saudi Arabia 289.0 -           -          
Total 855.7 7,388,609   Total 855.7 7,388,609 100.00     
Source: IIC Report and FMI 
 
Nine nations in the Middle East purchased oil from Iraq despite UN sanctions. In 
five cases –Turkey, UAE, Syria, Jordan, and Yemen-, GDP correlated with oil barrels 
lifted. Lebanon, Qatar, Oman and Saudi Arabia did not perform according to their GDP. 
Turkey led GDP and oil purchases. Turkey itself is not rich in oil, which may explain its 
performance here. Turkey houses most of the pipelines that pump oil from the Middle 
East to Europe. Turkey has borders with the Kurdistan, the richest oil region in Iraq. So it 
may be that Turkey purchased the Iraqi oil not for itself but to resell it in European 
markets. Lastly, Saudi Arabia did not purchase oil at all despite its high GDP. Saudi 
Arabia is one of the largest oil producers in the world, for which it does not need to 
purchase any. Syria ranked 3rd in oil purchases and 4th in GDP. On the contrary, the case 
of Jordan is interesting because, having the 2nd smaller GDP in the region, it ranked 4th in 
oil purchases. Why? The reasons may be found in the CFIJ and IIC Reports. First, the 
CFIJ stated that “Iraq evaded UN sanctions by means of “Protocols” or government-to-
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government economic trade agreements. Protocols allowed Saddam to generate a large 
amount of revenues outside the purview of the UN; protocols or government to 
government agreements generated over $7.5 billion for Saddam” (CFIJ, p. 54). Here, the 
CFIJ refers to the trade protocols Iraq signed with Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon and 
Syria, and the IIC accused those same nations of: 1) hiring front companies and 
intermediaries to trade with Iraq; 2) allow their banks to conceal and laundry Iraqi profits; 
3) smuggle oil out of Iraq and into the global market. The IIC found that “Saddam made 
about $990 million from oil cash sales or smuggling” (IIC, p. 17). I discuss the protocols 
in the next Chapter, but for now, let us study the data in the next table.   
 
Table 2.8 – Iraqi Profits from Smuggling with Middle East Nations 
Nations     Coallition for ISG  U.S. Senate
International Justice Report     PIC
      1992-1996 1992-1996
Jordan 699$                          2,220$     n/a
Turkey 99$                            -$         n/a
Iran 117$                          -$         n/a
Private Sales 70$                            180$        
Total 985$                          2,400$     n/a
       1997-2002 1997-2003 1997-2002
Jordan 1,654$                       2,226$     
Turkey 2,126$                       710$        
Syria 2,234$                       2,814$     
Egypt -$                           33$          
Iran 1,714$                       -$         
Kurdistand -$                           -$         45$              
Private Sales 595$                          1,022$     
Total 8,323$                       6,805$     45$               
Source: IIC, CFIJ, ISG Report, and U.S. Senate 
 
The Table shows profits Iraq made from oil smuggling through nations in the 
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Middle East. I collected the data from the IIC by the CFIJ, the ISG, and the U.S Senate, 
its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations-Committee on Governmental Affairs. The 
data show that Iraq engaged in oil smuggling through Jordan, Turkey and Iran from 1992 
to 1996. The CFIJ reported $985 million of dollars while ISG reported $2,400 million. 
From 1997 to 2003, smuggling expanded to Syria, Egypt and Kurdistan, increasing to 
$6,805 million dollars. It is true that the data vary from source to source, but the most 
relevant finding is not the volume of oil smuggled but rather the participation of Middle 
Eastern nations in the smuggling, which raises very important questions. For example, 
why would those nations allow smuggling from and to Iraq, a nation embargoed by the 
international community, a nation that threatened its neighbors, those very same nations?  
 To respond the question, perhaps I should analyze non-macroeconomic factors 
such as traditional trade, ethnic, religious and even family relations, which, according to 
Fukuyama (2006), are the base of good business and trade relations. Iraq and its 
neighbors have traded for centuries. The region was united under an empire for hundreds 
of years, enough to forge long-lasting trade relations and customs. So it is understandable 
that those relations remained strong even under a sanctions regime. After all, sanctions 
regimes affect embargoed and not embargoed nations. Sanctions regimes are prompt to 
cut off trade relations among nations, but they are slow in finding new sources of 
commerce for the nations affected, mainly for nations of limited resources and incomes, 
like Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Still, I should further ask, how did geopolitics 
among world superpowers affect the sanctions regime? Specifically, how did the 
Permanent members of UN Security Council performed under the UN sanctions regime 
against Iraq?  
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Table 2.9 – Permanent Members of UN Security Council 
 
 
Source: IIC Report and FMI 
  
See in Table 2.9 the performance of permanent members of UN Security Council 
in the UN sanctions regime. Here too, GDP did not correlate with oil purchases. Russia 
and France lifted more oil than the U.S. and UK. The U.S. led GDP, but it ranked last in 
oil purchases. In contrast, Russia ranked last in GDP, but it led oil purchases. The case of 
UK is interesting for it ranked fourth in barrels lifted, in tune with its GDP but not with 
its overall political attitude toward Iraq and the sanctions regime. That is, the UK, along 
with the U.S., led the fight against Saddam in the UN Security Council. The UK co-
sponsored the two no-fly-zones over Iraq and the American led invasions of Iraq in 1991 
and 2003. For their part, France and China had a balanced attitude France ranked second 
in both GDP and oil purchases. China ranked fourth in oil purchases, consequent with its 
political opposition to the UN sanctions and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In all, as Meyer 
and Califano argue, “Iraq steered nearly half of its oil sales to companies from three 
permanent members of the UN Security Council –Russia, China, and France- that it 
               Bloc I                             Bloc II
Country  GDP 1992-2003 Total Imports Country   GDP 1992-2003 Total Imports      %
 in USD millions in USD millions  in USD millions in USD millions
U.S. 5,776,984,615,385 482,825,657 Russia 200,521,192,308    19,300,618,432 64.32     
France 911,806,923,077 4,248,213,159 France 911,806,923,077 4,248,213,159 14.16
Uk 897,155,538,462 3,350,739,850 Uk 897,155,538,462 3,350,739,850 11.17
China 733,042,869,231 2,624,806,812 China 733,042,869,231 2,624,806,812 8.75
Russia 200,521,192,308  19,300,618,432 U.S. 5,776,984,615,385 482,825,657 1.61
Total 8,519,511,138,463 30,007,203,910 Total 8,519,511,138,463 30,007,203,910 100.00   
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believed were most sympathetic to lifting the sanctions against it” (Meyer and Califano, 
2006, p. 145). Moreover, the CIA argued that “Iraq’s “sticks” included not only 
redirecting those contracts to other more “pro-Iraqi” companies, but held the threat of 
forfeiture of foreign debts – totaling between approximately $116-250 billion; Saddam 
expressed confidence that France, Russia and China would support Iraq’s efforts to 
further erode the UN sanctions regime” (Dulfer Report, Saddam Strategic Intent, p. 12).  
 There is yet another way of testing performance under the UN sanctions regime. 
The IIC stated that “Iraq preferred to sell its oil to companies and individuals from 
countries that were as friendly to Iraq, and in particular, if they were permanent 
members of the Security Council in a position potentially to ease the restrictions of 
sanctions” (IIC, Manipulation of OFFP, p. 2). The quote implies that political interests in 
UN Security Council, not GDP, explain the overall performance of members of UN 
Security Council in regard to the UN sanctions since Saddam obtained two key 
concessions from the UN Security Council: 1) he was allowed to choose companies that 
he wanted to trade with; 2) he was allowed to negotiate prices and contracts. As Meyer 
and Califano put it, “The ill-fated decision to allow Saddam to choose his contracting 
partners unwittingly empowered him with political and economic leverage to advance his 
broader agenda; Saddam used this leverage to build and maintain political support for 
his efforts to overturn the sanctions regime and to circumvent the sanctions” (Meyer and 
Califano, 2006, p. 18). 
Indeed, Saddam lobbied the Security Council, which then eased their tough stand 
toward Iraq and the sanctions. The IIC stated that “Saddam Hussein, in exercising his 
ability to designate both buyers and sellers, did favor companies registered with those 
73 
permanent members of the Security Council most reluctant to maintain strong sanctions, 
specifically Russia, France and China; conversely, there was strong bias against 
potential U.S. or U.K. contractors” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 19). 
 France, Russia and China opposed the UN sanctions regime in various ways. 
First, they used their veto power to propose UN resolutions to: 1) reschedule debates for 
renewal of the sanctions from one every six month to once a year; 2) expand the scope of 
the sanctions or the list of goods and services allowed into Iraq; 3) oppose smart 
sanctions; 4) oppose British and American resolutions to block humanitarian contracts; 5) 
end the sanctions regime; 6) oppose the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Second, 
they lobbied the Iraqi regime to sign long-term contracts to explore new oil reserves and 
drill untapped oil wells. For instance, prior to the regime change in April 2003, French 
and Russian oil firms signed long-term oil contracts with Iraq that covered roughly 40% 
of Iraq’s wealth (New York Times, March 6th, 2008). France negotiated with Iraq oil 
deals such as the Majnoon and Nahr Umar oil field projects. Located in southern Iraq, the 
fields hold 25% of Iraqi oil reserves, approximately 26 billion barrels, representing about 
$650 billion in revenues for France (New York Times, March 6th, 2008). Russia signed a 
23-year contract with Iraq to revitalize the West Quarna oil field and drill in Saddam, 
Kirkuk and Bai Hassan oil fields. Russian companies also signed contracts for 67 new 
oil-related projects in Suba, Luhais, West Qurna, and Rumaila (The New York Times, 
March 6th, 2008). Lastly, China did not sign any oil deal with Saddam Hussein, but as we 
will see in coming chapters, Chinese firms were very active trading with Iraq.  
On the other hand, the U.S. and U.K. collaborated to enforce two non-fly-zones 
and the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq. The price tag was $921 and $270 billion dollars 
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respectively (IIC, Summary, p. 9), which included the creation of “smart sanctions,” the 
blocking of humanitarian contracts, and the blocking of delivery of goods of ‘dual use’. 
Nevertheless, British and American tough stand against Iraq did not prevent American 
and British firms from accessing Iraqi oil wells. The hitch is that governments and firms 
had different goals. In other words, while British and American governments promoted 
and enforced the sanctions, American and British firms evaded and profited from them. 
Chart 2.3 illustrates Iraqi oil sales to firms from around the world under the UN sanction.  
 
Chart 2.3 – Iraqi Oil Sales under the UN Sanctions Regime          
                                           
 
 
  Source: The Duelfer Report (CIA) 
 
 The Chart shows Iraqi legal and illegal oil sales to two main groups of firms. The 
first group includes American and British oil firms, in red bars. The second group 
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consists in firms from 37 “other nations,” represented by the blue bars. The data cover 
from the year 1994 to 2003. The quantity of oil is expressed in USD million of barrels.  
 At first glance, it seems that American and British corporations purchased less oil 
than corporations from all other nations. However, that is not accurate if we take into 
consideration that American and British corporations were competing against firms from 
37 nations. Above all, I find that American and British corporations did benefit from the 
sanctions regime that the UN imposed against Iraq, and that they did not follow the 
policies that the American and British governments had enacted toward the Iraqi regime. 
Specifically, I found that firms usually sold their contracts to other companies regardless 
of their nation of origin, and that this practice allowed American corporations to acquire 
oil contracts without declaring their nations of origin to Iraqi authorities and UN. Table 
2.10 shows a relation of two groups of nations: contractual and non-contractual nations.  
 
Table 2.10 – Contractual and Non-contractual Nations  
  Bloc I      Bloc II    Bloc III
Contractual Noncontract        Barrels Contractual Noncontract       Barrels Contractual Nonctractual     Barrels
Nations Nations transferred Nations Nations     transferred Nations Nations transferred
Algeria Switzerland 2,041,000    Lebanon Austria 2,006,000       France Switzerland 36,975,000    
Austria UAE 1,023,000    Libya Austria 5,407,000       Jordan Switzerland 28,381,000    
Bangladesh Russia 22,285,000  Lebanon Cyprus 3,049,000       Iran UK 27,983,000    
Bangladesh Jordan 8,613,000    Libya Cyprus 4,927,000       USA Cyprus 26,257,000    
Belarus Russia 3,435,000    USA Cyprus 26,257,000     Bangladesh Russia 22,285,000    
Brazil Lebanon 500,000       Various natio Cyprus 1,002,000       Jordan Spain 14,105,000    
Brazil Italy 1,481,000    Russia Denmark 2,258,000       France Netherlands 13,201,000    
Cyprus Panama 7,291,000    Qatar Egypt 2,927,000       India Liechtenstein 11,732,000    
Chad UAE 1,047,000    Syria Egypt 997,000          France Switzerland 10,751,000    
Egypt Jordan 1,995,000    Syria Finland 492,000          Yugoslavia UK 10,219,000    
Egypt Switzerland 7,625,000    Jordan France 5,278,000       Palestine Syria 10,126,000    
Egypt Pakistan 2,078,000    Lebanon France 4,549,000       Bangladesh Jordan 8,613,000       
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Egypt Jordan 1,000,000         Spain France 1,351,000           Egypt Switzerland 7,625,000          
France Switzerland 36,975,000       UK France 4,450,000           Cyprus Panama 7,291,000          
France Jordan 3,360,000         Brazil Italy 1,481,000           India Switzerland 6,985,000          
France Netherlands 13,201,000       Lebanon Italy 1,764,000           UK Jordan 6,681,000          
France Lichtenstein 2,027,000         Portugal Italy 2,568,000           Jordan Panama 6,035,000          
France Switzerland 10,751,000       Yugoslavia Italy 3,164,000           Qatar UAE 5,954,000          
Hungary Rumania 1,101,000         Bangladesh Jordan 8,613,000           Libya Austria 5,407,000          
India Liechtenstein 11,732,000       Egypt Jordan 1,995,000           Ukraine Russia 5,318,000          
India Switzerland 6,985,000         Egypt Jordan 1,000,000           Jordan France 5,278,000          
Iran UK 27,983,000       France Jordan 3,360,000           Palestine Jordan 5,188,000          
Italy Switzerland 2,055,000         Palestine Jordan 5,188,000           Libya Cyprus 4,927,000          
Italy UAE 2,049,000         Portugal Jordan 1,578,000           Yemen Panama 4,713,000          
Jordan Pakistan 2,826,000         UK Jordan 6,681,000           Lebanon Switzerland 4,594,000          
Jordan France 5,278,000         Brazil Lebanon 500,000              Lebanon France 4,549,000          
Jordan Turkey 2,002,000         France Lichtenstein 2,027,000           UK France 4,450,000          
Jordan South Africa 1,047,000         India Liechtenstein 11,732,000         Syria Panama 4,430,000          
Jordan UAE 1,902,000         Spain Liechtenstein 2,076,000           Syria UAE 4,112,000          
Jordan Spain 14,105,000       UAE Liechtenstein 1,955,000           Palestine Qatar 4,080,000          
Jordan Switzerland 28,381,000       Various nations Malaysia 1,949,000           Russia Switzerland 3,988,000          
Jordan Panama 6,035,000         Portugal Monaco 1,996,000           Belarus Russia 3,435,000          
Lebanon Italy 1,764,000         France Netherlands 13,201,000         France Jordan 3,360,000          
Lebanon Spain 995,000            Egypt Pakistan 2,078,000           Yugoslavia Italy 3,164,000          
Lebanon Switzerland 4,594,000         Jordan Pakistan 2,826,000           Lebanon Cyprus 3,049,000          
Lebanon France 4,549,000         Morocco Pakistan 797,000              Qatar Egypt 2,927,000          
Lebanon Cyprus 3,049,000         Palestine Pakistan 2,016,000           Jordan Pakistan 2,826,000          
Lebanon Austria 2,006,000         Cyprus Panama 7,291,000           Syria Switzerland 2,824,000          
Libya Austria 5,407,000         Jordan Panama 6,035,000           Morocco Switzerland 2,574,000          
Libya Cyprus 4,927,000         Pakistan Panama 1,022,000           Portugal Italy 2,568,000          
Morocco Switzerland 2,574,000         Palestine Panama 966,000              Romania UAE 2,560,000          
Morocco Pakistan 797,000            Syria Panama 4,430,000           Slovakia Russia 2,520,000          
Pakistan Panama 1,022,000         Syria Panama 2,049,000           Russia Denmark 2,258,000          
Palestine Spain 1,200,000         Turkey Panama 892,000              Egypt Pakistan 2,078,000          
Palestine Syria 10,126,000       Yemen Panama 4,713,000           Spain Liechtenstein 2,076,000          
Palestine Jordan 5,188,000         Palestine Qatar 4,080,000           Italy Switzerland 2,055,000          
Palestine Qatar 4,080,000         Romania Qatar 753,000              Italy UAE 2,049,000          
Palestine Panama 966,000            Hungary Rumania 1,101,000           Syria Panama 2,049,000          
Palestine Pakistan 2,016,000         Bangladesh Russia 22,285,000         Algeria Switzerland 2,041,000          
Palestine Russia 1,550,000         Belarus Russia 3,435,000           France Lichtenstein 2,027,000          
Portugal Jordan 1,578,000         Palestine Russia 1,550,000           Palestine Pakistan 2,016,000          
Portugal Italy 2,568,000         Slovakia Russia 2,520,000           Lebanon Austria 2,006,000          
Portugal Monaco 1,996,000         Ukraine Russia 5,318,000           Jordan Turkey 2,002,000          
Qatar UAE 5,954,000         Jordan South Africa 1,047,000           Portugal Monaco 1,996,000          
Qatar Egypt 2,927,000         Jordan Spain 14,105,000         Egypt Jordan 1,995,000          
Romania UAE 2,560,000         Lebanon Spain 995,000              Ukraine Switzerland 1,983,000          
Romania Qatar 753,000            Palestine Spain 1,200,000           UAE Liechtenstein 1,955,000          
Russia Denmark 2,258,000         Algeria Switzerland 2,041,000           Various nations Malaysia 1,949,000          
Russia Ukraine 1,940,000         Egypt Switzerland 7,625,000           Russia Ukraine 1,940,000          
Russia Switzerland 3,988,000         France Switzerland 36,975,000         Jordan UAE 1,902,000          
Slovakia Russia 2,520,000         France Switzerland 10,751,000         Yugoslavia UAE 1,840,000          
Total 418,110,000     418,110,000       418,110,000       
Source: IIC  
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Basically, Table 2.10 illustrates the nations that in the end executed the oil 
contracts obtained from the Iraqi regime. The Table has three blocks. Each has three 
columns. In all Blocks, Column “contractual nations” means nations that obtained oil 
contracts from Iraq. Column “non-contractual nations” means nations that ultimately 
executed the contracts. Column “barrels transferred” means the amount of barrels that 
contractual nations transferred to non-contractual nations. Bloc I is sorted by “contractual 
nations. Bloc II is sorted by “no contractual nations”. Bloc III is sorted by “barrels 
transferred”.  
 The data show one important finding: most contractual nations transferred their 
oil contracts to “non-contractual nations”, which then executed the contracts and sold the 
oil in the global market. That is, in Bloc I, we see that Algeria transferred $2,041,000 
million worth of oil to Switzerland. Bangladesh transferred $22,285,000 million to Russia 
and $8,613,000 to Jordan. Jordan and Syria led Bloc I as they transferred eight contracts 
respectively, only that Jordan’s contracts were worth $61,576,000 million while Syria’s 
were worth $13,855,000 million. The case of Palestine is interesting because it received 
seven contracts worth $25,126 million dollars, but it transferred them to no contractual 
nations. This is rational considering that Palestine does not even have oil refineries to 
refine crude oil. Palestine actually satisfies its energy needs by importing energy from 
Israel.  
 In Bloc II, Austria received $2,006,000 million dollars worth of oil from Lebanon 
and $5,407,000 million from Libya. Cyprus obtained $3,049,000 from Lebanon, 
$4,927,000 million from Libya, $1,002,000 from various, not identified nations, and 
$26,257,000 million from the U.S. This last transfer is meaningful because the U.S. does 
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not export oil; instead, it depends on foreign oil for economic growth. In fact, bloc II 
shows that the U.S. did not receive any transfer. But why would the U.S. transfer oil 
contracts to a small nation like Cyprus? Lastly, France led bloc III with the largest 
transfer, worth $36,975,000 million dollars. Jordan followed through with $28,381,000 
million. In turn, Switzerland received both transfers to actually lead with 13, worth 
$112,571,000 million dollars, as shown in bloc II, “no contractual nations”.  
 
Conclusion 
 From the analysis, first I infer that despite its macroeconomic importance, GDP 
was not the leading motive for oil purchases under the UN sanctions regime. Instead, 
non-macroeconomic factors such as regional and illegal trade may have influenced oil 
purchases among nations in the Middle East. Second, geopolitics among permanent 
members of the UN Security Council influenced the effectiveness of the UN sanctions 
regime. The UN Security Council was divided into two blocs: the U.S. and U.K. on one 
side, and France, Russia and China on the other. This division affected the scope of the 
Program, assignment of contracts and oil purchases, as well as overall enforcement of the 
sanctions regime. Third, corporate practices such as speculation, third party 
intermediation and transfer of contracts may have also played relevant roles in terms of 
financing oil purchases and oil flows.  
One important finding is that nations and oil firms approached the UN sanctions 
regime in different and opposite ways. That is, even though the U.S.’s oil purchases were 
low, American companies were among the leading beneficiaries under the Program. For 
its part, Iraq utilized disagreements in the UN Security Council to circumvent the UN 
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sanctions regime. Iraq managed to sell $64,183,493,296 million dollars in oil, plus 
another $26 billion that the IIC affirmed Iraq bartered or exchanged for goods and 
services. The CIA calculated that “Iraq earned an additional $12 billion from kickbacks 
and surcharges associated with the UN OFF program, $19 billion from oil “cash sales” 
or smuggling, and another $230 million from other surcharge impositions” (Duelfer 
Report, p.217). The entire operation amounted to about 100 billion dollars in ten years. It 
would be fair to ask: What did Iraq do with so much money? After all, Iraq was an 
embargoed nation, supposedly with no access to global markets, financing and 
investments. In the next chapter we will see that Iraq utilized revenues from its oil sales 
in two ways. First, Iraq utilized portions of its revenues to purchase goods and services 
around the world so it could feed its people and sustain its political regime. Second, Iraq 
utilized another portion of its revenues to revitalize its economy and its military apparatus 
so it could defend itself. How did Iraq do it? Did Iraq access global markets?        
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III. AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: NATION-STATES, GLOBAL 
TRADE AND THEIR EFFECTS ON MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIMES 
 
“The question is whether regional trade blocs are building blocs or stumbling blocs to the global trade 
system”.      
                              J. Bhagwati 
 
“The highest levels of the government, including the President and the Presidential Secretary, used trade 
Protocols and other cooperative agreements after 1991 as vehicles to circumvent UN sanctions and to 
facilitate the economic recovery of Iraq”.   
           Coalition for International Justice 
 
“Iraq’s bilateral trade Protocols with neighboring states provided Saddam with his largest source of illicit 
income during UN sanctions. Just the protocol with Jordan ensured the Regime’s financial survival”.  
                                             The Duelfer Report 
 
“France questions bilateral trade unions that the US engaged in the region. We mean to say Egypt, Turkey 
and Jordan; for they were Saddam’s trade darlings during this period. Even the Office of the US Trade 
Representatives acknowledges that American exports to Jordan grew 90% between 1999- 2003 alone”. 
   
                 Statement by the French Ministry of Foreign Affair, Paris, July 22, 2003 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 The critical question in this dissertation is whether globalization helps circumvent 
sanctions regimes. The key question for Iraq was how to get around the UN sanctions 
regime and access the global market to engage in trade relations with nations and 
corporations. I argue that the nature of the global trade system helps circumvent sanctions 
regimes. Global trade is so competitive, antagonistic and unmanageable that it creates 
what Bhagwati calls “The building and stumbling blocs of the multilateral trading 
system” (Bhagwati, 1993, p. 32). Global trade is not monolithic. Global trade is rather 
fragmented, built on numerous regional and bilateral trade blocs that can either straighten 
or weaken its foundations.  
In this chapter I present evidences indicating that Iraq circumvented UN sanctions 
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regimes through regional and bilateral trade blocs. Iraq accessed global trade through 
bilateral trade agreements that it signed with numerous nations, but mainly with its 
neighbors Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey and Syria. Those nations opened up their 
markets to Iraq, and almost instantly numerous nations from around the globe followed 
through. It was a two-way trade route: Iraq exported oil to global markets through Jordan, 
Egypt, Turkey and Syria. In turn, Iraq purchased goods and services from all around the 
world by using those nations as its trade headquarters. In part, it explains why Jordan, 
Egypt, Turkey, Syria attracted so much trade during the 1990s. Above all, it calls our 
attention the fact that the U.S. also signed bilateral trade agreements with Egypt in 1999, 
Turkey in 2000, and Jordan in 2001, while the UN sanctions regime was still being 
enforced. It prompted the French Minister of Foreign Affair to emphasize in July 23, 
2003, what the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (www.ustr.gov) had reported: 
American exports to Jordan grew by 90% between 1999 and 2003; the year that the U.S. 
led military coalition ousted Saddam Hussein. 
Consequently, as in chapter II, I use nations-states as the level of analysis, only 
that I focus on trade, one of the main means of globalization. First, I analyze how nation-
states approached global trade with Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. Second, I 
examine how the nature of global trade allowed Iraq to circumvent the UN sanctions 
regime. For that purpose, I rely on data collected from the IIC, CFIJ, GAO, and the 
Duelfer Reports.   
 
Global Trade 
 Global trade has historically been the cause of geopolitical conflicts among 
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nation-states. David S. Landes explains in “The Wealth and Poverty of Nations” that the 
quest for dominance over global trade led to the emergence of the Spanish, French, and 
British empires and the creation of the colonial system (Landes, 1999). Most colonial 
wars of the 1700s and 1800s aimed at securing the seas for commercial navigation and 
new markets. In “Imperialism, the Last Stage of Capitalism”, Lenin argues that disputes 
over trade cause wars (Lenin, 1996). He saw competition over trade as an intrinsic trait of 
global capitalism, which would in time produce an all-out war among world powers. 
President Wilson too saw in unfair trade one of the causes of wars. He argued that 
protectionism (closed markets, export quotas, and high tariffs among others) were among 
the causes of WWI. He thought that freedom of the seas and freedom from trade barriers 
were the basis for a lasting peace among nations, so he included them both in his 
Fourteen Points Plan for Peace. But protectionism prevailed and, for many, led to the 
collapse of global banking in 1929 and the economic depression that followed afterwards.  
 In fact, the Bretton Woods Accords enacted during the last years of WWII tried to 
correct the malpractices incurred in global trade during the 1920s and 1930s.  Ikemberry 
(2006) argues that free global trade was what American officials had in mind when they 
conceived the European and Asian blocs after WWII. He quotes American officials as 
saying that “Long-term American prosperity required open markets, unhindered access 
to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much – if not all- of Eurasia along liberal-
capitalist lines” (Ikemberry, 2006, p. 151).  
For his part, J. Bhagwati (1999) states that right after the Cold War the tendency 
was to build global trade on bilateral and regional trade blocs. Examples are regional 
trade blocs such NAFTA, Mercosur, EU and hundreds of bilateral trade agreements that, 
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according to the WTO, have been signed by nations during the last 20 years, a trend that 
remains to this day.  
 In effect, Ikemberry points out that the current global trade system “Is really an 
American order built on four pillars: open markets, social bargains, intergovernmental 
institutions and cooperative security” (Ikemberry, 2006, p. 145). Global trade “Is 
organized around American-led regional security, alliances in Europe and Asia, open 
and multilateral economic relations, several layers of regional and global multilateral 
institutions built around American power” (Ikemberry, 2006, p. 145).  
The two quotes imply that: a) global trade can be unstable and create global 
conflicts; b) cooperation and regionalization by trade blocs can lead to common security. 
The quest for free trade is so challenging that nation-states often link it to domestic 
political stability. Some nations even link it to national security and survival, as it was the 
case of Iraq. Iraq engaged in bilateral trade with its neighbors as a means to engage in 
regional trade, reach global markets and secure its survival as a nation. Thus, trade and 
security complement each other. By the same token, integration vis-à-vis cooperation 
aims at both trade and national security. That is, bilateral and regional integration beefs 
up national security vis-à-vis cooperation in issues such as bilateral and regional trade.  
The rationale is that bilateral and regional trade has domino effects: they change 
trade patterns, which then lead to integration of production and labor across borders, 
which ultimately lead to negotiated trade policies. It all leads to a common market in 
which common security is the guarantor of stable trade.  
 Two theories are vital to explicate the sudden collaboration among Iraq and its 
neighbors, mainly Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Egypt and Iran under the UN sanction regime. 
84 
The two theories are interdependency theory and trade theory.  
The Lessons of Interdependency Theory 
 Interdependency theory states that nations are interconnected through multiple 
and complex linkages, which include political, economic, technological, legal, religious, 
ideological, ecological and others (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Nations are so interconnected 
that policies enacted in one nation could cross boundaries and trigger social, economic, 
and political reactions in other nations. Second, interdependence theory relies on two 
basic points. For one, states are not the sole unit of analysis. Various non-state-actors 
(NSAs) shape global agendas, among which are corporations, NGOs, and international 
institutions such as the UN and WTO. Actors behave according to their interests. They 
make decisions based on cost-benefit analysis aimed at securing the best outcomes for 
themselves. But there are multiple channels of relations among actors. Keohane and Nye 
(2001) call them interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational channels of relations. 
Since there are also NSAs, we must pay attention to non-state channels as well. Another 
mark of interdependency is the lack of hierarchy in a global agenda (Keohane & Nye, 
2001). Global politics implies diversity of issues, from security and trade to governance, 
finance, drug trafficking, the environment, and many others. Yet, their priority in the 
global agenda depends on factors such as severity of the issue, media attention, coalitions 
forming, negotiation capabilities, and other variables. In an interdependent world, non-
state and state actors clash over agenda setting. An issue in a particular nation may lead 
to a regional and even global crisis, redefining regional and global political agendas. 
Lastly, interdependence theory does not assign much weight to the role of the military, 
mainly when dealing with trade (Keohane & Nye, 2001). Military confrontation does not 
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fix the problems of bilateral, regional and global trade. In the case of Iraq, enforcement of 
the UN sanctions regime was a priority for both the U.S. and U.K., so they assigned it to 
their armies. The U.S. and U.K. had military control over Northern and Southern Iraqis 
territories, enforced by a naval blockade and two no-fly zones. Yet, Iraq kept trading with 
its neighbors. Iraq managed to rebuild its economy and resist 13 years of sanctions.  
Two examples illustrate how interdependency among the U.S. and nations in the 
Middle East undermined the UN sanctions against Iraq. They are Turkey and Lebanon.  
First, the UN sanctions created a political dilemma for the U.S. and Turkey. 
Turkey is a member of NATO. As such, the U.S. used its territories to invade Iraq in 
1991. Now the U.S. was using Turkish military bases to enforce the no-fly zone in 
Northern Iraq. Even so, for its geographic position, Turkey had for centuries been a vital 
trade route between Europe and the Middle East. The UN sanctions cut off the route and 
halted trade along the Iraqi-Turkey border, affecting the economies of Turkey, Kurdistan, 
Jordan and Lebanon, three American allies in the region. The economic crisis led to the 
rise of a huge black market along the Turkish-Iraqi border. Trade along the Turkish-Iraqi 
border was so good that even the PKK benefited from it. The U.S. and U.K. tried to look 
the other way, but Turkey did not allow it. The CFIJ summed it up by stating that 
“Turkey claims that the impoverished and rebel-ridden southeast is enjoying a boost from 
the $300 million diesel trade. The trade has been tolerated by the U.S. and UK in part for 
this reason, in part because it has been brokered by and has handsomely benefited the 
Iraqi Kurds, but it is benefiting Kurd rebels as well who use the money to launch a 
guerrilla type offensive against Turkey” (CFIJ, 2002, p. 28).  
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The CFIJ was referring to the Iraqi-Kurds and Turkish-Kurds. Turkey had no 
problem with Iraqi-Kurds, but it did have serious issues with Turkish-Kurds organized 
around the PKK. Turkey views the PKK as a terrorist group. The PKK claimed a piece of 
Turkish territory for itself, so Turkey treated it as threat to its national security. It became 
a political dilemma for the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. had to offer a solution to Turkey 
without affecting Iraqi-Kurds and without benefiting the Turkish Kurds. The solution 
was: 1) allow Turkey to go after the PKK without crossing the Iraq border; 2) allow 
trade, namely smuggling, of oil and other goods along the Turkish-Iraqi border for it 
benefitted a key protégés of the U.S. in the zone: the Iraqi Kurds and their KDP; 3) allow 
Turkey to open a free trade zone along its border with Iraq. In all, the American plan had 
mixed results. The plan mostly legalized contraband along the Turkish-Iraqi borders. The 
CFIJ argued that “The Iraq-Turkey trade agreement was a rationalization and expansion 
of preexisting private-sector contracts along the Turkish-Iraqi border” (CFIJ, 2002, p. 
32). The Plan did alleviate the economic conditions of Iraqi-Kurds and increased Turkish 
trade opportunities in the region to make up for losses of revenues to truckers and 
smugglers. However, Saddam Hussein took advantage of it and began to pay Turkish and 
Iraqi-Kurds for smuggling. The CIA estimated that smuggling represented about $1 
billion yearly for Iraq (Duelfer Report, Saddam Strategic Intent, p. 12).   
Second, the case of Lebanon is as telling. Lebanon benefitted from the UN 
sanctions regime against Iraq vis-à-vis Syria, a political enemy of both the U.S. and Iraq. 
But Syria allied to Iraq to upset the U.S., which in turn needed Syria to: a) cooperate with 
the Israel-Palestinian peace negotiations; b) keep under control Hezbollah and other 
guerrilla groups in southern Lebanon but without upsetting Lebanon’s political stability. 
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To return the favor to Syria, the U.S. allowed illicit trade along the Syrian-Iraqi border. 
The CFIJ noted that “The US recognized that cooperation is critical to succeed in 
negotiating peace for the Middle East, including stability in Lebanon, and has therefore 
been reluctant to demand that President Bashar Assad make good on his year old 
promise that he would crack down on his country’s illicit trade with Baghdad… these 
included moving Iraqi oil to Lebanon and, in return, facilitating the transshipment 
though Syria of Lebanese goods” (CFIJ, 2002, p. 32). Such political maneuverings shows 
the level of interconnection between geopolitics and economics, and among nations.  
 
The Lessons of Trade Theory 
Like interdependency, trade theory explains unexpected cooperation of Middle 
Eastern nations with Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. Trade theory in fact explains 
the level of economic interconnections among nations in the Middle East, mainly among 
political archenemies like Iraq and Iran, all which jeopardized the UN sanctions regime.    
Krugman, (1979), Lancaster (1980) and Helpman (1981) introduce trade theory to 
explain global trade after World War II. Explicitly, they look at three features of global 
trade: a) trade among industrialized nations; b) trade among non-industrialized nations; c) 
the ratio of trade relative to GDP. Trade theory builds on David Ricardo’s comparative 
advantage theory, which states that nations maximize trade when they produce goods 
with resources available to them. But Ricardo’s theory led some scholars to assume that 
nations without natural resources are naturally unfitted for global trade. Scholars like 
Ohlin and Samuelson think differently. They argue that factors of proportions like labor, 
capital, industrial capacity and the size of a market can lead to a comparative advantage. 
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Then, Krugman elaborates on Ohlin-Samuelson’s model to include “unconventional” 
factors such as geography, namely the distance from production to consumption markets. 
For Krugman, geography is essential for decreasing the cost of trade. First, geographical 
proximity between production and consumption markets decreases transportation costs, 
mainly between nations of common borders. Geographical proximity is also central for 
factors such as movement of capital and people. Krugman argues that “When people and 
capital can move, however, factor proportions are themselves something to be explained” 
(Krugman, 1991, p. 491).   
Free movement of capital and people within a specific geography or region brings 
down the cost of transportation and labor. In fact, cheap transportation and labor helped 
Iraq engage in smuggling with Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Iran. Transportation 
and labor were so cheap that although Iraq imposed all sorts of taxes and fees, smuggling 
was among the main sources of revenue for Iraq, and trucking became one of the most 
lucrative industries under the UN sanctions regime. Trucking brought about $600 million 
dollars every year into the Kurdish economy only. I present two examples, one is Turkey 
and the second is Iran.   
 
Table 3.1 – Oil Smuggled into Turkey by Iraq 
# of oil 
Barrels per 
Day 
Iraq's Sales 
Price in USD
Transportation 
Fees in USD
Iraq's Final 
Sales in USD
Price at Global 
Markets in 
USD
Global 
Market's Final 
Sales
     100,000               21                    3    2,400,000                25 2,500,000        
  110,000               21                    3    2,640,000                25 2,750,000        
     110,000              22                    3    2,750,000                25 2,750,000        
     110,000               22                   4    2,860,000                26 2,860,000        
     110,000               22                    5    2,970,000               27 2,970,000         
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Sources: IIC, CFIJ and Duelfer Reports 
 In Table 3.1, I explain the price of Iraqi oil smuggled into Turkey by Iraq. Note 
that Iraq had ample room for maneuvering. Iraq could manipulate: a) production of oil 
per day (Column I); b) sell price (in Column II); c) transportation fees (in Column III). I 
bold Iraq’s tree choices for better understanding. Now, note that Iraq can keep its sell 
price (in Column II) below the price in the global market (Column V) by a $3 or $4 
dollars. It would not affect Iraq’s revenues. Iraq can even charge $3 to $4 dollars more to 
make up for transportation costs since its final sales (in Column IV) do not go over sales 
in the global market (Column VI). Iraq can do so due to three comparative advantages: 1) 
Iraq has plenty of oil, but Turkey does not; 2) Iraq has a border with Turkey, securing 
low transportation costs; 3) Kurds transported Iraq’s oil to Turkey, and the Kurdish 
economy relied on Iraq’s trade with Turkey. Iraq in fact controlled Kurdish labor costs. 
Yet, Iraq has two other advantages: a) Turkey’s excellent infrastructures to refine Iraqi 
crude oil; b) Turkey’s geographical position with respect to Europe, the second largest oil 
consumer of imported oil. As I explained in Chapter II, most of the oil Iraq smuggled 
ended up in European markets. Still, the next example is more telling for it involves Iran, 
Iraq’s political archenemy.  
 
Table 3.2 – Diesel Smuggled into Iran by Iraq 
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# of Oil 
Barrels per 
Day
Iraq's Sell 
Price in 
USD
Transportation 
Fees in USD
Iraq's Final 
Sales in USD
Price at 
Global 
Markets in 
USD
Global 
Market's 
Final Sales
        100,000                  11                          3       1,400,000                   16 1,600,000      
     110,000                  12                          3       1,650,000                   17 1,870,000      
        110,000                13                          3       1,760,000                   18 1,980,000      
        110,000                  14                         4       1,980,000                   19 2,090,000      
        110,000                  15                          5       2,200,000                  20 2,200,000       
Sources: IIC, CFIJ 
Like in the previous example, here Iraq had three choices. Iraq can increase: a) oil 
production per day (Column I); b) sale price (Column II); c) transportation fees (in 
Column III). In all, the increases never lead to final sales (Column IV) higher than final 
sales at global markets (Column VI). But this case is relevant for four main reasons. First, 
Iraq and Iran are oil rich nations, but they do not have infrastructures to convert it into 
gasoline; second, Iraq and Iran have common borders; thirdly, Iraq and Iran have a 
common enemy: the U.S. On the other hand, Iraq has a comparative advantage over Iran. 
Iraq has borders with Turkey, and Turkey does have industrial capacity to refine crude 
oil. Note that at the time, Iran could not get gasoline from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both 
Iran’s neighbors and the two largest gasoline producers in the region. Iran, a political 
enemy of the U.S., does not have good political relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
two key American political allies in the region. Iran, to this date, does not have refinery 
capacity. It subsidizes and rations its gasoline.   
Accordingly, Iraq and Iran have good reasons to work together to circumvent the 
UN sanctions against Iraq. Cooperation here consists in Iraq using Iraqi-Kurds to ship its 
oil to Turkey, which then converts it into gasoline. Iraqi-Kurds smuggled the gasoline 
into Iran via Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi regime. Here, low transportation and labor 
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costs guarantee low gasoline prices for Iran. Iraq itself makes a profit by taxing truckers 
for crossing Iraqi territories, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of dollars that 
Kurd truckers spend in Iraqi goods and services while crossing Iraqi territories. In total, 
the gains illustrate how geographic proximity between production and consumption 
centers can decrease transportation and labor costs, which in turn lead to a comparative 
advantage as explained by trade theory.  
All those factors can certainly contribute to the “natural” emergence of a regional 
trade blocs. In fact, it is Krugman who coins the notion of natural trade blocs, which he 
ironically defines in terms of a governmental policy. Krugman states that “The low cost 
of transportation at regional levels makes regional trade blocs a natural and beneficial 
policy” (Krugman, 1991, p. 485). That is, policy makers can build bilateral and regional 
trade blocs by using factors of proportions such as geography, culture, language and 
others as means to comparative advantages. It helps explain trade relations between Iraq, 
Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Egypt under the sanctions regime. Table 3.3 illustrates how 
those relations weakened the UN sanction against Iraq.  
 
Table 3.3 – Trade Contracts under the UN Sanctions Regime 
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       Block I                      Block II
Nations Contracts Percent      Exports in Percent Nations Contracts Percent      Exports in
  USD millions   USD millions
Jordan 2515 13.78 2,548,005,219  7.2800  Russia 1205 6.60 3,669,047,718 
France 2149 11.78 3,132,610,302  8.9500  France 2149 11.78 3,132,610,302 
Turkey 1280 7.01   1,649,514,851  4.710    Egypt 847 4.64 2,962,660,858 
Italy 1249 6.84   1,091,074,655  3.110    Jordan 2515 13.78 2,548,005,219 
Russia 1205 6.60   3,669,047,718  10.480  Australia 68 0.37 2,336,339,178 
UAE 1070 5.86   1,944,219,047  5.550    Vietnam 205 1.12 1,951,470,213 
Egypt 847 4.64   2,962,660,858  8.460    UAE 1070 5.86 1,944,219,047 
India 847 4.64   1,176,830,860  3.360    China 810 4.44 1,839,790,132 
China 810 4.44   1,839,790,132  5.250    Turkey 1280 7.01 1,649,514,851 
Syria 648 3.55   1,544,681,993  4.410    Syria 648 3.55 1,544,681,993 
Lebanon 550 3.01   770,030,253     2.200    India 847 4.64 1,176,830,860 
Germany 516 2.83   535,821,022     1.530    Italy 1249 6.84 1,091,074,655 
Belgium 422 2.31   269,062,223     0.760    Tunisia 329 1.80 1,056,700,795 
Switzerland 331 1.81   660,038,383     1.8800  Lebanon 550 3.01 770,030,253    
Tunisia 329 1.80   1,056,700,795  3.0100  Thailand 59 0.32 717,959,615    
Spain 287 1.57   280,446,290     0.8000  Switzerland 331 1.81 660,038,383    
Malaysia 242 1.33   581,161,511     1.6600  Saudi Arabia 165 0.90 654,764,093     
93 
Indonesia 232 1.27      230,831,644            0.6596      Malaysia 242 6.19 581,161,511                   10.9942
Austria 226 1.24      327,446,260            0.9357      Germany 516 13.20 535,821,022                   10.1365
UK 223 1.22      153,819,313            0.4395      Algeria 154 3.94 442,324,147                   8.3678
Vietnam 205 1.12      1,951,470,213         5.5762      Austria 226 5.78 327,446,260                   6.1945
Saudi Arabia 165 0.90      654,764,093            1.8709      Spain 287 7.34 280,446,290                   5.3054
Algeria 154 0.84      442,324,147            1.2639      Belgium 422 10.79 269,062,223                   5.0900
Sri Lanka 152 0.83      84,078,140              0.2402      Morocco 80 2.05 262,928,365                   4.9740
Cyprus 147 0.81      87,946,799              0.2513      Belarus 76 1.94 251,127,327                   4.7508
Denmark 134 0.73      150,734,159            0.4307      Netherlands 78 1.99 235,312,350                   4.4516
Oman 134 0.73      160,733,569            0.4593      US 41 1.05 234,105,616                   4.4287
Sweden 110 0.60      186,404,505            0.5326      Indonesia 232 5.93 230,831,644                   4.3668
Morocco 80 0.44      262,928,365            0.7513      Sweden 110 2.81 186,404,505                   3.5263
Yemen 80 0.44      101,257,783            0.2893      Oman 134 3.43 160,733,569                   3.0407
Netherlands 78 0.43      235,312,350            0.6724      UK 223 5.70 153,819,313                   2.9099
Belarus 76 0.42      251,127,327            0.7176      Denmark 134 3.43 150,734,159                   2.8515
Australia 68 0.37      2,336,339,178         6.6759      Pakistan 66 1.69 102,606,433                   1.9411
Pakistan 66 0.36      102,606,433            0.2932      Yemen 80 2.05 101,257,783                   1.9156
South Korea 63 0.35      49,304,315              0.1409      Japan 43 1.10 98,080,939                     1.8555
Thailand 59 0.32      717,959,615            2.0515      Cyprus 147 3.76 87,946,799                     1.6638
Greece 47 0.26      41,920,115              0.1198      Sri Lanka 152 3.89 84,078,140                     1.5906
Japan 43 0.24      98,080,939              0.2803      South Africa 27 0.69 59,742,802                     1.1302
US 41 0.22      234,105,616            0.6689      Brazil 21 0.54 51,367,238                     0.9718
Finland 33 0.18      6,686,514                0.0191      South Korea 63 1.61 49,304,315                     0.9327
Canada 28 0.15      33,798,631              0.0966      Greece 47 1.20 41,920,115                     0.7930
Romania 28 0.15      37,879,449              0.1082      Sudan 13 0.33 39,404,573                     0.7454
South Africa 27 0.15      59,742,802              0.1707      Romania 28 0.72 37,879,449                     0.7166
Ireland 25 0.14      14,596,678              0.0417      Yugoslavia 19 0.49 34,901,480                     0.6603
Bahrain 21 0.12      10,080,214              0.0288      Canada 28 0.72 33,798,631                     0.6394
Brazil 21 0.12      51,367,238              0.1468      Qatar 8 0.20 19,847,964                     0.3755
Bulgaria 19 0.10      13,354,097              0.0382      Ireland 25 0.64 14,596,678                     0.2761
Ukraine 19 0.10      10,740,679              0.0307      Libya 6 0.15 13,846,445                     0.2619
Yugoslavia 19 0.10      34,901,480              0.0997      Bulgaria 19 0.49 13,354,097                     0.2526
Liechtenstein 14 0.08      8,865,457                0.0253      Ukraine 19 0.49 10,740,679                     0.2032
Hungary 13 0.07      8,691,371                0.0248      Bahrain 21 0.54 10,080,214                     0.1907
Slovenia 13 0.07      3,757,494                0.0107      Myamar 4 0.10 9,915,821                       0.1876
Sudan 13 0.07      39,404,573              0.1126      Liechtenstein 14 0.36 8,865,457                       0.1677
Cuba 12 0.07      2,598,541                0.0074      Hungary 13 0.33 8,691,371                       0.1644
Croacia 8 0.04      1,424,021                0.0041      Finland 33 0.84 6,686,514                       0.1265
Iran 8 0.04      6,317,729                0.0181      Singapore 7 0.18 6,331,519                       0.1198
Qatar 8 0.04      19,847,964              0.0567      Iran 8 0.20 6,317,729                       0.1195
Singapore 7 0.04      6,331,519                0.0181      Macedonia 1 0.03 6,196,213                       0.1172
Libya 6 0.03      13,846,445              0.0396      Luxembourg 2 0.05 5,692,990                       0.1077
Poland 5 0.03      4,229,195                0.0121      Poland 5 0.13 4,229,195                       0.0800
Myamar 4 0.02      9,915,821                0.0283      Kenya 1 0.03 3,908,984                       0.0739
New Zealand 3 0.02      744,366                   0.0021      Slovenia 13 0.33 3,757,494                       0.0711
Argentina 2 0.01      119,185                   0.0003      Cuba 12 0.31 2,598,541                       0.0492
Luxembourg 2 0.01      5,692,990                0.0163      Bangladesh 1 0.03 2,426,485                       0.0459
Portugal 2 0.01      613,791                   0.0018      Monaco 1 0.03 1,995,014                       0.0377
Slovakia 2 0.01      1,401,378                0.0040      Croacia 8 0.20 1,424,021                       0.0269  
Source: IIC 
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 Table 3.3 shows the largest nation-exporters to Iraq. The Table has two blocs 
divided into five columns, which are nations, contracts and percentage of contracts per 
nation, exports in USD million, and percentages of total exports per nation. In the Table, 
first note that the number of contracts does not always render large volumes of exports. 
Jordan, Turkey and Italy rank first, third, and fourth respectively in Bloc I, but they rank 
fourth, ninth and twelfth respectively in Bloc II. Russia and Egypt rank fifth and seventh 
in Bloc I. Russia accounts for 10.6% of all contracts, leading exports under the UN 
sanction regime. Egypt jumps from seventh to third with contracts worth nearly $3 
billion, 8.7% of all exports. The case of Vietnam is as notable for it goes from twenty 
first in Bloc I to sixth in Bloc II. Yet, the main finding is that Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and 
Syria are among the top ten in both blocs. They are Iraqi neighbors, and they have 
historically had good trade relations with Iraq. I argue that their common trade relations 
and geography facilitated the signing of bilateral trade agreements, which d’ facto created 
a regional trade bloc. To illustrate it, I present Table 3.4.  
 
Table 3.4 – Trade Performance of Middle East Nations under UN Sanctions Regime  
         Bloc I        Bloc II
Countries  Ave. GDP       Exports in Countries  Ave. GDP    Exports in
1992-2003 in USD     USD 1992-2003 in USD   USD 
S. Arabia 154,469,346,725         654,764,093         Egypt 53,065,439,231           2,962,660,858    
Turkey 117,111,376,923         1,649,514,851      Jordan 5,188,421,231             2,548,005,219    
Egypt 53,065,439,231           2,962,660,858      UEA 38,904,620,000           1,944,219,047    
UEA 38,904,620,000           1,944,219,047      Turkey 117,111,376,923         1,649,514,851    
Syria 10,865,513,846           1,544,681,993      Syria 10,865,513,846           1,544,681,993    
Lebanon 10,442,206,923           770,030,253         Lebanon 10,442,206,923           770,030,253       
Qatar 9,323,203,846             19,847,964           S. Arabia 154,469,346,725         654,764,093       
Jordan 5,188,421,231             2,548,005,219      Qatar 9,323,203,846             19,847,964         
Total 399,370,128,725         12,093,724,278    399,370,128,725         12,093,724,278   
Source: IIC Report 
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 Table 3.4 summarizes exports of Middle East nations to Iraq under the UN 
sanctions. The Table has two blocs. Bloc I has two columns. One is for GDP. The other is 
for exports. Whereas Bloc I is sorted by GDP, Bloc II is sorted by export volumes. Note 
that I include Turkey and Egypt in this table although one is located in Europe and the 
other in North Africa, but not far from Iraq. Egypt is a Muslin nation. Its trade relations 
with Iraq are as old as their culture and religions. When the sanction regime was enacted 
in 1991, Egypt was Iraq’s main trade partner after Russia and France. For their part, 
Turkey and Iraq have common borders. They are both Muslim nations with a large 
population of Kurds. Their trade relations date back to ancient times, long before they 
were part of the Persian and Ottoman Empires. Still, Table 3.4 also shows that, in most 
cases, nations with borders with Iraq scored higher exports. Note that GDP does not 
correlate with exports. Egypt has the third largest GDP in the region and leads in exports 
per nation. The UAE has the fourth largest GDP and ranks third in exports. Syria and 
Lebanon occupy the same positions in terms of GDP and exports. However, Saudi Arabia 
has the largest GDP but ranks sixth in exports. Jordan has the smallest GDP, but it 
exports more than Saudi Arabia. Turkey has the second largest GDP but ranks fourth in 
exports. Lastly, consider that nations from the EU exported about $8 billion to Iraq, $4 
billion less than what all nations in Table 3.4 exported even though they have smaller 
GDPs. Middle Eastern nations outdid the members of the UN Security Council by nearly 
$3 billion. In all, based on Tables 3.3 and 3.4, I argue that, as the CIA put it, 
“Geographic proximity, cultural affinity, and historical economic relationship explain 
why Turkey, Jordan, and Syria reached formal trade Protocols with Iraq in contravention 
of UN resolutions” (Duelfer Report, Saddam Strategic Intent, p. 9).  
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Krugman (1979, 1991) and Samuelson (1949, 1983) explain it better than the 
CIA. Krugman treats geography, culture, and ethnicity not as mere factors but as 
determinants in regional trade. He incorporates what he calls determinants in his inter-
continental trading costs versus regional trading costs model, from which he infers that 
nations of common determinants form a natural regional bloc (Krugman, 1991, p.490). 
Krugman would argue, I think, that such was the case of Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran, 
and even Lebanon and Egypt under the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. For his part, 
Samuelson would argue that trade among Iraq, Jordan, Turkey and Syria was 
endogenous, that it consolidated after hundreds of years of economic interactions due to 
common borders, cultures, customs, language and other historic patterns. Samuelson adds 
that, “When patters are endogenous, small initial differences can make big effects in 
terms of costs and profits” (Samuelson, 1983, p. 57). I think that it is in that sense that 
Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iraq constitutes one common market, and as Samuelson 
states, “Trade costs shape the pattern of trade…, and costs are well explained by 
geography and a set for regional trade patterns” (Samuelson, 1983, p. 74). 
Of course, the Middle East was not the only regional trade block that Iraq utilized 
to circumvent the UN sanctions and reach global markets. Iraq also used the former 
Communist Bloc, in particular the bloc of nations that formed former Soviet Union. Here 
I define the Communist Bloc not only for its political and social configuration but also in 
terms of an economic system highly independent from the rest of the global market. The 
former Soviet Union brought Eastern European communist nations into the Soviet 
economy and a trade treaty known as the CAMECON. The problem is that those nations 
developed close trade relations with Iraq during the 1970s and 80s. The Soviet Union 
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invested heavily in Iraq’s oil, construction and military industries. As I showed in 
Chapter II, the Soviet Union alone was the second most important trade partner to Iraq 
before Gulf War of 1991. When the Soviet Union fell and Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Byelorussia emerged as independent republics, they did not break trade relations with 
Iraq. They were under such an economic crisis that they needed as many trade partners as 
possible. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Byelorussia took over the trade relations and 
contracts that the Soviet Union had with Iraq. For Iraq, it was a fortunate confluence of 
historic circumstances. Iraq could not afford to lose one trade partner under the UN 
sanctions. Certainly, it did not lose Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and other ex Soviet 
republics. In this Dissertation, Chapters V and VI in particular, we will see that ex Soviet 
republics continued to trade with Iraq until the final fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003.    
 All in all, regional economies make up the global economic system. They are the 
base of the global economy and the strongest link to global trade. Both global and 
regional trade is built on interconnected, interdependent transnational and corporate 
relations. They aim at opening markets, tearing down trade barriers, and enacting fairer 
trade policies at regional levels. Some scholars see regional trade as a desertion from 
global trade. But for Krugman, global and regional trade can function in harmony. He 
sees regional trade as “Improving in nature and likely to have a positive impact on the 
global trade system” (Krugman and Obstfel, 2003, p .77). The question is, as Bhagwati 
summarizes it, “Whether regional trade blocs are building blocks or stumbling blocks to 
the global trade system” (Bhagwati, 1993, p. 42). For Iraq, regional trade under the UN 
sanctions regime was a building block aimed at circumventing the UN sanctions regime 
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and reaching global markets. For Iraq’s regional trade partners too, regional trade was a 
building block to counterbalance the effects of UN sanctions on their economies.  
 
The Politics of Bilateral Trade 
  
 The UN sanctions against Iraq had a malign and benign domino effect in the 
Middle East. It had malign effects because Iraq’s neighboring economies suffered as 
much as Iraq’s. It had benign effects because as Iraq’s economy improved, Iraq’s 
neighboring economies resurged and the entire region enjoyed a relative economic boom. 
The Iraqi economy became more interconnected to its neighbors through a series of trade 
protocols which in turn led to more solid political interconnectness. The result was a new 
political map for the Middle East in detriment to the UN sanctions regime, the UN, and 
the U.S. and its allies.      
Bilateral trade protocols are a means to more bilateral trade. Bilateral trade 
protocols are biding contracts between two nations of common commercial interests. The 
two nations agree to discuss and implement a set of common goals related to bilateral 
trade (Bhagwati, Krishna & Panagariya, 1999, p. 64). The goal is to promote bilateral 
trade by minimizing undesirable bilateral competition between each other while 
maximizing comparative advantages. Each nation agrees to give each other some sort of 
special treatment in terms of tariffs, export-imports quotas and discounts among other 
benefits. For example, in the bilateral trade protocols that Iraq signed with Syria and 
Egypt, Iraq agreed to increase crude oil supplies to Syria and Egypt only after those two 
nations accepted a drastic decrease in taxes to agricultural and construction products that 
Iraq purchased from them (CFIJ, p. 55). Iraq agreed to sign a bilateral trade protocol with 
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Turkey only after Turkey agreed to meet one key Iraqi demand: lift the embargo on 
jewelry and other high ticket items that the Iraqi regime needed, so it could reward its 
most loyal servicemen (CFIJ, p. 55).  
In general, bilateral trade protocols do not cover all economic sectors, goods and 
services, which are limited to the rules and items of the protocols. Also, bilateral trade 
protocols are limited by time, meaning that they are valid for one, two or three years, 
after which the two parties can either renegotiate the terms of the Protocol or just opt out 
of it. For instance, Iraq signed its first trade protocol with Jordan in 1983 (CFIJ, p. 57). It 
was the largest trade protocol Iraq ever signed although it was limited to the trade of Iraqi 
oil for Jordanian grains. It contained a clause to allow both parties to amend it, include 
more goods and increase trade quotas (CFIJ, p. 57). The Protocol became inactive in 
1991, but in 1992 Iraq and Jordan renegotiated it based on that Clause. By 2003, it 
became a full Trade Agreement valid for 10 years and renegotiable every 2 years. The 
Agreement accounted for 94 Jordanian goods and 27 Iraqi products, of which 21 were oil 
derivatives (CFIJ, p. 57). The new Iraqi government has not ratified the Agreement.     
Note that bilateral trade can have positive effects on political relations between 
bilateral trading partners. Bilateral trade usually translates into political cooperation on 
wider range of issues. For example, by 1998, the good trade relations between Iraq and 
Jordan began to translate into good political relations. Relations improved so much that 
Iraq invited Jordanian Prime Minister Ali Abdul Ragheb to visit Iraq, the first visit to Iraq 
of any Arab Prime Minister since the enactment of the UN sanctions regime (CFIJ, p. 58; 
Duelfer Report, p. 88).  
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In November 2000, the Prime Minister landed in Bagdad. He carried a message 
from the King of Jordan that read: “Jordan would no longer comply with UN Resolution 
867” (CFIJ, p. 58). To confirm it, he publicly declared that “Jordan’s expansion of trade 
with Iraq was the government’s prime objective” (CFIJ, p. 58), and for that purpose “A 
Jordan-Iraqi company examines expanding land transport fleet, and that the General 
Assemble of Iraqi-Jordanian land Transport Company would meet in Bagdad” (CFIJ, p. 
58). In February 16, 2001, Iraq News Agency and the Jordan Times reported in 
headlines: “King, Crown Prince meets with Iraqi transport minister.” Two weeks later, 
Jordan expelled Lloyd’s Register, the company that UN had designated to monitor and 
audit the enforcement of the UN sanctions against Iraq (CFIJ, p. 59). On the other hand, 
to show that Jordan was still a moderate nation, King Abdullah travelled to Kuwait where 
he made a conciliatory speech. The King also sent a note to Israel and Saudi Arabia, two 
key Jordan trade partners but Iraqi rivals. He declared to the Jerusalem Post that “Iraqi 
exports to Israel are not out of the question.” He was responding to rumors that “Israel 
had made a tentative agreement to import oil from Iraq via Jordan (CFIJ, p. 59). In the 
case of Saudi Arabia, he offered subsidized oil for Jordan. But oil was not a concern to 
Jordan; after all, it was getting cheap oil from Iraq. Jordan’s real concern was its 
agricultural and agro-industrial exports to Iraq, which accounted for near 34% of Jordan 
GDP (CFIJ, p. 59). 
The U.S. did not like what Jordan was doing, so it accused Jordan of violating the 
UN sanction regime against Iraq and took over enforcement of the sanctions in Jordan 
territories. The U.S. and UK began to patrol and inspect Jordan ports, prompting a 
Jordanian official to declare that: “What we are experiencing is a blockade against a 
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non-sanctioned nation” (CFIJ, p. 58). U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
travelled to Amman on two occasions to demand “Effective enforcing of the sanctions, 
only them the US would recall its patrols from Jordan ports” (CFIJ, p. 58). Yet, Jordan 
resisted the pressure and joined the large group of nations that by the year 2000 were 
openly opposing the UN sanctions against Iraq. High level Jordanian officials voiced 
Jordan’s position, and some of them travelled to Bagdad to show public support for Iraq.   
 
Global Trade with Iraq during the Sanctions Regime 
 Global trade is about trade as much as it is about politics. It is so because there are 
many parties involved. Nations, corporations, states’ agencies, civic organizations and 
individuals, they all have some interests vested in trade. So they all, one way or the other, 
participate in trade politics. That is why trade politics is not monolithic but fragmented 
according to trade interests. For its part, global trade is divided into regions, sub-regions, 
blocs and sectors, resembling the world’s political map. If 20 years ago there were a first, 
second, and third world, today there are developing and developed nations. If 20 years 
ago there were a couple of trading blocs, namely nations allied to the U.S. and nations 
allied to the former Soviet Union, today there is about a dozen of them. Trade blocs act 
and interact under the umbrella of globalization. They are interconnected and 
interdependent. Despite all the grouping and subgrouping, there is just one global 
economic system, namely the capitalist system. It all undermines a sanctions regime, 
even if it is multilateral, enforced by the UN with the support of the U.S., namely the 
most powerful nation in the world.  
 Indeed, in chapter II, I explained how Iraq obtained about $75 billion from oil 
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sales. Evidences suggest that those revenues allowed Iraq to: 1) access and engage in 
trade relations in the global economy; 2) increase purchases in global markets; 3) 
reactivate its economy; 4) increase its expenditures. Chart 3.1 shows Iraq’s budgetary and 
expenditures under the UN sanctions regime.    
 
Chart 3.1 – Budget and Expenditure 
                                                                                                    
                                                            
Source: the Duelfer Report  
  
The Chart is a representation of Iraq’s budget and expenditures from 1991 to 
2003, the timeframe of the UN sanctions against Ira. The blue line represents Iraq’s 
budget while the red represents Iraq’s expenditures. Notice that Iraq’s budget fell sharply 
from 1991 to 1992, right after the Gulf War, and that it stagnated between 1993 and 
1994. The GDP per capita fell from $2,304 to $495 dollars. The dramatic decline was due 
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to two main factors: 1) UN sanctions were in fact effective; 2) Saddam Hussein was still 
preparing a plan to evade the sanctions. But observe in the Chart how the budget began to 
pick up by the end of 1994 and grew steadily until 2000 when the Iraqi economy slowed 
down and its budget shrunk once again, losing nearly $4,000 million by 2003. It was in 
1994 when Iraq finally adopted a plan to circumvent the UN sanctions regime.   
 In contrast, the red line shows that Iraq’s expenditures grew noticeably. Note that 
the Iraqi budged stayed below the $10,000 million from 1991 to 1998, but Iraq spent 
roughly $20,000 million during the fiscal year 1997-1998, twice its budget. This trend 
continued until 2003 although the Iraqi budget began to shrink once again in 2000. This 
relation between budget and expenditure suggests three points. First, Iraq was making 
enough money as to afford sharp budgetary increases during the UN sanctions regime. 
Second, Iraq showed no intention to slow down expenditures, living beyond its means for 
most of the UN sanctions regime. Third, it shows the intensity of Iraq’s trade. During the 
Gulf War, Iraq’s infrastructures were basically destroyed, its industries paralyzed, its 
agriculture unproductive. Iraq needed to import all kind of goods and services, from food, 
cloth and medicines to industrial parts, hardware and machineries. Iraq’s lucrative oil 
sales allowed it to afford those purchases. But the question remained: How did Iraq 
circumvent the sanctions? For Iraq, the answer was twofold. Iraq would focus on regional 
markets as a means to reach global trade, and regional trade to engage in global trade. 
Second, in order to ensure regional trade, Iraq sought trade agreements with its neighbors. 
After all, Iraq knew its neighbors very well. It had been trading with them for centuries. 
Evidences suggest that Iraq used geography as a comparative advantage. Iraq 
utilized regional and bilateral trade to evade UN sanctions and reach global markets. Iraqi 
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commerce rested on several bilateral trade protocols that Iraq signed with about 30 
nations, including North Korea, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, China, 
South Africa, Thailand, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Yet, the bulk of Iraqi trade fell on a dozen 
nations in the Middle East, mainly on Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Egypt, and Lebanon. The 
Chart below shows the main sources of income for Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. 
 
Chart 3.2 – Main Sources of Income for Iraq under UN Sanctions Regime 
 
Sources: CFIP, the Duelfer Report 
  
The Chart shows that trade agreements rounded 70% of all Iraqi revenues under 
the UN sanctions regime. It was well ahead of bribes and kick-backs, which Iraq utilized, 
along with the protocols, for political and economic purposes.   
In terms of politics, Iraq first used trade agreements to gather support against the 
UN sanctions. Iraq did an excellent job showing the world the wrongs that the sanctions 
caused on Iraqi people. In the age of global media, pictures and videos of Iraqi children 
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and women dying due to hunger and malnutrition circulated around the world, causing 
great sympathy toward the Iraqi people. As years passed, support for the sanctions regime 
eroded, and it became more difficult for UN and the U.S. to prevent nations from trading 
with Iraq. Second, UN and American officials did not take into account advices from 
economists like Bhagwati who argue that bilateral and regional trade constituted the 
foundation of the global economy, so Iraq could well utilize bilateral and regional trade 
to reach the global market. Third, the sanctions had a domino effect in the entire region. 
For example, Jordan and Syria fell into a deep recession right after UN began to enforce 
the sanctions because they could not export their agricultural products to Iraq, and Iraq 
could not sell its oil and derivatives to them. Turkey lost a vital source of income: 
charging the E.U. and Iraq for using Turkish transcontinental oil pipes to move Iraqi 
crude oil from Northern Iraq to European markets. And Egypt and Lebanon had to buy 
oil from Libya and Saudi Arabia at a higher price.  
Lastly, Iraq used trade as means to political integration via trade integration with 
the Middle East. The CFIJ quoted the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affair as saying that “The 
free market agreements are steps on the road of Arab economic integration and unity. 
This is Iraq’s principled stand. Unlike some of the industrialists, we do not view every 
stage and every step that we take in this regard from the angle of loss on profit. This is a 
huge strategic action. Any pan-Arab step has gains and may have losses although we do 
not considerer them as losses from our principled and pan-Arab perspective” (CFIJ, p. 
74). The CIA was well aware of the political implications of the protocols for the region. 
In a Memo dated May 1998, the CIA stated: “Iraq stands to gain from these agreements 
on several fronts. First, it gets the immediate political benefit of publicizing agreements 
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that can demonstrate domestically and internationally the ongoing erosion of sanctions. 
Second, the agreements enable Iraq to increase its presence in the Arab world, which has 
ongoing trade negotiation both among Arab nations and with other key partners, 
particularly under the EU-Mediterranean free trade pact. Iraq’s apparent objective here 
would be to solidify its standing with regard to a future Arab Common Market. Third, 
these agreements, once ratified, and so far, only the UAE and Tunisia have done so – will 
guarantee Iraq preferential trading access as soon as sanctions are lifted” (Duelfer 
Report, p. 264). The CIA got it right because, by 2003, 14 Muslim and Arab nations had 
openly signed trade agreements with Iraq. Table 3.5 lists them. 
 
Table 3.5 – Muslim and Arab Nations that Signed Trade Agreements with Iraq 
 
                                   
Egypt 1997, 1999, 2001
Syria 1997, 1999, 2000
Tunisia February-01
Yemen August-01
Algeria October-01
UAE November-01
Sudan March-01
Bharain March-01
Oman April-01
Lebanon 1999, 2001, 2002
Qatar June-02
Jordan 1998, 1999, 2002
Saudi Arabia 1999, 2002
Morroco June-01  
  Sources: CFIJ, the Duelfer Report 
 
First, observe in the Table that Egypt and Syria signed protocols with Iraq as early 
as 1997. In the case of Jordan, although it signed its first Protocol in 1998, it had been 
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negotiating it since 1995. Second, note that some nations signed Agreements in several 
years. The parties meet to renegotiate terms of contracts, expand lists of products or just 
adapt trade relations to realities on the ground. This was chiefly true of Iraq, which varied 
its business dealings according to the political demands of the U.S. and UN, not to 
mention that Iraq kept testing American influence in the UN with respect to the sanctions 
regime. Such was the case, just to mention one, of the Jordan-Iraqi Special Protocol to 
allow Muslim pilgrims to visit Iraq’s most revered shrines. Jordan was to manage the 
Protocol, but Iraq not only wanted to charge $2,000 per pilgrim, it also demanded that the 
money be deposited at the Iraqi Central Bank (CFIJ, p. 57). The U.S. and UK opposed it. 
France, Russia and China went for it. Then, Iraq asked for more. It asked to raise the 
number of pilgrims from 10,000 to 30,000 per year. The CIA calculated that so many 
pilgrims would bring to Iraq about $100 million dollars. So the U.S. fiercely lobbied 
France, Russia and China, which this time voted against Iraq’s request (CFIJ, p. 57).  
The most relevant here is that the Agreements became the most important source 
of revenues for the Iraqi regime. The CIA stated that ‘The protocols allowed Saddam to 
generate large amounts of revenues outside the purview of the UN” (Duelfer Report, p. 
29). The Heritage Foundation found that “Iraq’s bilateral trade Protocols with 
neighboring states provided Saddam with his largest source of illicit income during UN 
sanctions. Jordan, Egypt and Turkey welcomed it but OPEC hated Saddam” (Heritage 
Foundation, p. 15). And the IIC concluded that “Trade protocols earned Saddam over 
$800 billions of revenues that he did not have to account for to UN. His trade partners 
knew it all along” (IIC, Illicit Trade, p. 8). It led Mr. Volcker, Chairman of the IIC, to 
declare to Congress, in frustration, that “It is particularly important to state for the 
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records, Mr. Chairman, that this is more than six times as much as he was able to skim 
off the Oil for-Food Program. This is massive trade, Mr. Chairman; tremendous amount 
of trade to the gates of Europe, Asia and North America and we didn’t see it Mr. 
Chairman, we didn’t” (Hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, 
House of Representatives, 108th Congress).  
Indeed, Iraq’s trade relations with its neighbors were the gates to global markets. 
Yet, Mr. Volker failed to note some key facts. First, nations like Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, 
Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, France and even the U.S. were at the other end of Saddam’s 
scheme, for they all had some kind of trade agreements with Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and 
Turkey. Therefore, purposely or not, they all engaged in trade with Iraq. Second, the U.S. 
and UN actually endorsed and promoted some of those trade agreements to amend 
“unexpected” side-effects of UN sanctions against Iraq. As I stated earlier, the Iraqi 
economy was so interconnected to its neighbors that UN sanctions almost bankrupted the 
economies of Jordan, Turkey, and the Kurdistan, which happened to be political allies of 
the U.S. On the other hand, the sanctions were benefiting US enemies like Iran.  I next 
present four case studies to explain how Iraq utilized bilateral trade agreements with its 
neighbors to evade the UN sanctions regime and reach the global market.       
 
Case Studies 
  In this section we present four cases of trade agreements that were instrumental in 
the circumvention of UN sanctions. They are: Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Turkey. We 
selected those cases based on the following rationale. First, they all are Middle Eastern 
nations, and three of them have borders with Iraq. This is very important because 
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geographical proximity between trade partners seems to have helped Iraq tremendously 
in reducing transportation costs, time and resources. Also, knowing the terrain was 
crucial for smuggling, and we will see here that smuggling was a key means to evade UN 
inspectors and US military patrols, not to mention that it was also one of the most 
essential sources of revenue for Iraq. Second, the cases of Syria, Jordan and Turkey had 
several secondary effects. They ended up benefiting third parties such as Lebanon, Iran, 
Cyprus and the Kurds. The trade agreements between Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Turkey are, 
indeed, illustrative of the multiplicative effects that bilateral trade can have on regional 
and global trade. Lastly, the trade protocols were the most lucrative for Iraq. Chart 3.3 
shows estimates of revenues through the protocols with Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Egypt. 
 
 
Chart 3.3 - Iraq’s Trade Protocols 
                                                       
 
Source: Duelfer Report, IIC, CFIJ, Michigan Project 
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 I obtained the data from four main sources. Although they did not coincide 100% 
in their findings, the numbers were close enough. I added them up and determined an 
average, so I can utilize just one measure to simplify the comparative analysis. I sorted 
the cases according to revenues. In other words, I discuss first Syria because it had the 
lowest revenues. And I end with Turkey for it had the highest revenues.   
 
Syria  
Syria-Iraqi trade was not as profitable as others. Yet, I discuss it here because it 
brought Syria and Iraq together, two nations that had had serious political disagreements 
since their foundations. Syria-Iraq trade also had key implications for Jordan and, mainly, 
Lebanon, a nation within the sphere of influence of Syria.  
Syria and Iraq always had good trade relations. They are natural markets. They 
share borders, culture, language, religion, tribal and family relations, and even the same 
food diet. As I stated in Chapter II, the entire territory once constituted just one people. It 
was partitioned by the British first and later by the UN. In 1991, Syria dominated 21% of 
the Iraqi market, but the trade was rather informal due to the shaky political relations the 
two nations have had since their foundation (Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p.12). 
Political tension escalated when Syria sided with Iran during the Iraq-Iran war and with 
Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion of that nation. Syria thought that one day Saddam would 
invade it. Still, in 1994, the two nations began to talk about ‘a new era’ and, particularly, 
about ‘reviewing’ their trade relations. In 1995, they agreed to reopen an oil pipeline that 
had been shot down in 1980 (CCFIJ, p. 41). In 1995 too, they established border posts to 
allow commercial trucks to move freely between the two nations. The trucks belonged to 
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Syrian and Iraqi smugglers hand-picked by their respective governments to do the 
smuggling, and the so called border posts were in fact military patrols purposely created 
to protect smugglers and their cargoes from UN inspectors (CFIJ, p.41). Then, in 1996, 
Syria and Iraq created several free trade zones along the Syria-Iraq border. They were 
opened not only for smugglers but also for Syrian and Iraqi merchants. According to the 
CFIJ, “It all occurred so fast that Iraqi and Syrian merchants thought that it was one of 
Saddam’s political moves to crack down on his political enemies” (CFIJ, p. 42). 
Indeed, commerce picked up, and in 1997 the two nations began to announce a 
series of trade protocols which the media from the two nations celebrated with fanfare 
and headlines. For example, Iraq News Agency announced in July 10th, 1997 that “Iraq 
and Syria sign joint cooperation minute”, and the Syria Live commented that “Syria and 
Iraq sign transport agreement” (CFIJ, p. 39). But perhaps the most important agreement, 
at least for Iraq, was the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed to reopen the oil 
pipeline that had been closed in 1980. This time, the Syria Live headlined the event with 
some exaggeration for it affirmed, on February 23, 1997, that “The new Syrian-Iraqi oil 
pipeline will carry 1.4 million barrels per day” (CFIJ, p. 39). According to most experts 
on the field, the pipeline could not handle such an amount of barrels per day, but work to 
repair the pipeline still began almost immediately. By July 1998, Syria had repaired its 
portion of the pipe although it was having technical issues with some pumping posts. 
Syria called French engineers for help. The French not only repaired the pumps but also 
redesigned a 12 mile expansion of pipe. Oil began to flow from Iraq to Syria in 2001.   
Reopening of the pipeline was a great momentum for the trade relations between 
the two nations. The British newspaper The Guardian highlighted its importance in 
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March 26thst, 2001 by stating that “Syrian economic rehabilitating is in the pipeline”. 
The Iraqi Press celebrated it by stating on July 20th that “Iraq’s trade with Syria booms 
despite UN embargo”. The CFIJ noted that “The oil flow accelerated the thaw in 
bilateral relations for it led to a series of important economic events” (CFIJ, p. 40).  
Indeed, Syria repaired and re-inaugurated the Aleppo-Mosul rail-tracks in about nine 
months. The reopening was crucial because, with train-tankers now moving oil to 
Aleppo, Syria was able to reopen an electricity plant it had there. The plant consumed 
nearly 30,000 barrels of Iraqi oil per day (CFIJ, p. 42). Iraq corresponded by repairing the 
pipeline that ran from Kirkuk, Northern Iraq, to Bania, a port at the Syrian Mediterranean 
coast. It motivated Syria to rapidly set aside $34 million to repair and expand the port of 
Tartous. The Arabic News celebrated the announcement by reporting, on February 23, 
2002, that “With the investment Iraq increases its imports through Syrian ports”, but the 
Sunday Telegraphs editorialized on February 27th that “It was another Saddam’s set up of 
smuggling to beat sanctions”. 
Iraq opened another 4 border crossings, and Syria reciprocated by creating the 
National Trucking Company, which converted its trucking industry into small private 
fleets. It allocated $9 million to build posts and repair roads along the Syrian-Iraqi border 
(CFIJ, p. 42). It also built new roads to connect seven free trade zones along their 
common borders. The Iraqi regime sent 25 diplomats to its Embassy in Damascus, and 
the Syrian government crated a new office at the Syrian Embassy in Bagdad. The office 
had a status of trade attaché, and it had 17 employees who participated in trade meetings 
with Iraqi delegates and companies (CFIJ, p. 42). Then, in 2000, Syria and Iraq 
consolidated their trade protocols and signed a trade agreement. The Duelfer Report 
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stated that “The protocol was augmented to the category of Free Trade Agreement” 
(Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 13). The agreements stated that Syria was to 
acquire oil at a discount. In return, Syria was to allow the use of its oil pipelines to ship 
oil out of Iraq to Lebanese ports, from where it would ship it to Turkey and then Europe. 
The Duelfer Report found that “From November 2000 until the fall of Saddam’s 
Government, Iraq made an estimated —and these estimates differ— $2.8 billion by 
smuggling oil through Syria. As much as 250,000 barrels per day flowed through Syria at 
cut-rate prices, allowing the Syrians to refine the oil for domestic use and sell reserves of 
their own oil on the world market” (Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 13). For its 
part, GAO reported that “According to estimates from Iraq’s State Oil Marketing 
Organization, known as SOMO, from June 2000 until July 2003, the Iraq-Syria Trade 
Protocol generated approximately $3.4 billion from the sale of illicit Iraqi crude oil and 
Iraqi petroleum products” (GAO Report, p. 61).  
 Also, the Duelfer Report stated that “Syria acted as Iraq’s banker, and some of its 
highest officials brokered military deals for Iraq and profited from these military deals” 
(Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 9). American investigators from the Treasury 
Department detected some Iraqi accounts at Commercial Bank of Syria where “about 
$850 million had been left behind by the Iraqi regime. The Syrian Government, without 
authentication or authorization from SOMO, had deposited an estimated $580 million to 
pay out outstanding claims by Syrian and Iraqi companies, leaving $266 million as Iraqi 
assets in the Commercial Bank in Syria” (Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 14). 
Iraq consistently used the Syria-Iraqi Protocol to collect and make payments. Documents 
found at Iraq’s ministry of trade revealed that Infobank, a Belarusian Bank, transferred 
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$114 million to an Iraqi bank account in Syria, from where it was transferred to Bagdad. 
The documents revealed a stream of payments from different sources, including Russian, 
French, and Chinese firms (Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 14). In all, “Syria was 
Iraq’s second largest market for smuggled oil, and the Syrian Protocol was Iraq’s 
primary illicit income source from 2000 to 2003 when US and its allies invaded Iraq” 
(Duelfer Report, Syria-Iraq Protocol, p. 5). The Protocol included contracts for Syrian 
companies to buy goods on Iraq’s behalf. Syria also became Iraq’s main route for illegal 
trade with Iraq from 1999 to 2003. Just from October 2000 to April 2001, Syria 
transported $2 billion worth of goods into Iraq, most of which was purchased in Bulgaria, 
Rumania, and Yugoslavia. Goods included machineries and spare parts for transportation 
and electrical grids (Duelfer Report, Finance and Procurement, p. 102). Chart 3.4 shows 
the distribution of goods imported into Iraq under the Syrian-Iraqi Protocol.  
 
Chart 3.4 - Iraq-Syria Trade Protocol 
                                                   
  
Source: Duelfer Report, IIC, CFIJ, Michigan Project 
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 Chart 3.4 reveals the overall scope of the Syrian-Iraqi trade protocol. For instance, 
it shows that industry ranked second in trade volumes even though Syria and Iraq are not 
industrial nations. But above all, it calls to my attention that defense trade reached $1,500 
million dollars, and that miscellaneous accounted for almost $1,700 million. Note that the 
Iraqi regime usually tallied military hardware as miscellaneous charged it to a NGO. 
Therefore, here defense and miscellaneous mean the same thing: military hardware. But 
Graph 3.4 does not say it all. For example, it does not reveal the multiplicative effects 
trade had over Jordan and Lebanon.     
 
Lebanon 
I study the case of Lebanon as part of the Syria-Iraq trade agreements because, as 
I stated earlier, this case illustrates how interdependent Syria and Lebanon are and how 
such interdependency affected the effectiveness of the UN sanction regime against Iraq.  
 Syria has for many years shown great geopolitical interests in Lebanon. Lebanon 
does not have oil in abundance. It depends on oil imports from Libya and Northern Iraq 
via Turkey. Lebanon consumes about 50,000 barrels of oil per day, and it imports close to 
$1 billion worth of oil and its derivatives every year (CFIJ, p. 53). For its part, Syria has 
for long tried to control the flow of oil into Lebanon for political reasons and because it 
would add a billion dollars annually to its budget. Then, there is Iraq, which needed to 
export as much oil as it could, and to do so it had to circumvent UN inspectors. The Iraqi 
regime had at that point two standing routes. It had the Turkish-Kurd route and Iranian 
territorial waters, which I will discuss shortly. Nonetheless, the Iraqi regime reasoned that 
having a third route would increase its oil exports without saturating the other two routes. 
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A Syria-Lebanon pipeline would do it. It was a good route to Europe too. Therefore, Iraq, 
Syria and Lebanon struck a deal to repair a pipeline that ran from Iraq to Syria and then 
to Lebanon. They agreed to do it within the marks of the Syria-Trade trade agreement. 
They also brought in Libya to: a) provide technical support; b) provide infrastructure; c) 
provide ship-tankers under Cypriots flag from Lebanon to North Africa and Southern 
Europe (CFIJ, p. 53). As for Lebanon, the deal brought million of dollars not only for 
using its territory for the pipeline but also all the commerce that Iraq smuggled back from 
Europe and northern Africa. The following table shows the volume of trade between Iraq, 
Syria and Lebanon from 1999 to 2002. 
 
Table 3.6 – Trade Volume between Iraq, Syria and Lebanon from 1992 to 2002   
1999 2000 2001 2002
Iraq $110 millions $113 millions $119 millions $125 millions
Syria $165 millions $172 millions $121 millions $129 millions
Lebanon $121 millions $88 millions $91 millions $97 millions  
Sources: The Duelfer Report, the CFIJ 
  
 Table 3.6 shows that trade between the three nations was voluminous. But the 
main point here is how trade and political relations between two nations can affect other 
nations within the same region. In this case, trade between Iraq and Syria benefitted 
Lebanon. Yet, trade between Iraq and Syria affected American politics toward Iraq, Syria 
and Lebanon. First, Iraq was capable of linking its economy to a market it did not have 
before: Syria. It translated into low costs, more commerce, and more revenues. Second, 
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economic gains eventually translated into political gains. Iraq hoped that, as Syria’s 
economic gains increased, Syria would become active against the sanctions regime. 
Moreover, the two economies would be so linked that Syria would have no choice but to 
violate the UN sanctions. Third, Iraq also expected that other neighboring nations would 
ultimately imitate Syria. In particular, the Syrian-Iraqi deal pushed Jordan to compete 
with Syria for Iraqi trade. Iraq hoped that such competition would force Jordan to relax 
its stand on smuggling.  
It actually occurred. I explained earlier that, by the year 2000, Jordan’s King was 
traveling to Bagdad and that Jordan was openly breaking with the UN sanctions regime.   
 
Jordan 
Like the Syrian-Iraqi case, Jordanian-Iraqi trade has for long been based on tribal 
and family relations. Jordan usually exported agricultural products and foodstuffs to Iraq, 
controlling 45% of the Iraqi food market. In 1991, Iraq imported 70% of the food it 
consumed from Jordan. In exchange, Iraq exported oil to Jordan, meeting Jordan oil 
needs. Jordan depends on Iraq for about 85% of its oil consumption. To facilitate their 
trade, Jordan and Iraq never taxed their trade zones along their borders.  
The UN sanctions regime disrupted the trade between the two nations. It affected 
Jordan so much that Jordan protested numerous times before the UN Security Council. 
Jordan based its claims on Article 50 of the UN Charter (CFIJ, p. 35). This Article states 
that a nation-state whose economy is affected by economic sanctions that the Security 
Council imposes on another nation “Shall have the right to consult the Security Council 
with regard to a solution of those problems” (CFIJ, p. 35). Jordan argued that the UN 
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sanctions regime led to “Extreme economic hardships, including a direct financial loss of 
approximately $1.5 billion dollars per year and even the total collapse of the Jordan 
economy” (CFIJ, p. 35). Jordan took its case to the 661 Committee. There it stated that 
“Finding a continuous and secure source of oil was almost impossible since Iraq was a 
regional supplier and Jordan’s cheapest trade partner” (CFIJ, p. 35). Then, Jordan 
approached UN Security Council. It proposed that Iraq funded oil deliveries not with cash 
or credit but with the money Iraq owed to Jordan. Jordan promised to submit a monthly 
report that would account for quantities, value, schedules of deliveries and their costs.  
 The 661 Committee and the U.S. accepted it. The 661 Committee allowed Jordan 
to sign a first bilateral trade agreement with Iraq based on oil-for-debt-reduction. Jordan 
would get oil from Iraq in exchange for a reduction of Iraq’s debt with Jordan. Once the 
debt was paid off, Jordan would exchange oil for foodstuffs. In addition, the U.S. granted 
to Jordan $2.4 billion dollars in economic aid, the most favored nation status, and it even 
signed a bilateral trade protocol with Jordan (CFIJ, p. 36). Jordan utilized those benefits 
to trade with Iraq. With the American loans, Jordan purchased American products that it 
could then resell to Iraq. The U.S. knew about it but decided to ignore it for geopolitical 
reasons. Let us not forget that Jordan is a moderate nation in a volatile region, and it is 
one of the few allies the U.S. has in the Middle East. As Meyer and Califano state it: 
“Successive U.S. administrations acknowledged that U.S. - Jordan trade undermined the 
sanctions but cited its cooperation in other foreign policy objectives and annually 
invoked the national interest exception in Jordan’s favor” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 
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The new trade eventually led to a new trade agreement, which the two nations 
signed in late 1992 and renegotiated in 1996 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p. 144; CFIJ, p. 37). In reality, it did not alter the nature of their trade 
relations that much. Like always, Iraq exported oil and its derivatives to Jordan in 
exchange for foodstuffs and access to Jordan’s oil pipelines. However, there was a new 
component to it: Iraq pumped oil to Jordan, which Jordan then channeled to Lebanon and 
Egypt. Lebanon and Egypt shipped the oil to the Balkans, Italy, Spain, France and other 
nations in the Mediterranean basin. It was during this period that the UN sanctions 
regime had its strongest effects on the Iraqi economy, so this oil sells through Jordan 
constituted a huge break for Iraq. The Duelfer Report stated that “Jordan ensured the 
Iraqi regime’s financial survival until the UN OFF program began in December 1996” 
(Dulfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 143). The Report also stated that 
“Iraq’s earnings amounted to about $400 million annually from 1992 through 1995. This 
estimate includes trade under US-Jordan Protocol averaging about $200 million 
annually and Iraq’s debt to Jordan increasing by $1 billion, which accounts for 
additional Iraqi imports averaging another $200 million a year” (Dulfer Report, Regime 
Finance and Procurement, p. 144.)  
Iraq also smuggled about $2.4 billion worth oil into Jordan during the same 
period. The IIC detailed the operation as follow: “Iraq trucked both crude oil and oil 
products—fuel oil, gas oil, LPG, base oil and gasoline—to Jordan under the agreement, 
according to SOMO records. Then Jordan trucked and piped the crude to ports in the 
Mediterranean. Lebanon and Egypt led the trade; Italy, Spain, Cyprus and the Balkans 
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were their customers” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 148). Chart 
3.5 summarizes Iraq-Jordan exports under the Protocol. 
 
Chart 3.5 – Iraq-Jordan Trade Protocol 
 
 
Sources: Duelfer Report, CFIJ, ICC, Michigan Project 
  
 We can see in the Chart that trade between Iraq and Jordan covered multiple 
industries, even immigration, which is understandable since they are neighbors of 
common tribal and religions heritage. We can also see that their trade was a multimillion 
dollar operation. Ironically, Jordan exported to Iraq about $2,300 million in food, which 
was much more of what Jordan could actually produce, considering its agricultural 
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capabilities. By 1995, the volume increased by $300 million annually, and Jordan’s 
agriculture produces only about $200 million per year. Also, note that defense scored 
high levels of trade as well. Of course, it does not mean that Jordan manufactured arms 
for Iraq because Jordan does not have an arm industry. Rather, it means that Jordanian 
intermediaries and Iraqi firms based in Jordan purchased components and spare parts for 
the Iraqi military industry, as I will explain more in Chapter VII. For now, observe that 
most of the Jordan-Iraqi trade was done by trucking. That explains the large amount of 
revenues in term of transportation. It is another evidence of the importance that the 
trucking industry had for commerce under the UN sanctions regime.      
For its part, Iraqi oil deliveries were so voluminous that Iraq almost saturated the 
Jordanian market. As result, in 1997, Jordan and Iraq began to talk about renegotiating 
the trade agreement. They signed a final draft in 1998, and they amended it in November 
1999 and December 2001 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 146; 
CFIJ, p. 37). They agreed to meet yearly to discuss trade volumes, prices, types of 
products, delivery schedules and other trade issues. According to Iraqi officials, the 
negotiations were rough and lasted long hours. Saddam questioned every aspect of the 
agreement and always demanded more. Jordan limited itself to accept Iraqi conditions for 
it needed Iraqi oil. For example, Jordan had to accept an increase in oil delivery from 
65,000 barrels per day to 110,000 when Jordan only needed about 50,000 for its 
economy. About 300 trucks full of Iraqi oil per day entered Jordan (Duelfer Report, 
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 146; CFIJ, p. 37). The Overland Transport 
Company managed the operation. Both Jordan and Iraq owned the company in a joint-
venture since 1980. Yet, Iraq managed to force Jordan to pay between $50 and $80 
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million per year for transportation (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 
148; CFIJ, p. 37). But perhaps the most important accord was the building of an oil 
pipeline from Iraq to Jordan and then to Lebanon. Work on the pipeline began in 2001, 
with a planned capacity for 350,000 barrels of oil per day, part of which was to be 
redirected to Palestine and Israel. In the end, construction was put on hold due to the US-
led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 146; 
CFIJ, p. 37). Table 3.7 below shows trade volumes from 1995 to 2002. 
 
Table 3.7 – Trade Volume between Iraq and Jordan 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Protocol in bpd 82000 84000 90000 96000 96000 96000 100000 110000
Actual bpd 83000 88000 87000 94000 91000 94000 125000 135000
Imports in USD millons 220.00$   220.00$  255.00$   200.00$  300.00$  450.00$  260.00$   310.00$   
Iraq in USD millons 317.00$   185.00$  249.00$   199.00$  162.00$  190.00$  430.00$   424.00$   
Jordan in USD millions 442.00$   502.00$  510.00$   330.00$  414.00$  677.00$  734.00$   646.00$    
Sources: Duelfer Report, CFIJ 
 
This trade protocol was exuberant, excellent for Iraq, but it had two undesirable 
consequences for Jordan. First, Iraq was saturating Jordan oil market, and Jordan did not 
have storage capacity for so much oil. Second, Iraq was literally forcing Jordan to sell the 
surplus in the black market, something that Jordan wanted to avoid, so it could keep in 
good standing its political relations with the UN and the U.S. Nevertheless, some 
evidence shows that Jordan did sell oil in the black market. For example, the CFIJ found 
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that “Jordan sold the excess at a discount, believed to be $5-6 below market price. The 
value of which has ranged from $200 million in the early 1990s to $450 million in 2001” 
(CFIJ, p. 38). But according to the Arab Oil and Gas Directory, “Jordan works hard to 
accommodate the money from oil surplus. Jordan deposits payment for the cut-rate oil 
into an Iraqi –controlled account at the Central Bank of Jordan. Iraq can use these funds 
to purchase Jordanian goods. It practice, these funds could be used to purchase anything, 
including items imported into Jordan that are otherwise banned by UN sanctions” (CFIJ, 
p. 38).  
It is revealing the way Jordan and Iraq worked together to laundry the money that 
Jordan made though illicit oil sells. For instance, in reality Iraq never received any money 
from Jordan. I stated earlier that Iraq had a commercial attaché in its embassy in Jordan. 
This attaché would show up at a branch of the Central Bank of Jordan and hand in an 
invoice stamped by the Iraqi government. The Bank would then transfer the value of the 
invoice to the company or nation that purchased the goods on behalf of Iraq. The issue 
was that nations like Russia, Egypt and Jordan itself purchased goods on Iraq’s behalf in 
the global market. The CFIJ explains that “The modus operandi is far from new: using 
the Central Bank of Jordan to provide funds, ostensibly to subsidize Jordanian-produced 
goods, but in fact to help powerful Jordanian firms move foreign goods to Iraq, was a 
technique employed by Bagdad to evade UN sanctions and obtain access to foreign 
commerce” (CFIJ p. 35).  
The Iraq-Jordan trade protocol was profitable for both nations. The Jordan Times 
made the math and reported in November 1st, 2000 that “The $600 million per year oil 
Protocol with Iraq weights in the Kingdom’s economic balance sheet”. For Iraq, the 
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Protocol represented about 2,000 million per year, but above it helped to the survival of 
the Iraqi regime.   
 
Egypt 
 Iraq signed a trade protocol with Egypt. The CIA acknowledged that “We do not 
have access to documents outlining this agreement,” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance 
and Procurement, p. 162) for which little is known about the Protocol. Most of what is 
known was obtained after the American led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and it is not 
abundant. Nonetheless, I found that the protocol lasted about five years, from 1998 to 
2003, and that Egypt was among a handful of nations that kept illegally trading with Iraq 
after September 11 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 168). 
That is, as the U.S. began to make plans to invade Iraq, Iraq lost most of its 
customers and its oil sales fell dramatically. But Egypt seized the opportunity, stayed in 
and profited handsomely from Iraq’s few customers, very low oil prices, and high oil 
supplies. I also found that the Egyptian-Iraqi protocol “Was 60-percent credit and 40-
percent cash. The credit account was under SOMO’s name at the National Bank of Egypt 
and the cash proceeds were deposited in the Ahli Bank (Jordan National Bank) in 
Jordan” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 163). It involved the Iraqi 
Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), an Iraqi front company with subsidiaries in 
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Egypt itself.  
I also found that Iraq trucked its oil and delivered it to Aqaba, Jordan, then 
shipped it to Yemeni ports, and then to Egypt. The final destination was East Asia, in 
particular Taiwan and China. The smuggling included crude oil and its derivatives. Iraq 
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charged $7 dollars per barrel to Egypt, half less than the price of crude oil in the global 
market and much less than what UN allowed Iraq to charge, which was between $16 and 
$20 dollars per barrel (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). The 
CIA estimated that oil sales under the Protocol amounted to $21 billion dollars in three 
years (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). In exchange, Egypt 
provided Iraq with steel, copper, aluminum, chemicals and electrical wiring. All those 
materials were strictly prohibited by the UN sanctions regime since they could be used 
for military purposes. Egypt also sold Iraq acid nitric. This chemical was specifically 
prohibited by the UN sanctions regime because it is widely used in the making of WMDs 
although it is a basic component for pesticides as well, useful in the agriculture in the 
Middle East.  
In total, Egypt shipped back to Iraq about $150 million dollars annually from 
1993 to 1997 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). During the first 
half of 1999, Egyptian exports to Iraq increased by $570 million dollars, a 50% higher 
than in 1998 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). In 2000, just 
one Egyptian company, Ginza, exported $300 million dollars to Iraq (Duelfer Report, 
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 167). It motivated the Egyptian Prime Minister to 
declare to AFP that “Egypt’s exports to Iraq will reach three billion dollars by the end of 
2002” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 168). Whether the Egyptian 
Prime Minister was exaggerating of not, the number gives us a rough idea of the volume 
of trade between Egypt and Iraq at the time. I would have expected that the sanctions 
regime should have brought that number down to much lower levels.   
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Chart 3.6 – Iraq-Egypt Trade Protocol 
   
Source: the Duelfer Report  
  
As a whole, the trade agreement provided Iraq with about $8 billion dollars over 
10 years. Additionally, it provided about $75 million in fees, $28 million from kickbacks, 
$990 million from oil “cash sales” or smuggling; and $230 million from other surcharge 
impositions (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). Still, the most 
significant finding here is that Chart 3.6 omits revenues for transportation, unlike in the 
cases of Syria Jordan and Turkey and Iran. Of course, it means that there were no 
transportation revenues in the case of Egypt, but it also means that trade between Egypt 
and Iraq was so expensive that revenues were not significant. It explains why the overall 
trade between Iraq and Egypt was less voluminous than with Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and 
Iran. Iraq does not have border with Egypt. It does with Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Iran. 
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This is exactly what I would expect to find based on Krugman’s trade theory as applied to 
circumvention of the UN sanctions against Iraq.  
The Iraqi-Egypt Protocol was not the most profitable for Iraq. It was not the most 
significant for the UN sanctions regime. Surely, it is not the most important for this 
dissertation. The most relevant case study is the Iraqi-Turkey trade agreement. We will 
next see why.   
 
Turkey   
 The Turkey-Iraq trade protocol was vital for Iraq’s survival because, as the 
Duelfer Report put it, “Turkey provided Iraq with significant revenue streams that 
permitted the Iraqi Regime to fund its illicit procurement activities” (Duelfer Report, 
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 163). But the Turkey-Iraq trade protocol was the 
most interesting of all Iraqi protocols for one main reason: its multiplicative effect 
benefitted not only Turkey and Iraq but also Kurdistan, Cyprus, and even Iran. I will 
study those nations separately for they have unique features and political impact.   
  The first free trade zone opened for business in 1994, and it was an immediate 
success for Turkey, Kurdistan, and Iraq since legal trade amounted to $1 billion dollars in 
the first 2 years (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 165). The trade 
resembled what it had been for decades. Iraq sold crude oil to Turkish companies which 
then refined it and shipped a portion, in the form of diesel oil, to Europe and another 
portion back to Iraq and Iran (CFIJ, p. 27). Kurds from both sides of the border 
transported crude and diesel oil by truck (CFIJ, p. 27). Turkish small companies brought 
all sorts of goods from Europe, from clothing and food to industrial machinery, trucks, 
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cars and spare parts (CFIJ, p. 28). They sold them throughout the Middle East. Since they 
crossed Iraqi territories, Iraq taxed their cargoes and even purchased portions for itself 
and for resale. Turk and Iraqi Kurds did not mind paying taxes to the Iraqis (CFIJ, p. 27). 
Trade was still good enough. Besides, they had no more opportunities for they were being 
discriminated against and deprived of almost all rights under the Saddam’s regime.  
Trade was booming. Turkish, Kurds and Iraqi intermediaries were smuggling 
about 70,000 barrels of oil per day. TUPRAS, the largest Turkish refinery, had so much 
oil to refine that it outsourced some to its clients (CFIJ, p. 28). TUPRAS was the second 
largest recipient of illegal Iraqi oil from 1992 to 1997, a period of intense contraband in 
the zone. In fact, trade was so booming and contraband was so rampant that by 1996 
Turkey proposed a trade protocol to the Iraqi government (CFIJ, p. 28). They decided to 
cooperate because they both were losing money to contraband. UN sponsored the 
Protocol, and the U.S. served as an observer (CFIJ, p. 28).  
According to the Protocol, Iraq was to reserve 21% of its market for Turkey’s 
exports. In return, Iraq was to sell crude oil to just 4 Turkish private companies. They 
were: OZ Ortadobgu, Ram Dis, Tekfen and the state-owned company Turkish Petroleum 
International Company (TPIC). TUPRAS was to refine the crude and convert it into 
diesel. The Protocol also authorized “Turkey to pay roughly $6 less than the authorized 
price for crude under the UN OFF Program; the low price served as an incentive for 
Turkey to participate in the scheme as a guarantor of the UN sanctions regime against 
Iraq” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 162). In addition, the deal 
stipulated that Iraq could increase oil sales in 3 million barrels per day to Turkish 
Petroleum International Company, a subsidiary of the state-owned Turkish National Oil 
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Company (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 163). It is worth noting 
that TPIC was also a subsidiary of Erdem, which traded oil on behalf of Mobil Corp, a 
parent company of Exxon-Mobil (CFIJ, p. 28). Both Mobil Corp and Exxon-Mobil are 
American companies. In Chapter V, I will explain how corporations utilized corporate 
models such as subsidiaries and parent companies to evade UN sanctions against Iraq. 
For now, let me state that the CIA and the CFIJ showed ample evidence of how the TPIC, 
Mobil Corp and Exxon-Mobil lobbied for Turkey-Iraq trade protocol (CFIJ, p. 28). It is 
yet another case of how private firms influenced bilateral and regional trade agreements.  
Suddenly “an army” of intermediaries emerged in Turkey. They rushed to 
Turkish-Iraqi border to grab a piece of the Iraqi market. They purchased cloths, 
foodstuffs, medicines, furniture, school and medical supplies, and spare parts for 
construction and the oil industry in European markets to sell them in Iraq. The CIA cited 
some captured documents to reveal that “Turkish intermediaries exported to Iraq 10,000 
generators, Mitsubishi pickup trucks, cranes and assorted construction materials” 
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 106). The CFIJ argued that 
“Turkish merchants played a leading role in reactivating agriculture in Kurdish lands by 
selling tractors, equipments, seeds and pesticides to Kurdish farmers” (CFIJ, p. 31). 
Indeed, Turks purchased most of the Kurd’s harvest at preferential price, which they then 
resold in European markets. In Chapter VII, I will explain how some of those 
intermediaries even sold military equipment and hardware to Iraq. At the request of Iraq, 
Turkish intermediaries purchased equipment in Europe and utensils to be used in research 
projects that the Iraqi government sponsored. Some projects had civilian ends, but some 
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had both civilian and military use as they dealt with biochemical research. This evidence 
led the CIA and UN investigators to believe that Iraq was working on a WMD program.   
Still, I would argue that the Turkish-Iraqi trade agreement was a political solution 
to a problem that the UN sanctions created along the Turkish-Iraqi border. For the CFIJ, 
“Trade agreement between Turkey and Iraq is a political deal. Although shortsighted, it 
will curb unexpected effects of UN sanctions in this strategic region. The arrangement 
involves first direct contacts between the Turkish and Iraqi governments, and second the 
KDP and Turkish Kurds acting as middlemen between Iraqi ‘private sellers’ and Turkish 
entrepreneurs. Turkey is going after the PKK and Saddam won’t interfere” (CFIJ, p. 31).  
  Two factions de facto occupied the Iraqi-Turkish border. On one hand, there 
were the Iraqi-Kurds and their militia known as Peshmerga. With the support of the US, 
they established a stronghold on the Iraqi side of the Iraqi-Turkish border. On the other 
hand, there were the Turkish-Kurds and their KDP. They too had a stronghold along the 
Iraqi-Turkish border, but on the Turkish side. Both the Iraqi and Turkish-Kurds noted the 
business opportunities that the UN sanctions regime against Iraq had created for them. 
The sanctions automatically created a black market along the border. On top of it, 
coalition forces had bombed the pipelines that transported Iraqi oil from Iraq to Turkey 
(CFIJ, p. 32). It meant that transporting oil, and all cargoes, had to be by truck and 
truckers had to cross Kurdish lines. The Kurds realized that they could control trade in 
the zone, and they did so. They first imposed a sort of “tax” to pay for security in the 
zone. But soon they began to serve as intermediaries between Iraqis and Turks. They 
arranged contracts, financed operations, transported the cargo, collected fees, and even 
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policed the region. The CFIJ stated that “The Kurds came to develop a modus Vivendi out 
of the UN sanctions regime” (CFIJ, p. 28). 
For the KDP, it was a means to survival as an Iraqi minority under Saddam’s 
regime. Iraqi-Kurds even set a mission for themselves by claiming that they were the 
intermediaries between Iraqis and Turks. As early as 1993, the KDP’s representative in 
Ankara publicly stated that “The diesel trade is tying the economy of the KDP’s territory 
close to that of Turkey. Almost all the goods that Kurdish businessmen purchase with 
their profits from the diesel trade come from Turkey. And Turkish entrepreneurs are 
beginning to take an interest in the KDP’s market; so far, that has spawned several joint 
ventures in hotels and the opening of the first private supermarket in Dahuk” (CFIJ, p. 
29). The KDP created a corporation named Asia to manage trade along the Iraqi-Turkish 
border on Turkish side. The Financial Officer of Asia was Massoud Barzani, the leader of 
the KDP. According to the CFIJ, the KDP was making $1 million daily just for taxing oil 
that was crossing its territory from Iraq (CFIJ, p.28). As one official from the State 
Department noted, “The Kurds are getting a lot of money through the oil trade, and we 
like the Kurds. Two American presidents appear to have calculated that Baghdad’s 
profits from the Turkish oil trade were a tolerable cost for the above mentioned benefits 
to other participants in that trade. The argument put forward has been that, as long as 
the Turks took care to inspect and interdict materials that would support Saddam’s 
development of weapons of mass destruction, US policy was being implemented” (CFIJ, 
p. 29). 
Turkey had no problem with that either. They actually wanted the Kurds to 
prosper, hoping that they would not turn against the Turkish government and engage in 
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guerrilla warfare. A Turk-Kurd legislator, arguing in the Turkish parliament in favor of 
illicit trade, affirmed that “If people were not offered employment, they would have no 
alternative but to take their guns and go to the mountains” (CFIJ, p. 30) And Prime 
Minister Bulent Ecevit argued that he would “Increase, not curtail the illicit trade with 
Iraq” (CFIJ, p. 28). Two months later, he declared that the Turkish government intended 
to increase imports of crude oil to 80,000 barrels per day. The CFIJ suggested that “The 
United States and the UN Sanctions Committee have allowed trade to flourish with only 
nominal protestations. With the northern no-fly zone patrolled from Turkish airbases, the 
US and UN are not eager to press the Turkish authorities to shut down the smuggling. 
Moreover, Western governments see some advantage in allowing the trade to go on to 
benefit the Turks and Kurds” (CFIJ, p. 28). 
There was a problem, though. By 1996, the Turkey began to suspect that the 
Kurds were channeling money to the PKK, the military arm of the Turkish-Kurds 
separatists that the Turkish government classified as terrorists. In 1997, Turkish oil 
traders handed a Report to the Turkish National Security Council with evidences of how 
the Kurds transferred money to the PKK. In the same year, the Turkey took over a 
contract that a suspected PKK-linked company had won in an open bid (CFIJ, p. 28). 
Turkey complained to the U.S. and UN, and the U.S. allowed Turkey to take control over 
trade along its border with Iraq. In 1998, Turkey passed several laws to regulate trade in 
its border with Iraq. The Turkish government defended the regulations in an editorial that 
it published in the Turkish Daily News, March 7, 1998. The editorial informed that “The 
government tightened border trade regulations to avoid tax losses” (CFIJ, p. 30). 
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The new regulations centralized the oil trade with Iraq. The CFIJ argued that the 
measure “Effectively legalized the sanctions-busting trade in diesel with Iraq” (CFIJ, p. 
30). It created a Turkish Petroleum International Corporation, a subsidiary of Turk Petrol, 
a corporation that the Turkish government owned, and as I will argue in Chapter VI, 
governments and corporations utilized corporate models like subsidiaries as means to 
circumvent the UN sanctions regime. Still, Turkish Petroleum created an oil deposit near 
the Turkish-Iraqi border where all crude and diesel traders had to dump their cargoes for 
auditing (CFIJ, p. 31). Trucks and truckers had to obtain a special license for a fee. They 
had to sell their loads to just 15 Turkish companies, previously designated by the Turkish 
government. In reality, those 15 companies were part of SILOPI A.S, an auditing firm 
that the Turkish government had created to manage trade with Iraq under the UN 
sanctions regime. The new system began to operate in 1998 (CFIJ, p.31). 
 The printed media reported the events as they developed. For example, the 
Turkish Daily News reported in July 28, 1998 that “Silopi A.S. established for Habur 
diesel trade”. The Los Angeles Times reported in August 4, 1998 headlines: “Turkey 
Shrugs off UN blockade of Iraq commerce as it lets truck drivers openly import, sell 
diesel from Kurdish-controlled areas”. For its part, Reuters revealed in September 3, 
1998, that “Turk takes control of illicit Iraqi diesel”.  The New York Times denounced in 
March 30, that “At Iraq’s backdoor, Turkey Flouts UN sanctions”. The CFIJ concluded 
that “The involvement of the Turkish government has also further politicized the diesel 
trade: as the Turkish government now has a direct financial stake in each transaction, 
the Iraqi government enjoys new leverage” (CFIJ, p. 33). Ironically Iraq, an embargoed 
nation, donated 500,000 barrels of oil to Turkey (CFIJ, p. 33). It did not mind that Iraqi 
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people were starved. Saddam wanted to show “solidarity” to the Turks in light of the 
earthquake that had hit Turkey two weeks earlier.  
 Turkey profited handsomely from the trade as it made $74 million dollars during 
the first three months of the new Plan, just in taxes. It made $324 million in the first year 
(CFIJ, p. 33). By then, bottlenecks had been forming along the Turkish-Iraqi border. Such 
a massive traffic could not go unnoticed. The UN calculated that, at some point, Turkish-
Iraqi trade employed about 45,000 Turkish truckers, mechanics, retailers and other 
personnel along the Habur-Kirkuk route. This trend continued until right before the 
American led invasion of 2003 (CFIJ, p. 33).   
 The Kurds benefited as well from the Iraqi-Turkish trade. The CFIJ summed it up 
in this way: “For the Kurds, the Iraq-Turkey oil trade is a mixed blessing. The wholesale 
and retail trade in Iraqi Kurdistan of Turkish and European goods has flourished due to 
this arrangement, and estimates of revenues run as high as $3 million a day; the trade in 
oil, diesel and other commodities is the most significant source of funds for the 
embargoed areas, amounting to $11 million per day” (CFIJ, p. 33). Table 3.8 below 
shows Kurds’ profits for moving oil out of Iraq and diesel back to Iraq and Iran.  
 
Table 3.8 – Kurds’ Profits for Moving Oil and Diesel 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Diesel 27$    98$    121$  553$    830$    1,078$ 2,005$ 1,648$  1,170$ 598$    
Crude 112$  117$  237$  648$    897$    1,210$ 2,115$ 1,781$  980$    321$    
Diesel-Crude 63$    67$    214$  596$    553$    830$    2,005$ 2,126$  1,151$ 1,006$ 
Total 202$  282$  572$  1,797$ 2,280$ 3,118$ 6,125$ 5,555$  3,301$ 1,925$  
Sources: The Duelfer Report, IIC, CFIJ 
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 The numbers explain three main points. First, they explain the intensity of Iraq’s 
crude oil sales under the sanctions regime. The trade was so intense that UN inspectors 
estimated that, at some point, 5000 Kurd truckers were engaging in illegal oil trade along 
the Turkish-Iraqi border. The data account just for Iraq’s sales to the Kurds. It does not 
include sales to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Turkey. Second, the numbers also 
explain Iraq’s consumption levels of diesel-crude. Iraq utilizes most of its oil to produce 
oil derivatives. Third, Iraq profited too. For example, note in Table 3.8 that most of the 
crude oil the Kurds moved out of Iraq came back to Iraq in the form of diesel. A portion 
of it was for Iraq’s consumption, and another portion went to Iran. Eventually, Iraq found 
in diesel a steady source of income. The CIA, the Michigan Project, the IIC and other 
sources agreed that the portion of diesel meant for Iraq decreased over the years as Iraq 
repaired some of its refineries. Conversely, the portion that Iraq shipped to Iran increased 
steadily to satisfy Iran’s demand for subsidized diesel.    
Iraq also gained access to foreign goods that Turkish-Kurds brought with them 
when they came to dump the diesel and collect crude oil. Turkish-Kurds left a lot of 
money in Iraq for goods they purchased and services they consumed in Iraqi territories. 
The CFIJ cited CIA’s findings to explain the nature of the Turkey-Iraqi trade. It noted 
that “The busting traffic is two-way, with truckers and traders bringing in many types of 
consumer goods for sale. The truckers often spend up to a week in Iraq and hence spend 
money in restaurants, hotels, and on vehicle maintenance. The Turkish-Kurd truckers 
thus provide spin-off economic benefits to those northern regions of Iraq under 
Baghdad’s control, such as Mosul and Kirkurk” (CFIJ, p. 33). 
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The CIA calculated that Iraq generated about $12 billion from 1996 to 2000, just 
from its trade protocol with Turkey (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, 
p. 162). The CFIJ set the amount at $9 billion in a six-year period (CFIJ, p. 29), and the 
IIC put it at $14 billion from 1992 to 2003 (IIC, p. 89). The Duelfer Report found that 
“Some of these funds were transferred to interest bearing accounts. As of January 2004, 
SOMO held $157 million in these accounts and had earned almost $7.7 million in 
interest since October 2000” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 162). 
Chart 3.8 summarizes Iraqi revenues from its trade protocol with Turkey but by industry 
from 1995 to 2002. 
 
Chart 3.8 – Iraq-Turkey Trade Protocol  
 
 
                               
                         
Source: The Duelfer Report, IIC, CFIJ 
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Chart 3.8 shows an average of revenues per industry calculated from three main 
sources: The Duelfer Report, the IIC, and the CFIJ. First, the Chart shows the diversity of 
trade between Iraq and Turkey. Note that some industries were not included for two 
reasons: a) lack of dates; b) conflictive, not reliable sources. I did not include revenues 
from kickbacks, artificial fees, and illegal taxes. When I say illegal, I mean according to 
the UN sanctions. Iraq was a sovereign nation and as such it could impose any tax it 
considered pertinent. Second, defense was the second largest source of revenues. This is 
important because Turkey actually granted permission to the U.S. and UN to use Turkish 
territories to manage the UN sanctions regime from Turkey, not to mention that a large 
number of UN inspectors were stationed in Turkey to monitor Iraq’s rearmament and 
WMD programs from there. Still, Iraq managed to import goods and services for its 
defense industry via the Iraqi-Turkish border. And I do not mean here that Turkey, as a 
nation-state, sold military equipment and hardware to Iraq. I did not find any evidence of 
it. What I am saying is that Turks, Kurds, and intermediaries from other nationalities sold 
military equipment to Iraq, and that Iraq utilized its trade agreement with Turkey and 
Turkey’s territory for that purpose. In Chapter VI, I will explain the extent of such a 
trade. For now note that oil was not the largest source of revenue for Iraq. There was a 
reason for that. Most Iraqi oil exports to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and other Iraqi neighbors 
were through oil pipelines. In the cases of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco, Iraq 
shipped the oil by sea. However, in the case of Turkey, oil trade had to be by truck 
because, as I stated earlier, the American led Coalition Forces had bombed the two oil 
pipelines that connected Iraqi oil fields to Turkish refineries. In fact, that is the reason 
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why the trucking industry flourished so much in Turkey, Iraq and Kurdistan. The Table 
below shows revenues drawn from oil trade under the Iraqi-Turkish trade protocol.  
 
Table 3.9 – Iraqi Revenues Drawn from Iraq-Turkey Protocol 
 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Iraqi Gov't 17 19 24 27 27 46 92 68 75 27 11
Udai's Corp. 21 27 22 72 55 55 247 243 73 38 14
Iraqi-Kurd Gov 20 22 37 56 56 93 186 139 56 28 9
Iraqi-Kurd Corp 22 22 61 108 82 82 370 365 109 57 14
Turkish Gov't 74 185 74 37
Turkish Corp 57 81 119 333 333 555 1036 648 259 130 19  
Sources: Duelfer Report, CFIJ 
 
Note that all parties, except Turkey, seem to have started oil smuggling in 1993, 
two years after the sanctions regime was implemented. The Turkish government started 
only in 1999. Second, Udai’s Corp means front companies that belonged to Udai 
Hussein, Saddam’s son. Udai’s companies made more money than the Iraqi government 
every year except in 2001 when it beat Udai by just $2 million. I could not determine 
whether or not Udai’s money went to his personal savings or to the Iraqi government. I 
did find, though, that Udai had a fleet of 50 tankers for his oil trade. Evidence shows that 
he wanted to purchase 250 smaller, rapider tankers from Japan and South Korea. Finally, 
both the Iraqi-Kurdish government and Iraqi-Kurds consistently made money, only out-
performed by Turkish corporations. It was a remarkable performance if we take into 
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account that only as recently as 1991 Iraqi-Kurds had been gassed by the Iraqi 
government and only in 1992 won autonomy of their territories.    
 
 
Cyprus 
 
 Cyprus too signed a trade agreement with Iraq. The uniqueness of this agreement 
derives from two main features: 1) Cyprus signed it on behalf of Turkey; 2) Turkey used 
the agreement to smuggle goods, cigarettes and liqueur in particular, into Iraq.   
The Cyprus-Iraq trade agreement included agricultural, fishery, agro-industrial, 
and oil industries, but that is not new. Most Iraqi trade agreements included those same 
industries. Therefore, what is really new here is that Turkey made of Cyprus the 
operational center for the largest contraband ring of cigarettes that ever occurred in 
Europe. The CFIJ summed it up: “In reality the Cyprus-Iraq trade agreement was an 
effort by the Turkish to exploit Iraq’s fascination with cigarettes” (CFIJ, p. 55). Indeed, 
Iraq is a lucrative market for cigarettes as Iraqis consume about 18 billion cigarettes 
annually, of which they imports 10 billion (CFIJ, p. 55).  Iraq also imports about 2000 
tons of tobacco leaves. For its part, Cyprus has an excellent cigarette industrial 
infrastructure for it produces about 26.5 billion of cigarettes per year while it consumes 
just about 3.5 billion (CFIJ, p. 55). Cyprus is famous for smuggling cigarettes to Europe. 
According to the EU, Cyprus also smuggled cigarettes into Iraq. It found that “Iraq 
became a prime market for cigarettes smuggled via Cyprus” (CFIJ, p. 56), and the EU 
was not happy about it. Note that taxing cigarettes constitutes a sound source of revenues 
for EU nations (CFIJ, p. 56).   
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 In effect, the EU had for many years been trying to dismantle cigarette smuggling 
via Cyprus. For example, the EU sued American firms in American Courts for using 
Cyprus as a platform for cigarette smuggling in Europe. The EU filed a lawsuit against 
RJ Reynolds and Phillip Morris in November 2001 for violating the RICO Laws (the Act 
of 1970), but U.S. Courts dismissed the charges and the contraband continued (CFIJ, p. 
55).  So it was kind of ironic that just two months later the U.S. asked the EU for help to 
crack down on cigarette smuggling in Iraq. The EU responded with an “I told you so” 
and passed on to the U.S. the evidences it had of how Cyprus, the PKK, Iran and Iraq 
engaged in cigarette smuggling. In addition, the British Foreign Office produced 
evidences of cigarette and alcohol smuggling to Iraq through Cyprus and Kurdistan. The 
Office argued that, “In the last 6 months, and these figures incidentally have been 
provided through the United Nations Security Council, Saddam Hussein has imported 
over 300 million packs of cigarettes, 38,000 bottles of whisky per month, 230,000 cans or 
115,000 liters of beer per month, over 120,000 cans or 40,000 of vodka per months and 
almost 19,000 bottles of wine a month” (CFIJ, p.56). The British Foreign Office accused 
Cyprus of ignoring, as it put it, “an epidemic in Cypriot territory” (CFIJ, p. 55). 
The results of the American investigation alarmed American officials. The 
contraband included cigarettes and liquor but also furniture, appliances, cars, 
motorcycles, cloths and even perfumes. Saddam distributed those products among high 
ranking officials, closest allies and soldiers who excelled in their duties and obligations. 
Yet, the U.S. could do no more than take the case to UN Security Council and propose a 
resolution to warn Cyprus. After all, Cyprus was acting on behalf of Turkey, a member of 
NATO and key ally of the U.S.  
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Iran 
Iran was yet another beneficiary of both the UN sanctions regime against Iraq and 
the Turkish-Iraqi trade protocol. It was not unexpected because some common factors 
unite Iran and Iraq. On one hand, Iran and Iraq had a common enemy: the United States. 
An old geopolitical proverb goes: the enemy of my enemy is my friend, and sticking to 
the proverb, Iran and Iraq found in the U.S. a good motive for cooperation. On the other 
hand, Iran and Iraq have common borders by land and sea, and according to Krugman’s 
theory, this is very advantageous for trade. For instance, for Iraq, one way of cooperating 
with Iran was by smuggling diesel into Iran by truck. Another way was to use Iranian 
waters to ship out crude oil. For its part, Iran itself has oil in abundance, but it does not 
have refining capacity to convert it into gasoline or diesel. Even today Iran imports 89% 
of the gasoline and diesel it consumes (CFIJ, p.43). Iran reasoned that it could balance 
out its disadvantage by cooperating with Iraq in violating the UN sanctions regime. Iran 
could: a) get free gasoline from Iraq in exchange for allowing Iraq to ship crude oil 
through its waters; b) charge Iraq for using Iranian waters for smuggling; 3) charge all 
foreign ships for using Iranian waters to get cargoes into Iraq. This was especially true for 
ships navigating under Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and French flags (CFIJ, p. 43; 
Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 166). Those nations had good 
political and trade relations with Iraq and Iran.   
Iran did all of the above. Conscious of the political and even military risks, Iran 
charged hefty fees to any foreign ship crossing its waters in route to Iraq (CFIJ, p .44; 
Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 167). Iraq did a lot of trade by 
trucking, especially though Syria, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. But it was slow, costly, and 
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risky. To be fair with UN inspectors, plenty of evidences show that they did intercept 
thousands and thousands of trucks trying to get in and out of Iraqi territory full of goods 
CFIJ, p.45; Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p.166; IIC, p.114). 
Smuggling was so rampant that it was not really hard for UN inspectors to catch some 
violators of the sanctions. Even intercepted violators, once put back to the streets, would 
get back to smuggling for it was one of the most profitable jobs around at the time.  
The point is that Iraq preferred smuggling by sea, mainly oil, and Iranian waters 
were the route to go through. For example, the CFIJ describes operations as follow: 
“Smaller tankers fill up at the Shatt al-Arab ports of al-Muftiya and Abu al-Flus, north 
and south of Basra respectively, cross to the Iranian side and then travel along the 
Iranian coast, all the way to the islands of Qesh or Qeshim. Along the way, naval patrols 
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, particularly from the Revolutionary Guard’s 
maritime station just north of the mouths of the Shatt al-Arab, record, facilitate and 
charge for the transit. These vessels, each with carrying capacities in the range of 
15,000-50,000 barrels, are often overloaded and listed. Iran furnishes its own pilots to 
navigate the shallow waters close to shore and to help prevent accidents and spill outs 
that could leave evidences of smuggling behind. At Qeshim, at the Strait of Hormuz, the 
smugglers may acquire Iranian certificates of origin for their cargo. For all these 
services the Iranians reportedly charge a fee of approximately $7 a barrel. The oil is then 
either transferred into larger vessels or, bearing the new documentation; the barges 
proceed to Pakistan, India or cross the Strait of Hormuz to the port of Fujairah or Dubai 
where the oil enters the world market system and is reloaded for onward shipment. 
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During the UN sanctions regime, 100,000 bpd transited this route almost daily” (CFIJ, 
p.45). 
Foreign ships coming into Iraq took a riskier route in terms of exposure to UN 
inspectors as well as to patrols from U.S. and UK. First, they utilized Iranian waters, and 
then they moved into Kuwaiti, Bahraini and Qatari waters, down to the UAE (CFIJ, p. 
44; Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 168). The risk consisted in that 
all those nations were allies of the U.S., and as such they allowed UN, American and 
British patrols all along their coasts to enforce the UN sanctions. For that reason, 
stopping in Iranian ports to later sail toward Iraq was the most common option for all 
parties. The ships got to their destinations. Iran collected its fees. And Iraq got their 
cargoes.    
It worked. The Duelfer Report noted that the Iraqi Ministry of Industry, Mr. 
Hussein Kamel al-Majid, at first commanded the Iraqi-Iranian maritime route (Duelfer 
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 171). Mr. Kamel broke a deal with Russian 
tankers to operate under Bahamian and Honduran flags, which is a common practice in 
global trade and, as we saw in Chapter II, Iraq successfully employed it to circumvent 
UN inspectors. So through the Iraqi-Iranian route, Mr. Kamel exported about 60,000 bpd 
in 1993, just two years into the sanctions regime (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p. 168). In 1994, Mr. Kamel exported 30,000 bpd to Pakistan. In return, 
Pakistan sold about $240 million dollars worth of North Korean long-range missiles to 
Iraq, which Mr. Kamel shipped back to Iraq through Iranian waters. But Mr. Kamel did 
not last long in his post. Suddenly, the Iraqi government dismissed him, arguing that at 57 
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he was too old for the job that demanded a lot of traveling and risky operations (Duelfer 
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 168).  
The job went to Saddam’s son Udai (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p.168). It is said that Mr.Udain broke a deal with the Iranian President 
Rafsanjani’s son to expand diesel trade to 70,000 bpd by truck and smaller and rapider 
boats. No one exactly knows how much diesel Udai trucked into Iran. Most sources set 
the volume at 100,000 bpd since mid 1995 to 1997 (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p. 168; IIC, p. 171). The CFIJ argued that the volume increased drastically 
in 1998 when UN inspectors left Iraq and then decreased in 2000 when UN inspectors 
came back (CFIJ, p.46). In fact, when UN inspectors came back, they found a rail track 
connecting the port of Bash’ra in Southern Iraq with Khorramshar, an Iranian port also in 
the South (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 168; CFIJ, p. 46). Table 
3.10 shows some estimates of the Iraqi-Iranian oil trade under Udai’s command.        
 
Table 3.10 – Estimates of Iraq-Iran Oil Trade under Udai’s Command 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Avg bpd 25,000  49,000 70,000 90,000  75,000   52,000  45,000    
Iraq 117$     222$    314$    402$     336$      235$     205$       
Iran 53$       97$      135$    172$     144$      107$     89$          
Source: The Duelfer Report; the CFIJ 
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 Of course, the U.S. knew about the trading. The U.S. Navy actually intercepted 
numerous shipments. I can cite a couple of examples. In 2000, the U.S. Navy detained 
two Russian tankers on Iraq-Iranian waters (CFIJ, p. 44). The first tanker, Volgoneft-147, 
belonged to SovFinAmTrans (SFAT) a Russian firm in joint venture with Transcisco, an 
American company. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
financed the operation. UN inspectors found that EBRD had loaned the money to 
Transpetro-Volga, a subsidiary of SFAT, but the cargo belonged to Primestar, an oil 
trading firm based in British Virgin Islands. The Volgoneft-147 had given 40 trips 
between Iraq and Iran by the time U.S. intercepted it (CFIJ, p. 44). The second tanker 
was Novorossisk Shipping. It was navigating under Russian flag, in route to Singapore. 
The cargo belonged to Royal Dutch/Shell, and UN fined Shell for $250,000 dollars 
(CFIJ, p. 44). But then why would the U.S. allow Iran to engage in illegal trading with 
Iraq?     
 There was much speculation among observers in that regard (CFIJ, p. 46). 
However, the consensus is that the US wanted to improve relations with the Iranian 
President. This President, Khatami, was a moderate. He was sending ‘signals’ to the U.S. 
about his interests in improving U.S.-Iran relations. In fact, during this period, the U.S. 
eased unilaterally the U.S sanctions regime against Iran, so Iran could import some 
agricultural and industrial products (CFIJ, p. 46). Iran reciprocated by intercepting 
smuggling that was not meant for Iran. In April 2000, the Iranian Navy, in a surprising 
move, blockaded Iraqi waters and confiscated ships and cargos coming from Iraq (CFIJ, 
p. 46). However, two factions opposed President Kathami’s actions. One faction was 
Russian and French lobbyists representing Russian and French corporations with large 
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interests in both the Iraqi and Iranian economies. They approached the Iranian hard-liners 
and threatened to withdraw from the Iranian market if President Khatami did not lift the 
blockade (CFIJ, p.46). The second faction was Iranian hardliners. They argued that 
President Khatami was giving in to American pressure and affecting Iran’s good 
economic relations with France and Russia. After all, the U.S. had a sanctions regime 
against Iran, and France and Russia were Iran’s best trade partners. In the end, the hard-
liners prevailed. They went after the Iranian moderates, and President Khatami had no 
choice but to lift the blockade and allow the smuggling to go on (CFIJ, p.46).  
 
Trade Fairs 
 
Iraq promoted its trade agreements with trade fairs it held in Bagdad. These trade 
fairs were very important because they enabled Iraq to circumvent the UN sanctions 
regime. Specifically, the fairs allowed Iraq to: a) obtain immediate much needed 
revenues; b) obtain access to global markets; c) rally political support again the UN 
sanctions regime. 
First of all, the international trade fairs enabled Iraq to immediately raise huge 
revenues. Each fair brought about $100 million to Iraqi balance sheets (CFIJ, p. 50). For 
example, the Iraqi government charged $1000 fee per person and per company just for 
participating in the Fair. It charged for processing passport, custom and other 
bureaucratic documents. Then, Iraq charged participants for everything they used and/or 
consumed, from water to food, telephones, fax machines, office supplies, etc. It certainly 
charged for air conditioning, electricity and even security. Estimated expenditures per 
person were about $3000 dollars over a five days stay in Iraq (CFIJ, p. 50). Note that 
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18,000 people attended the Annual Fair Trade of Bagdad of 1998, including merchants, 
journalists, diplomats and their bodyguards, members of NGOs, etc (CFIJ, p. 50). In 
2001, 65,000 people attended the Bagdad trade fair (CFIJ, p. 50). Third, Iraq charged 
between $50 and 100 dollars per square meter of floor space, depending on location, 
exposure, and visibility among other factors. Minimum allotment was $2000 per 
exhibitor (CFIJ, p. 51). In 2001, Iraq rented out almost 28,000 square meters of indoor 
floor space and 18,000 square meters of outdoor space. Besides, construction and 
furnishing of cubicles was mandatory, and Iraq charged $30 dollar per square meter 
(CFIJ, p. 51). Of course, all those fees increased over time as Iraq gained in experience, 
attracted more participants, and more companies and nations were willing to participate 
in the fairs. Consequently, if Iraq made about 4.5 million dollars in the first fair it held in 
Bagdad, by 2002 it was making $400 million dollars per year (CFIJ, p. 51). Iraq could not 
have done better. After all, it was under a multilateral sanctions regime. 
 Second, international trade fairs enable Iraq to get access to global markets and 
attract trade partners from around the world. Iraq held its first fair in 1995, three years 
into the UN sanctions regime. Iraq called it Baghdad International Fair (CFIJ, p. 52). 
The use of the word international was intentional. Words have meaning, and here Iraq 
meant that the fair had an international character: 400 companies from 15 nations had 
accepted invitations to participate (CFIJ, p. 52). In fact, in the end 421 companies from 
17 nations travelled to Iraq and showed their products to Iraqi companies, and Iraq signed 
about 900 contracts in that Fair (CFIJ, p. 52). It was such a success that Iraq decided to 
organize at least two fairs per year. It even created a state-owned company for that 
purchase. Iraq called it State Company for Iraqi Fairs. The Company hired the German 
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firm IMAG for consulting and marketing, and it also opened a bank account at the 
Baghdad branch of Rafidain Bank-Al-mansour, which had branches in most Middle 
Eastern nations (CFIJ, p. 52). In 1996, Iraq celebrated three trade fairs. This company 
hired the German firm IMAG for consulting and marketing (CFIJ, p. 52).  
Iraq celebrated its second international trade fair in 1997, attracting 800 
companies and 20, 000 people from 31 nations (CFIJ, p. 52). In 1999, it attracted 1,210 
companies and 29,000 people from 35 nations. The international trade fair celebrated in 
Bagdad in 2001 brought 1,650 companies and 65,000 people from 48 nations from 
almost all continents (CFIJ, p. 52. It was a true global event, although European, North 
African and Middle Eastern nations dominated it. Companies from Germany, Sweden, 
Denmark, Italy and Austria sent representatives. About 200 Russian and French 
companies sent delegates. And about 150 firms from Egypt and Turkey participated. 
Even Palestine produced 325 small companies to participate in the fair (CFIJ, p .52).  
Absent from the fairs were always Kuwait, the US and UK. However, it does not 
mean that companies from those nations missed out business opportunities. They did 
obtain contracts but though intermediaries, subsidiaries, parent companies and other 
corporate models. Indeed, in Chapter VI, I will examine how companies utilized 
corporate models to obtain contracts and circumvent the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq. 
Here, it is worth noting that British companies complained to the British government. 
This time British companies argued that trade was rampant in Iraq anyway, and that they 
were missing out on great business opportunities. They reminded the British government 
that British firms had been absent from the Iraqi market since the 1970s, and that the 
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sanctions regime was a good opportunity to return to it. A few months later, the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the House of Commons concluded that “The “the Baghdad Trade 
Fair is not in itself a breach of sanctions. The UN Oil for Food humanitarian program, 
with revenues of about 14 billions, offers considerable opportunities for legitimate trade 
with Iraq. We are supporting British companies in their efforts to win a share of this 
trade” (CFIJ, p. 54; www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk). 
 Third, perhaps the most important gain for Iraq was that it got access to the global 
market. Indeed, by year 2000, numerous nations were holding trade fairs to, as Saddam 
put it, “honor the Iraqi people” (CFIJ, p. 53). In 2000, Morocco, Syria, Lebanon, 
Algeria, the UAE and even the Philippines held trade fairs in which Iraq was the main 
honoree (CFIJ, p. 53). In 2001, Ukraine went so far as to sponsor a trade fair (CFIJ, p. 
53). The main exhibitors were the Ukraine Ministry of Defense and Iraq’s Military 
Industrial Commission, by then Iraq’s most important military procurement agency. This 
is very relevant because in Chapter VII we will see that Ukraine played a pivotal role in 
procuring components, spare parts and machinery for Iraq’s missile programs. But in 
November of the same year, during the Bagdad Trade Fair, Tunisia and Morocco 
announced that they were opening free trade zones where Iraqi companies could sell their 
product (CFIJ, p. 53). Two days after, Lebanon and Iraq were signing their 2nd trade 
agreement in three years (Daily Star Beirut, Nov., 6, 2001.) Still, the following year was 
even better for Iraq. In May 4, 2002, the Iraqi News Agency announced with much 
fanfare that the French government had invited Iraq to participate in the Paris 
International Fair (Iraqi News Agency, May 4, 2002). In May 21 of the same year, the 
Agency announced that Germany too was inviting Iraq to the 4th International 
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Commercial Fair (Iraqi News Agency, May 21, 2002). In August 2001, Egypt invited 
Iraq to its international trade fair. This was important because Iraq had invested a lot of 
political and financial capital to improve political and trade relations with Egypt 
(RFE/RL, August 24, 2001, and October 12, 2001). Iraq sent 2000 representatives and, 
more important, two Ministries. Then, in August 2002, Turkey invited Iraq to participate 
in the Izmir International Fair (CFIJ, p. 50). Even Saudi Arabia invited Iraq to the trade 
fair that it celebrated in September 2002.  
 Finally, most analysts agreed that Iraq scored huge political gains from the trade 
fairs. It did it in two main ways: a) Iraq granted contracts to companies that publicly 
declared opposition to the UN sanctions regime; b) eventually, state actors began to 
personally participate in the trade fairs, which Iraq used for political advantage.  
Indeed, the CIA acknowledged that “The Iraqis have become very effective at 
using the annual Trade Fairs for their wider purposes” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance 
and Procurement, p. 171). The CIA was referring to how Iraq was utilizing trade fairs for 
political gains and propaganda as much as for commercial purposes. In a trade fair held in 
Bagdad n 1999, the Iraqi Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan publicly declared that 
“The sanctions are a terrorist weapon responsible for the deaths of over a million Iraqi 
children” (RFE/RL, Nov. 5, 1999). He then went on to “Grant the best prices and 
contracts to those who denounce the horrors of UN sanctions against the Iraqi people” 
(RFE/RL, Nov 5, 1999). Indeed, participants in the fairs soon learned that, as Dania Saadi 
from the Daily Star of Beirut put it, “Competitive prices without sound political stands 
will not tempt Iraqi authorities to strike business deals”. Dania Saadi went on to warn 
that “Opposing sanctions will secure deals” (Daily Star, Nov 6, 2001). Eventually, 
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governments joined companies in their public opposition to the UN sanctions regime. At 
the beginning, most governments published conciliatory statements. For example, the 
Saudi government defended a trade fair it held to honor Iraq by stating that “Your 
Majesty was honoring the warm relations between the peoples of Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia,” and the government of Jordan stated that “We are helping our own families, for 
Iraqis are our blood” (CFIJ, p. 54). But other governments were more explicit and 
directly condemned UN sanctions. Such was the case of France, Russia, Egypt, and even 
Turkey. Still, by the year 2000, some governments not only spoke but also acted. They 
began to utilize the trade fairs to visit Iraq. As the CFIJ put it, “Fair attendees witnessed 
a parade of Prime Ministers, Vice-Ministers and foreign dignitaries flying into Baghdad 
airport; we should note that those flights in themselves were violations of the sanctions 
regime” (CFIJ, p. 54). They usually met with Iraq and made public condemnatory 
remarks against the sanctions regime, like in the Prime Minister of Lebanon. During the 
trade fair of Baghdad in 2002, he remarked that “Lebanon is here to help Iraqis break 
unjust sanctions” (Daily Star, Nov 6, 2001).  
 
Conclusion 
               This Chapter tests whether or not global trade allowed Iraq to circumvent the 
UN sanctions regime. Based on the evidence presented here, we conclude that the 
fragmented nature of global trade allowed Iraq to circumvent UN sanctions. Iraq accessed 
global trade through a number of trade agreements it signed with about 25 nations, 
particularly with Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and Syria. The trade agreements opened two-way 
trade routes: Iraq shipped its oil to global markets through Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and 
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Syria. In turn, those nations attracted trade from all around the world, which Iraq 
accessed through its trade protocols.  
 Altogether, the protocols allowed Saddam to feed his people and postpone the fall 
of the regime for a few years. For the most part, and based on the evidence collected, we 
can conclude that: 1) the UN embargo was circumvented; 2) instruments of globalization 
such as front companies, intermediaries and the international banking system were 
utilized to circumvent the embargo 3) when it comes to Middle East nations, any 
relationship between GDP, exports and oil imports under the UN Oil for Food Program is 
illusive, unless we utilize it to argue that, more than GDP per nation, geography, history 
and traditional trade ties played an important role in the performance of Middle East 
nations in the UN Oil for Food Program and their consequent violations of the UN 
embargo. Those nations share the following characteristics: geographical proximity, long 
standing trade routes and markets, centuries of trade partnerships, common local trade 
costumes and business trends, a common language, a shared animosity toward the West, 
the United States in particular, and, consequently an opposition to the UN embargo 
against Iraq. As third world economies, they needed trade, jobs and money, and the UN 
embargo, just like all embargoes, offered sound economic opportunities, in particular to 
companies losing global competition, to companies from the developing world. That 
explains their performance in the UN sanctions regime against Iraq.    
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IV. AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
NON-STATE ACTORS  
       
“The first [era of Globalization] lasted from 1492….until around 1800. I would call this era Globalization 
1.0. This era was about countries. In this era, countries and governments (often inspired by imperialism or a 
combination of both) led the way in breaking down walls and knitting the world together, driving global 
integration.   The second great era [of] Globalization lasted roughly from 1800 to 2000. In globalization 
2.0, the key agent of change, the dynamic force driving global integration, was multinational companies. 
These multinationals went global for markets and labor, spearheaded first by the expansion of the Dutch 
and English joint-stock companies and the Industrial revolution”. 
                                                                        Thomas L. Friedman 
 
“Arguably Christopher Columbus was a non-state actor, were Vasco da Gama and Martin Luther and 
Henry Hudson, a subcontractor for West Indian Company and discoverer of the Hudson River as were the 
East India Company, the Hudson Bay Company, the French revolutionaries, and nationalist movements of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”.         
                                                   Fred Halliday 
 
“The UN once dealt only with governments. By now we know that peace and prosperity cannot be 
achieved without partnerships involving governments, the business community and civil society”. 
                                                                                                     Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines non-state actors (NSAs) in relation to a multilateral 
sanctions regime under globalization. I posit that NSAs undermine the overall 
effectiveness of sanctions regimes, and that globalization facilitates their activities. In the 
case of Iraq, I specifically argue that a large number of NSAs formed alliances among 
themselves and with nation-states for the sole purpose of circumventing the UN sanctions 
regime against Iraq. That is, individuals, NGOs, political and religious groups, banks and 
businesses of all sorts worked together, with state actors and members of Saddam’s 
regime, to evade UN sanctions and conceal their profits. 
To better illustrate my argument, I have divided this chapter into two sections. In 
the first section, I review the literature on NSAs. In the second section, I present and 
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discuss evidences of how NSAs, as agents of globalization, facilitated the evasion of UN 
sanctions regime. I gathered the evidence from multiple sources, among which are the 
IIC Report, the Duelfer Report, a report from the CFIJ, the Michigan Project, and the 
Heritage Foundation. I also utilize reports from Western and Middle Eastern newspapers.   
 
NSAs and Global Politics 
 Most scholars of international politics accept as a fact the presence of NSAs in 
global politics, but some still hold mixed opinions about how NSAs affect it. As Josselin 
and Wallace put it, “The debate no longer focus on whether NSAs play a role in world 
politics, but rather on how they do so” (Josselin & Wallace, 2001, p. 12).  In this section, 
I discuss the nature of NSAs and their relations with states and world politics.  
 First, NSAs like to distance themselves from state actors. They may act as 
autonomous entities, but they are not completely autonomous. There are well defined 
relations between NSAs and states, and I mean here legal, administrative, procedural and 
financial practices and relations. Josselin and Wallace argue that “Defining non-state 
actors chiefly by their independence from states and state authority would be misleading 
for both in domestic and international politics the theoretical purity of these opposing 
ideal types –state and nonstates- is muddied by the complexities of praxis” (Josselin & 
Wallace, 2001, p. 2). That is, NSAs and states are opposing categories interconnected 
through what Keohane and Nye (1971) define as governmental, national and 
transnational relations. NSAs grow so interconnected with respect to state actors that in 
time they lose autonomy, blurring political spaces between them. NSAs and states 
become interdependent, and according to Krasner (1983, 1995), as interdependence 
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consolidates, it at some point leads to a new regime type, a sort of partnership among 
them. Josselin and Wallace (2001) call it triangular relationships, whereas NSAs stand 
somewhere between states, their agencies and agents. The question is, as Josselin and 
Wallace put it, “How far non-state actors, in their triangular relations with states, still 
operate within the constraints of national and international politics” (Josselin and 
Wallace, 2001, p. 7). In the case of Iraq, many NSAs went really far in their interactions 
with state officials. This was the case for NGOs like Qandil and Diakonia from Sweden, 
Peace Winds of Japan, and Handicapped International of Belgium (IIC, 2005, p. 78; 
CFIJ, 2002, p. 19). In an effort to carry out their duties, those NGOs maintained a close 
relationship with the Iraqi regime. They not only lobbied Saddam for a license to operate 
in Iraq but even paid a hefty annual “fee” that Saddam demanded for those licenses. But 
Saddam needed more than money. Saddam needed public solidarity and political support. 
So he asked NGOs to publicly denounce the hardships that UN sanctions inflicted upon 
Iraqi people (IIC, 2005, p. 18; CFIJ, 2002, p. 19). Saddam cautiously courted not only 
NGOs but also corporations, scientists, universities, European political parties and 
religious denominations for their political support (IIC, 2005, p. 18; CFIJ, 2002, p. 19).  
 Indeed, the Iraqi case illustrates some of the problems that NSAs must confront in 
order to exist and operate. NSAs must deal with financial, legal, political, climatic, 
religious and even cultural limitations. But according to Smith (2001), Josselin and 
Wallace (2001), above all there are two concepts that limit the actions and nature of 
NSAs. They are: raison d’ eta and national security. Those two concepts are directly 
related to the very nature of nation-states. According to Smith, the two concepts became 
the motive of domestic politics as states emerged and struggled with NSAs to establish 
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the best approach toward neighboring states and world politics (Smith, 2001, p. 51). For 
Smith, “The two concepts neither mean nor imply that NSAs are enemies of nation-states 
and that those NSAs necessarily oppose states’ interests” (Smith, 2001, p. 51). Yet, I 
would state that raison d’ eta and national security define, to this date, the nature of 
relations between states and NSAs. In the name of raison d’ eta and national security, 
states try to keep NSAs away from national and global politics. Nation-states set legal 
jurisdictions to prevent NSAs from accessing states’ information, which state actors 
conceal and manipulate, arguably to protect the interests of the state. Nation-states outlaw 
some of NSAs’ activities which, according to state actors, could affect national security. 
Some nation-states outlaw and persecute religious groups, political parties and activists.  
For instance, I explained in Chapter II how states used the concepts of 
securitization and sectorization to define which issues constituted a raison d’ eta and of 
national security. Securitization and sectorization allow nation-states to overuse raison d’ 
eta and stretch out the notion of national security as a means to limit the activities of 
NSAs. In the case of Iraq, NSAs had to navigate through a political scenario that 
included: a) politics among permanent members of UN Security Council; b) US and 
UK’s foreign policies toward Iraq; c) Iraq’s own notion of national security, given the 
fact that it was a nation isolated politically and economically, and threatened militarily. 
Opposition to NSAs such as political activists and NGOs mainly came from the US, UK, 
and Iraq itself (CFIJ, 2002, p. 19).  
They blocked NSAs by: 1) harassing them politically and legally; 2) denying 
them visas to travel to Iraq; 3) revoking their operational licenses; 4) imposing on them 
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unbearable taxes, fees and other financial obligations; 5) denying them access to financial 
resources and logistics (CFIJ, 2002, p. 19).  
Again, by using national security as an excuse, Saddam banned many NSAs from 
ever entering Iraq. Saddam sectored the oil industry and declared it an issue of national 
security. But then he granted oil contracts to NSAs according to raison d’ eta and 
national security interests. Especially, he granted contracts to NSAs that publicly 
denounced UN sanctions (IIC, 2005, pp. 78-87).  For their part, both the US and UK 
favored NSAs that condemned the Iraqi regime. The US and UK publicly condemned, in 
some cases harassed, NSAs who opposed the sanctions against Iraq, like Mr. Oscar 
Wyatt, an oil tycoon from Texas and, for many years, the only American that Saddam 
trusted. Mr. Wyatt publicly opposed the UN sanctions against Iraq from the beginning. In 
2001, the Bush administration opened an investigation against Mr. Wyatt and his oil 
corporations. In 2003, Mr. Waytt was indicted for conspiracy and racketeering under the 
RICO Act (New York Times and Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2006).  
 
Types of NSAs 
There are many types of NSAs. There world is so diverse that most scholars 
define them according to their interests, the nature of their work, and their political 
affiliation. But according to Colomonos (2000), Smith (2001), and Josselin and Wallace 
(2001), most NSAs are: 1) independent from states and/or state actors; 2) relatively 
autonomous; 3) domestic actors but their politics and operations seldom transcend 
transnational networks; 4) affect foreign policy agendas and relations among states. 
Based on those parameters, in this Chapter I focus on seven NSAs. They are: 
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transnational corporations, political parties, NGOs, religious organizations, Diaspora, 
political activists, and empowered individuals. They all demonstrated a high level of 
engagement in the UN sanctions regime against Iraq  
 The first NSA I want to analyze is transnational corporations due to their active 
role in shaping globalization, circumventing a sanctions regime, and in international 
politics in general. I dedicate Chapter VI to examine the role of corporations in the 
circumvention of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. However, for now let us define 
transnational corporations as NSAs. For Josselin and Wallace (2002), as for Colomonos 
(2000), transnational corporations are basically corporations that operate in more than 
one nation. Such corporations can be private or public, or a combination of both. They 
can also be state-controlled through partial or total ownership. Their main goal is to 
produce goods and services, but they also engage in domestic and transnational politics. 
As Halliday states, “You do not have to be a Marxist to write the history of international 
relations in terms of political activities by transnational corporations” (Halliday, 2000, 
p. 31). Transnationals are not isolated entities. They are part of a global civil society. Yes, 
they are rich and powerful. I would argue that they are the strongest and most influential 
of all NSAs, but they do not dominate global politics as they used to. Transnationals must 
share power and influence with other NSAs who have their own interests and goals. 
Global trade, traditionally the main concern of transnationals, no longer dominates the 
global agenda. First, transnational have gradually moved away from trade issues to focus 
more on obtaining investment privileges across nations. Second, many NSAs see global 
trade as just one among many issues, among which are the environment, human rights, 
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nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. In fact, limiting the powers of transnational 
corporations is a key issue in global politics and a goal of many NSAs.  
In order to cope with other NSAs and their initiatives, transnational corporations 
have adopted two main approaches. The first is to avoid global regulations by relocating 
their operations to nations where governments are weaker, laws are flexible and 
enforcement lousy or nonexistent. Some governments facilitate relocations and grant 
incentives as part of their quest for foreign investment, itself a policy that transnational 
corporations defend and lobby for. Stephen F. Cohen argues in “Failed Crusades” that the 
case of Russia is a good example because, on the one hand, transnational corporations 
almost took over the Russian state through the privatization process that occurred there in 
the 1990s. On the other hand, Russia became a critical destination for corporations 
seeking to evade UN sanctions against Iraq. In Chapter II, I showed that Russia, an oil 
producer itself, ranked second in oil purchases from Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. 
But in chapters V and VI we will see that Russia did not really consume that oil. Rather, 
transnational corporations hired nascent Russian corporations as intermediaries to 
circumvent the UN sanctions against Iraq.  
The second approach that corporations use is to invest in trade regimes favorable 
to them. Transnationals lobby for and against regulations that affect their bottom lines. 
They influence norms and procedures embedded in the GATT, the WTO, and various 
bilateral, regional and global trade organizations. Not surprisingly, they invest against 
sanctions regimes. As Colomonos points out, “transnational corporations lobbied 
heavily against the promulgation of the Helms-Burton and Iran-Libya Sanctions (ILSA) 
Act. They fought the UN sanctions regime against Iraq and they have emerged at the 
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forefront of protest against commercial embargoes imposed by their own country” 
(Colomonos, 2000, p. 85). In their quest against sanctions regimes, transnational 
corporations often seek support from NSAs that oppose sanctions regimes. Colonomos 
explains that “Corporations have contacted think-tanks specializing in international 
economics and sponsored studies highlighting the cost of American sanctions for US 
companies and the American economy” (Colomonos, 2000, p. 85). Referring to British 
transnationals, the CFIJ noted that “The British too appear to be eager for their piece of 
the action” (CFIJ, 2002, p. 24). In all, I find that in order to trade with Iraq under the UN 
sanctions regime, transnational corporations allied with NSAs like NGOs, political 
parties, activists, scientists and even universities to evade UN sanctions and inspectors.   
The second group of NSAs related to this dissertation is NGOs. The beginning of 
NGOs dates back to the early 1900s. For instance, the Rotary International, known as the 
Rotary, was created in 1904. The Red Cross was created around the same time. By 1940, 
there were about 1,500 NGOs (www.un.org). But NGOs only became popular with the 
creation of UN which, in its Charter, Article 71, called for the creation of “Organizations 
that are neither governments nor member states” (www.un.org). A second definition 
drew from Resolution 288 of ECOSOC, the UN’s Agency that regulates and attends 
NGOs’ affairs. The Agency defined NGOs as “Any international organization that is not 
founded by an international treaty” (ECOSOC, www.un.org; Josselin and Wallace, 2001, 
p. 26). It was a broad definition. It was the early days of the Cold War, and UN members 
wanted to attract resources from all nations despite their ideology, religion, political 
affiliation and economic system. Later, the UN elaborated a more specific definition. It 
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stated that an NGO was a “Legally established non-for profit organization with no 
relation to any government” (www.un.org; Josselin and Wallace, 2001, p. 27). 
A few years after that, the UN once again amended it to invite more governments 
to cooperate in the promotion of NGOs. The Amendment limited governments to funding 
NGOs, which should remain self-sufficient and unbiased even if they received resources 
from nation-states. State actors should not participate in the daily operations, planning 
and decision-making of NGOs (ECOSOC, www.un.org). Now, it is very important to 
note that I utilize here the definition of NSAs as stated by UN statutes. There are three 
main reasons for it. First, based on such a definition, UN granted and denied licenses to 
NSAs that sought to operate in Iraq under the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. Second, 
based on UN’s definition of NGOS, the U.S., UK, Germany, India, Australia, New 
Zealand and other nations reprimanded and in some cases prosecuted NSAs that violated 
the UN sanctions against Iraq (IIC Report, p. 181; CFIJ, 2002, p. 19). In sum, there are 
other, perhaps more scholarly, definitions of NSAs, but they lack the legal and 
institutional frameworks as to explain violations of a UN sanctions regime by NGOs. 
Violating UN sanctions is a legal matter, not a political one.   
   The numbers and significance of NGOs were limited throughout the Cold War. 
The politics of the bipolar system impeded their work as the two leading superpowers, 
the U.S. and the USRR, limited their free movement and access to needy people, 
particularly in third world nations where proxy wars provoked poverty, diseases, 
starvation and exodus. Americans and the Soviets wanted to show the superiority of their 
political, social and economic systems. As Josselin and Wallace (2001) argue, they both 
wanted to hide their systemic failures, so they accused each other of using NGOs for 
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propaganda, proselytism, spying, and in some instances of breaching sovereignty. Right 
after the end of the Cold War, there seemed to be an ideological “consensus” about 
NGOs and their work. Most nations began to recognize that governments had limits on 
what they could do. Also, global crisis such the spread of HIV in poor nations, the war in 
Bosnia, and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda created a new spirit of cooperation among 
nations and NGOs. The intensification of globalization during the 1990s brought people 
together through greater transnational communication, traveling and global mass-media. 
People began to take note of what NGOs were doing to fight diseases, illiteracy, poverty, 
and other issues in poor nations. Today, NGOs are in all continents delivering social 
work under labels such as independent sector, civil society, grassroots organizations, 
transnational social movements, private voluntary organizations, self-help organizations 
and others. There are also the “mega” or “super” NGOs that emerged during the 1990s, 
owned and managed by philanthropists-entrepreneurs like Bill Gates, George Soros, 
Warren Buffet, Richard Branson, and other powerful individuals.   
 Most nations greet NGOs, but they are also suspicious about their intentions. 
Some nations accuse NGOs of corruption and proselytism. For many, NGOs have 
become a way of life, a source of influence and fame. In Afghanistan, the Afghan 
government has repeatedly accused some NGOs of driving luxury cars, living in fancy 
houses and partying too much (WSJ, June 17, 2007). In Latin America, some 
governments have accused NGOs of engaging in prostitution and drug trafficking, and 
there the Catholic Church keeps accusing some NGOs of promoting abortion and 
executing it illegally. (El Pais, September 7, 2007). Other governments find NGOs taking 
political positions, siding with opposition parties and leaders. In the 2009 political crisis 
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in Honduras, ten NGOs publicly supported the removal by force of the Honduran 
President (El Pais, October 21, 2009). Some nations go as far as directly financing NGOs. 
The ten largest NGOs in Honduras are funded by the U.S. State Department to this day 
(WSJ, September 28, 2009). In the case of Iraq, I found concrete evidence of NGOs 
acting as intermediaries to Iraqi and non-Iraqi corporations. NGOs took contracts from 
the Iraqi regime and sold them to Russian, American, and Ukrainian corporations among 
others.  
 The forth NSA to argue is religious denominations. They have historically had a 
visible presence in global politics, mostly through the Catholic Church. As Ryall argues, 
they are “One of the oldest and largest transnational actors of all. [] … and Jesuits can 
claim to be prototypes of globalization” (Ryall, 2001, p. 41) 
At least in the West, the Church dominated global politics since the fall of the 
Roman Empire through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, Reformation and 
Counterreformation up to the Peace of Westphalia (Cantor, 1994, p. 181). The rise of the 
Westphalia System represented a major loss of power to the Church for it brought two 
key assumptions: 1) the State was the supreme authority within a demarcated territory 
and over a people; 2) the State held a monopoly over the use of force (Ryall, 2001, p. 42). 
Thus, religious denominations became NSAs, often opposing the authority and actions of 
the State. As religious NSAs, they attempted to address questions related to the nature of 
the state and their monopoly over the use of force against civilians (Ryall, 2001, p. 42). In 
the case of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq, religious NSAs directly challenged not 
only the legitimacy of the sanctions but also the morality of imposing them (ICFJ, 2001, 
p. 20). Like corporations, NGOs and other NSAs, religious NSAs denounced the UN 
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sanctions regime against Iraq. Unlike corporations, NGOs and other NSAs, religious 
NSAs were more prepared, in theory and praxis, to challenge the overall legitimacy of a 
sanctions regime as an instrument of force and foreign policy. For them, the question 
was: how moral and practical is it to starve millions of powerless women and children in 
the name of national security, regime change and international relations. 
 Religions NSAs are not powerless. As Ryall argues, they are as transnational and 
global as corporations (Ryall, 2001, p. 41). They own schools, universities, newspapers, 
radio and TV stations, think-tanks, interest groups, and NGOs around the world. They 
have the support of millions of believers around the world. In the case of Catholic 
organizations, they have the financial, legal and political support of the Vatican, a state in 
itself. This is very important for two reasons. First, we must be cautious when defining 
Catholic organizations as NSAs for their actions can respond to specific policies and 
interests of the Vatican. Second, numerous Catholic NSAs publicly opposed the UN 
sanctions regime against Iraq. Later in this chapter we will discuss the case of a Catholic 
priest who in connection with the Central Bank of the Vatican violated the UN sanctions 
regime against Iraq. We must not ignore that the Central Bank of the Vatican has on 
numerous occasions been accused of money laundering and racketeering.  
   The fifth NSA relevant here is Diasporas. The term Diaspora refers to the exile of 
Jews in Egypt in 70 AD. Today, it refers to “A victimized exile group unable to return to 
their homeland for political reasons” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 1999, p. 220) and to “Any 
group with a territorially discontinuous relationship with a group settled elsewhere” 
(Marientrans, 1989, p. 120). The term implies a legal status, a political stand and a social 
condition. Diasporas are voluntary or involuntary, but both hold some degrees of 
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persecution to a large number of its members. A Diaspora usually settles in several 
nations. It is why Ostergaard-Nielsen argues that “Diasporas are transnational per 
definition” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 1999, p. 220). They settle mostly in nations willing to 
welcome them as political refugees, a status with some sense of stability or “permanent” 
security. In this dissertation, Diaspora refers to Iraqis living in exile due to: 1) opposition 
to Hussein’s regime; 2) born in exile; 3) self-imposed exile. Those three groups had many 
differences, mainly with respect to Saddam’s regime and the UN sanctions against Iraq. 
But most of them played key roles in violating the sanctions regime.   
 Diasporas tend to remain in touch with their homeland emotionally and 
economically. Diasporas are exceptionally active politically. Ostergaard-Nielsen observes 
that “Their emotive, social, economic and not least political cross-border networks with 
their homeland – or with other segments of the diasporas- constitute one of their main 
resources for political influence” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 1999, p. 220). They have two 
main goals. For one, they aspire to one day return safely to their homeland, for which 
they lobby parliaments, international institutions and whoever likes to hear their case. As 
Ostergaard-Nielsen points out, “A Diaspora has no government or state, it is the agenda 
devoted to obtaining one which mobilize the Diaspora” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 1999, p. 
220). Second, since they cannot guarantee their return to their homeland, they must work 
to secure a place to live and prosper. Diasporas tend to create a community for 
themselves in their adoptive nation. Such a situation is “Related to its (often troubled) 
relationship with its host country as well as its continued identification with is 
homeland” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 1999, p. 220). It is that troubled identity deficit what 
makes Diasporas unique NSAs. Diasporas mobilize, raise funds, and lobby for foreign 
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policies directly related to their motherland. For example, the Cuban-American Diaspora 
based in the U.S. is largely responsible for the 50 years of unilateral American sanctions 
against Cuba. For its part, the Iraqi Diaspora lobbied heavily against Saddam’s regime in 
France, UK, the U.S and other nations (IIC, p. 324; ICFJ, 2001, p. 22). They asked the 
UN, the EU and other international organizations for support. The American government 
employed members of the Iraqi Diaspora to “build” the case for the invasion to Iraq in 
2003. Many Iraqis in exile engaged in violations of the UN sanctions against Iraq.    
 The final NSA to discuss is empowered individuals (Josselin and Wallace, 2001) 
since they played important roles in regard to the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. I 
mean here individuals with direct access to the means of power, namely politics, 
finances, and public opinion. As Josselin and Wallace state, “Globalization allows them 
to globalize their messages and expose themselves to global multitudes through means of 
globalization such as mass media” (Josselin and Wallace, 2001, p.19). Examples of 
empowered individuals are Bill Gates, George Soros and Bono. They attract global 
audiences. They shape public opinion through a global media interested in selling their 
public images and life styles. They are political assets for they have an audience. They 
use their political capital to lobby politicians, governments and international institutions. 
So George Soros is an investor who spends his money promoting civic societies around 
the world. Bono, a singer, is a recurrent participant in WTO meetings where he lobbies 
Presidents and Prime Ministers for fair trade. In Iraq, the politics around the UN 
sanctions attracted empowered individuals of diverse social, political and professional 
stratums. I present five models of how NSAs worked together to evade the UN sanction 
against Iraq. They are: a) empowered individuals - UN associates - corporations; b) 
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individuals - religious organizations - corporations; c) individuals - political activism-
corporations; d) individuals - civic organizations - corporations; e) individuals – 
international organizations - corporations. Note that individuals and corporations are the 
common denominators. Figure 4.1 represents the relations among NSAs.  
 
Figure 4.1 – Relations among NSAs 
 
 I infer from Chart 4.1 three main points. First of all, individuals are responsible 
for the actions of NSAs because, in the end, individuals manage and lead religious, 
political and international organizations and corporations. Individuals set and execute 
their agendas. They donate money and write grants in the name of numerous causes. In 
the Iraqi case, it was individuals who facilitated access to the Iraqi regime and its 
contracts. Second, corporations are the means to evade the UN sanctions against Iraq. 
Most NSAs relied on corporations to execute the contracts they obtained from Saddam’s 
regime, and most corporations employed NGOs, religious groups, and empowered 
individuals to obtain contracts from Saddam’s regime. Third, most individuals fallow 
almost the same modus operandi. They first seek access to Iraq’s governmental agencies 
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and agents. They then convert access into influence, paying special attention to agenda 
setting and policy-making. Lastly, they turn influence into marginal gains, then into 
power and finally into political leverage. The process requires funding, public relations, 
media coverage, and favorable public opinion among other capacities. In the next section, 
I show how NSAs worked together to evade the UN sanctions against Iraq.  
 
Overview of NSA Activities during the UN Sanctions Regime 
 The IIC found that “Saddam Hussein, beyond favoring companies from Russia, 
China and France, also decided to furnish allocations of oil to friendly political figures 
and organizations had political positions favorable to Iraq” (IIC, p. 334). The CIA 
agreed. I draw Chart 4.1 with data from the CIA’s Report on violations of UN sanctions.    
 
 Chart 4.1 – Nationality of Individuals and Organizations 
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Source: The Duelfer Report (CIA) 
  
 The Chart shows individuals and organizations of different nationalities that 
illegally obtained about $18,000 million worth of contracts from Iraq. NSAs had never 
engaged in trade operations of such a magnitude under a sanctions regime. In the graph, 
we can see that individuals and organizations from “other nations,” about 41, accounted 
for $4,000 million worth of contracts. Russia, French, Chinese and Swiss ranked second, 
third, and fourth respectively. They obtained about $6,000 million worth of contracts. 
Syrians, Turks, Jordanians and Egyptians ranked seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth 
respectively, accounting for nearly $1,200 million. Still, individuals and organizations did 
not have resources and expertise to execute their contracts. Also, Meyer and Califano 
argue that “Most political figures who received oil allocations from Iraq […] had no 
desire to have their name appear on a contract with SOMO. For this reason, political 
beneficiaries often nominated companies to exercise their allocation rights, and these 
companies were named to sign formal contracts with SOMO to buy the oil” (Meyer and 
Califano, 2006, p. 75). In their investigations, the IIC and CIA defined as beneficiaries 
those individuals and organizations that sold their contracts to corporations (IIC, p. 334; 
Duelfer Report, p. 451). I will discuss individuals and organization separately to better 
examine their role in the circumvention of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq.   
 
Individuals 
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 To better explain the role of individuals under the UN sanctions regime against 
Iraq, I present Table 4.1. The Table shows a sample of individuals and their beneficiaries 
under the UN sanctions regime as they appear n the IIC and CIA’s Report.        
 
Table 4.1 – Individuals-Violators of UN Sanctions Regime 
171 
Individual    Proffesion/Type Nation Beneficiary Company Beneficiary Contracts 
of Non-state Actor In USD
 Adel Al-Dzhilaui Business & political activist Iraqi Exile Pitkin Lmt. Cyprus 2,925,000          
Ali Ballout Religious leader Lebanon Galaxy Management S.A. Italy 1,764,000          
Ali Ballout Religious leader Lebanon Primacosa Enterprises Ltd. Cyprus 1,002,000          
Ali Ballout Religious leader Lebanon Amosta S.L. Spain 995,000             
Ahmed Saeed Al-Otaiba Business & political activist UAE Emirol Est. UAE 3,984,000          
Ahmed Saeed Al-Otaiba Bussines & political activist UAE Loyoil LLC UAE 2,441,000          
Ahmed Saeed Al-Otaiba Business & political activist UAE Benzoil UAE 2,004,000          
 Benon Sevan UN affiliate France Impexoil LLC Russia 3,913,000          
Benon Sevan UN affiliate France African Middle East Petroleum  Panama 7,291,000          
Burhan Al-Chalabi Business & political activist Iraqi in Exile Fortun Oil And Gas OY Finland 3,935,000          
Enrica Benniti Political activist Italy Finasi SPA Italy 1,113,000          
Father Benjamin Priest Italy Zyria Management Serv. Ltd Switzerland 2,055,000          
 George Galloway ex Member of UK Parliament UK Middle East Semiconductor Jordan 6,681,000          
Hamad Bin Ali Jabr Political activist Qatar Emiroil Est. UAE 5,954,000          
Hamad Bin Ali Jabr Political activist Qatar Int'nal Petroleum Services Egypt 2,927,000          
Jean Bernard Merimee Retired Diplomatat France Fenar Petroleum Ltd Lichtenstein 2,027,000          
Khalifa Al-Nahyan Political & religious leader UAE Fenar Petroleum Ltd Lichtenstein 1,955,000          
Mohammad Helmi Al-Sahwah newspaper Egypt Antemina International LLC Jordan 1,000,000          
Mohammed Al-Houni Journalist Libya K.T.G. Kentford Globe Ltd. Cyprus 3,929,000          
Mohammed Al-Houni Journalist Libya Gulf Erdolhandels GMBH Austria 5,407,000          
Mohammed Al-Houni Journalist Libya Arcmed Energy Ltd Cyprus 998,000             
Mr. Mousinikov President of Ukraine Soc. Party Ukraine Inves Co. Ltd Ukraine 899,000             
Mr. Persenkov Chairman of Social Dem. Party Ukraine Commercial Council Deal Ukraine 3,392,000          
President Lahhoud' son  Son of President of Libanon Lebanon Fadi Oil International Sal Lebanon 2,280,000          
Riad El-Taher Friendship without Borders Iraqi in Exile Perenco PLC UK 960,000             
Russian Embassador's son Son of Russian Embassador Russia RAO Mes Int'nal Econ. Co. Russia 13,071,000        
Serge Boiedeevaix  Retired Diplomatat France Vitol S.A. Switzerland 29,525,000        
 Sergei Rudassiev Solidarity for Iraqi People Russia Hyperborey Company Ukraine 1,940,000          
Shaker Bin Zaid Bussinessmen Jordan Aredio Petroleum S.A.R.L France 3,253,000          
 Shakir Al-Khafaji Assoc. Solidarity/Iraqi People Iraqi in Exile Omni Oil S. Africa 2,070,000          
Son of a President President / Republic of Kalmykia Russia Kalmyk Oil & Gas Company Russia 1,563,000          
Wafa Tawfiz Butrus Professor and Political activist Palestine National Oil Well Maint. Qatar 2,050,000          
Wafa Tawfiz Butrus Professor and Political activist Palestine B.C. International PVT Ltd. Pakistan 1,000,000          
Zia Ja'far Religious leader Iraqi in Exile Cressent Petroleum Ltd UAE 1,389,000          
Ziad al-Hadi Businessmen & political activist Iraqi in Exile VTT Vulcan Petroleum SA Switzerland 1,766,000          
Total 129,458,000        
        
 Source: The Duelfer Report; the IIC 
 The Table shows, in Column I, 35 names of participants, the largest recipients of 
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oil and procurement contracts, in the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. Column II shows 
their professions or “type” of non-state actors as they appeared in Iraqi official 
documents. Column III reveals their nationalities. Since they sold their contracts to 
“beneficiaries,” Column IV shows the names of beneficiaries, and Column V their 
nations of registration. Column VI includes the value of the contracts that individuals and 
their beneficiaries exchanged. The data show three main aspects: a) dominance of Arab 
and Russian NSAs; b) Middle Eastern individuals living in Europe; c) contributions of 
Russian and Ukrainian politicians, consistent with what Califano and Meyer found: 
“Among the most favored beneficiaries were politicians and political parties from Russia 
and Ukraine” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p.76). 
 The participation of NSAs from the Middle East is understandable. In political 
terms, the UN sanctions regime against Iraq constituted an insult to most Muslims and 
Arabs. They considered it an aggression to Islam and the Arab world. I would argue that, 
for Muslims and Arabs, violating the UN sanctions was just a reaction to an aggression, a 
political statement, and an expression of solidarity with respect to the Iraqi people. 
Nonetheless, not all was about politics for, in economic terms, the UN sanction regime 
created good business opportunities for many Arabs and Muslims. After all, they had a 
comparative advantage in terms of geography, culture, customs, and historic trade 
relations. In Chapter III, I explained that the UN sanctions regime could not disrupt the 
historic trade relations that Iraq had with its neighbors, especially Syria, Turkey, Jordan, 
and even Iran, Iraq’s historic enemy. On the contrary, the UN sanctions brought them 
together. I also argued in Chapter III that those nations in fact increased their trade 
through bilateral trade agreements as a means to maximizing their comparative 
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advantages. It explains the participation of Arabs and Muslim NSAs in the circumvention 
of UN sanctions against Iraq. From corporations and banks to scientists and universities, 
churches and religious activists, politicians and political parties, they all profited from the 
business opportunities that UN sanctions created not only in Iraq but in the region. UN’s 
inspectors could not prevent NSAs from engaging in the intense economic activity that 
UN sanctions created in Iraq and the region. UN and US’ officials could not comprehend 
the magnitude of the issue. Yet, Western NSAs understood it so well that they hired Arab 
and Muslims NSAs to evade UN inspectors and access the Iraqi market. It explains: a) 
the low number of Western NSAs that violated the UN sanctions against Iraq; b) the high 
number of Arabs and Muslims that violated the UN sanctions.  
 A bit more complex is the participation of NSAs from ex-Soviet societies. 
Political and economic reforms that occurred in ex-Soviet republics after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union created opportunities for consolidating trade, commercial relationships 
that ex-Soviet republics had with Iraq. Cohen (2001) argues in his “Failed Crusades” that 
the reforms created a civic society composed by Russian and foreign NSAs that took 
advantage of the new economic opportunities in Russia. But some Ukrainian, Belarusian, 
and Russian NSAs, like the conglomerate Gasprom and the Russian National Party, took 
advantage of the traditional economic relations Iraq had with former Soviet Union. As 
previously noted, the Soviet Union had been Iraq’s main business partner for almost 40 
years. NSAs from ex-Soviet republics will be the focus of discussion all throughout this 
dissertation due to their presence in Iraq under the UN sanctions.   
Second, according to the CIA, individuals declared 27 professions when they 
introduced themselves to Saddam’s bureaucrats (IIC, Committee Tables, Table IV). They 
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included doctors, politicians, businessmen, ex-legislators and ex- ambassadors, and even 
priests and professors. I can cite a few examples from Table 4.1. For example, according 
to the IIC, CIA and CFIJ, Father Benjamin was a priest who received about 21,000 
barrels of oil from Saddam’s regime, which he sold to Zyria Management Service Ltd., a 
Swiss corporation. Another example was Serge Bojedeevaix, a French ex-diplomat who 
obtained almost 30,000 barrels of oil, only to sell them to African Middle East Petroleum. 
Ironically, the Firm was based neither in Africa nor in the Middle East but in Panama. 
For his part, Benon Sevan, an ex French diplomat too and UN official for almost 20 
years, received almost 12,000 barrels of oil. According to the IIC, CIA and CFIJ, he 
passed his vouchers on to Vitol S.A, a Swiss company, and to Impexoil, from Russia. 
Note that both Mr. Bojedeevaix and Mr. Sevan retired from their diplomatic posts early 
into the UN sanctions regime and rapidly began to travel to Iraq as private citizens.  
 Politicians were among the most visible violators of the UN sanctions. Table 
4.1 shows 13 individuals who one way or another made a living out of politics. Table 4.1 
shows that Arab and Middle Eastern politicians were the largest recipients of contracts. 
Russians and Ukrainians participated in larger numbers, but they received fewer 
contracts. Also, note that the data only include oil contracts. It does not include 
construction, industrial, educational and health contracts, over which, French, Russians 
and Ukrainians largely dominated. According to the IIC, Saddam’s regime granted $6 
billion in contracts to Russian and Ukrainian individuals within a five-year period (IIC, 
Chapter III, p. 39). Some were executed, but some were not. Again, Saddam’s regime 
granted contracts based on political criteria, and most of those individuals had no 
resources and expertise to execute those contracts.  
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 Iraq also granted contracts to sons, daughters and relatives of ambassadors, 
political leaders, prime ministers and heads of states. Table 4.1 above shows that 
Saddam’s regime grated 2,280,000 barrels of oil to the son of the President of Lebanon, 
who then sold his oil to Said Oil International Sal, a Lebanese oil corporation. The Table 
indicates that the Iraqi regime granted 1,563,000 million barrels to the son of the 
President of Kalmykia, a small ex-Soviet Republic. He sold the contracts to Kalmyk Oil 
& Gas Company, an oil company owned by the state of Kalmykia. The son of the 
Russian ambassador to Iraq received 13,071,000 barrels, which he sold to RAO Mes 
International Economic Company, of Russia. All told, Table 4.1 shows that 36 
individuals obtained a total of 129,458,000 barrels of oil. It accounted for 29% of all oil 
contracts granted to individuals under the sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter III, p. 39).  
 
Organizations 
 The UN issued 259 licenses to 172 NGOs, including political and religious 
organizations, from 1996 to 2002, so they could carry out humanitarian work in Iraq (IIC, 
Chapter III, p. 44). Some of those NGOs were very vocal when denouncing the impact 
that the UN sanctions had on Iraqis. Others focused on lobbying governmental agencies, 
politicians and UN officials to ease the sanctions or create “smart sanctions.” But others 
decided to profit from the sanctions regime. Like individuals did, they allied to oil 
traders, financiers and export-import firms to execute the contracts they obtained from 
Saddam’s regime. The IIC reported 73 religious NGOs as violators of the UN sanctions 
(IIC, Chapter III, p. 79). The CIA reported 84. Table 4.2 shows a group of 29 violators 
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selected according to the size of the business they accrued (CIA, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p. 211). They obtained contracts for 1,000,000 million barrels of oil.    
 
Table 4.2 – Organizations-Violators of the UN Sanctions Regime  
 
  
Organization Nationality Beneficiary Company Nationality Barrels Lifted
Russia Communist Party Russia Monaco JSC Russia 110,618,000      
 Russia Peace and Unity Party Russia Rossbulneft Ad Russia 87,281,000        
Russian Liberal Democratic Party Russia Sindanco Russia 62,068,000        
Mujahedeen Khalq Organization Iraq Century Marketing Associates UK 27,983,000        
Socialist and Radical Parties (50%ea) Yugoslavia Eurol Int'l  (based in Bermuda) UK 19,392,000        
Amities Franco-Irakiennes France Aredio Petroleum S.A.R.L. France 11,140,000        
Iraqi-Ukraine House Ukraine H.I.U. Ltd Ukraine 10,318,000        
Ukraine Communist Party Ukraine Hyperborey Ukraine 7,393,000          
Liberal Democratic Party Belarus Belmetalenergo, Inc Belarus 6,552,000          
Belarus Communist Party Belarus ACTEC Russia 6,435,000          
Yugoslavia Radical Party Yugoslavia Pitkin Ltd Yugoslavia 4,056,000          
Socialist Party of Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Emiroil EST UAE 3,984,000          
Palestine Economic Institute Palestine Petrolina Oil Ltd Jordan 3,688,000          
Russian Political Science Academy Russia Zerich GMBH Russia 3,635,000          
Gubkin University of Oil And Gas Russia Zarubezhneft Russia 3,337,000          
Bulgaria Socialist Party Bulgaria Vassilevy Brothers Ltd Bulgaria 3,023,000          
India-Congress Party India Masefield AG Switzerland 2,937,000          
Union of all Russian Officers Russia Tatneft Russia 2,708,000          
Romania Labor Party Romania Petroline FZC UAE 2,275,000          
Palestinian Liberation Front Palestine Awad Ammora Co. & Partners Syria 2,051,000          
National Press Association of Algeria Algeria Zyria Management Services Switzerland 2,041,000          
Iraqi-Bulgaria Co. Ltd Bulgaria Vassilevi Brothers Ltd. Bulgaria 2,039,000          
Russia for Benefit of Government Russia Zarubezhneft Russia 2,016,000          
Yugoslavia Left Wing Party Yugoslavia Petroline FZC UAE 1,840,000          
Hungary-Welfare Party Hungary Rompetrol S.A. Rumania 1,101,000          
Romania Communist Party Romania Petroline FZC UAE 1,038,000          
Arab-Austrian Friendship Society Austria Al-Hoda Int'l Trading Co. UAE 1,023,000          
Ukraine Socialist Party Ukraine Zerich GMBH Russia 1,001,000          
Yugoslavia Kostunica Party Yugoslavia Gromig Export-Import Yugoslavia 1,000,000          
Total 393,973,000       
    
Source: Duelfer Report, IIC Report 
   
There are several findings here. First, see in Column I that political parties, 
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universities, academies, unions and civic associations are among the NSAs that illegally 
approached Saddam’s regime for contracts. Political organizations led the trend. Second, 
there is a notable presence of political parties from nations of the former communist bloc. 
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and ex-Soviet republics led this tendency. I 
argued earlier that the UN sanctions coincided with the disintegration of the communist 
bloc and the economic crisis that followed there. Also important is the sweeping political 
reforms that occurred in those nations. The reforms brought about a multiparty system 
with no financial support from the state. Political parties had to fund themselves. They 
had to raise money from their constituencies or other sources. Evidences suggest that the 
UN sanctions regime became a source of funding 
 Indeed, Table 4.2 reveals that twelve political parties obtained over a million 
barrels of oil. The three leading beneficiaries were Russian political organizations, and 
that the leading recipient was the Russian Communist Party. This may be the result of the 
long standing relations between the Russian Communist Party and the Iraqi regime, 
dating back to the days when the Soviet Union was among the main political and 
economic allies of the Iraqi regime. Now observe in the Column IV the number of 
Russian companies. There are nine in total, acting as beneficiaries. It was the result of the 
privatization process that took place in Russia during the 1990s, which only in the oil 
industry led to the creation of hundreds of oil companies. Russian political organizations 
and Russian oil firms worked together to circumvent the UN sanctions regime. In fact, 
later in this dissertation I explain that banks, companies and businesses of all sorts 
preferred Russian companies to execute their contracts. Among other things, it illustrates 
how rapidly Russian political parties and businesses transitioned from a closed society 
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and market to the open global society and economy.     
 It is important to emphasize the role of two Palestinian organizations: the 
Palestinian Liberation Front (PLO) and the Palestine Economic Institute, in 
circumventing the sanctions regime. These organizations had no experience in the oil 
business. In fact, Palestine is not a state, and there are no oil firms and refineries in 
Palestinian territories. The Palestinian people actually meet 100% of its energy demands 
through Israel (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 188). What then did 
Palestinian organizations do with those oil contracts? The answer is straightforward: they 
resold them to finance their political activities, just like most political organization did. 
As Table 4.2 shows, the PLO resold 2,016,000 million barrels to Awad Ammora Co. & 
Partners, a Turkish Firm registered and based in Syria. The Palestine Economic Institute 
resold 3,688,000 million barrels to Petrolina Oil Ltd, an Italian petroleum conglomerate 
with numerous refineries in Jordan and other nations in the Middle East. 
 Overall, Table 4.2 shows that 29 organizations received a total of 421,022,000 
barrels of oil within an average period of 3 years (IIC, Chapter III, p. 79). The IIC 
estimated that the contracts were worth about $550 million dollars (IIC, Chapter III, p. 
79). The CIA reported that, in total, Saddam’s regime granted about $3 billion dollars 
worth of oil to NGOs, political parties, religious organizations and other civic entities 
from all around the world (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 190). In 
the next section, I discuss examples of how individuals and organizations worked with 
corporations and banks to evade the UN sanctions and to conceal their profits.      
 
Case Studies 
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 In this section, I present eight case studies to explain how NSAs evaded or helped 
evade the UN sanctions in Iraq. The cases are: 1) Mr. Kojo Annan and Cotecna; 2) Mr. 
Benon Sevan and AMEP; 3) Mr. Jean Bernard Mérimée; 4) Father Benjamin; 5) Mr. 
George Galloway, Mariam Appeal, Fortum and Delta Services; 6) Mr. Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky, his son Mr. Igor Lebedev, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and the 
three companies: Bayoil, Sidanco, and Plasco Shipping Co.; 7) the Communist Party of 
the Russian Federation, the Foundation for Friendship with Peoples of Arab States, the 
Council for Trade and Economic Cooperation with the Middle East and North African 
Countries, and Glencore International AG, a transnational corporation; 8) the African 
National Congress, the South Africa-Iraq Friendship Association, the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) and two corporations: Montega Trading Ltd and Imvume 
Management Ltd. Again, corporations are the common denominator here. It is so because 
most NSAs confronted the same key issue: they did not possess the “know-how” to 
execute business contracts they obtained from Saddam’s regime; therefore, they allied to 
corporations that did have the capabilities to execute the contracts. But above all, these 
case studies illustrate: a) how NSAs interact within the context of a global civic society; 
b) how vulnerable multilateral sanctions regimes are to a global civil society.   
 
Kojo Anan and Cotecna 
 The first case involves the model individual-UN associates-corporations. The 
model typifies how individuals lobbied UN associates on behalf of corporations 
interested in trading with the Iraqi regime under the UN sanctions regime. The case 
focuses on Kojo Annan, the son of Kofi Annan, UN’s Secretary General at the time the 
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UN conceived and enforced its sanctions regime against Iraq. Strong evidences suggest 
that Kojo Annan utilized his contacts at UN to win, among other contracts, perhaps the 
most important contract under the UN sanctions regime: the contract to inspect import-
export operations in Iraqi. Kojo won the contract for Cotecna Inc.  
 Cotecna was a family-owned business, registered and based in Geneva, 
Switzerland (IIC, p. 480). The company belonged to Elie Massey, an Egyptian old friend 
of Boutros-Ghali, a former UN Secretary General (IIC, p. 480). The CIA and IIC 
assumed that thanks to the friendship, Cotecna obtained several contracts from UN 
during Ghali’s tenure, to the point that Cotecna became a multimillion dollars business 
and UN’s main subcontractor in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria. 
But once Boutros-Ghali’s Secretariat was over, Cotecna began to lose influence at UN 
and, as result, numerous contracts. Cotecna even faced a corruption scandal in Pakistan, 
which involved the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 48). It 
was during this period of crisis for Cotecna that Kojo Annan sought to work for the 
company. Kojo applied for a job there through his old friend Michael Wilson, Cotecna’s 
Vice President for Marketing Operations in Africa. Cotecna hired Kojo as a consultant. 
Meyer and Califano affirmed that that “Cotecna decided to hire Kojo because of his 
connections and standing. Though not yet Secretary-General, Kofi Annan was already a 
prominent UN functionary serving under the Secretary-General and a strong candidate 
to substitute Boutros Ghali. The United States saw in Annan a reformer and supported 
his candidacy from the very beginning” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 48).  
 Kojo became a consultant for Cotecna in 1995, and Cotecna became the sole 
inspection company of import-export operations in Iraq in 1996 (IIC, p. 481; Meyer and 
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Califano, 2006, p. 48). The contract itself was not lucrative for it was worth just $6 
million per year, but Cotecna began to impose hidden fees and surcharges, accepted 
briberies, and paid kickbacks to Saddam’s regime. Cotecna paid its way into Saddam’s 
bureaucracy, which eventually translated into more lucrative contracts. Cotecna obtained 
39 procurement contracts (IIC, p. 482; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 48). Through its 
auditing work, it absorbed contracts that included construction projects, transportation, 
and even in the health care sector. The CIA and IIC calculated that Cotecna made about 
$120 million dollars per year through illegal deals and operations. Their activities had 
multiplier effects of about $800 million dollars per year for the Iraqi economy (IIC, p. 
481; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 48). 
  Cotecna paid Kojo a salary of $2,500 per month for seven days of work per week, 
and it also paid Kojo $500 dollars per day in allowances and issued a credit card for him. 
Cotecna paid Kojo about a $3 million dollars in “consulting fees” for a period of two 
years (IIC, p. 482; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 48). Cotecna’s bank records revealed a 
trail of transactions from its accounts to Kojo’s. For example, the IIC found that Cotecna 
paid $195,000 dollars through Confiner and Meteor, two dormant companies owned by 
Mr. Massey, Kojo’s friend and mentor. The trail of proof shifted toward Westexim by the 
year 2000. Westexim was a shell company registered in Switzerland but with P.O. Box in 
London. Cotecna issued seven money transfers of $118,000 dollars through Westexim, 
but there were another two payments of $130,000 to Kojo from an offshore account 
Cotecna had in Jersey Island (IIC, p. 483).   
 What is important here is that Kojo Anan utilized his influence as the son of 
UN’s Secretary General to attain a lucrative UN contract for Cotecna, which was a 
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private enterprise. Cotecna paid Kojo for his services, and it paid itself handsomely. Yet, 
it failed to inspect and detect violations of sanctions. Under Cotecna’s watch, NGOs, 
individuals, political parties, banks, companies and Iraq profited hundreds of millions of 
dollars through kickbacks, overcharges, surcharges, money laundering, and other illegal 
operations. Thus, I would safely argue that Cotecna was largely responsible for the 
failures of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. 
 
Benon Sevan 
 The second case explains the model UN bureaucrats - corporations, namely 
how bureaucrats working for an international institution such as UN can affect a 
multilateral sanctions regime. The case study is about Mr. Benon Sevan, one of the most 
visible individuals in the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. Mr. Sevan was the Executive 
Director of OIP, the very office responsible for overseeing the UN sanctions regime. Mr. 
Sevan’s actions contributed to violations of the UN sanctions.   
 Mr. Sevan began to work for UN in 1965. He was promoted to Assistant 
Secretary General and Secretary-General’s Personal Representative in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan from 1989 to 1997 (IIC, p. 213). He was then appointed Executive Director of 
the OIP in 1997, an office explicitly created to oversee the sanctions regime. It was a 
powerful post in bureaucratic and political terms. From his office, Mr. Sevan supervised 
daily operations of the sanctions regime during the period 1997-2003 (IIC, p. 213; Meyer 
and Califano, 2006, p. 182). The office established administrative rules and policies, set 
agendas, conducted periodic audits, gathered statistical and financial data, and prepared 
reports for the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Sevan’s office had 
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an adjacent division responsible for overseeing the execution of contracts. It had 
hundreds of auditors monitoring compliance of contracts and sanctions. In addition, it had 
a third office, this one “on the ground,” on Iraqi soil, to coordinate enforcement of 
sanctions throughout Iraq and its borders. In other words, under the right leadership, Mr. 
Sevan’s office could have been an effective instrument of the UN sanctions regime. On 
the wrong hands, it could have led to mismanagement, corruption and nepotism. The 
latter prevailed. 
 Right after his appointment at the UN, Mr. Sevan started lobbying against the 
very sanctions regime he was supposed to enforce and oversee. He travelled 16 times in 
one year to Iraq, always as a UN representative; yet, while there, he spoke against the UN 
sanctions regime (IIC, p. 213; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 182). He traveled across the 
world to speak to prime ministers, politicians, religious leaders and human right groups. 
He spoke of relaxing the sanctions, rebuilding the Iraqi oil industry, and increasing sells 
of Iraqi oil. Meyer and Califano noted that “Mr. Sevan became the unofficial ambassador 
and voice of the Oil for Food Program” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 183).  
 It is plausible that Mr. Sevan truly felt the need for relaxing the sanctions regime 
after witnessing the suffering of Iraqi people at first hand. However, evidences show that 
he illegally accepted oil vouchers from the Iraqi regime and sold them to AMEP, an oil 
trader registered in Panama (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 183). I showed in Table 4.1 
that Mr. Sevan illegally obtained vouchers for 11 million barrels of oil. IIC’s records 
indicated that Mr. Sevan sold the vouchers to AMEP, and Sevan’s bank statements 
revealed “Regular deposits of thousands of dollars of cash – usually in the form of one-
hundred-dollar U.S. banknotes- to their New York bank accounts at the UN Federal 
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Credit Union and Chase Manhattan Bank” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 183). Chart I 
right below shows deposits in Sevan’s personal bank accounts.         
 
Chart 4.2 - Benon Sevan’s Personal Bank Account during the UN Sanctions Regime 
 
 
    
Source: IIC, Duelfer Report  
 
  
 Chart 4.2 shows deposits from $7,000 to $18,000 thousand from December 1998 
to April 2002 even though Mr. Sevan had just one legal source of income: the salary he 
received from the UN. Curiously, “Bank records for accounts used by Sevan and his wife, 
Micheline Sevan, who was also a UN employee, showed that… their accounts went into 
overdraft status almost two hundred times. But after AMEP’s first oil sale at the end of 
1998, all of it changed as a mysterious chain of cash deposits emerged” (Meyer and 
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Califano, 2006, p. 183). The IIC linked Mr. Sevan’s bank deposits to AMEP’s bank 
withdrawals. The deposits coincided with the first oil voucher the Iraqi regime assigned 
to Mr. Sevan, coinciding with AMEP’s first oil sale under the UN sanctions regime. 
AMEP tallied its payments to Mr. Sevan “as commissions that ranged between 5 to 10 
cents per oil barrel” (IIC, p. 215; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 183). Mr. Sevan and his 
wife made their last large deposit in April 2002. Coincidently, AMEP executed its last oil 
sale just a month earlier. I found evidences of Mr. Sevan and AMEP’s illegal activities 
through records that Shell Corporation made public upon subpoena by the IIC. Shell’s 
records revealed that AMEP resold Mr. Sevan’s vouchers to Shell Corporation (IIC, p. 
215; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 183).  
 
Jean Bernard Mérimée  
This third case also involves the model individuals - UN associates -corporations. 
The case is about Mr. Jean Bernard Mérimée. This case is significant because Mr. 
Mérimée was the French Ambassador to UN from 1991 to 1995, and as such he 
conceived and negotiated UN Resolution 986, which established the UN sanctions regime 
against Iraq. Let us not forget that France has veto power as one of the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, which gave Mr. Mérimée authority and a lot of 
power with respect to the UN sanctions regime and in UN in general.   
 Mr. Mérimée began to oppose Resolution 986 soon after UN approved it. To be 
fair, he “Advocated for lifting the sanctions once Iraq satisfied its obligations concerning 
its weapons program pursuant to United Nations resolutions” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 49; 
Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 77). He favored the “smart sanctions” initiative, which 
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eventually became France’s policy toward the Iraqi question. Yes, I would argue that it 
was France’s policy and not Mérimée’s. Yet, it all seems suspicious because Mérimée 
ended his ambassadorship to UN in 1995, and soon afterwards he became the Special 
Advisor to UN Secretary General on European Affairs, from where he voiced his support 
for “smart sanctions” as an alternative to the UN sanctions regime against Iraq (IIC, 
Chapter II, p. 49; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 77).     
 It turned out that Mr. Mérimée had forged a friendship with Tariq Azid, Iraq’s 
Foreign Minister. “To show his pleasure for Mr. Mérimée’s fair negotiations,” Tariz Azid 
granted $2 million barrels of oil and a dozen procurement contracts to Mr. Mérimée, who 
then sold them to Fenar Petroleum Ltd; a Firm based in Liechtenstein and subsidiary of 
Taurus Group, a Swiss oil trader (IIC, p. 49; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 77). Mr. 
Mérimée hired Mr. Elias Firzli to manage the operations. Mr. Firzli was an intermediary 
who “Often helped beneficiaries based in France to sell contracts received from 
Saddam’s regime” (IIC, Chapter II p. 51; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 78). Mr. 
Mérimée, Mr. Firzli and Fenar utilized BMCE Bank of Morocco to conduct their 
financial transactions. The idea came from Mr. Mérimée himself. He declared to the IIC 
that “He was careful not to involve a French entity in the transactions” (IIC, p. 51; 
Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 78). The obvious plan was to use Morocco’s flexible 
banking system to avoid French and UN auditors. The IIC estimated that Mr. Mérimée 
pocketed about $2 million dollars, the result of his illegal business deals under the UN 
sanctions regime against Iraq (IIC, Chapter II; p. 52; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 78).     
Father Benjamin 
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 The fourth case study involves the formula individual-religious activism-
companies. It is about Father Jean-Marie Benjamin, a priest who used humanitarian work 
and a private enterprise as a façade to evade sanctions.   
 Father Benjamin worked as Assistant to the Vatican Secretary of State from 1991 
to 1994 (IIC, Chapter II, p. 99). Once his assignment ended, he began a public relations 
campaign against the sanctions regime. He produced the documentary “Iraq: The Birth of 
Time” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 99). It was his personal account of the negative effects that the 
sanctions had upon Iraqi population. The documentary was well-acclaimed in Europe, 
motivating a passionate debate about the morality of sanctions regimes as instruments of 
foreign policy, given their negative impact on civil population. Father Benjamin also 
created “Benjamin Committee for Iraq,” a NGO to raise money, cloths, medicines, and 
school supplies for Iraqi children (IIC, Chapter II, p. 100). In April 2000, Faher Benjamin 
became the center of media frenzy as he, and another 200 activists, boarded an illegal 
flight to Baghdad in defiance of UN sanctions. In fact, he visited Iraq and met Saddam on 
various occasions. He even invited Tariq Aziz, a Christian, to pay a visit to Pope John 
Paul II at the Vatican (IIC, Chapter II, p.100; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 88).   
 It was during one of those meetings that Father Benjamin asked Tariq Aziz for oil 
vouchers and procurement contracts (IIC, Chapter II, p. 100; Meyer and Califano, 2006, 
p. 88). He argued that selling the contracts would have raised capital to fund his public 
relations campaign against the sanctions regime. Tariq Aziz accepted the proposal, and 
Father Benjamin proceeded to contact Alain Bionda, a Swiss oil trader, owner of Zyria 
Management Services (IIC, Chapter II, p. 100, Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 88). Mr. 
Bionda had been seeking business opportunities in Iraq without success, so he rapidly 
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accepted and proceeded to hire several companies to execute the contracts. The most 
notable was Taurus Group and its subsidiaries. Bank records show that Zyria and Taurus 
shared transactions for about $25 million per year from 1997 to 2001 (IIC, Chapter II, p. 
101; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 88). They transferred about $7 million dollars in the 
form of bank notes to Father Benjamin’s accounts at UBS Geneva and Vatican Bank, 
Istituto per le Opere di Religione. The companies described the transfers as “donations.” 
The IIC calculated that Father Benjamin received vouchers for about 6 million barrels of 
oil and procurement contracts worth $20 million dollars (IIC, Chapter II, p. 101; Meyer 
and Califano, 2006, p. 88).  
 
George Galloway  
The case, like the fourth, illustrates how NSAs evaded the UN sanctions regime in 
the name of charitable work, only that this case involves a legislator using a NGO as a 
façade. The case fits the formula individuals- political activism – corporations. It entails 
Mr. George Galloway, his charity foundation Mariam Appeal, and corporations Fortum 
and Delta Services.  
 Mr. Galloway was a British MP well-known for his opposition to the UN 
sanctions regime. He reasoned that the sanctions affected the Iraqi people, not the Iraqi 
regime. To illustrate his argument, he visited Iraq on several occasions and documented 
the effects that the UN sanctions were having on Iraqi civilians. He even brought a four 
year old Iraqi girl to Great Britain for medical treatment. Her name was Mariam. In her 
honor, Mr. Galloway founded the charitable foundation Mariam Appeal, whose mission 
was to mobilize public opinion, lobby the UN and governments, and raise money to 
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purchase medicines, food, and school supplies for Iraqi children. Mr. Galloway toured ten 
nations in a double-decker British bus, including Iraq. He voiced his message wherever 
he went. Below is a record of his visits to Iraq in violations of the UN sanctions.   
 
Table 4.3 – George Galloway’s Visits to Iraq during the UN Sanctions Regime 
 
George Galloway's Visits to Iraq from 1993 to 2002
Date Meeting
Oct-02 Deputy Prime Minister tariq Aziz
Aug-02 Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz
May-02 Tariq Aziz
Jan-02 Information Minister, Muhammad Said al-Sahhaf
Nov-01 Tariq Aziz
Oct-01 Agriculture Minister, Abd-al-Ilah Hamid Muhammad
Feb-01 Tariq Aziz
Jan-01 Tariq Aziz
Nov-00 Tariq Aziz
Oct-00 Tariq Aziz
May-00 Culture Minister, Humam Abd-al-Khaliq
Mar-00 Tariq Aziz
Dec-99 Vice Chairman, Revolution Command Council Izzat Ibrahim
Nov-99 Tariq Aziz and Foreign Minister Muhammad Said Al-Sahhaf
Aug-99 Tariq Aziz
Jun-99 Mariam Appeal Convoy
Oct-98 Tariq Aziz
Apr-98 Tariq Aziz
Mar-98 Tariq Aziz
Jan-94 Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz
May-93 Speaker of the National Assembly, Sadi Mahdi Salih  
Source: IIC, Meyer and Califano 
 Mariam Appeal received many donations. Among others, it received $500,000 
from the UAE government, $150,000 from the King of Saudi Arabia, $6,750 from 
Fortum Oil and Gas, and $375,000 from Fawaz Zureikat (IIC, Chapter II, p. 79; Meyer 
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and Califano, 2006, p. 78). But Mr. Galloway was using Mariam Appeal as a façade to 
receive contracts from the Iraqi regime. Galloway adopted the pseudonym Abu Mariam. 
With it, he channeled to Mariam Appeal 39 contracts, worth $50 million dollars, to 
export British foodstuffs and medicines to Iraq (IIC, Chapter II, p. 79; Meyer and 
Califano, 2006, p. 78). In addition, he channeled between 18-20 million barrels of oil for 
a value $80 million in a three year period (IIC, Chapter II, p. 79; Meyer and Califano, 
2006, p. 78). The scheme worked as follow: Mr. Galloway appointed Fawaz Zureikat as 
co-Chairman of Mariam Appeal and his liaison in Baghdad. Mr. Zureikat was a Jordanian 
businessman, owner of a dozen small companies throughout the Middle East. The Iraqi 
regime granted contracts to Mariam Appeal as “donations for Iraqi women and 
children.” Mariam Appeal then passed the contracts on to Mr. Zureikat’s various 
companies. Zureikat used his companies to provide business logistics, sell the oil in 
European markets, and channel payments to Mr. Galloway. In turn, both Galloway and 
Zureikat worked with Mr. Al-Chalabi, an Iraqi businessman living in Great Britain and 
owner of Fortum and Delta Services, two import-export Firms (IIC, Chapter II, p. 81; 
Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 79). The role of Al-Chalabi was to move money from Mr. 
Zureikat to Mariam and then to Galloway’s bank accounts at Citibank. Al-Chalabi 
referenced its transfers as “funding for medical supplies.” 
 For example, the IIC revealed that Delta Services sold oil contract M/07/83 in 
January 2000 (IIC, Chapter II, p. 81; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 79). Soon after, it 
made a series of electronic transfers of $120,000 thousand to Mr. Zureikat until totaling 
$472,228, who then transferred the money to Mariam in the form of “donations for 
medical supplies” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 81; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 79). Ms. 
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Galloway’s bank records showed a series of deposits for $472,228 thousand during the 
same period of time (IIC, Chapter II, p. 81; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 79). Fortum 
made a series of transfers of 70,000 thousand dollars to Mr. Zureikat as well (IIC, 
Chapter II, p. 82; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 78). Coincidently, Ms. Galloway’s bank 
records accounted for seven consecutive deposits of $70,000 during seven consecutive 
weeks (IIC, Chapter II, p. 82; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 78).   
 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Liberal Democratic Party 
 The sixth case study follows the model individual-political parties-corporations. 
This case is involves a legislator, a state-actor, who employed his son, a NSA, to 
circumvent UN sanctions. Father and son used a political party as a means to access 
Saddam’s regime and obtain contracts.  
 This case is about Vladimir Zhirinovsky, co-founder of the Liberal Democratic 
Party of the Soviet Union. Mr. Zhirinovsky consolidated his political career during the 
1990s with the emergence of Russian nationalism. He founded the Liberal Democratic 
Party of the Russian Federation (LDPR), and almost overnight he became the most 
visible face of Russian nationalism and right-wing politics in Russia. Mr. Zhirinovsky ran 
for President in 1991, 1995 and 2000. He always lost although scoring large numbers of 
votes. For instance, he won 23% of votes during the Russian elections of 1993, ranking 
third among a large number of political candidates (IIC, Chapter II, p. 30). It was not 
enough to win the Russian Presidency, but it was large enough to legitimize his political 
persona and control 12% of the Russian Duma.   
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 The rise of Zhirinovsky’s political career coincided with the consolidation of the 
UN sanctions regime. Mr. Zhirinovsky visited Bagdad a dozen times, not as a legislator 
but as a leader of the LDPR. On one occasion, he led a delegation of 50 Russian political 
activists and businessmen to Baghdad where he “Called for the immediate end to UN 
sanctions against Iraq and the end of American occupation of Iraqi territories” (IIC, US 
Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 8). He also met “With Saddam 
Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and Speaker of the National Assemble Saadi 
Mehdi Saleh” (IIC, US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 8). They 
signed “An agreement of cooperation between the parliament of Iraq and the LDPR 
faction; in addition, he signed an agreement on “inter-party ties” between the Hussein-
controlled Baath Party and the LDPR” (IIC, US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, p. 8). He promised Saddam that “He and the LDPR will stand firmly 
against the enforcement of the United Nations economic sanctions against Iraq... and 
that in order to balance the political situation in the world, the LDPR will use our 
influence on the Duma to adopt resolutions that will facilitate the economic cooperation 
between our countries” (IIC, US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 
8). 
 The Iraqi government rewarded Mr. Zhirinovsky for his services. The IIC and the 
US Senate estimated that the Iraqi government illegally granted 78.8 million barrels of oil 
to Mr. Zhirinovsky, and that he made about $9 million in a two-year period (IIC, Chapter 
II, p. 31; Meyer and Califano, 2006, 2006, p. 76-77). The Iraqi government also granted 
32 procurement contracts to Zhirinovsky, so he could export industrial parts and 
machinery to Iraq. The contracts were worth about $20 million (IIC, Chapter II, p. 31; 
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Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 76-77). Mr. Zhirinovsky obtained a contract to repair three 
Iraqi oil refineries that had been damaged during the Persian Gulf War. The contract was 
worth $600 million dollars, but he lost it (IIC, Chapter II, p. 31; Meyer and Califano, 
2006, p. 76-77). He could not find a subcontractor, a company willing to execute the 
contract at the prices he had set forth.  
 The IIC and the U.S. Senate concluded that it was impossible to estimate exactly 
how much Zhirinovsky made through violations of the UN sanctions. The problem was 
that most Russian individuals, organizations and companies used cash, among other 
reasons, for lack of credit history. In fact, in the following chapters I will explain how the 
use of cash was a common practice to evade the sanctions, but for the moment I will cite 
the IIC, which stated that “Some surcharge payments were partially or fully satisfied 
through cash payments at the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow,” and that “Diplomatic bags, 
which could hold up to $1.5 million in $100 bills, were used to transport the money” 
(IIC, US Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 8). Still, the IIC did trace 
some of the money back “to an account in the Bank of Cyprus with the reference in favor 
of Igor Lebedev” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 32; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 77). 
 Igor Lebedev was too a member of the LDPR, but he also was the son of Mr. 
Zhirinovsky. It turned out that the IIC and CIA linked Mr. Lebedev’s account at Bank of 
Cyprus to accounts owned by Bayoil, Sidanco, and Plasco Shipping Co. Ltd (IIC, 
Chapter II, p. 32; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 77). It all suggests that Igor Lebedev was 
the intermediary between Zhirinovsky (his father) and those companies. 
 Bayoil was an oil trading company based in Bahamas and a parent company of 
Bayoil Inc., based in Houston, Texas. Bayoil Inc. was a financier of oil, coal and other 
194 
forms of energy (IIC, Chapter II, p. 32; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 88-89). For its part, 
Sidanco was a Russian company specialized in the extraction and refining of oil, and 
Plasco was a Liberian company specialized in the transportation of oil and linked to 
Bayoil Inc. as a subcontractor (IIC, Chapter II, p. 32; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 88-
89). The three companies helped Mr. Zhirinovsky finance, lift and transport oil from Iraqi 
oil wells to world markets by using Igor Lebedev as their intermediary. Their operations 
went undetected for about seven years of multilateral sanctions, until Zhirinovsky 
defaulted in his “kickbacks” to the Iraqi government and Saddam banned him from doing 
business with Iraq.    
 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
 This case is about the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF.) It 
shows how a political organization aligned to an NGO and a private corporation with the 
goal of evading a sanctions regime. They followed the model individuals – political 
activism – corporations.  
 The KPRF was founded in 1993 after the disintegration of the Soviet Union (IIC, 
Chapter II, p. 27). The Party was largely recognized as the heir of the Communist Party 
of the USRR, which had solid ideological, political and commercial relations with 
Saddam and his regime. Their relations go back to the days when the Communist Party 
was the sole spiritual, ideological, political leader of former Soviet Union and its 
satellites.  
 In Chapters II and III, I showed evidences of how Saddam’s regime was one of 
the most important commercial and military partners the Soviets had in the Middle East 
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during the Cold War. The partnership continued after the end of the Cold War through 
the UN sanctions regime. The KPRF was powerless and penniless, and Saddam’s regime 
was doomed to collapse. Thus, they needed each other. The KPRF needed money and 
international recognition in a time when most communist parties, and their ideology, 
were considered dead. Saddam, for his part, needed support against the UN sanctions 
regime and the multilateral coalition led by the U.S. and UK, which occupied half of the 
Iraqi territory. Saddam thought that the KPRF and Mr. Zyuganov could be a useful voice 
in the Russian Federation and around the world (IIC, US Senate, Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 22). From 1996 to 2000, Gennady Zyuganov came 
second in the Russian Presidential election, and the KPRF held an important number of 
seats in the Russian Duma (IIC, Chapter II, p. 27; IIC, US Senate, Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 22). Above all, consider that Russia was a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council.                
 For those reasons, the KPRF had no problem obtaining oil and procurement 
contracts from Saddam’s regime. After all, it publicly opposed the sanctions and military 
actions against Iraq. It even submitted a public letter to the UN calling for lifting the 
inhuman embargo against Iraq. Its problem, however, was executing those contracts for, 
as a political organization, it had no business experience whatsoever. The KPRF found a 
solution in the global civil society.  
 First, the KPRF found a partner in the Foundation for Friendship with Peoples of 
Arab States (FFPAS), a relatively well-known political organization with offices in Paris, 
London, Amsterdam, Geneva and other European capitals (IIC, US Senate, Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations, p. 22-23). The KPRF was not to receive contracts 
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directly from Iraq but rather through FFPAS. The obvious objective was to evade the UN 
sanctions regime. Second, the KPRF itself created a non-state actor and named it “The 
Council for Trade and Economic Cooperation with the Middle East and North African 
Countries” (ACTEC). In its Articles of Incorporation, ACTEC assures us that its main 
and sole objective was the promotion of Iraqi trade throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa. However, Meyer and Califano stated that “It was merely a nameplate company 
that temporarily leased an office space at a Russian foreign services training school in 
Moscow” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 103) and the IIC affirmed that “The exact scope 
of ACTEC’s business activity is unclear, but it appears to have been established 
specifically for Programme-related business projects” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 43-44). 
Nevertheless, ACTEC proceeded to hire Glencore International AG as a subcontractor. 
Glencore was a holding company specializing in commodity trading (IIC, Chapter II, p. 
43-44). It was registered and based in Switzerland, owned by a partnership between its 
management and employees. The partnership presented a difficulty to Glencore’s 
management though: it feared that employees would oppose engaging in business 
relations with ACTEC, a Russian NGO promoting business with Iraq, which was an 
embargoed nation.  
 Glencore reinvented itself to deal with that difficulty. It created Petrogaz 
Distribution S.A. and Glencore France S.A. in 1999, and it registered them in France 
(IIC, Chapter II, p. 43-44). Then, Glencore approached Al-Khaled Engineering Est., a 
Jordanian company specialized in logistics and transportation of crude oil. Next, 
Glencore created several layers of bank accounts dispersed at different banks throughout 
the global banking system. Bank records show that Glencore deposited $9.1 billion in its 
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accounts at Arab Bank Geneva, in Geneva, Deutsche Bank A.G., in Munich, and 
Commercial Bank International and Arab Bank Dubai, both in Dubai (IIC, Chapter II, p. 
45, Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 104). The IIC traced the money to accounts that Delta 
Petroleum Products Trading owned in Geneva, Switzerland. Delta was a dormant 
company Glencore created and registered in Switzerland in 1999. Through it, Glencore 
paid Scandinavian T. Ltd, which in turn paid ACTEC for its contracts. ACTEC ranked 
fourth among all Russian non-state actors, including companies, in oil and procurement 
contracts. It ranked eight among all participants in the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. 
The money was supposed to go to KPRF, but the CIA and the IIC could only account for 
approximately $2 billion dollars in oil contracts and $2 billion for its procurement 
contracts in a period of 3 years (IIC, Chapter II, p. 45; Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 104).     
 
The ANC, the South Africa-Iraq Friendship, and the Non-Aligned Movement 
 The last case involves the model individuals - international organizations - 
corporations. This case is about an alliance that a political party, a NGO and an 
international institution forged to evade the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. This case 
shows one of those ironies in international politics for it involves the African National 
Congress (ANC). The ANC violated the UN sanctions regime upon Iraq after benefiting 
itself from one: the multinational embargo imposed upon South Africa to eradicate the 
apartheid regime. Moreover, one of the pillars of the multilateral embargo against South 
Africa was to free Nelson Mandela, the ANC’s most prestigious leader and founder of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, which was ANC’s armed arm. This case study also involves the 
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South Africa-Iraq Friendship Association (SAIFA) and the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM.)  
 This case is relevant for two main reasons: first, the ANC was governing South 
Africa when it conceived its scheme to circumvent the sanctions regime. Second, the 
ANC negotiated with Iraqi officials in the name of the South African government. 
Nevertheless, as soon as the IIC launched its investigation on violations of the UN 
sanctions regime, the South African government distanced itself from the ANC, and 
South African officials went out to publicly state that the government of South Africa had 
nothing to do with ANC’s actions. The government of South Africa never investigated 
the allegations, which in the end were ignored and forgotten.  
 The problem was that the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, was also the 
Chair of NAM and the African Union. It appeared that some important members of the 
ANC took advantage of NAM to engage in business relations with the Iraqi government. 
For instance, in November 1999, members of the ANC organized a delegation to visit 
Iraq in the name of the NAM. The ANC did not hide its intentions. It announced that the 
objective of the visit was to “Expose South African businesses with already established 
interests in the so called oil for food Programme with Iraq to the processes involved in 
winning such UN-approved contracts” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 103). According to the IIC, the 
ANC pushed for establishing full diplomatic relations between South African and Iraq, 
and it even invited Tariq Azid, Iraq’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, to visit South Africa. 
Then, the ANC joined the South Africa-Iraq Friendship Association (SAIFA) to welcome 
Tariq Azid to South Africa. It turned out that SAIFA had been serving as a business 
intermediary between Montega Trading Ltd (Montega), Imvume Management Ltd 
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(Imvume), and the Iraqi government. The IIC pointed out that “South African 
businessmen formed the companies to take advantage of the oil contract available under 
the UN sanctions regime” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 104), and “Mr. Majali used Montega and 
Imvume as the contracting companies to purchase the oil” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 104). 
Sandi Majali was the Chairman of both SAIFA and SABCETT. A series of letters and 
actions showed that he was the ANC’s strong man in Baghdad for the purpose of 
organizing ANC’s operations in Iraq.  
 For example, in a letter to Tariq Azid, the ANC appointed Mr. Majali “As a 
recognized representative of the ANC” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 103). Iraqi officials accredited 
him as “Advisor of the ANC and to the President of South Africa” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 
103). Second, Mr. Majali “Led a delegation to Iraq, which included officials from the 
South African Strategic Fuel Fund Association and South African Department of 
Minerals and Energy” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 104). The purpose of the trip was to hold 
“Discussions on strengthening ties between the ANC and the Iraq Friendship Association 
and Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party, as well as building better oil trade relations between the 
two countries” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 105). A letter from Mr. Montlanthe, Chairman of Iraq 
Friendship Association, stated that “Mr. Majali’s position as Chairperson of SAIFA had 
the ANC’s full approval and blessing” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 105). The letter confirmed 
“ANC’s approval of Mr. Majali as a designated person to lead the implementation 
process arising out of our economic development programme” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 103). 
 For his part, Mr. Majali “Wrote two letters to Iraqi authorities in which he 
referred to a request for oil allocations that had been made to support South Africa’s 
political activities in connection with Iraq” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 108). In another letter, 
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this one addressed to the President of the Iraqi Friendship Association, Mr. Majali argued 
that “A joint effort between the ANC and the Arab Baáth Party will add a lot of value 
towards achieving the common political objectives, which will result in an effective 
strategy geared toward campaigning for the lifting of sanctions” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 
108). In the same letter, he requested 12 million barrels of oil “With particular attention 
to the competitive advantage pricing of this transaction for the benefit of both parties in 
order to build financial resources to support political programs […] that the ANC and 
Ba’ath parties will be implementing and to run seminars, workshops in order to develop 
effective political development strategies” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 108). Still, in another letter 
Mr. Majali requested another 12 million barrels of oil. He argued that the oil was 
“Required by the South African government for its strategic reserves” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 
109). He confirmed that the “ANC will be sending a high level delegation” to a 
colloquium the Iraqi government was organizing in Baghdad against the UN sanctions 
regime.  
 The correspondence between Mr. Majali and Iraqi officials was abundant. It 
went on for almost five years, proving that Mr. Majali did not act alone; rather, he always 
appeared as a representative of the African National Congress, the South African ruling 
party at the time. The IIC calculated that the ANC illegally made about $80 million 
dollars through oil sales and another $120 million through procurement contracts (IIC, 
Chapter II, p. 110). It is worth repeating that the ANC itself was a beneficiary of the 
multilateral sanctions regime imposed upon South Africa to end racism there. It clearly 
shows political and even ideological contradictions within the ranks of the ANC, but as 
important as it might be, it is not a determinant. What is primarily relevant here is: firstly, 
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the conflicts of interests between states and global non-state actors; secondly, the 
diversity of global non-state actors relative to their economic, political, and ideological 
interests; thirdly, the complexities of multilateral sanctions regimes, and the difficulty of 
enforcing them.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I found that NSAs do affect foreign policies such as multilateral 
sanction regimes. For instance, I found that a large number of NSAs allied with each 
other and a wide range of other actors for the sole purpose of circumventing the sanctions 
regime. Individuals, NGOs, political and religious groups, banks and businesses of all 
sorts worked together, and with Saddam’s regime, to evade the sanctions and profit from 
them. Their actions undermined UN policy toward the Iraqi regime, affected politics in 
the Middle East, and relations among world superpowers. Here, one key finding is that 
political and civic activists, NGOs, religions organizations and political parties did not 
have the required expertise to finance and carry out the contracts they obtained from 
Saddam’s regime. As result, they had to pass those contracts on to banks and companies, 
which were ultimately responsible for resuming the operations. This is particularly 
important because in the next Chapter I will discuss how banks and creditors, through the 
global banking industry, circumvented the UN sanctions regime against Iraq to finance 
import-export operations there.    
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V. AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: THE GLOBAL BANKING 
SYSTEM, BANKS, INVESTORS AND SPECULATORS 
 
“Someone has asked you to make a payment to a third party,  and that third party happens to be a bank 
owned by a company that  is incorporated out of the Cayman Islands, and that is the only thing you know 
about it. That seems suspicious”. 
      Congressman Dana Rohrabaher 
 
“Iraq manipulated its national banking structure to finance illicit trade… Iraq established international 
accounts to finance its illegal procurement network. Iraq’s international accounts, mainly located in Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria were instrumental in Iraq’s ability to successfully transfer billions of dollars of its    
illicitly earned oil revenues from its various global accounts to international suppliers, front companies, 
domestic government and business entities”. 
                                 The Duelfer Report 
 
“Some movements of funds, such as large deposits followed quickly by similarly large withdrawals from 
the account, combined with other factors, including the identity of the recipient of the funds, are examples 
of possible money laundering behavior perpetrated by some of these lesser known companies, which went 
undetected by banks engaged in trade with Iraq”. 
                                                                  The IIC Report 
 
 
Introduction 
Globalization is a system formed by subsystems, groups and units. In order to 
explain the system, we must study its various components, identify their characteristics 
and behaviors, and clarify how they interact and what makes them unique within the 
system. In this chapter, I examine a very unique subsystem of globalization, a means of 
globalization, a system in itself. I examine the global banking system and its various 
agents, namely banks, investors and speculators.  
In this chapter, I argue that the current global banking system allows nation-states, 
banks, investors, speculators, corporations, and NSAs in general to operate and profit 
under a sanctions regime, even if it is multilateral. Specifically, I argue the UN sanctions 
regime in Iraq failed in large measure due to a global banking system that, directly and 
indirectly, intentionally or not, financed the circumvention of the sanctions. To illustrate 
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my argument, I present evidences of how states and global NSAs utilized global banking 
to finance purchases of Iraqi oil and its derivatives, to finance procurement contracts and 
exports to Iraq, to laundry and conceal money, and evade UN inspectors.  
I address three main points in this chapter. First, I study the Iraqi banking system 
and its surprising expansion under the UN sanctions regime. Second, I examine the role 
of BNP Paribas, the bank that the UN appointed to oversee Iraq’s banking. Third, I 
discuss how banks, investors and speculators collaborated to finance the circumvention of 
the UN sanctions regime. I have collected most of the evidences from the Duelfer Report, 
the IIC Report, the Michigan Project, the Heritage Foundation, and media sources.  
 
Global Banking and Banks 
 I cannot overemphasize the role that the global banking system plays in the global 
economy. For one, global banking guarantees the free exchange of money from banks to 
investors, speculators, corporations and nation-states throughout global markets and back 
to banks. The World Bank estimates that $1.5 trillion dollars flows into the global 
economy every day to finance global trade (imports and exports), transportation, labor, 
production, investment and speculation (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 545). Second, most of that 
money circulates in the form of credit and electronic money. Most businesses operate on 
credit, and electronic money, not cash, is the predominant way money circulates through 
global markets. The collapse of the global banking system and the subsequent global 
credit crisis during the summer of 2008 illustrates a fact of globalization: global banking 
finances global trade and credit in the form of electronic money is its blood.  
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 To begin with, banks have existed for centuries. I can trace them back to the 
Greek city-states and Roman Empire where they financed commerce, construction, 
armies and wars (Cantor, 1993, p. 41). And Venetian bankers financed some of the most 
expensive projects of the Roman Church, including the Crusades (Cantor, 1993, p. 42). 
Venetian bankers sponsored the Renaissance too (Cantor, 1993, p. 44). And Dutch and 
British banks funded slavery and colonialism. They financed the textile, tobacco, cotton 
and other labor-intensive industries. They also invested heavily in the industrial 
revolution, which created large industrial outputs and facilitated the accumulation of 
capital, used in turn for reinvestment and for the consolidation of the capitalist system.  
 Banking was already an international industry by the 1920s, but its contemporary 
global characteristics came with the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime in 1971 
(Burchill, 2001, p. 77; Smith, 2003, p. 57). The “regime” regulated the banking industry 
to prevent the speculative excesses of the 1920s that had led to the “crash” of the stock 
market in 1929 and the economic depression of the 1930s. Over time, inflation, slow 
economic growth, trade barriers and other economic factors caused the collapse of the 
American dollar, provoking in turn the collapse of the Bretton Woods Accords. 
Deregulation of capital in 1971 coincided with very important innovations like banking 
software and electronic money, which facilitated the flow of money throughout global 
markets at speeds never realized before. The new Regime linked markets and 
consolidated interrelations between banks, producers, consumers, and nation-states, but it 
kept in place a key feature of Bretton Woods Accords: it did not allow banks to invest in 
the import-export industry (Smith, 2003, p. 54). The rationale was that banks were in 
large measure responsible for the misfortunes of global trade during the 1910s, 1920s and 
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1930s. But by 1982, the U.S. deregulated banking and the import-export industries, 
allowing banks to invest in import-exports if they invested through subsidiaries and 
affiliates (the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, the 97th Congress). Soon, American 
banks such as Bank of America, Manufacturer of Hanover Trust, Chase Manhattan, City 
Bank and others created subsidiaries and affiliates for the sole purpose of investing in 
import-export firms. The new American law also mobilized foreign banks, which rushed 
themselves into American markets, at the time the largest importer-exporter of goods and 
services in the world (Barovic, 1985, p. 4). Today, banking is a true global system 
composed of investment and brokerage houses, insurance and security firms, and all sorts 
of “funds,” from mutual to edge, to sovereign funds.  
 Next, data from World Bank indicate that banks currently finance 56% of the 
global trade, namely the export-import industry (IIC Report, Chapter IV, p. 545). 
Financing refers to pay for investing, insurance, legal advising, account management, 
currency exchange, cost and payment processing, and lending. Financing is for the most 
part made in the form of credit. There are three main types of credit in the global trade: 
consignment, open-account and payment in advance (Smith, 2003, p.13-14). 
 Trading on consignment means that exporters run with all costs and risks 
involved in trading (Smith, 2003, p. 15). Exporters ship their cargo with the required 
documentation. Once arrived, importers claim ownership of the cargo, but they pay for it 
only when the merchandise is sold out. With open-account, exporters absorb all shipping 
expenses, but importers pay for the cargo according to a contract previously agreed upon 
(Smith, 2003, p. 15). Payment in advance is a sort of insurance, a fee that exporters 
charge to importers for risks involved in shipping operations (Smith, 2003, p. 16). Such 
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fees can be large, usually from 50 to 70 percent of the total amount owed. It depends on 
the importers’ credit history and years in service. In all instances, the role of banks is to 
finance shipping operations for which they charge some fees. Banks finance global trade 
through two banking devices: trade bills and letters of credit.  
Export-import firms utilize trade bills to curtail risks like damages and loss of 
goods, failure to pay on time and/or defaulting on loans (Smith, 2003, p. 17). That is why 
most banks operate through intermediaries or third parties. Exporters draft a trade bill for 
an intermediary, which is usually a carrier or shipping company. Intermediaries run with 
all shipping expenses in advance through a loan they receive from a bank. They issue a 
bill of landing to exporters as proof that the cargo was shipped (Smith, 2003, p. 17). 
Importers receive and pay intermediaries for the trade bill upon arrival of the cargo. 
Finally, intermediaries pay the loan back to the bank. If the cargo is lost, damaged or 
never delivered, the intermediary still has to pay for the loan unless it declares 
bankruptcy. If it does, the intermediary’s insurance pays for the loan. The bank never 
loses its money. On the other hand, a letter of credit is the most common, efficient, 
secured mechanism for financing global trade (Slager, 2004, p. 44; Smith, 2003, p. 13-
14). There are two main types: commercial and standby (Smith, 2003, p. 18). A 
commercial letter of credit is the prime payment mechanism. Importers and exporters 
utilize it when they do not want -or cannot afford- to run with shipping risks and 
expenses. A commercial letter of credit is a contractual agreement between an advising 
bank (exporter’s bank) and an opening or issuing bank (importer’s bank) through which 
they assume all shipping costs and risks involved in the import-export operation (Slager, 
2004, p. 47; Smith, 2003, p. 19). If an exporter does not deliver its cargo as stipulated in 
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the contract, the advising bank pays for fees and fines. If the cargo is lost or damaged, the 
advising bank also pays for it. If an importer defaults or fails to receive the cargo as 
contracted, then its opening bank pays. On the other hand, a standby letter of credit 
serves as a secondary payment method to ensure that primary payment is delivered within 
the terms of the contract (Slager, 2004, p. 55; Smith, 2003, p. 13-14). The standby letter 
of credit is also a back up credit to strengthen the exporters and importers’ credit 
worthiness. An opening bank issues a standby letter of credit with an expiration date 
attached to it. The exporter holds (or standby) the letters until terms of contracts are met. 
If they are, the importer pays the exporter for the cargo, and the advising bank disregards 
the letter and ends the contract. In general, commercial and standby letters of credit are 
backed up by other documents such as invoices, promissory notes, and insurance.  
In all, letters of credits are valuable for banks, exporters and importers (Slager, 
2004, p. 77). First, exporters and importers never use their money up front but just credit, 
or a promise to pay later in montly amounts. For their parts, banks do not use their credit 
but their customers’. Also, by financing trade through credit, exporters-importers do not 
need to move large sums of capital. Consider that global trade is expensive for it requires 
chartering planes, vessels and large trucks to transport cargoes. It incurs in costs such as 
freight, port and airport fees, warehousing, security, insurance, salaries among others.  
Global trade also demands that money be moved from account to account and 
banks to banks in a rapid, secured and efficient manner. This has largely been 
accomplished through a sophisticated global banking infrastructure built on two pillars: 
electronic banking and electronic money (Slager, 2004, p. 62; Smith, 2003, p.102).  
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Electronic banking refers to banking products and services executed through 
electronic channels (Slager, 2004, p. 63; Smith, 2003, p. 107). They include deposit-
taking, lending, account management, electronic bill payment and electronic money. 
Delivery of these products and services occurs through two electronic networks: closed 
and open (Slager, 2004, p. 65; Smith, 2003, p. 115). Closed networks restrict access to 
participants, meaning to financial institutions, merchants and, more important, third party 
service providers or intermediaries who conduct voluminous transactions of investments 
and liquidation of capital (Slager, 2004, p. 65; Smith, 2003, p. 115). Conversely, open 
networks have no membership requirements, and they are delivered through automatic 
tellers, telephones, computers, smart cards and other electronic devices (Slager, 2004, p. 
65; Smith, 2003, p. 115). Electronic money refers to prepaid payment mechanisms 
executed through direct transfers, from digital debit to digital credit (Slager, 2004, p. 65; 
Smith, 2003, p. 115). Electronic money saves time and increases efficiency, but it has 
two important disadvantages: it is anonymous, so it lends itself to money laundering and 
evasion of regulatory regimes such as sanctions regimes. Collin Powell defined electronic 
money as the life-line of terrorism (Collin Powell, Testimony Before Banking 
Committee, Houser of Representatives, 2002). It is not a hyperbole. I stated earlier that 
about $1.5 trillion dollars moves throughout global markets on a daily basis, making it 
too difficult for governments to trace it from account to account and bank to bank. Money 
is especially difficult to trace when it is stored in shell companies and offshore banking 
(Slanger, 2004, p. 209). 
 Shell companies have no real business activity. Also known as “aged” or 
“dormant” companies, they are not incorporated for three main reasons (Slanger, 2004, p. 
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209). First, they carry an aura of corporate longevity. Since some nations require that a 
company be in existence for some time before ever obtaining a contract, a shell company 
represents a useful tool to overcome such a requirement (Slanger, 2007, p.209). Besides, 
longevity facilitates access to letters of credit, cheap credit, and fresh capital. That is why 
shell companies are often sold to a company seeking credit (Slanger, 2004, p. 209; Smith, 
2003, p. 119). Finally, businesses and individuals use shell companies to avoid taxation 
and currency restrictions imposed in some countries. Though, shell companies are usually 
linked to financial crimes. Banking officials are often suspicious about large movement 
of capital through shell companies for they are usually related to bribery, tax evasion, 
money laundering, prostitution, and the finance of terrorism.  
 Like shell companies, offshore banking is seldom utilized for financial 
wrongdoings such as tax evasion, money laundering, and white collar crimes (Slanger, 
2004, p. 209; Smith, 2003, p. 124). Yet, it offers some advantages to corporations, 
investment firms and individuals seeking flexibility and profitability. Offshore banking 
refers to a bank based in a jurisdiction beyond its original residence, meaning beyond the 
nation where it was originally created. Under this corporate structure, offshore accounts 
enjoy several advantages. First, offshore accounts guarantee great savings in terms of 
taxation. Second, they offer privacy and anonymity. Third, they provide easy access for 
deposit and withdrawal, facilitating movement of capital for investments or just 
emergencies, something so vital in today’s volatile financial markets. Fourth, they offer 
asset protection and limited liability against domestic and international laws. And finally, 
when coupled with an escrow account, offshore accounts become important sources of 
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liquidity and fresh, cheap, reliable credit, especially in the form of letters of credit, so 
important in global commerce (Slanger, 2004, p. 209; Smith, 2003, p. 124). 
 Economists believe that half of global capital, in terms of investments and 
savings, is moved to offshore accounts in offshore centers. For the IMF, offshore banking 
centers account for 26% of the global financial wealth, which is about $6 trillion dollars 
(www.imf.org); yet, offshore centers account for just 1.2% of the world’s population 
(www.un.org). The IMF and the World Bank estimate that, of that money, between $500 
and $2 trillion can be traced back to money laundering, tax evasion, prostitution, illegal 
gambling, arms trafficking and terrorism (www.imf.org; www.wb.org). Money 
laundering amounts to $500 billion dollars while tax evasion may reach a trillion. 
According to the American Federal Reserve, American corporations redirect 31% of its 
profits toward offshore banking centers every year, and the GAO affirms that “59 out of 
100 largest publicly-traded federal contractors had established hundreds of subsidiaries 
in offshore-tax havens” (Sen. Dorgan, Hearing Before Finance Committee, 2007). Just 
recently, the U.S. government and the Swiss bank UBS settled a lawsuit to uncover about 
4,450 accounts that American investors own there, and the accounts are worth about $18 
billion dollars (www.nyt.com, August 20, 2009). Lynnley Browning, from the New York 
Times, states that “The landmark settlement peels back layers of Swiss banking secrecy 
and expects to provide a road map for the authorities as they try to crack down on tax 
evasion by Americans who, through private banks and other Swiss-based financial 
intermediaries, use offshore accounts to go undeclared to the IRS” (www.nyt.com, 
August 20, 2009). They use offshore accounts for tax evasion, but the U.S. government is 
most concerned about terrorist groups using them for financing terrorist activities.  
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 Switzerland and Cayman Islands constitute the two most important offshore 
banking centers in the world, but The Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, 
Cyprus, Panama, Liechtenstein, Monaco and Andorra are important as well. For example, 
the infamous Enron Corporation had 1,300 tax-havens around the world, 441 of which 
were located in Cayman Islands. Exxon-Mobil Corporation has 11 tax-haven subsidiaries 
in The Bahamas. Halliburton Corporation has 17, including 13 in Cayman Islands, 
Panama and Liechtenstein (Uncooperative tax Heavens, www.elpais.es, March 25, 2008). 
Recently the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, headquartered in 
Paris, labeled Liechtenstein, Monaco and Andorra as “uncooperative tax havens” 
(Uncooperative tax Heavens, www.elpais.es, March 25, 2008). In chapters II and III, I 
explained that The Bahamas, Cyprus, Panama, and Liechtenstein ranked among the most 
active importer-exporter nations under the UN sanctions in Iraq. In this chapter, I explain 
why. I argue that banks, companies, investors and other NSAs used banking centers in 
those nations to conceal profits made under the UN sanctions regime in Iraq. In fact, the 
UN was well aware of those issues, to the point that it mandated the use of an escrow 
account to collect proceeds from the UN sanctions regime in Iraq.  
An escrow account is a trust account held on a borrower’s name to pay 
obligations such as debts, taxes and insurance premiums (Slanger, 2004, p. 127; Smith, 
2003, p. 194). Under a contract, a beneficiary deposits cash into an escrow account 
managed by a third party, an escrow agent acting as a trustee. Once the cash is deposited, 
the escrow agent delivers the payments as the contract mandates (Slanger, 2004, p. 127; 
Smith, 2003, p. 194). Escrow accounts are widely used for wire transfers and letters of 
credit. Note that both the UN Security Council and Saddam Hussein chose escrow 
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accounts to store money, but they did it for two very different reasons. The UN Security 
Council sought transparency and reliable oversight while Saddam Hussein sought to 
circumvent the UN sanctions regime. An estimated 71% of all corporations that traded 
with Iraq chose offshore accounts (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 481), which can be an indication 
of their true intentions, that is concealing trade and profits from UN inspectors.   
  
Investors and Speculators 
 Investors and speculators play a crucial role in both the global banking system 
and global trade. They played a key role under the UN sanctions regime against Iraq.  
Investors and speculators are financial intermediaries, individuals or entities 
acting as financial contacts between two parties, which could be two companies, two 
individuals, or a company and an individual (Slanger, 2004, p. 151; Smith, 2003, p. 89). 
The intermediation mainly consists in the transferring of funds from one account to 
another, and it could involve lending, borrowing, depositing, saving and investing of 
different forms (Slanger, 2004, p. 151; Smith, 2003, p. 89). This usually occurs through 
regular commercial banks. However, there are larger and more complex business 
operations like financing and insuring large volumes of goods and services for global 
trade. They involve large amounts of funds, logistics, risks and liabilities. In such cases, 
instead of using their own funds, names and licenses, businesses prefer to employ 
investors and speculators (Slanger, 2004, p. 151; Smith, 2003, p. 89). They are small, as 
in the case of day traders, but they are also large, often linked to brokerage firms, mutual 
funds, edge funds, insurers and others financial entities (Slanger, 2004, p. 151; Smith, 
2003, p. 89).  
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 Investors and speculators are expensive due to the fees and interest rates they 
charge. Yet, importers and exporters seek their services for several reasons. First of all, 
investors and speculators have “easy” access to credit. Second, they assume all financial 
risks involved in trade. Third, they offer great solutions to the issue of liquidity. For 
instance, when there are losses, investors and speculators assume them all or a portion. 
They can even save companies from bankruptcy. Fourth, they contribute to business 
diversification and expansion. They help companies to participate in several businesses 
and markets at the same time. Finally, investors and speculators are sound substitutes for 
banks. They have taken 42% of world commerce from banks during the last twenty years 
(Slanger, 2004, p. 153; Smith, 2003, p. 94; www.fmi.org, 2007). They have done it 
through the creation of brokerage firms specializing in import-export operations. Some of 
them are publicly traded in stock exchanges in global markets. Some are small and 
private. Still others are part of mutual, edge and sovereign funds.   
Investors and speculators have a lot of critics for some of their practices can 
create serious systemic problems. For instance, Slanger and Smith argue that investors 
and speculators are responsible for the volatility of global markets. They manipulate the 
“invisible hand”, altering the “natural” course of supply and demand (Slanger, 2004, p. 
153; Smith, 2003, p. 94). They drive prices up and down for no other reason that quick 
profits. In the specific case of global trade, investors and speculators impose high interest 
rates, commissions and fees for their services, which, according to Senator Lieberman, 
“Are divorced from market realities” (Hearing Before Senate Committee on Finance, 
Sep. 26, 2007). It all is reflected in the cost of transportation, labor, warehousing and 
other expenses, which drives inflation.   
214 
 In sum, the global banking system is a subsystem of globalization. Banks, 
investors and speculators are very important NSAs with unique roles in global trade. 
Global banking guarantees the free flow of money among banks, investors, speculators, 
corporations and nations in the global markets. Banks, investors and speculators are the 
main creditors to global trade. They issue credit to importers and exporters alike. Yet, 
these actors affect global politics as well. They create trade crises, market volatility, and 
affect macroeconomic indexes such as inflation. They lend themselves to tax evasion and 
money laundering. They finance illegal arms trade, terrorism, and even wars. Banks, 
investors and speculators can be so damaging to international peace that governments and 
international organizations like the UN have created international laws such as the 
OFAC, SDN’s lists, and the NCS, among others to combat illegal banking practices.   
 
Global Banking and Iraq 
 I discuss four findings in this section: 1) Iraq entered the UN sanctions regime 
with a solid centralized banking system; 2) Iraq used its banking system under the 
sanctions regime despite UN Security Resolution 986, which ordered Iraq to utilize an 
escrow account at BNP Paribas New York for all its businesses; 3) Iraq expanded its 
banking system by opening new banks and branches along with hundreds of new secret 
accounts in banking centers throughout the Middle East; 4) Iraq used domestic and 
regional banking to reach the global banking system.   
 The government of Abd Al-Salam Árif nationalized the Iraqi banking system in 
1965. The National Banking Law, as it was known, consolidated 65% of all Iraqi banks 
into the Rafidian Ban, and it mandated the creation of the Central Bank of Iraq with three 
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national jurisdictions: Bagdad, Mosul, and Bashra. The Bank was to “Issue and store 
currency of the government, protecting against counterfeit currency and disbursing funds 
based on directives from the Minister of Finance” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p. 45). In 1988, the CBI created another state-owned, the Rasheed Bank, to 
focus on investments, currency exchange, and trade. The CBI created 4 other banks: 
Agriculture Cooperative Bank, Real State Bank, and Social Bank. Chart 5.1 shows the 
state of the Iraq’s banking net by 1991.  
 
 Chart 5.1 – The State of Iraqi Banking System in 1991  
                                                                  
 
 Source: the Duelfer Report (CIA) 
 
 The data were drawn from the Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement. 
Observe that the state-run Central Bank controlled 34% of the Iraqi banking industry, 
holding actives worth $770 million. The Rafidian Bank controlled another 34%, with 
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actives of about $758 million. Rafidian Bank allocated 60% of its funds to imports, 
indicative of Iraqi’s reliance on foreign goods and services. Note that Iraq dedicated 3% 
of its banking, just $65 million dollars, to agriculture, which explains Iraq’s reliance on 
imports of foodstuff from neighboring nations. One final factor is Iraq’s private banking. 
In Chart 5.1, it appears as “banks with assets under 64 million”. Iraq had 19 private 
banks in times of Saddam Hussein, accounting for 9% of the Iraqi banking system, worth 
$192.70 million. Their share was minuscule, but their impact on the UN sanctions regime 
was considerable. Table 5.1 shows all Iraqi banks since 1935. 
 
Table 5.1 – Iraqi Banks since 1935               
                Bank's Name    Year   Active
Branches Established    Capital
Al-Baraka Bank for Investment 4 2001 815           
Mosul Bank 3 2001 667           
Al-Warka Bank for Investment 3 2000 667           
Gulf Commercial Bank 7 2000 880           
Babylon Bank 6 1999 833           
Economic Investment Bank 14 1999 267           
Summer Commercial Bank 6 1999 533           
Credit Bank of Iraq 10 1998 833           
Dar Al-Salam Bank Company of Investment 14 1998 800           
United Bank for Investment 5 1995 1,000        
Al-Ahli Al-Iraqi Bank 4 1995 500           
Iraqi National Bank 4 1995 500           
Iraqi Islamic Bank 9 1993 365           
Iraqi Middle East Investment Bank 11 1993 2,160        
Basrah Private Bank for Investment 14 1993 667           
Investment Bank of Iraq 17 1993 1,280        
Baghdad Investment Bank 20 1992 1,167        
Commercial Bank of Iraq 11 1992 1,665        
Social Bank 4 1990 667           
Rasheed Bank 170 1988 1,300        
Estate Bank 16 1948 733           
Rafidian Bank 164 1941 2,700          
Industrial Bank 5 1935 300           
Agricultural Cooperative Bank 42 1935 400           
Total 563 21,699       
 
Source: the Duelfer Report 
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 I collected the data for Table 5.1 from the Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and 
Procurement. The Table reveals three main points. First, Iraq had five large banks in 
1991 when the UN enacted the sanctions regime. Though, observe that Iraq created 18 
banks from 1992 to 2001 despite the UN sanctions. Second, note that Iraq created six 
banks from 1992 to 1995, coinciding, on one hand, with the most severe period of the UN 
sanctions, and on the other, with the establishment of trade protocols with Jordan, Syria, 
Turkey, Lebanon and Yemen. This is also the period when Iraq intensified trade relations 
with former Soviet Republics such as Belarus, Ukraine and Russia. Third, observe that 
Iraq established yet another 9 banks from 1996 to 2001, coinciding with implementation 
of the UN Oil for Food Program. This sudden expansion of the Iraqi banking industry 
suggests that commerce was intense, and that there was a new governmental policy 
toward investing, funding, and circulation of money. Iraq decentralized its banking 
system during this period.  
 Next, Iraq always enjoyed good relations with the global banking system until the 
Gulf War of 1991 and the passing of the UN sanctions regime thereafter. Yet, it does not 
mean that Iraq pulled out of the global banking system entirely. As the Dulfer Report 
stated, “Before the 1991 Gulf War the Regime had funds in accounts in the U.S., Europe, 
Turkey and Japan, but after 1991, the Regime shifted its assets into accounts in Jordan, 
Lebanon, Egypt and Syria” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 48). 
Iraq used Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Syria’s banking systems to connect with European 
and American banks. In other words, Iraq used regional banking to reach global banking, 
corroborating two points that I stated in Chapter III. First, regional trade, more than a 
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choice, is a means to reach global trade. Second, custom and traditional trade relations 
among neighboring nations help evade a sanctions regime. 
 After 1991, Iraq opened more than two hundred secret foreign accounts. Iraq 
opened a dozen of what the Duelfer Report called bridge accounts (Duelfer Report, 
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 40). Also known as numbered accounts, banks use 
them to track the flow of money through various accounts, but Iraq used them “To 
conceal the fact that foreign companies were making payments to Iraq” (Duelfer Report, 
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 46). Iraq had 5 of those accounts but individually 
named at Ahli Bank in Jordan. Three accounts were for oil proceeds and two were “A 
Protocol trade account set up to receive payments related to the Iraq-Jordanian Protocol 
and was opened just a few months before 1996” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p. 40). Under the scheme, 60% of oil proceeds were transferred to 
“Protocol” accounts and another 40% went to at least seven accounts at Halk Bank’s 
branches at Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the UAE where it gained almost $8 million in 
interest rates in just one year (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 42). 
Then, 40% of oil proceeds went to the Commercial Bank of Syria. The Duelfer Report 
stated that “The Bank was instructed to transfer all extra amounts to the Syrian-Lebanese 
Commercial Back account once the proceeds exceeded $1 million dollars” (Duelfer 
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 42). In addition, Iraq had two bank accounts 
at the Queen Nor Branch of the Jordan National Bank, under the name of the Jordan 
Petroleum Refinery Co. Ltd, which had deposits of $7.4 and $3.9 million respectively 
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 44).  
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The money came from “surcharges” and “service fees”. Still, illegal proceeds 
delivered to Iraqi embassies in the Middle East were deposited in three individually 
named accounts at Ahli Bank (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 44). 
But Iraqi proceeds resulting from oil “surcharges” were deposited in several accounts at 
Ahli Bank, Sardar Bank and Fransabank in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, UEA and Turkey 
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 45). Iraq kept two accounts at 
Fransabank, one in Euros and another in American dollars, so it could convert it into 
Euros as needed. Lastly, Iraq had another 24 accounts in Lebanese banks, seven in 
Jordanian banks, and one in a Belarusian bank. Iraq used them to deposit cash from 
kickbacks, surcharges and other illicit practices (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p. 45). By 1999, Rafidian Bank took over CBI’s management section, 
mainly its Foreign Accounts Section, which really was a ring of hundreds of accounts 
that Iraq had in banks in the Middle East. By 2003, Iraq had brought most of its assets to 
a few banks in the Middle East. Table 5.2 shows Iraq’s deposits as 2003.  
 
Table 5.2 – Iraq’s Deposits as 2003   
Bank      Nation Account Type Private Sector    State Sector
Ahli Bank Jordan Cash 329,155,944.56      9,264,353.00               
Fransabank Lebanon Cash 48,000.00               44,285,476.00             
Jordan National Bank Jordan Cash 47,026,041.80        -                               
National Bank of Egypt Egypt Trade Account -                          19,710,881.00             
Commercial Bank of Syria Syria Trade Account -                          790,361,517.00           
Commercial Bank of Lebanon Lebanon Cash -                          251,949,039.00           
Halk Bank Turkey Trade Account -                          195,697,846.00           
Sardar Bank Lebanon Trade Account 520,778.00                  
Total 376,229,986.36      1,311,789,890.00                
Sources: Duelfer Report, IIC 
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 The data for Table 5.2 were collected from the Duelfer and the IIC Reports. In 
general, Iraq preferred to utilize Jordanian banks for its operations. Iraq created private 
accounts, managed by the Iraqi Trading Office in Amman and the Iraqi embassy in 
Jordan. Iraq avoided the use of electronic money for it feared that the U.S. would track its 
transactions. Instead, Iraq used cash, vouchers, and intermediaries who “laundered” the 
money through the HSBC in collaboration with the Jordanian Ministry of Industry and 
Trade and the Central Bank of Jordan. Still, Iraq utilized 16 Lebanese banks to conceal 
cash, pay for bribes and receive payments. This money was personally managed by the 
Ministers of Trade, Treasury and Commerce, and the governor of the CBI. Next, by 
1999, when Iraqi-Jordanian relations came to a stalemate, Iraq moved its operations to 
Syrian, Turkish and Egyptian banks. Iraq transferred $500 million to the Commercial 
Bank of Syria, $700 million to Egypt, and $200 million to Turkey (Duelfer Report, 
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 62). Iraq used Turkey as a gateway to European 
financial institutions. Iraq agreed with Turkish Petroleum International Company (TIPC) 
to use Turkish oil pipelines to deliver oil to Europe in exchange for keeping a minimum 
of 70% of the proceeds at Turkish banks at preferential rates (Duelfer Report, Regime 
Finance and Procurement, p. 70; CFIJ, 2002, p. 33) 
The two parties shared the profits. Finally, Iraq laundered money through gold 
purchases. In 2003, Iraq had four tons of gold reserves, purchased “In relatively small 
quantities on a frequent basis from Lebanese banks in which Iraq had large foreign 
currency deposits” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 51). For the 
operation, Iraq used its embassies in Beirut, Amman, and Damascus. How did Iraq and 
banks in the Middle East manage their operations amid the UN sanctions regime?  
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For the CIA, the answer is the Arab money transfer system known as hawala. 
When the UN 661 Committee conceived the sanctions regime, it ignored, or did not take 
into account, the hawala system. Hawala is a credit and payment device used in the Arab 
world for centuries. In Arabic, the word hawala means “change” or transform, but in 
banking it means “transfer” or “wire”. Today, there are three types of hawalas. First, 
bank hawala is money circulating throughout the banking system in the form of a note or 
electronic money. Second, there is a hawala for money exchange. This is a licensed and 
unlicensed investor who exchanges currencies according to “fluctuations” in the market. 
This is very common in the Middle East where there are so many currencies, economies 
are rather informal, based on cash and bartering. Finally, there are illegal hawalas too. 
The practice is based on an ancient informal banking used throughout South Asia and the 
Middle East to send money to distant places with no regard for bureaucratic limits. This 
hawala is based on religious norms, tribal values, prestige, and trust above all, which is, 
according to Francis Fukuyama, the basis of trade (Fukuyama, 2006, 17). In all, hawalas 
are speedy, flexible and cheap. They reduce paperwork and bureaucracy. With hawalas, 
there is no need for exchange and interest rates, which are banned by the Koran (Duelfer 
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 255). 
 Hawalas have historically presented serious problems to regulatory regimes in 
Arab nations. Since hawalas do not require recordkeeping, they lend themselves to illegal 
activities such as tax evasion, black-market operations, money launderings, and drug 
trafficking. Such illegal operations have become more sophisticated in today’s global 
economy with the “Use of e-mail, faxes, and telephones, which have made these private 
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cash transfers almost instantaneous and nearly impossible to trace or regulate” (Duelfer 
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 255).  
In fact, Saddam Hussein banned the use of hawalas right after he took over 
power, but Iraqis continued to use them anyways in the black market to pay for illegal 
trade across the Syrian, Jordan, and Turkish and Iranian borders. The CIA found that 
“Illegal hawalas were often used by the average Iraqi individual or company to transfer 
funds from expatriate communities to the homeland” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance 
and Procurement, p. 255). However, Saddam allowed hawalas –without formally 
legalizing them- right after the Gulf War of 1991 to fight inflation, stabilize prices, and 
keep liquidity in the Iraqi economy (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, 
p.255; CFIJ, 2002, p. 62). In the end, Saddam fully legalized hawalas in 1993 to link the 
Iraqi economy with the economies of the Middle East and evade UN sanctions regime. 
Rapidly, hawalas became a practice promoted by the Iraqi regime. The CIA addressed 
the role of hawala in the circumvention of the UN sanctions. It stated that “In order to 
import goods, a letter of credit was normally needed from a bank in Jordan. To get this, 
the Jordanian bank would need some cash. Because it was illegal to transfer cash out of 
Iraq through the normal banking system, the illegal hawala system was used to move the 
money” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 256).  
 
BNP Paribas and Other Banks 
 When the UN sanctions regime against Iraq was approved, the UN Secretary-
General selected BNP New York to manage Iraq’s money and financial resources in 
general. BNP is a transnational French bank, a subsidiary of Banque Nationale de Paris 
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S.A, registered in Paris and licensed to operate in New York in 1993 (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 
433). The UN Resolution 986 enacted the Banking Negotiated Contract Act, which 
mandated that BNP Paribas of New York had the right and obligation to: 1) establish and 
manage an escrow account to receive proceeds from the sales of Iraqi oil and to disburse 
funds so Iraq could purchase humanitarian goods and services; 2) confirm letters of credit 
issued from banks and retained by companies interested in buying oil from Iraq; 3) issue 
letters of credit to Iraqi companies so they could purchase humanitarian goods and 
services (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 433). Based on those mandates, BNP issued 2,234 letters of 
credits worth $9.7 billion, of which it issued credit for $6.2 billion to finance purchases of 
Iraqi oil (IIC Report, Chapter IV, p. 433). It also extended credit to Iraq for $3.5 billion to 
purchase goods and services (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 433). Again, those letters of credit were 
legal, in tune with the contract signed between BNP and United Nations. Table 5.3 shows 
distribution of letters of credit through BNP’s subsidiaries and affiliates.  
 
Table 5.3 – Distribution of Letters of Credit through BNP 
 
              
BNP Subsidiaries Number of L/Cs Value of L/Cs
Geneva 1,224                            25,897,061,250$               
Paris 495                               9,716,040,616$                 
London 172                               3,507,013,659$                 
Milan 60                                 856,101,638$                    
Hong Kong 52                                 1,157,795,138$                 
Basel 36                                 727,568,006$                    
Others (13 Branches) 195                               3,905,122,639$                 
Total BNP 2,234                            45,766,703,001$               
Total UN Program 3,120                            64,181,293,181$               
% of BNP to Total UN Program 71.6%
% of Other Banks & Firms 28.4%  
 
Source: IIC Report 
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First, I must clarify that BNP acquired the Swiss bank United European Bank in 
1998, becoming BNP in Geneva; then, it acquired Banque Paribas in 2000, and it became 
BNP Paribas S.A (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 433). The timing of the acquisitions was perfect. 
The French and Swiss banking systems offered independence and anonymity, two key 
desirable features in the banking industry. With the acquisition, BNP had the potential to 
control 80% of all Iraqi purchases (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 433). To capitalize on it, BNP 
allowed its subsidiaries and affiliates to issue letters of credit to intermediaries not 
authorized to trade with Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. The Bank did so in violation 
of Article 2 of the 661 Committee, which demanded from BNP that “The United Nations 
would be made aware of, and approve, the parties to whom Iraq sold its oil and purchased 
humanitarian goods and services” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 440).  
Resolution 661 further banned BNP from selling or transferring letters of credit to 
any third party. The goal was: first, prevent buyers from reselling and speculating with 
Iraqi oil; second, prevent Saddam Hussein from either selling oil at a loss or engaging in 
price gauging (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 31). BNP violated both resolutions. It 
accepted letters of credits from banks, investment firms, and financiers who then paid 
BNP “service fees” for not disclosing their names, clients and terms of contracts, which is 
rightly legal in global banking but no in the UN sanctions regime. The IIC stated, “The 
opportunity to issue a letter of credit in the first instance rather than simply to confirm a 
letter of credit issued by another bank meant that BNP acquired a second customer, and 
with it, the possibility for a conflict of interest with its primary customer, the United 
Nations” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 433). It all meant that BNP was creating a conflict of 
interest for itself. As an escrow agent, BNP was getting involved in two contracts with 
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two different conflicting clients at the same time: one was a contract with the U.N.; the 
other was letters of credits that BNP extended to private companies, namely violators of 
the UN sanctions regime. Still, BNP invested $91 million in credit, which it channeled to 
its companies through its subsidiaries, mainly, in Switzerland and Hong Kong. It was a 
lucrative business. Table 5.2 below shows BNP earnings related to letters of credits under 
the UN sanctions regime from 1998 to 2003. Data are from the IIC Report, Chapter IV, 
Report on Manipulations, the Escrow Bank.  
 
Chart 5.2 - BNP Earnings under the UN Sanctions Regime 
            
             
Source: IIC 
 
The red bars represent fees that BNP imposed on companies that exported to Iraq. 
The blue bars account for fees that BNP charged to companies that purchased oil from 
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Iraq. As we can see, BNP earned $296 million, $205 million above its initial investment 
of $91 million. Yet, this only represents the legal side of the business. Based on the 
auditing that both the IIC and CIA conducted, they suspected that BNP engaged in 
money laundering or, at least, in illegal banking practices. For instance, the IIC found that 
BNP made 403 payments worth $1.5 billion dollars to 30 non-financial institutions, 
violating Resolution 986 of the UN Security Council (Role of BNP-Paribas; Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 55-81). Explicitly, the 
IIC examined 10 cases in which BNP engaged in illicit banking practices. They were: 
ACTEC, Glencore, Gulf-Drilling-Texaco, Belmetalenergo, East Star Trading, Al Douh 
Jordanian Establishment, Talfeet Trading Est., Inesfood Group, Telwar International Inc., 
Limpex Trading, and Zahrat Al Riyadh (Role of BNP-Paribas; Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 55-81). Then, the IIC and the 
CIA found that only 70% of all companies participating in the sanctions regime financed 
their businesses through letters of credit issued by BNP (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 436). The 
other 30% obtained funding from other banks, third parties acting as financiers, and 
independent investors (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 441).  
According to the IIC and the 661 Committee, the scheme worked as follow: 
companies created or hired a third party that would serve as an intermediary between the 
bank issuing the letter of credit and themselves. The contracting company extended a 
power of attorney to the intermediary, so it could execute contracts, request letters of 
credit from a bank, and acquire the right to operate as an independent commercial entity. 
The practice was so common that intermediaries consumed 75% of all letters of credit 
extended under the sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 441).  
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There were three main reasons for utilizing intermediaries. First, most companies 
did not have technical support, experience and enough credit to engage in global trade, 
especially given the restrictions of the UN sanctions regime. Second, well-established 
companies did not want to see their names associated with the Iraqi regime. Such an 
association would affect their long-term business interests in nations opposed to the UN 
sanctions regime, in Middle Eastern nations in particular, for they regarded the UN 
sanctions as cruel and detrimental to their fellow Iraqi Muslims. Lastly, companies 
wanted to evade the sanctions and hide their wrongdoings. A front company or a third-
party acting as an intermediary would work. One important finding is that 81% of banks -
other than BNP- that issued letters of credit were located in banking centers known as 
“offshore,” as shown in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4 – Most Used Banking Centers under the UN Sanctions Regime    
 
  Bloc I    Bloc II
Banking Center # of Balance Banking Center # of Balance
Companies US millions Companies US million
Switzerland 178 1,756           Switzerland 178 1,756          
Cayman Islands 142 1,527           Cayman Islands 142 1,527          
Bahamas 140 942              Cyprus 65 1,373          
Liechtenstein 137 1,272           Liechtenstein 137 1,272          
Monaco 119 973              Monaco 119 973             
Hong Kong 92 659              Bahamas 140 942             
British Virgin Islands 78 863              Panama 29 877             
Cyprus 65 1,373           British Virgin Islands 78 863             
Bermuda 43 622              Hong Kong 92 659             
Panama 29 877              Bermuda 43 622             
Total 1,023       10,864      Total 1,023        10,864         
Source: The IIC Report  
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The Table contains two blocs of data. Bloc I is sorted by # of companies and bloc 
II by balance in USD millions. Column # of companies means number of companies 
distributed per nation. Column balance in US million refers to the amount of money 
companies deposited in banks in those nations. These banking centers hosted 1,023 
companies that traded with Iraq under the UN sanctions regime. Together, they deposited 
$10,864 million dollars, representing 17.11% of all deposits. Also, note that Switzerland 
and Cayman Islands led both blocs as 320 companies chose Switzerland and Cayman 
Islands as their banking centers. Companies had, at some point, $3,283 million dollars 
deposited in banks in offshore centers. Those nations are well known in the banking 
industry for promoting an international banking system that protects customers from 
regulatory regimes and governmental oversight. They played a crucial role in the UN 
sanctions regime as well. They concealed illicit payments, accounts and the identities of 
intermediaries and third parties. For instance, the 661 Committee stated the “The 
Committee has been unable to establish the percentage of letters of credit financed by 
third parties over the history of the Programmed” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 441). The 661 
Committee expressly referred to Swiss banks. They issued large numbers of letters of 
credit and refused to reveal their contents based on Swiss laws, which “Prohibited from 
disclosing client information to anyone other than its parent, including officials at other 
affiliates of the Bank” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 447). Curiously, in 1997 Switzerland enacted 
the Money Laundering Act, obligating Swiss banks to comply with International Anti-
Laundering Law.  
In addition, the IIC stated that banks failed to detect “Customers involved in a 
high risk business... and report them to the OFAC list or check if it was listed as a SDN” 
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(IIC, Chapter IV, p. 545). Note that OFAC stands for Office of Foreign Asset Control, 
and SDN stands for Specially Designated Nationals. It all means that although BNP was 
doing business with foreign (non-American) customers, it did not report it as it was 
mandated by federal laws. The IIC particularly mentioned the case of “Augusto 
Giangradi of Italtech as a party involved in legal proceedings in South Florida in 
connection with an illegal sale of controlled American technology to Iraq as well as 
money laundering activity” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 545). Also, the IIC was alarmed by the 
fact that banks did not report movements of large amounts of funds from account to 
account and bank to bank. Banks “Failed to scrutinize large unusual transactions or a 
series of large incoming deposits, followed shortly thereafter by large disbursements” 
(IIC, Chapter IV, p. 553) as mandated by International Anti-Money Laundering Laws. 
Explicitly, the IIC cited Alcon Petroleum, Fenar Petroleum, Taurus Group, Japal 
Petroleum and Petrocorp since, as it put it, “Their transactions were limited to large, 
often six-figure incoming wire transfers; these companies, in turn, disbursed similarly 
large sums” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 545). The cases of Jabal Petroleum and Petrocorp were 
of more concern because “They were located in Lebanon, which at the time was listed as 
a Non-Cooperative Country or Territory (NCCT) in fighting Money Laundering… and 
associated with the Iraqi regime” (IIC, Chapter IV, p. 546).  
The evidences presented so far attempt to explain how the current global banking 
facilitated the circumvention of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. On one hand, I 
found that Iraq actually expanded its banking industry during the UN sanctions regime 
agasint Iraq, particularly throughout the Middle East. Iraq utilized regional banking to 
reach global banking. On the other hand, BNP failed to comply with the UN sanctions 
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regime. BNP in fact extended credit to companies engaging in illicit practices. BNP 
helped companies to move money, conceal malpractice, and evade the UN sanctions.      
 
Investors and Speculators 
 In this section, I discuss investors and speculators, key NSAs in the global 
economy and under the UN sanctions regime. The goal is to explicate an essential feature 
of globalization, widely utilized to circumvent regulatory regimes like sanctions regimes.  
First, the IIC defined investors and speculators as “Underlying financiers or 
established crude oil traders and companies that are involved in the purchase and resale 
of crude oil but do not generally process the oil in their own refineries; they often charter 
ships and expedite the logistics of getting oil to a refinery” (IIC, Oil Expert Report III, p. 
4). The IIC also stated that “Most contract-holders currently fall under this category. 
They don’t seem to add any value to the Programme and are just there to earn a risk-free 
commission at the expense of the United Nations-Iraq account; it is very difficult to find a 
justification for their participation in the Programme” (IIC, Oil Expert Report III, p. 4). 
In general, speculation here refers to how speculators usually move contracts throughout 
the global market, how contracts are sold and resold, passed on from a contractor to an 
investor, then to a company which in turn subcontracts another company, all in matter of 
days, even hours. Investors and speculators played a key role under the UN sanctions 
regime. They financed companies that had no money and no means to obtain it. They 
extended credit to companies created mainly to evade the UN sanctions. Table 5.5 below 
shows a list of investors and speculators, or underlying financiers.   
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Table 5.5 - Underlying Financiers 
Underlying financiers Nation of Registration Barrels financed in USD        Barrels lifted
Bayoil Bahamas (USA) 403,703,074                    7,349,738,302          
Taurus Bahamas (USA) 256,213,572                    4,970,216,904          
Vitol Switzerland 196,049,893                    4,034,320,347          
Glencore International AG Switzerland 149,247,723                    3,162,905,704          
Chevron Texaco United States 83,854,714                      1,778,799,188          
Betoil Ltd 44,023,908                      886,104,961             
Sinochem International Oil London United Kingdom China 29,633,836                      706,687,377             
Arcadia Petroleum Ltd 27,962,071                      596,389,267             
Gunvor Energy Ltd 20,877,957                      438,030,217             
Scandinavian T. Ltd 13,152,490                      309,882,592             
Galaxy Energy Intl. Ltd 11,708,415                      265,462,533             
Total International Ltd France 11,007,323                      293,399,846             
Marc Rich 10,179,086                      265,344,993             
Valero Energy Group United States 10,151,491                      186,137,767             
Sonatrach Petroleum Corp BVI Algeria 9,766,286                        223,444,361             
Petraco Oil Co Ltd 9,703,314                        229,868,316             
Shell International Trading United Kingdom 9,078,714                        251,375,169             
Mednafta Trading Co. Ltd Swiss, Cyprus, USA 8,140,763                        164,819,715             
Gunvor International Ltd 7,678,745                        146,200,291             
March Rich & Co. Investment AG 6,915,565                        170,572,149             
Trafigura Beheer BV Netherlands 6,746,013                        141,683,838             
Crown Resources/ERC Trading 4,995,213                        120,987,228             
Mitsubishi Japan 4,875,597                        108,869,481             
ELF Trading SA 4,840,246                        120,036,022             
Totsa Total Oil Trading 3,249,753                        70,640,672               
NRG Oils SRL Geneva Switzerland 3,082,784                        78,485,902               
Wincor SA 3,007,534                        54,508,916               
OMV Supply & Trading Switzerland 2,590,546                        68,595,607               
Sempra Oil Trading SARL 2,589,136                        68,666,097               
ERC Trading 2,085,074                        41,163,897               
Pedestal Enterprises SA 2,071,083                        38,580,826               
Naftex Oil Trading Ltd 1,986,991                        52,587,704               
Koch 1,917,957                        46,185,504               
Masfield Switzerland 1,909,909                        39,347,987               
Unipec 1,668,213                        39,293,089               
Repsol Petroleum SA - London Spain 1,602,374                        44,823,471               
Petroplus Ref. Intl BV Netherlands 1,529,381                        44,199,017               
Sovoil AG/Nafta Swiss AG 1,099,359                        29,765,331               
Arcadia/NRG 1,044,890                        19,340,583               
FADI Oil International S.A.L Lebanon 1,011,684                        18,326,976               
Petroserve Ltd S.A. 1,002,505                        18,788,766               
Inter INA Ltd 990,745                           17,102,041               
Alexoil Switzerland 874,862                           19,390,669               
Mediterranean Oil Supply & Trading Monaco 620,431                           14,726,263               
Addax BV, Rotterdam GE Switzerland 602,272                           15,136,300               
Iplom International SA Switzerland 598,593                           11,554,803               
Nafta Swiss AG Switzerland 594,788                           11,667,956               
CO.GE.P. SRL Costieri 584,312                           15,594,703               
Total              1,378,821,185                 27,799,749,648         
Source: IIC 
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I collected the data for Table 5.5 from the IIC Report, Oil Expert Report III.  
The table has four columns. Columns one and two contain the names of underlying 
financiers and their nation of registration respectively. The third column represents oil 
barrels financed in USD million dollars. Column four accounts for number of oil barrels 
actually lifted. Values in column 4 will always be higher than values in column 3. The 
data is sorted by “barrels financed.” Above all, observe: 1) money invested versus the 
amount of oil purchased with it; 2) the role of underlying financiers in terms of funding; 
3) since oil prices fluctuated, underlying financiers invested more money to lift the same 
or less amount of oil.  
The data show that companies financed $27,799,749,648 million of Iraqi crude, 
43.3% of the oil lifted under the UN sanctions. Yet, there are key issues to discuss here. 
First, the data show that Chevron-Texaco and Valero were the only American underlying 
financiers, but that is incorrect. Bayoil and Taurus were American firms too, only that 
they were registered in The Bahamas. Bayoil belonged to a holding company based in 
Delaware, and Taurus was a subsidiary of Taurus Group, an oil trading firm based in 
Houston, Texas. Thus, when I add up all investments made by Chevron-Texaco, Valero, 
Bayoil and Taurus, I obtain that American underlying financiers financed 762,063,614 
barrels of oil worth $14,449,711,876 million dollars. Bayoil and Taurus ranked 1st and 2nd 
respectively while Chevron-Texaco ranked fifth. What those companies did is totally 
legal. It is indeed a common practice under globalization, but it was illegal under the UN 
sanctions. Firms from other nations engaged in the same practice. For instance, Sinochen 
was not British but a Chinese, and most Swiss underlying financiers were subsidiaries or 
parented to companies from other nations. They registered themselves in Switzerland to 
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benefit from Swiss advantageous banking laws. As for American underlying financiers, 
the decision to operate in such a way is linked to Saddam’s policy of banning American 
firms from getting Iraqi oil. As the IIC affirms, “None of these traders had been given the 
significant direct access to oil contracts that they sought under the Programme..., so they 
approached intermediary entities” (IIC, Chapter II, p. 12). A final point to make is that 
American underlying financiers ranked first, surpassing Russians, French and Chinese. 
This is essential for we saw in Chapter II that the U.S. ranked 27th in oil purchases while 
Russia, France, and China ranked 1st, 2nd and 7th respectively. It means that in terms of 
investing in oil purchases, American firms played a vital role, as Table 5.6 shows.  
 
Table 5.6 – American Investors Financing Non-American Firms 
Underlying                   Contractual Company      # of Contractual Barrels  Barrels Financed
Financiers Contracts Nation Financed  in USD millions
Bayoil ACTEC 8             Russia 12,027,284  217,882,341      
Alexoil S.A. 4             Switzerland 3,936,639    102,578,122      
Alfa Eco 49           Russia 76,709,258  1,236,384,917   
AL-Hoda International Trading Co 7             UAE 12,171,851  196,556,276      
Asmos Ltd 1             Kenya 1,000,000    20,754,000        
B.C. International Ltd 3             Pakistan 1,426,475    24,656,583        
Bashneft 1             Russia 1,237,445    30,804,956        
Bayoil 3             Bahamas 5,673,263    102,326,625      
Belmetalenergo, Inc 3             Belarus 5,356,326    106,386,467      
Benzol 1             UAE 2,003,987    48,636,764        
CAMTECH Manufacturing LLC 1             UAE 500,000       10,353,860        
China National United Oil Corp 3             China 5,021,626    129,408,470      
Consult & Trade 1             Austria 1,001,901    16,403,944        
Continental Oil Ltd 1             Cyprus 500,000       12,944,026        
Delta Petroleum Products Trading Co 1             Turkey 1,960,561    38,110,819        
Emercom Agency 1             Russia 2,105,469    32,946,142        
Emiroil Est 2             UAE 3,963,514    84,131,603        
Energy Resources People's Co 2             Ukraine 2,928,233    56,298,115        
Erdem Holding (On behalf of Mobil Corp) 1             UAE 457,000       8,897,207          
Federally Torgoviy Dom Oil 2             Ukraine 1,000,000    18,529,772        
Hiperborey Company 1             Ukraine 1,940,324    41,206,846        
Impexoil LLC 7             Russia 5,487,799    117,949,145      
Ives Co. Ltd 1             Ukraine 510,401       13,213,287        
Khrizolit 1             Russia 1,979,539    37,136,066        
Lukoil 12           Russia 18,000,747  261,401,623       
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Machinoimport 7             Russia 10,153,970        238,042,129             
Marbel Resources Ltd 4             U.K. 4,679,722          93,499,365               
Monaco Trading Ltd 2             Cyprus 2,015,126          39,796,365               
NAFTA Moskva 12           Russia 16,738,536        262,030,589             
NAFTA Petroleum 2             Cyprus 4,063,279          72,591,407               
National Oil Well Maintenance Co 6             Qatar 5,391,876          103,320,379             
Oilexco Incorporated 1             Canada 1,887,204          16,507,373               
Omni Oil 1             South Africa 2,070,270          38,550,168               
Petroleum Technical Services Co 10           Vietnam 13,442,816        309,661,675             
Petroline FZC 5             UAE 6,940,742          103,836,511             
Petrovietnam Trading Co 2             Vietnam 2,999,696          61,859,886               
Primacosa Enterprises Ltd 4             Cyprus 2,286,791          36,784,264               
Rosneft 2             Russia 2,584,563          27,877,912               
Rosnefteimpex NK 21           Russia 34,265,072        691,907,893             
Rossbulneft AD 1             Bulgaria 1,048,863          10,549,464               
Shaher Trading Company Ltd 1             Yemen 13,444,448        22,325,035               
Sidanco 1             Russia 1,023,836          10,639,704               
Slavneft 2             Russia 4,190,373          78,094,990               
SOCAP International Ltd 7             France 9,263,222          196,199,013             
Surgutneftegas 3             Russia 1,950,000          46,742,850               
Tatneft 16           Russia 17,472,724        233,231,641             
Total International Ltd 6             France 8,091,086          146,124,804             
Trafigura Beheer BV 6             Netherlands 7,844,032          85,608,672               
Tyumen Oil Company 20           Russia 25,562,460        483,186,951             
Zarubezhneft 2             Russia 3,455,931          79,750,511               
Zerich GMBH 1             Switzerland 2,001,702          48,851,537               
Chevron/ Anwar Akkad Son's Co. Trade & Ind. 1             Syria 2,059,989          46,247,663               
Texaco Belmetalenergo, Inc 5             Belarus 7,785,947          162,805,369             
Erdem Holding (On behalf of Mobil Corp.) 8             Turkey 12,912,021        275,528,739             
Fal Oil Company Ltd 2             UAE 4,043,821          79,062,833               
Gazprom 1             Russia 2,077,974          44,759,560               
H.I.U. Ltd 3             Switzerland 4,988,774          99,814,822               
IES-Italiana Energia E Servizi SPA 1             Italy 1,966,345          39,708,866               
Jewan Oil 2             UAE 4,069,646          75,399,753               
Kalmyk Oil & Gas Company 2             Russia 4,030,754          92,991,316               
Lada-OMC Holding SA 3             Belarus 3,483,299          77,909,198               
Machinoimport 6             Russia 8,042,738          154,025,921             
Mediterranean Oil Supply & Trading 1             Monaco 1,996,475          54,734,724               
Naftogas 1             Ukraine 2,004,217          32,330,652               
Phoenix International 5             U.S.A. 4,718,552          103,261,121             
PT SRI Muktigas Corporation 1             Indonesia 1,025,212          21,240,660               
Rao Mes International Econ. Cooperation 2             Russia 1,549,442          34,229,405               
Tatneft 1             Russia 1,030,475          13,348,459               
Sinochem International Oil London 4             U.K. 4,581,547          115,871,583             
Vavilon 2             Ukraine 1,484,710          36,747,557               
Zerich GMBH 10           Switzerland 10,002,776        218,328,853             
Taurus A & A Services 1 Pakistan 1,000,000          14,015,455               
Alcon Petroleum 34           Liechtenstein 45,613,620        923,881,529             
Arab Trade Development Co. 1             Egypt 932,061             16,903,466               
Aredio Petroleum SARI 25           France 24,232,964        499,397,166             
Valero Nafta Petroleum/Mednafta Trading Co. 6             Cyprus 10,151,491        186,137,767             
Total 305         411,486,777      76,679,018,176         
Source: IIC and Duelfer Report   
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 I collected the data from the IIC Report. Table 5.6 has six columns. The first 
column shows four American companies that acted as underlying financiers. The second 
column shows companies that received financing from underlying financiers. The third 
column shows the number of contracts financed. Column four shows nations of 
registration per company. Column five shows barrels financed and column six shows 
barrels financed in USD millions.  
 In total, four American companies acted as underlying financiers. They were 
Bayoil, Chevron-Texaco, Taurus and Valero. They financed 390 contracts for 
539,552,832 million barrels of oil, worth $9,922,151,501 million dollars. Bayoil led the 
practice with 262 contracts, 373,767,982 million barrels worth $6,503,469,064 million 
dollars. Chevron-Texaco ranked second with 61 contracts, 83,854,714 million barrels and 
$1,778,347,054 million dollars. Taurus came third with 61 contracts too but of 
71,778,645 million barrels worth $1,454,197,616 million. Valero came forth with just 6 
contracts, 10,151,491 million barrels and $186,137,767 million. The data illustrate the 
magnitude of American involvement in financing businesses under the sanctions regime. 
The involvement was not massive in terms of “company participation,” but it was 
relevant in terms of amounts of money invested. Again, American companies could not 
purchase Iraqi oil because Saddam Hussein would not sell it to them. So they opted for 
financing purchases for other companies. What's more, observe in the third column the 
nationality of companies that American investors financed. It is diverse, but what is more 
revealing is how many Russian companies obtained financing from American financiers. 
The following table helps see this point. I collected the data for Table 5.7 from the IIC 
Report.   
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Table 5.7 – American Investors Financing Firms from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine 
Underlying Barrels      # of Noncotractual Barrels  Barrels Lifted
Financiers Lifted Contracts Nation Lifted  In USD
Bayoil ACTEC 8              Russia 12,027,284        217,882,341$         
Alfa Eco 49            Russia 76,709,258        1,236,384,917$      
Bashneft 1              Russia 1,237,445          30,804,956$           
Emercom Agency 1              Russia 2,105,469          32,946,142$           
Impexoil LLC 7              Russia 5,487,799          117,949,145$         
Khrizolit 1              Russia 1,979,539          37,136,066$           
Lukoil 12            Russia 18,000,747        261,401,623$         
Machinoimport 7              Russia 10,153,970        238,042,129$         
NAFTA Moskva 12            Russia 16,738,536        262,030,589$         
Rosneft 2              Russia 2,584,563          27,877,912$           
Rosnefteimpex NK 21            Russia 34,265,072        691,907,893$         
Sidanco 1              Russia 1,023,836          10,639,704$           
Slavneft 2              Russia 4,190,373          78,094,990$           
Surgutneftegas 3              Russia 1,950,000          46,742,850$           
Tatneft 16            Russia 17,472,724        233,231,641$         
Tyumen Oil Company 20            Russia 25,562,460        483,186,951$         
Zarubezhneft 2              Russia 3,455,931          79,750,511$           
Total 165          234,945,006      4,086,010,360$      
Chevron /Texaco Gazprom 1              Russia 2,077,974          44,759,560$           
Kalmyk Oil & Gas Company 2              Russia 4,030,754          92,991,316$           
Machinoimport 6              Russia 8,042,738          154,025,921$         
Rao Mes Intnl. Econ. Coop. 2              Russia 1,549,442          34,229,405$           
Tatneft 1              Russia 1,030,475          13,348,459$           
Total 12            16,731,383        339,354,661$         
Grand Total 177          251,676,389 4,425,365,021$          
Source: IIC Report 
  
 In its final report, the IIC stated that “According to Iraqi Vice President Taha 
Yassin Ramadan… oil allocated to United States companies was given to Russian 
companies” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 2), but he failed to mention that, as we see in Table 5.7,  
American companies stayed in as financiers of Russian companies. Note that, at the time, 
Russia was going through an economic crisis and a privatization process. Russian 
companies needed credit and funding. We can see in Table 5.7 that American underlying 
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financiers financed 177 Russian contracts, 251,676,389 million barrels worth 
$4,425,365,021 million. It represents roughly 23% of all Russian oil purchased in the UN 
sanctions regime. Bayoil financed 165 Russian contracts, 234,945,006 million barrels 
worth $4,086,010,360 million. Chevron-Texaco financed 12 Russian contracts, 
16,731,383 million barrels worth $339,354,661 million dollars.    
 The case of Mobil Refining illustrates one of the ironies of the corporate world 
and globalization. Mobil Corp did not finance oil purchases; rather, it obtained financing 
through its archrivals: Chevron-Texaco, Bayoil, Glencore and Shell. But Mobil Corp. did 
not do it directly. Instead, it hired a company called Erdem Holding Co., which them 
approached Chevron Texaco, Bayoil, Glencore and Shell for financing. Table 5.8 below 
shows Mobil Corporation refining purchases. I collected the data for Table 5.8 from the 
IIC Report, Oil Expert Report III.  
 
Table 5.8 – Mobil Corporation Refining Oil Purchases 
Financier Contractual    # of           No contractual Barrels Barrels lifted
Purchaser Contracts                 Purchaser  Lifted in USD
Chevron Texaco Erdem Holding Co. 8              On behalf of Mobil Refining 12,912,921     275,528,739       
Bayoil Erdem Holding Co. 1              On behalf of Mobil Refining 457,000          8,897,207           
Glencore Erdem Holding Co. 1              On behalf of Mobil Refining 2,002,942       41,316,900         
Shell Erdem Holding Co. 1  On behalf of Mobil Refining 1,037,812       30,444,343         
Total 11            16,410,675     356,187,189        
Source: IIC Report  
  
Knowing that Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are themselves important oil producers 
and hold large oil reserves, it is worth asking why companies from those nations 
purchased so much oil in violation of the UN sanctions regime.  
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The answer is that they were oil speculators. They did not purchase oil for 
consumption but to resell it in world markets. Three factors helped them. Iraq stopped 
trading with British and American companies, “end-users” or refineries that convert oil 
into gasoline and other oil derivatives. Second, Iraq traded with small investors and 
trading houses, which did not own refineries and had no capacity to refine oil. As Meyer 
and Califano argued “Trade houses are very small in size and seem to have limited credit 
facilities…many of which had no equipment beyond a fax machine and a telephone” 
(Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 144).  
That is, they acted as front companies, as mere speculators. In fact, they were 
violating Resolution 986 of the UN Security Council, which stated that “It is expressly 
understood that Buyer will process crude oil sold under this contract in its own 
processing facilities” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 144). Third, Iraq manipulated oil 
prices through discounts and wholesaling. Having so much oil, it could afford to sell it 
below the global market price. Iraq could have only done it through speculators, and 
Saddam controlled many of them. As Meyer and Califano stated “By controlling which 
obscure trading companies win the right to buy that oil, Iraq can direct the flow of these 
discounts; it explained why major western refiners have been bumped off the Iraqi buyer 
list and replaced by more and more unknown names” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 
140). According to Meyer and Califano, the scheme worked as follow: “Investors 
contacted a number of trading companies to which they proposed to sell oil if the 
companies in question agreed to their price (the official sales price plus the premium), 
issued them a letter of credit, chartered a ship and paid them” (Meyer and Califano, 
2006, p. 145). Table 5.9 illustrates some of those investors.  
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Table 5.9 – Independent Oil Investors and Speculators 
             Contractual party Contractual             No contractual party No contractual     # of      Barrels
                  Or Speculator     Nation    Nation Contracts        Lifted
Mr. Serge Boiedeevaix France Vitol S.A. Switzerland 8             29,525,000         
USA Nafta Petroleum/Mednafta Trading Co. Cyprus 4             26,257,000         
Mr. Zain Al-Abedeen Erdem Turkey Erdem Holding Co. Turkey 11           25,754,000         
Italy Costieri Genovesi Petrolferi Italy 11           24,104,000         
Mohammad ABDE Al-Manan Bangladesh Lukoil Petroleum Ltd Russia 5             22,285,000         
Mr. Vladimir Zhirinovsky Russia Sindanco Russia 3             18,739,000         
Russia Soyuzneftegaz Russia 4             18,053,000         
Mr. Mikhael Gutseriev Russia Slavneft Russia 4             16,961,000         
Russia Nafta Moskva Russia 1             16,738,000         
Mr. Awad Ammora Syria Awad Ammora Co. & Partner Syria 5             16,691,000         
Reliance Petroleum Ltd India Alcon Petroleum Ltd. Liechtenstein 3             15,780,000         
China North Industries Corp. China China Wanbao Engineering Corp China 6             14,462,000         
Mr. Bassim Qaqish Jordan Lubna Trading S.A. Spain 7             14,105,000         
Mr. Salvatore Nicotra Italy Industria Petrolifera Siciliana I.P.S. Italy 7             13,787,000         
Russia Tyumen Oil Company Russia 2             13,498,000         
Mr. Patrick Maugein France Trafigura Beheer B.V. Netherlands 2             13,201,000         
Mr. Talal Abu-Reyaleh Jordan Glencore International AG Switzerland 1             12,107,000         
Mr. Michel Grimard France Addax S.A.R.L. Switzerland 7             11,831,000         
Mr. Bashar Nouri Syria Nouri For Trading Co. Syria 5             11,156,000         
Amities Franco-Irakiennes France Aredio Petroleum S.A.R.L. France 8             11,140,000         
Mr. Charles Pasqua France Genmar Resources GMBH Switzerland 3             10,751,000         
Mr. Sokolov Ukraine H.I.U. Ltd Ukraine 4             10,318,000         
NIS Yugopetrol Yugoslavia Eurol International, reg. in Bermuda UK 2             10,219,000         
Mr. Lotfi Doughan Turkey Seta Insaat Petrol Ve Petrol Urunleri Turkey 8             10,202,000         
Thai Rice Trader Thailand Chayaporn Rice Co. Ltd Thailand 5             9,886,000           
Mr. Ghassan Shallah Syria Ghassan Shallah Co. Syria 4             9,664,000           
Riad El-Taher (live in U.K.) Iraq Bula Resources PLC Ireland 7             8,981,000           
Jordan Petrogaz Distribution SA Switzerland 1             8,626,000           
Bangladesh Jordan Grain Co.LTD Jordan 3             8,613,000           
Mr. Claude Kaspereit France E.O.T.C. France 4             8,538,000           
Mr. Abu Al-Abbass Palestine Awad Ammora Co. & Partner Syria 4             8,375,000           
Mr. Mohamed Osman Said Kenya Asmos Ltd Kenya 6             8,017,000           
Mr. Leith Shbeilat Jordan Petrogaz Distribution SA Switzerland 3             7,648,000           
Mr. Emad El-Said El-Galada Egypt Alexoil S.A. Switzerland 3             7,625,000           
Mr. Benon Sevan Cyprus African Middle East Petroleum Co. Panama 5             7,291,000           
Mr. Abdallah Al-Sallawi Morocco Petrade Morocco 4             7,190,000           
Mr. Muhammad Aslan Turkey Emin Dis Ticaret Petrol Ve Petrol Turkey 4             7,030,000           
Russia Neftegazexport Russia 2             6,725,000           
Mr. George Galloway UK Middle East Advanced Semiconductor Jordan 3             6,681,000           
Mr. Agababov Russia Rosneftegazexport Russia 2             6,370,000           
Zarubezhneft Russia Zarnestservice Ltd Russia 1             6,203,000           
Yemen ZSA Services Ltd Yemen 3             6,129,000           
Mr. Ahmad Al-Bashir Jordan Al-Rasheed International Cooperation Jordan 3             6,100,000           
Asia Public Trading Co. Iraq Oil & Gas Services Group Ltd Pakistan 3             6,084,000           
380         874,767,000        
Source: IIC and Duelfer Report  
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I collected the data for Table 5.8 from the IIC Report.  Table 5.8 has six columns. 
Column I consists in a list of contractual non-state actors, and Column II lists their 
nationalities. Column III lists no-contractual investors and/or speculator. Column IV 
shows their nationality while Column V shows the # of contracts they purchased from 
contractual non-state actors. Column VI accounts for the amount of barrels they lifted. 
 First, according to the CIA and the IIC, there were a total of 121 contractual non-
state actors from 40 different nationalities that invested in oil and speculated with it under 
the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. However, I included in my analysis only those that 
speculated with contracts worth more than a million barrels of oil. Including those that 
contracted less than a million would have been redundant and confusing. Still, the high 
number of participants and their nationalities explains two points: first, the violation of 
the sanctions was massive and violators were diverse.  
Second, whereas some contractual actors had more than one nationality, non-
contractual actors had just one: their nation of registration. For instance, Serge 
Boiedeevaix appears as French and an American, but his real nationality is French. Mr. 
Zain Al-Abedeen Erdem is a Turkish national, but he appears as Turk and Italian. Also, 
Mr. Salvatore Nicotra was an Italian, and he signed contracts as a Russian. And Mr. Riad 
El-Taher was an Iraqi residing in the UK; yet, he accepted contracts as a citizen of Jordan 
and Bangladesh. I can mention another 22 cases, but the central point here is that 
contractual non-state actors altered their nationalities to evade UN inspectors. Then, non-
contractual actors operated under a license issued by their country of registration, which 
most of the time differed from the nationality of whoever owned the license. That is, non-
contractual actors like Glencore and Vitol had Swiss licenses to operate, but their owners 
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were French nationals. There were 67 cases like it under the UN sanctions regime. It is a 
common practice under globalization, though.  
 Third, note that Column I includes individuals, NGOs, universities and other non-
state actors. Most of them appeared in Chapter III as NSAs, and their nations appeared in 
Chapters II and III as the largest money-makers under the sanctions regime. Meanwhile, 
Column III includes only companies because, as we saw in Chapter III, contractual NSAs 
accepted contracts only to sell them non-contractual actors. Contractual actors had no 
money and expertise to execute the contracts they took on. Precisely, their “mission” was 
to obtain contracts from the Iraqi government and sell them to non-contractual actors. 
Conversely, non-contractual actors had the money so that their “mission” was to finance 
contracts. They usually financed several contractual actors, and they did not limit 
themselves to finance oil contracts. They financed every sort of trade, from construction, 
tourism and agriculture to education, health and even public relations. 
In fact, some non-contractual actors had never invested in the oil industry. The 
UN sanctions regime was their first time because it offered good business opportunities. 
Meyer and Califano found that speculators financed 25.68% of the oil traded under the 
sanctions (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 145). Finally, observe that selling contracts from 
contractual to non-contractual parties almost always involved a change of non-contractual 
nations. For example, Mr. Serge Boiedeevaix was a French national who also obtained 
contracts as an American. Here, France and the US were the contractual nations. But Mr. 
Boiedeevaix sold his contracts to companies registered in Switzerland and Cyprus; 
therefore, Switzerland and Cyprus were the non-contractual nations. Perhaps the most 
illustrative case involves six contractual actors from Iraq who sold their contracts to six 
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non-contractual speculators. It all explains why some nations received more oil than 
others and the global nature of such operations.  
  In sum, based on their modus operandis, we can see why investors, speculators 
and investing are such important agents and means of globalizing. They are the drivers of 
speculation because they move contracts throughout the global market, from contractor to 
investors, to then a company, then a subcontractor, and so on. They play central unique 
roles in the circumvention of sanctions regimes as well. In the next section, I present 4 
cases to illustrate how banks, investors, companies and even state actors concur in the 
market place to invest and speculate.    
 
Case Studies 
 In this section, I further illustrate the hypothesis of this chapter: global banking 
undermines a multilateral sanctions regime; global banking, as a means of globalization, 
facilitated the circumvention of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq by providing 
financial instruments to the agents of globalizations, namely corporations, NGOs,  
political activists and other NSAs.  
Circumvention of UN sanctions against Iraq occurred through three main 
categories: 1) state-owned banks; 2) private banks, 3) speculators. They all require 
participation of third parties or intermediaries, which mostly included state and/or non-
state actors such as speculators, politicians, and political organizations and businessmen. 
In order to execute their contracts, intermediaries then sold their contracts to companies. 
The Chart below illustrates the most common financing scheme under the UN sanctions 
regime.  
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Figure 5.1 – Most Common Financing Schemes under the UN Sanctions Regime 
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Chalmers, a NSA empowered by his oil trade firm, Bayoil Inc. The fourth case is 
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stated that “Were typical of the financial transactions under the sanction regime” (IIC, 
Chapter IV, p. 434); b) the use of wire transfers and cash; c) the use of intermediaries or 
third parties to ultimately execute the services.  
 
Infobank-Belmetalenergo 
 The first case involves a state-owned bank. It explains how nation-states and 
banks worked together to circumvent the UN sanctions regime. This case is about 
Infobank, Belarus and Iraq.  
The Duelfer Report affirmed that “The critical financial element in the illicit 
trade process between Belarus and Iraq was Infobank” (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance 
and Procurement, p. 129). But the model was simple: “Belarus demanded to be paid 75 
percent of any contract price in hard currency before delivery of any goods. In return, it 
would purchase goods in the world market for Iraq, including military goods. Infobank 
agreed to provide bridging funds, including the 75 percent up-front fee, to finance illicit 
deals between Belarus and Iraq for a fee of 15 percent of any contract” (Duelfer Report, 
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 129) 
 Infobank was a result of privatization of Soviet Union’s banking industry in 1994 
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 129). Infobank became Belarus’ 
largest bank, taking over 39% of all investments the former Soviet Union had throughout 
the Middle East (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 129). Infobank 
also acquired 10% of Belmetalenergo, a firm registered in Belarus in 1993 (Duelfer 
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 129). Like Infobank, Belmetalenergo 
picked 67% of the businesses that the former Soviet Union had in the Middle East. 
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Belmetalenergo even took over the office the Soviets had in Bagdad and used it as 
headquarter. Belmetalenergo’s businesses consisted in the export of tractors, trucks, 
construction equipments, heavy machinery and spare parts, including military spare parts, 
all made in Belarus and/or Russia. When the UN sanctions regime was established, 
Infobank emerged as the main financier of Belmetalenergo’s businesses in Iraq. The 
partnership soon became a trade engine between Belarus and Iraq. The importance of 
Infobank was confirmed in a letter from the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture to Iraqi 
business nomenclature. The Minister stated that “Guarantees from Infobank are accepted 
by all Iraqi companies and ministries; we must be certain that cooperation with Infobank 
is never broken” (IIC, Chapter III, p. 337). 
  Infobank guaranteed Belmetalenergo’s good image in European markets where it 
purchased goods to export to Iraq. At some point, most of Belmetalenergo’s businesses 
responded to Iraqi needs. It became the 13th largest exporter to Iraq (IIC, Chapter III, p. 
337). The IIC found that Belmetalenergo picked 71 contracts worth $349.3 million 
dollars in just 2 years of sanctions, all of which was financed by Infobank through 129 
letters of credits (IIC, Chapter III, p. 340). The CIA found another 20 contracts that UN 
auditors could not detect because Infobank did not keep records of Belmetalenrgo-Iraqi 
deals (IIC, Chapter III, p. 340). When the CIA asked why, Infobank’s officials argued 
that “It was a practice to destroy all documentations once contracts were satisfied” (IIC, 
Chapter III, p. 340). The CIA did identify, however, around $69 million dollars that Iraq 
illegally paid to Belmetalenergo through Jordan National Bank and then to Infobank (IIC, 
Chapter III, p. 340). Observe that Iraq was not supposed to pay its customers. UN 
Resolution 896 mandated that Iraq had to issue payments through BNP New York, the 
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bank that guarded Iraq’s escrow accounts. In 2003, Infobank still held $7 million dollars 
that belonged to Iraq (IIC, Chapter III, p. 340).  
 Although Belmetalenergo was mainly an export oriented enterprise and Infobank 
a financier of its exports, they also engaged in oil trading under the sanctions regime. 
They purchased 21.6 million barrels worth $464.2 million dollars (IIC, Chapter III, p. 
337). Infobank and Belmetalenergo undertook another four oil contracts, which they 
insured through Bayoil and Chevron-Texaco, two American oil companies (IIC, Chapter 
III, p. 337). Chevron-Texaco kept the oil and paid $1 million dollars to Belmetalenergo 
and $2.9 million to Infobank (IIC, Chapter III, p. 337). To conceal its dealings, Chevron-
Texaco made its payments through an amalgam of front companies that included 
Balmorals Ventures, Hanner Tired Trading, Hi-Tech Technology Corp Ltd, and Rouden 
Co. LLC (IIC, Chapter III, p. 337). Those firms belonged to Belmoral International and 
Trustbank, a parent company of Infobank. Belmoral International and Trustbank were 
also funded and registered in Belarus. The linkage between Infobank and Trustbank was 
Mr. Victor Shevtsov, Chairman of the Board of Directors of both Infobank and 
Trustbank. Belarus’ legislature appointed him, and he supervised Infobank’s operations 
(IIC, Chapter III, p. 337).       
 
East Star Trading-BNP Paribas 
 This second case involves two oil traders and a private bank. This case is 
illustrative of how oil traders and banks allied to finance Iraq’s oil exports. The IIC and 
GAO cited a total of 14 major private banks as violators of the UN sanctions, among 
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which were HSBC of Hong Kong, Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, and Barclays of 
London (IIC, Chapter III, p. 341; GAO, Audits, p. 11).  
The IIC explicitly accused private banks of: 1) concealing the identities of 
violators of the UN sanctions; 2) paying intermediaries and third parties. Specially, BNP 
was the target of direct accusations. Congresswoman Rohrabacher accused BNP Paribas 
of paying East Star, Al-Douh, Glencore International AG, Belmetalenergo, Texaco Corp. 
and other intermediaries for services they did not render. She argued that “They were not 
authorized to receive payments as they were not the original party to the transaction, and 
this is a third party being paid for what someone else is doing” (The Role of BNP 
Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 7). 
UN Security Council Resolution 986 stated that “only financial institutions could have 
funds reassigned to them” (The Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 7). East Star, Al-Douh, Glencore International 
AG, Belmetalenergo and Texaco Corp were not financial institutions, yet, they had funds 
reassigned to them through BNP of Geneva, Credit Agricole Indosuez Singapore and 
HSBC Bank Middle East among other banks.       
East Star Trading was incorporated in the Cayman Islands on February 27, 1990 
as an affiliate to Pacific Inter-Link SDN BHD (www.pacificinterlink.comny, 2002). Both 
companies belonged to Commodities House Investment Ltd., which in turn was part of 
Hayel Saeed Anam Group, an Arab conglomerate formed by about 100 companies. 
Pacific Inter-Link was incorporated in Malaysia on June 22, 1988 as the “leader” of a 
group of subsidiaries and affiliates specialized in imports-exports. Seven of them traded 
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with Iraq under the UN sanctions and made about $270 million dollars (The Role of BNP 
Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 7-8).  
East Star was just one of them. East Star instructed Al-Riyadh International 
Flowers, one of its many affiliates, to establish trade relations with Iraq (The Role of 
BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 
8). Al-Riyadh began to finance exports to Iraq through letters of credit it obtained from 
Credit Agricole Indosuez Singapore. Al-Riyadh then reassigned its contracts to a 
subcontractor, Investment Trading Industry & Medical Hygienic Services, which actually 
executed the exports; then, BNP New York paid Al-Riyadh with Iraqi funds and Al-
Riyadh repaid its loans to Credit Agricole Indosuez. Any money remaining was actually a 
profit for East Star (The Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 7). For its parts, Investment Trading Industry & 
Medical Hygienic Services never got paid although it actually executed the contracts. 
Investment Trading was just a front company to East Star. Congresswoman Ms. 
Rohrabacher called East Star “a shadowy company” (The Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 7). 
 When Saddam Hussein refused to trade with American companies, some of those 
companies proceeded to hire intermediaries in the form of subcontractors. One of them 
was Texaco Corp, which in turn hired Bulf, a company registered in The Bahamas but 
based in Panama (www.pacificinterlink.com.ny, 2002). Bulf was a subsidiary of Midway 
Oil of Reston, a little known oil company based in Virginia. According to the partnership, 
Bulf was to obtain contracts from Iraq and execute them, and Texaco was to obtain letters 
of credit from BNP to finance Bulf’s operations (The Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing 
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before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 11). Texaco’s 
outstanding credit history guaranteed the lowest interest rates for Bulf. Texaco even lent 
its technologies, equipments and expertise to Bulf. Texaco asked BNP to conceal its 
identity and redirect payments to its numerous subsidiaries and affiliates, then to BNP 
Geneva, and from it to Chase Manhattan Bank. Texaco also asked BNP to channel the 
money in the form of “liquid securities,” so it could convert it back into cash at anytime 
(The Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, 2005, p. 11). Midway Oil of Reston too asked BNP not to reveal its 
association with Bulf and to channel payments through Bank of America to Panama 
Bank, in Panama. BNP agreed in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 986 (The 
Role of BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 
2005, p. 11).        
 Bulf obtained 14 contracts from Iraq in a period of two years. It lifted two million 
oil barrels per contract, which it later resold in European markets. Bulf profited a total of 
$97 million. Iraq paid BNP New York, which then paid Texaco Corp. Yet, BNP claimed 
to have no record of Texaco’s involvement in Bulf’s operations (The Role of BNP 
Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 12). 
GAO and IIC learned about Texaco’s scheme through Panama Bank and Bank of 
America.    
 In all, what is most relevant in this case is the participation of BNP New York in 
the scheme. BNP was the bank that UN chose to manage Iraqi finances under the UN 
sanctions regime. Congresswoman Rohrabacher harshly criticized BNP for its acts in a 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations in the House of 
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Representatives of the U.S. Congress. Congresswoman Rohrabacher told BNP’s CEO 
that “You were not supposed to deliver these payments to third parties unless they were 
banks. But you went ahead and delivered it to that company, which was then owned by 
some other company in the Cayman Islands. Really, this smells; this stinks” (The Role of 
BNP Paribas, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 2005, p. 
13). Congresswoman Rohrabacher suspected the obvious: that BNP laundered money for 
East Star, Al-Douh, Glencore and many other companies that traded with Iraq. In fact, 
auditors from GAO found that BNP issued a total of 572 payments to third parties (GAO 
Report, p. 9).       
 
David Chalmers and Bayoil 
 The third case is relevant since it involved an empowered individual, the sort I 
explained in Chapter IV. This case is about Mr. David Chalmers and his Bayoil Inc, an 
oil trading firm based in Houston, Texas. Mr. Chalmers and Bayoil speculated with about 
$600 million dollars worth of oil in about three years. As I stated earlier, oil traders 
financed 26% of all contracts under the UN sanctions regime. By 1999, just “Four 
traders financed and lifted over 60% of the Iraqi oil under the Program” (IIC, Chapter 
II, p. 115). Bayoil was one of them. 
 Mr. Chalmers opposed the UN sanctions regime from day one, and he made his 
position known to President George Bush Sr. through several letters and personal 
meetings, hoping that the President, an oil trader himself, would eventually ease the 
American position toward Iraq (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 323). Mr. Chalmers also 
visited Bagdad and met with Saddam on several occasions. He asked Saddam to accept 
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UN conditions for disarmament in exchange for easing UN sanctions against Iraq. Mr. 
Chalmers became one of the main negotiators involved in helping to set the terms of the 
UN sanctions regime in Iraq. He actively intermediated between the U.S., UN, Saddam 
and OPEC. He served as an expert in oil trading, frequently warning about instability in 
oil prices and markets. Meyer and Califano pointed out that “Mr. Chalmers let the parties 
know that Iraqi oil industry was to be untouched if the Coalition wanted stability in oil 
prices in OPEC” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 323). Additionally, Mr. Chalmers 
collected money, medicines and school supplies for Iraqi children and women. He even 
used his own money to repair an Iraqi hospital and several schools damaged during the 
Coalition’s bombing in 1991 (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. 323).   
 For its part, the Bayoil was a conglomerate registered in Delaware but 
headquartered in Houston, Texas. Among its many subsidiaries and affiliates were Bayoil 
Technologies, Bayoil S.A., and Bayoil Supply and Trading Ltd. Bayoil registered and 
based them in Nassau, The Bahamas. Never mind the names of those companies. They 
were oil traders, mere speculators.  
 Bayoil did not engage itself in oil deals under the UN sanctions regime. I found 
that Bayoil violated UN sanctions through Italtech SRL, one of its many affiliates. 
Italtech was registered in Italy and had been “dormant” for some years. Bayoil revived it 
as a front company specialized in oil trading (IIC, Report on Oil Allocations, p. 36). 
Then, Bayoil approached several Russian firms and asked them to act as intermediaries 
between Italtech and the government of Iraq (IIC, Chapter II, p. 36). The Russian 
companies were: Alfa Eco (JSC), Tatneft (OAO), Lukoil, Tyumen Oil Company, Nafta 
Moskva (JSC), Zarubezhneft, and ACTEC. Bayoil chose Russian companies for two 
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main reasons: 1) Russia was a close ally of Saddam who, in turn, was willing to grant any 
oil contract to any Russian company for political support at the UN; 2) during this period 
-1998 to 2002- most Russian companies were immersed in a deep financial crisis. They 
needed businesses to stay afloat.      
 Bayoil bridged money to Italtech in the form of letters of credit. Italtech utilized it 
to finance Russian companies that ultimately executed the contracts. For that purpose, 
Italtech opened a series of bank accounts in banks around the world, including: Merrill 
Lynch S.A. in Geneva, Switzerland; UEB in Abu Dhabi in Dubai; and BNP in France, 
Brussels, Luxemburg, Cyprus, Singapore and Bangladesh (IIC, Chapter II, p. 36). Right 
afterward, Italtech created United Management, an accounting firm to process billing, 
payments, and route profits back to Bayoil. Italtech registered and based United 
Management in Santiago de Chile (IIC, Chapter II, p. 36). Lastly, United Management 
opened bank accounts in Santiago de Chile, Paris, Geneva, and Luxemburg (IIC, Chapter 
II, p. 36).  
Through that scheme Buyoil purchased and sold $215 million barrels of Iraqi oil 
in just 10 months. For instance, in January 8th, 1999, SOMO confirmed the allocation of 
contract M/5/50 for $7 million barrels divided in five shipments to J.S.C. and Nafta’s 
parent companies in Singapore and Bangladesh (IIC, Chapter II, p. 37). In July 1999, 
SOMO amended contract M/6/25 to allocate $10 million barrels to Lukoil, another 
Russian company, and Plasco Shipping, a subsidiary of Lukoil, delivered the contract in 6 
shipments (IIC, Chapter II, p. 37). Italtech’s records indicate that Plasco delivered a total 
of 7,843,376 million barrels, and that United Management routed about $1.4 million 
dollars to Bayoil for the same contract (IIC, Chapter II, p. 37). In January 19th, 2000, 
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SOMO granted contract M/7/90 for 6.5 million barrels of oil to a Russian front company 
called Tyumen Oil Co., also known as TNK (IIC, Chapter II, p. 37). The contract 
consisted in four deliveries worth $620,000, $221,650 and $128,650 million respectively. 
Italtech bridged $4 million dollars to a Russian financial entity with the name of Bayvan 
Consulting to pay for the shipments, and United Management collected $7 million dollars 
for the sale of the contracts (IIC Report, Chapter II, p. 37). Soon after, SOMO granted 
contract M/8/40 to Crown Trade and Finance Ltd., a financial firm affiliated to Tyumen, 
a Russian oil company as well. Tyumen delivered the contract in September 2000. It 
contained 9 million barrels, and Italtech paid three cents per barrel to Tyumen through 
Crown Trade and Finance Ltd. It always did it on Bayoil’s behalf. United Management 
collected $30 million dollars (IIC, Chapter II, p. 37). 
 Later, in December 7th, 2000, SOMO assigned contract M/8/9/19 for 4 million 
barrels to Machinoimport, yet another Russian company (IIC, Chapter II, p. 38). 
Machinoimport delivered the contract in three shipments between July and August 14, 
2001, but IIC and the 661 Committee did not find payments related to them. In August 
2001, there was still a contract, M/10/19 for 6 million barrels. United Management’s 
accounting ledgers revealed that it deposited $839,368.10 at Cyprus Popular Bank Ltd. in 
favor of Machinoimport (IIC, Chapter II, p. 38). Finally, in August 26, 2001, Lukoil Asia 
Pacific PTE Ltd, a subsidiary of Lukoil, Inc executed contract M/10/67 for 4 million 
barrels which had been granted a couple of months before. Yet, United Management paid 
Plasco Shipping three cents a barrel for the shipments (IIC, Chapter II, p. 38). It did not 
pay Lukoil Asia Pacific Pte Ltd as it should have done according to the mandates of the 
UN sanctions regime against.     
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 On the other hand, the way Italtech paid the Iraqi government was as intricate. It 
went as follow: Bayoil deposited funds in Italtech’s accounts at BNP Paris. Italtech, at its 
discretion, wire transferred the funds to United Management, Al-Hoda, or Al Wasel & 
Babel’s accounts at Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank or Jordan National Bank (IIC, Chapter 
II, p. 39; Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 117). They then paid 
SOMO. One case illustrates it. Early in 2001, Bayoil financed and delivered Iraqi oil for 
Petroleum Technical Services Co., also known as PTSC. Bayoil charged PTSC for the 
services and instructed it to wire transfer $812,386.20 thousand dollars to Italtech’s 
account at United European Bank, which in turn wire transferred it to Al Wasel & 
Babel’s account at Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank in Dubai (IIC, Chapter II, p. 40; Duelfer 
Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 117). In total, between 2000 and 2001, 
Italtech paid $11 million to Saddam Hussein through this intricate financial network o 
bank accounts and banks (IIC, Chapter II, p. 40). 
 In all, David Chalmers and Bayoil purchased 9% of all oil contracts sold under 
the UN sanctions regime against Iraq (WSJ, Oct 13th, 2004; American Journal of 
International Law, vol.99, p. 904-906). Their network involved 7 nations, 12 Russian 
intermediaries, 11 subsidiaries and affiliates, 9 banks, and an undetermined number of 
bank accounts. In the end, the government of the United States accused Mr. Chalmers 
and Bayoil of "Paying inflated commissions to brokers knowing that these commissions 
were earmarked for the kickback to the Hussein regime" (WSJ, Oct 13th, 2004). The 
accusations included “wire fraud, conducting financial transactions with a state sponsor 
of terrorism and breaking the economic embargo with Iraq” (WSJ, Oct 13th, 2004; 
American Journal of International Law, vol.99, p. 904-906). Mr. Chalmers and Bayoil 
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were indicted in 2007 (WSJ, Oct 13th, 2004; American Journal of International Law, 
vol.99, p. 904-906). 
 
Trafigura - Ibex 
This last case reveals the intricacy of global trading. This case tells us: a) how 
banks, speculators and companies interact through multiple layers of bank accounts, 
letters of credits, wire transferring and electronic money; b) how speculators 
circumvented the Iraqi government; c) how speculators corrupted UN officials. This case 
involves Trafigura and Ibex, two well established global traders secretly associated 
through an amalgam of bank accounts and companies they owned around the world. 
 Trafigura Beheer B.V. was a British oil and commodity financier while Ibex 
Energy/Multi-Prestation S.A.R.L. was a French oil and commodity service corporation 
(IIC, Chapter II, p. 176). Basically, they both specialized in financing large operations of 
commodities. Trafigura Beheer B.V. purposely created Trafigura Ltd in May 1997 to 
participate in the UN sanctions regime. Yet, Trafigura created its own net of subsidiaries 
and affiliates, among which was Toro Energy S.A.M. Trafigura registered and based it in 
Monaco in October 1997 (IIC Report, Chapter II, p. 176). It made an initial wire transfer 
of $51 million dollars to Toro’s account at a branch of Barclays Bank in Monaco. 
Immediately, investors rolled in, and three months later Toro was worth $100 million 
(IIC, Chapter II, p. 177). Trafigura employed Toro as a front company. Trafigura 
received 65% of all profits while Toro retained 35% in form of investment for future 
operations (IIC, Chapter II, p. 176). Toro purchased oil from Iraq and resold it in Europe. 
In return, it purchased commodities in Africa and Latin America and sold them to Iraq. In 
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total, Toro traded 21 million barrels of Iraqi oil in 1998 for a net profit of $128 million, 
and it sold Iraq $29 million worth of rice, corn, salt and sugar to Iraq in two years (IIC 
Report, Chapter II, p. 176). Toro paid dividends to its investors and still retained $17 
million, a stocky amount for a 1 year-old company with just one customer: the Iraqi 
government (IIC, Chapter II, p. 176).  
 Trafigura expanded its operations in 1991. It began to purchase oil allocated to 
SOCO International, another speculative firm registered and based in London (IIC, 
Chapter II, p. 178). Under the deal, Trafigura subcontracted 44 million barrels of oil 
worth $240 million dollars. But in that same year, Saddam Hussein banned American and 
British companies from purchasing Iraqi oil. The ban affected Trafigura and all its 
associates. Trafigura circumvented Iraqi authorities by allying itself to Ibex, which at the 
time was smuggling oil on behalf of the Iraqi government. Ibex was receiving 25% of the 
proceeds, so it decided to pay 12% to Trafigura Ltd for allocating the oil in refineries 
around the world and laundering the money (IIC, Chapter II, p. 178). 
Trafigura and Ibex began cheating on the Iraqi government and the UN sanctions 
regime in March 2000. They bribed Iraqi and UN inspectors who repeatedly allowed the 
overloading of oil tankers (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182). The tankers belonged to Falcon 
Navigation Corp., another affiliate of Trafigura Beheer B.V. Trafigura financed its oil 
deals according to two schemes. First, it financed the top-off of the cargo portion with 
standby letters of credit issued to Roundhead Inc., an “off the shelf” Bahamian company 
that Trafigura Ltd had acquired in February 2000 (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182). Bank records 
showed that on June 14th, 2001, Trafigura wire transferred $51 million from its account 
at Credit Agricole Indosuez to Ibex Service & Equipment Ltd., a company registered and 
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based in the British Virgin Islands. Part of the money, $24 million, was to cancel 
Roundhead’s standby letters of credit (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182). The remaining portion, 
$27 million, Ibex Service & Equipment Ltd. wired transferred it to Windmill Trade Ltd., 
also a shelf company registered and based in British Virgin Islands and parented to 
Trafigura Beheer B.V. (IIC Report, Chapter II, p. 182). Windmill received the money in 
its account at Banque Audi’s branch in Beirut. Finally, Windmill wire transferred the 
money to a SOMO account at Fransabank in Beirut, Lebanon (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182). 
A second scheme consisted in issuing letters of credit to Ibex. Trafigura issued 
credit and sold contracts to Koch Petroleum and Marathon Ashland, two American oil 
refineries. Koch Petroleum paid Trafigura $20.8 million dollars in two installments wire 
transferred to Trafigura’s accounts at BNP Paris (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182). For its part, 
Marathon Ashland paid Trafigura $23.2 million in two installments wired transferred to 
Trafigura’s accounts at the London branch of Credit Agricole Indosuez S.A. The IIC 
traced the two amounts to a branch of Barclays Bank in Cayman Island (IIC, Chapter II, 
p. 182). In one instance, Trafigura issued a letter of credit to finance an Ibex contract 
worth one million barrels of oil. Ibex overloaded the tanker with about 200,000 barrels. It 
then sold it to Koch Petroleum and Petromar S.A., based in Curazao and affiliated to 
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A., owned by the state of Venezuela (IIC, Chapter II, p. 182). 
Trafigura financed the extra 200,000 barrels through a stand-by letter of credit issued to 
Roundhead (IIC, Chapter II, p. 184). To honor the credit, it wired transferred $6.4 million 
to Ibex Standard & Equipment’s account at Credit Agricole Indosuez, which transferred 
the money to Windmill’s account at Banque Saradar in Beirut. Windmill paid SOMO’s 
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share by wire transferring $5.2 million to SOMO’s account at Fransabank, in Beirut (IIC, 
Chapter II, p. 182).  
Even though the 661 Committee could not determine exactly how much oil the 
two companies smuggled out of Iraq, it did estimate that they engaged in at least 75 
overloading operations worth $900 million dollars in a period of three years (IIC, Chapter 
II, p. 182). Trafigura and Ibex’s operations involved three holdings, 7seven subsidiaries, 
four affiliates, three offshore companies, two shelf companies, five banks and a dozen 
bank accounts. To complicate it even more, they involved seven nations from five 
continents. It was so complicated that their smuggling went unnoticed with these 
operations until 2003. The U.S. discovered it only after it invaded Iraq and confiscated 
the archives of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. Indeed, the case of Trafigura and Ibex is intricate 
and difficult to decipher precisely because Trafigura and Ibex wanted it that way, so they 
would not get caught. After all, that is nature of trade under globalization: intricate and 
difficult to decipher.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I discussed how global banking, a means of globalization, and 
banks, investors and speculators, the agents of globalization, undermines a multilateral 
sanctions regime. I conclude that in effect, the current global banking system allowed 
nation-states, banks, investors, speculators, corporations, and NSAs in general to operate 
and profit under the UN sanctions regime. On one hand, I first found that the Iraqi 
banking system actually expanded throughout the Middle East under the UN sanctions 
regime. Secondly, Iraq utilized the domestic and regional banking to reach global 
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banking. On the other hand, when the UN conceived and implemented the UN sanctions 
regime upon Iraq, it basically ignored the hawala, the credit system that Iraq and most 
Middle Eastern nations had been using for centuries but alien to Western banking 
standards. In addition, companies, traders, speculators and even nation-states such as 
Belarus and Russia utilized banks and global banking to conceal their wrongdoings and 
even to launder money. They did it through banking instruments such as letters of credit, 
wire transferring, offshore accounts, and multiple layers of bank accounts for their 
affiliates, subsidiaries, and parent companies. But what are affiliates, subsidiaries and 
parent companies anyway? They are corporate models, another means of globalization. In 
the next chapter, I analyze in more detail how companies employed global corporate 
models to circumvent a sanctions regime.   
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VI. 
 
AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: CORPORATIONS AND 
CORPORATE MODELS 
 
“The second great era [of] Globalization lasted roughly from 1800 to 2000. In globalization 2.0, the key 
agent of change, the dynamic force driving global integration, was multinational companies. These 
multinationals went global for markets and labor, spearheaded first by the expansion of the Dutch and 
English joint-stock companies and the Industrial revolution”.      
                                             Thomas L. Friedman 
 
“The company that then asked you to deliver its money that it was receiving for that overcharging to East 
Star, which then of course, as we can see now, was owned by Commodities House Investment. Who knows 
who owns Commodities House Investment?”  
              Congressman Mr. Rohrabacher 
     
 
Introduction 
Corporate models were essential for the circumvention of the UN sanctions 
regime in Iraq. On the one hand, the government of Iraq employed corporate models to 
sell to and purchase from corporations and states. Iraq used corporate models to reach 
local, regional and global markets. On the other hand, there were non-Iraqi corporations 
that were interested in the Iraqi market. They too employed corporate models to evade 
UN sanctions and inspectors, conceal their wrongdoings, and laundry their profits. I use 
the first part of this chapter to analyze corporate models. I include an analysis of 
corporate governance and responsibility since they are part of the overall structure of 
corporate models. In the second part, I present specific examples of how corporations 
employed corporate models to circumvent the UN sanctions regime in Iraq.  
 
The Corporation: A Global Agent and Globalizing Force  
 Corporations are among the main agents of globalization. I would argue that 
corporations created globalization. For example, let us look at the colonization of the 
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Americas. The European Crowns could not manage their American colonies from their 
metropolis because they did not have the infrastructure. Bureaucracies were lousy, and 
global means of transportation and communication were still in their “primitive” stages. 
It took weeks to send a message from London to Philadelphia and months to send an 
envoy to India. The solution was decentralization and delegation of authority to 
corporations through charters.  
 A charter is probably the first global corporate model that ever existed. A charter 
is a legal document issued to acknowledge full authority over a piece of territory 
(Draakman, 2004, p. 37; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 74). The charter grants certain 
prerogatives to a recipient, but those prerogatives do not include ownership, which 
remains as a right of the entity or legal person who holds it. This person can annul the 
charter at any time (Draakman, 2004, p. 39; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 74). If it 
occurs, the recipient must restrain from claiming indemnity or relation to the property in 
question (Draakman, 2004, p. 39; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 74). Based on those 
principles, for example, the English Crown issued a charter to the London Company, 
which in turn created the Charter of the Virginia Company of London with the sole 
purpose of establishing colonies in North America. The English Crown also issued a 
charter to the Plymouth Company to create the Virginia Company of Plymouth, also 
known as Virginia Bay Company.      
 The Dutch Crown took another approach. It hired corporations to manage 
colonization. It contracted the Dutch West Indian Company to open trade routes through 
the Caribbean Sea and areas of South America like Brazil, Suriname and Guyana 
(Draakman, 2004, p. 40; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 82). It created mining centers 
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in what are today Ghana, Angola, Congo and some parts of South Africa. The Dutch 
West Indian Company financed the expedition that led to the discovery of the Hudson 
River. It later subcontracted the Hudson River Company to build a port there, and the 
port soon became the most important trade center in what was then New Amsterdam, 
which covered most of New York, Connecticut, Delaware and New Jersey (Draakman, 
2004, p. 41; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 82). The Dutch also used the Dutch East 
Indian Company, a parent corporation of the Dutch West Indian, to open trade routes in 
Asia and establish markets there. For Draakman (2004), Easterbrook and Fishel (1991) 
and other historian of Corporate Law, the Dutch West Indian was the first multinational 
corporation and the first mega-corporation in the world. It was so powerful that it had the 
power to wage war, negotiate treaties, coin money and establish colonies (Draakman, 
2004, p. 44; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 87). The Dutch West Indian created what is 
today Indonesia.  
  In “The World is Flat”, Thomas L. Friedman argues that companies consolidated 
themselves as a true globalizing agent during the 1800-2000 period. Friedman calls it 
“the second great era of globalization” (Friedman, 2008, p. 61) He explicates that, 
during this period, corporations became multinationals through corporate models, which 
they created for two main reasons: a) to control sources of raw materials worldwide; b) to 
open and control new markets where they could allocate their finished products. It is in 
that sense that corporations structured globalization. But William I. Robinson (2004) 
disagrees. In “A Theory of Global Capitalism”, Robinson suggests that there is a key 
difference between multinational and transnational corporate models, and that such a 
difference has a structural character. The multinational model is built on three 
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assumptions: a) there is a global economy; 2) there are national economies; 3) there are 
different models of production and accumulation of capital across global and national 
markets (Robinson, 2004, p. 10-11). In other words, each nation adopted an economic 
model based on, among other factors, economic needs, natural resources, market forces, 
political systems, and position within the context of regional and global economies. 
Corporations had no choice but to conceive and adopt corporative models according to 
national economic models. I have drawn Figure 6.1 to typify a transnational Firm 
operating under the multinational model.   
 
Figure 6.1 – Transnational “XYZ Inc” Operating under the Multinational Model                      
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I have called this hypothetical transnational XYZ Inc. Now, in Figure 6.1 each 
color represents a unique corporate model, and each circle represents a different nation. 
XYZ Inc is based and licensed to operate in nation Green. But then, XYZ Inc creates a 
subsidiary to operate in nation Yellow. The subsidiary, known as ‘A Inc’, decides to 
expand to operate in nation Blue, so it creates a parent company. It licenses and bases it 
in nation Blue under the name ‘B Inc’. Lastly, when XYZ Inc expands to operate in nation 
Red, it adopts three different corporate models. It becomes an intermediary, a shell, and a 
front company. The same occurs as the corporation moves to operate from local to 
bilateral, regional and global markets. That is, under the multinational model, a 
corporation adopts a different corporate model as it crosses national borders.   
 It all works differently under the transnational corporate model. This model, 
unlike the multinational, assumes that there is just a global economy, implying that there 
is uniformity across national markets. The end of the Cold War, according to Fukuyama 
(1992), presupposed the triumph of neoliberalism over planned-centralized and other 
economic models. According to Robison (2004), transnational capital expanded global 
models of production across states, in the process becoming a hegemonic political force 
in a large number of nations. Most nations have adopted, although with some variations, 
the same neoliberal economic structures, trade strategies, business legal codes, and even 
political systems. In fact, I can safely argue that the proliferation of bilateral and regional 
trade treaties during the last 20 years is an evidence of how little structural differences 
there are among national economies in most of Europe, Latin America and South East 
Asia. Moreover, the philosophical and practical concept behind the WTO is to induce 
uniformity across national and regional markets, so a true global economy can 
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consolidate and flourish. GATT and WTO attempt to guarantee the existence of just one 
body of corporate and trade laws applicable to corporations regardless of their nation of 
origin, domicile, and jurisdiction. Some nations resist such attempts though. For instance, 
Russia and China have very different corporate and trade rules, and the European Union 
and the US have different regulatory structures. But in general, I find that under the 
transnational corporate model, this condition of uniformity across national economies is 
ideal for corporations because they do not have to adopt different corporate models as 
they cross markets boundaries. I drew Figure 6.2 below to exemplify how corporations 
operate under uniform transnational markets.  
 
Figure 6.2 – Transnational “XYZ Inc” Operation under Uniform Transnational Markets 
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 Let us assume that there is just one global regulatory regime. Let us assume that 
there is full globalization under a global capitalist system and all nations signed up on 
GATT, WTO and other international trade regimes. Under such assumptions, corporation 
XYZ Inc would operate under a condition of full uniformity across local, bilateral, 
regional and global markets, which in Figure 6.2 are delimited by black, yellow, and blue 
circles respectively. Observe that XYZ Inc remains green because it does not need to 
adopt different corporate models to operate across local, bilateral, regional and global 
boundaries.  
 For one, uniformity creates a sense of stability and positive expectations across 
transnational markets. It also facilitates production, transportation of raw materials and 
finished goods, and movement of capital from nation to nation, region to region, and 
globally. In addition, uniformity makes it easier for corporations to conceive and 
implement global business strategies. The underlying assumption is that if corporations 
did not need to adapt to different bodies of business laws and politics, then they would 
employ the same corporate models across nations and regions. Under such conditions, 
corporations can expand easily. They do not need to create new corporations. They just 
have to acquire existing ones. In fact, scholars like Bhagwati (2004) and Friedman 
(2008), and data from FMI (wwwfmi.org, 2008) indicate that merging and acquisition 
have been the most common means of corporate expansion and growth from 1800s to 
2000. I can cite many well known cases across different industrial sectors, from oil and 
pharmaceutical to computer and food industries. But let us just take three corporations in 
the automobile industry. For instance, although General Motors has consistently been 
losing market shares to its competitors over the years, it has grown steadily by purchasing 
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several automakers around the world, among which were Opel and Volvo. The same 
occurred with Chrysler and Ford Motors. Chryslers, once in bankruptcy, purchased 
Daimler-Benz. Ford Motors grew spectacularly by purchasing Jaguar, Hyundai, and Land 
Rover. In all, General Motors, Chryslers and Ford are among the most globalizing agents 
in the global economy not only for the markets they control but also because they have 
suppliers, assembly plants and distributors in about 72 nations (Friedman, 2008, p. 119).  
 In sum, corporations have historically been among the main agents of 
globalization. Their very nature demands expansion from their town of origin to the 
global market. But corporate expansion does not come easy. Corporations in fact often 
clash with politics, competition, litigation, geography and climate among other obstacles. 
Corporations have created an array of corporate models to circumvent those obstacles or 
at least minimize their effects.  
 
Global Corporate Models 
 I can trace the concept of a corporation back to Roman times. The word itself 
derives from the Latin language to mean corpus or body (Corporate Law, Black 
Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, p. 471). For the Romans, a businessperson was a legal “body,” a 
corporation, and Roman courts treated it as such (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 
2007, Vol.3, p. 475). The concept reemerged early during the industrial revolution with a 
new notion, of broader connotations. The “new” corporation was still a legal body but 
also a person. A corporation was an abstraction yet a body in its own right (Corporate 
Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, p. 476). If in Roman times a corporation had slaves 
to do the work, the corporation of the industrial revolution had to hire free men for a 
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salary. This new corporation could also raise capital, accumulate and use it as it pleased, 
according to its abilities (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, p. 476). It is in 
that sense that capitalists utilized corporations as agents to create and manage wealth, and 
it was how corporations became the agents of capitalism. Even state-owned corporations 
have corporate rights and enjoy certain freedoms to act as a business enterprise. The 
Soviet Union, East Germany and other socialist states utilized corporations to manage 
their planned centralized economies. And there are corporations in North Korea and 
Cuba. They may be state-owned, but they are still corporations. 
 Indeed, the definition of a corporation varies according to each nation’s legal 
framework (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, p. 478), which suggests that 
different regulatory structures do exist. But as a whole, I would state that a corporation is 
an organizational instrument with legal obligations and privileges. There are several types 
of corporations, and each is formed according to business objectives and jurisdictions. 
Corporations are independent from the entity and/or body that incorporated it, and even 
ownership and profit sharing are limited by the legal rights of the corporation (Corporate 
Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 480-95). Yet, we must distinguish a corporation 
from a company. A corporation is a company that has been incorporated, meaning that a 
corporation is legally separated from the person or persons who creates and runs it 
(Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 480-495). A corporation exists and 
acts on its own. In other words, a corporation collects, accumulates and spends capital, 
sues and is sued, establishes structures and enacts statutes and procedures. A company, 
on the contrary, adopts the legal standing of the person who creates it (Corporate Law, 
Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 511-521). A company does not act on its own right, 
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and suing the owner is like suing the company, and vice- versa. For legal purposes, the 
money of the company is the money of the person who owns the company.       
There are several types of corporations, but the most relevant for this analysis are: 
holding, parent, intermediary, offshore, front, and state-owned. In one way or another, all 
of them are: limited (Ltd) by shared capital, limited by guarantee, limited by guarantee 
and share capital, and unlimited by liability. Yet, they also have particularities. 
A holding is a corporation that owns part, all, or a majority of other corporations 
(Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.8, p. 327-361). A holding does not produce 
any product or service per se; rather, its role is to hold or manage several corporations 
under one legal entity (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.8, p. 327-361). A 
holding has two main objectives. The first is to maximize profits. It does it by gaining 
market shares through growth and expansion across different industries and economic 
sectors. The second objective is to minimize risks, chiefly legal risks. It does it by 
creating corporations according to sectors, markets shares, nations and even regions and 
sub-regions, which the holding usually defines as divisions and/or subdivisions 
(Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.8, p. 327-361). Such structuring guarantees 
flexibility while limiting liability. It means that the holding is only liable to the 
jurisdiction of its legal domicile or “general headquarter” and not to the jurisdictions of 
its numerous corporations (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.8, p. 327-361). 
This way the holding can move funds throughout its numerous corporations; however, if 
a corporation in a particular sector, subdivision or region loses money or it is found guilty 
of a wrongdoing, only that corporation would be responsible. The other corporations of 
the holding, and the holding itself, are not accountable and can actually distance from it. 
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Examples of holdings are American Investment Corporation, which owns numerous 
insurance groups around the world; UAL Corp., owner of United Airlines and its 
subsidiaries; and AMR Corp., that in turn owns American Airlines and its parent 
corporations.  
Another model is the parent corporation. This is basically a holding that owns 
enough shares in another enterprise as to make decisions over operations and profits 
(Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510).  For example, Hewlett 
Packard is a parent company of Compaq. Since they manufacture computers, they 
compete against each other, seldom in the same market. One can go broke, found liable 
and even be dismantled but the other one would stay in business and even take over its 
failing “parent.” A parent corporation usually owns two types of corporations: affiliate 
and subsidiary.  
An affiliate, also known as an associate, owns small portions of shares while a 
subsidiary owns large portions (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-
510). But also, an affiliate is a corporation that owns less than 50% of another 
corporation, either a subsidiary or a third party corporation (Corporate Law, Black 
Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510).  
A parent corporation usually creates a subsidiary by acquiring or merging with an 
ailing company (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510). It may do 
it for two reasons. The first one is to get rid of the competition. A parent corporation buys 
out the competition, incorporates it as an affiliate and later dismantles it. It is a common 
practice among corporations that produce the same products and/or deliver the same 
service but are located in different markets. The second reason is to expand and grow. A 
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parent corporation purchases an ailing company to retool and return it to profitability. An 
example is Nestlé, the Swiss producer and distributor of chocolate bars, among other 
products. During the 1990s, Nestlé purchased numerous companies in South America, 
including Donofrio, the largest candy and ice cream producer in Peru. Donofrio was an 
ailing family owned company. It operated with obsolete technologies in a poor market. It 
needed an infusion of cash to retool its plants and reduce costs, so it could make its 
products more affordable. Nestlé provided the investment but allowed Donofrio to keep 
its name, in part because it was a well-known brand, in part because of political reasons. 
Nestlé did not want Peruvians to resent the takeover. In time, Donofrio returned to 
profitability. Most Peruvians still ignore that their beloved Donofrio is actually owned by 
a Swiss multinational (El Comercio, Aug 20, 1998). We will see shortly that this was a 
common practice under the UN sanction regime in Iraq as corporations did not want their 
customers to know that they were trading with Saddam’s regime.  
Conversely, subsidiaries are mostly conceived to address issues related to 
taxation. There are two kinds of subsidiaries: operating and non-operating. An operating 
subsidiary refers to a corporation operating with its own identity, equipment, and within 
its market share (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510). A non-
operating subsidiary exists only on paper. It has been incorporated. It has a tax ID and 
domicile, but it operates under the article of incorporation of the corporation it is parented 
to (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510). It even uses its tax ID. 
Also note that a subsidiary can create its own subsidiaries, which in time can create their 
own as well. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is a good example. Berkshire is a holding with 
many parent corporations, which in turn own about 60 subsidiaries among numerous 
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industries across the world. Berkshire Hathaway Inc is a true global corporation; yet, 
most people have not heard of it. Indeed, anonymity is one of the main reasons for 
creating corporate models such as affiliate and subsidiary. Nevertheless, we should not 
confuse subsidiaries with divisions for the latter are legally binding and financially 
dependent on a parent company. A parent corporation does not have to be stronger or 
larger than its affiliates and/or subsidiaries. After all, they operate in different markets 
across different industries and industrial sectors.  
In addition, parent corporations usually create front corporations to shield 
themselves from lawsuits, avoid accountability and still be able to collect profits on 
behalf of its parent corporation (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-
510). A front corporation never acts independently, but its actions are difficult to trace 
back to the corporation it is parented to. The IIC defined a front corporation as “A 
Company that the Government of Iraq secretly owned in part; the term does not connote 
that the company had no genuine business operations or that the full scope of its 
operations was carried in a fraudulent manner” (IIC, Chapter III, p. 249). Here, the 
irony is that the CIA invented this corporate model during the 1940s to conduct covert 
operations throughout the world, and now businessmen utilize it to “cover up” illegal 
operations and dubious sources of income (Draakman, 2004, p. 290; Easterbrook and 
Fishel, 1991, p. 221). For many years, Cuba has been using a dozens of front corporations 
to circumvent the U.S.’s unilateral sanctions regime against the island. But in 1989, the 
Cuban government accused and found guilty one of its front corporations, MC Inc., of 
drug-trafficking and money laundering (Cabello, 1998, p. 27). In fact, front corporations 
are seldom employed for gambling, money laundering, prostitution, and terrorism.  
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 A front corporation is not an intermediary, which is a corporation serving as 
point of contact between two or more corporations (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 
2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510). An intermediary does not produce any product. It is just a 
distributor of goods and services. For example, a supermarket is an intermediary for it 
does not produce anything. It purchases vegetables, meats and dairy products, which then 
advertises and sales to consumers at marginal price. Intermediaries dominate global trade 
due to: 1) new economic infrastructures in the developed world as it moves from an 
industrial-manufacturing oriented economy to one based on services; 2) improvement in 
transportation, communication, and storing technologies. The growing influence of 
intermediaries is reflected in the Dow Jones, Standard & Poor and others financial 
indexes. For example, during the 1990s, the Dow Jones substituted old American 
manufacturing corporations for service-oriented intermediaries. In fact, 12 of its 30 
members are intermediaries. The most notable are Home Depot and Wal-Mart.  
Next, a conglomerate is a group of corporations of diverse, dissimilar enterprises 
across various industries (Corporate Law, Black Dictionary, 2007, Vol.3, pp. 495-510). A 
conglomerate can own a bank, an insurance company, an automobile plant, a construction 
company, a research lab, a university, and so on. Walt Disney Corp., for example, is one 
of the largest conglomerates in the world. It owns 15 corporations, each structured as a 
group, and each group owns numerous corporations as well. Walt Disney Corp owns 
movie and music studios, cable TV networks, newspapers and book publishers, radio 
stations, hotels, restaurants, resorts, cruise lines, and amusement parks. Other 
conglomerates are General Electric in the U.S., Vivendi in France, Televisa from Mexico, 
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Sony from Japan, PRISA of Spain, Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso of Italy, and 
Organizasoe O’Globo from Brazil.    
 Finally, another corporative model is the joint venture (Corporate Law, Black 
Dictionary, 2007, Vol.10, pp. 364-381). Here, two or more investors create a corporation 
to share legal responsibilities and operational expenses. This model aims at new markets, 
foreign in particular. For example, corporation “A” wants to enter market X, in which 
corporation “B” is well positioned. So “A” joins “B” to create corporation “C.” 
Corporation “A” provides fresh capital and technologies while “B” provides labor, 
required permits, licenses and market shares. The joint venture can take the form of a 
company, corporation, partnership or limited liability (Ltd). Usually, joint ventures 
operate for a limited period of time, after which inventors dismantle them. In a few 
instances, investors decide to expand their venture by either welcoming more investors or 
acquiring smaller corporations and/or Firms. Again, the underlying rationale is 
minimizing risks and accountability even at the expense of profitability. That is why joint 
ventures are considered one of the safest investments. Most governments utilize joint 
ventures as a means to investing.   
 Altogether, I find that a global corporation is a well defined organizational 
structure. The corporation is right at the center of the structure, from which emanates 
other corporations in different corporate models. The corporation utilizes corporate 
models to keep an active or dormant presence in global markets and move throughout the 
global economy. Figure 6.3 illustrates how transnational corporation XYZ Inc is 
structured to operate under globalization.        
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Figure 6.3 – Structure of Transnational “XYZ Inc” under Globalization  
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than others in terms of legal, financial, operational, and governmental standings. As we 
stated earlier, corporations adopt corporate models not only to enhance efficiency and 
high productivity but also to avoid accountability and circumvent regulatory regimes. The 
Graph shows how: a) the closer a corporate model to the corporation, the more 
accountable the corporation is; b) the closer the corporate model to the corporation, the 
harder it is for the corporation to evade regulatory regimes. That is why intermediary, 
dormant and shell corporations are so often utilized for the most risky businesses, in 
particular to avoid taxation, circumvent laws and regulations, and to conceal wrong- 
doings. They become more unaccountable when they are registered and based in “save 
heaven” centers such as The Bahamas, Cayman Island, Panama and Andorra among 
others. Indeed, we saw in Chapters II, III and V that a large number of corporations that 
violated the UN sanctions against Iraq had registration and domicile in those nations.      
 Some corporations adopt just one or two corporate models, but others implement 
three or four. It all depends on their business objectives, strategies, market conditions, 
and other factors (Draakman, 2004, p. 52; Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991, p. 102). But 
above all, Draakman (2004), Easterbrook and Fishel (1991) argue that corporations adopt 
corporate models depending on two main factors: institutional and geopolitical 
environments. On one hand, institutional environment here means civil and political 
institutions in a particular market. Institutions influence the way corporations choose a 
corporate model for that particular market. Institutions shape corporate culture, 
governance, and compliance with legal and social norms. Of course, corporations 
exercise great influence on civil and political institutions, their memberships and policies. 
They do not want to adapt to institutions. They prefer it the other way: institutions 
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adapting to corporate models. Corporations lobby and invest heavily to reshape 
institutional environments, reframe institutional agendas, and bring institutional policies 
closer to corporate goals. Corporations lobby heavily to shape regulatory and trade 
regimes according to their interests.     
 Corporations fear geopolitics (Soskice, 1999, p.77). Geopolitics is bad for 
business, and corporations cannot shape and control it. To address it, corporations have 
conceived four market models: local, multi-local or semi-regional, regional, and global 
models (Soskice, 1999, p. 78). The local model targets local markets and focuses on local 
demand and consumption patterns (Soskice, 1999, p. 77). It targets cities of large 
populations such as New York, Los Angeles, Beijing, and Mexico City. Budgeting and 
marketing efforts are limited to a select clientele and competitors. The overall corporate 
strategy is coordinated and managed from the core of the corporation. Another model is 
the multi-local, which aims at several markets across a well-defined region (Soskice, 
1999, p. 79). This is also a semi-regional model, and it can be national and multi-national 
for it often includes small regions of two or more nations. This model is particularly ideal 
for zones of high migrations, as it is the case of the U.S-Mexican and the Venezuelan-
Colombian borders. According to Soskice (1999), some of those markets grow naturally 
as result of historic, cultural, and religious linkages, as occurred on the borders between 
Jordan, Syria and Iraq. A good example is the Kurdistan, which covers a good part of 
eastern Turkey and a chunk of Northern Iraq. For Soskice (1999), this is probably the 
most difficult model for it attempts to establish centralized corporate strategies while 
recognizing the existence of marketing differing patterns across the various localities it 
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targets. Management is centralized, but it grants some autonomy to budgeting and 
decision-making. 
 As its name indicates, the regional model focuses on specific regional markets 
like NAFTA in North America, CARICOM in the Caribbean Basin and Mercosur in the 
south of South America (Soskice, 1999, p. 86). In the corporate world, regions are also 
known as divisions. For instance, General Motors has a North American division, a 
European Division, a South American division, and so on. That is so because the regional 
model recognizes that there are different market patterns within and across regions. 
Corporations cope with differing market patterns by: a) limiting the size of a market; b) 
creating market-blocs (Soskice, 1999, p. 87). In other words, corporations conceive 
regional models to induce uniformity and create a market of standardized features. The 
main goals are to predict and control market behavior. Lastly, there is the global model 
(Soskice, 1999, p. 98). The model is centralized and hierarchal. It is organized from top 
to bottom, and it has a nucleus from where decisions emanate. Around the nucleus spin 
several satellites, or regional and semi-regional trade centers. The model attempts to 
consolidate blocs, segments and categories into just one big unit while keeping some 
levels of differentiation. The goal is to demark assembling from distribution, supply from 
demand, short from long term investing, short from long term planning, etc (Soskice, 
1999, p. 98).                                  
 In sum, corporations conceive, adopt and dismiss corporate models as part of their 
overall corporate strategies. Corporations expand, grow smaller, stagnate and even 
disappear due to market conditions and decisions they make to deal with market 
behavior. One of those decisions is to choose a corporate model to cope with regulatory 
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regimes. I will explain here examples of corporations that adopted corporate models to 
circumvent the UN sanctions regime in Iraq.     
 
Corporate Governance 
 Examining corporate governance here is important for two main reasons: a) the 
decision to circumvent a regulatory regime depends on corporate governance; b) the 
decision to choose a corporate model to cope with a regulatory regime is a result of 
corporate governance.  
Corporate governance is a set of rules, processes, goals and interests inherent to a 
corporation (Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 32; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 449). 
Corporate governance is built on goals and interests, which eventually lead to praxis. 
Corporate governance directly affects the way a corporation operates. Of course, 
corporate governance has both institutional and human faces. It is an institution because it 
behaves according to rules, structures and hierarchies, and it is human because human 
actors populate it and lead the decision-making process (Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 
32; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 449). Actors include: board of directors, investors, 
creditors, members of management, regulators and in some instances unions and 
employees. Scholars like Aaronson and Reeves (2002) do not consider unions, workers 
and even management as part of corporate governance. They argue that unions and 
employees have no saying whatsoever in the operations and decisions of a corporation, 
and that investors and boards of directors dominate the agenda and decision-making 
process. That is probably true. Yet, here the objective is to focus on diversity of interests, 
conflicts among investors and between the headquarters, its subsidiaries and parents 
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firms. Specially, I examine how corporations decide to violate a sanctions regime and 
how they choose a corporate model to conceal the violations.   
 Global corporations seek two main goals: expansion and integration. Corporate 
models and corporate governance aim at expanding production, distribution, marketing, 
and accessing raw materials and financing, all at global levels. It is part of the operational 
side of the corporation. However, only corporate governance has the means to integrate 
the corporation according to global legal systems, political processes, culture, 
compliance, responsibility, and accountability (Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 51; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 451). In other words, only corporate governance can 
create and manage a true global corporation   
 First, corporate governance focuses on politics as much as it does on business 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 454). Corporate governance integrates political and 
business decisions. Corporate governing boards are integrated to the politics of the 
markets in which they operate. Politics determine laws and policies friendly and 
unfriendly to corporations. Observe that nation-states establish regulatory regimes to 
which corporations must adapt or circumvent at their own risk. Also, corporate governing 
boards interact with multiple actors of diverse means, ends and idiosyncrasies (Aaronson 
and Reeves, 2002, p. 32; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 449). They must engage, 
negotiate, compromise and be willing to trade short-term gains for long-term goals and 
not consider it a loss. Besides, as Soskice (1999) points out, corporations seldom operate 
under complex market conditions like unfair competition, intense scrutiny, political 
instability, and even violence. It is the task of corporate governance to adopt strategies – 
corporate models among them - that could successfully take the corporation though 
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diverse market conditions. Additionally, corporate governance is restricted and protected 
by corporate laws, the result of over 300 years of corporate jurisprudence under 
capitalism (Soskice, 1999, p. 141; Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 99; Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003, p. 457). 
 Second, corporate governance is about accountability too, which includes 
efficiency and behavior (Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 117; Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003, p. 456). Efficiency here means profits. It aims at minimizing costs while 
maximizing production and quality control. To address efficiency, corporate governance 
relies on internal and external mechanisms (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 458). Internal 
mechanisms are boards of directors, internal auditors, and balance of power between 
directors, investors, management and employees. External mechanisms are competition, 
creditors, governmental regulations and regulators, the media and interest groups. Some 
corporations voluntarily invite and pay for external auditors whose task is to 
counterbalance internal auditors. On the other hand, accountability attempts to deal with 
behavior, both human and corporate behaviors. Individuals shape corporate structures, 
culture and behavior (Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 117; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 
456). They decide and act on behalf of the corporation. But individuals bring their own 
vices and habits in to the corporation as well. Corporate accountability attempts to tackle 
them before they become part of a corporate culture. It does it by establishing codes of 
conduct and corporate ethics.  
 It is common to find a corporation with multiple codes of conduct, one per market 
and region (Soskice, 1999, p. 147). For example, a corporation can have a code of 
conduct for its division in South America, another code for its parent corporations in 
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Europe, and still another one for its subsidiaries in Asia. In effect, by doing so, the 
corporation acknowledges the existence of operational divides or “ways of doing things” 
across markets, namely subregional, regional and even local (Soskice, 1999, p. 148; 
Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 125). The corporation can even acknowledge cultural 
divides. It just cannot treat cultural patterns equally, with the same code of conducts and 
corporate ethics. In fact, a corporation can have a code of conduct for its subsidiary in 
Japan and another code for its subsidiary in China. Here, the corporation may be 
addressing some cultural features inherent to Japanese market, but it may be coping with 
some political issues characteristics of the Chinese political system. The case of Cuba is 
illustrative. Corporations doing business there have created “especial” codes of conduct 
to deal with Cuba’s unique economic and political systems. For example, Sol Meliá Corp, 
the Spanish hotel chain, operates several hotels in Cuba. Sol Meliá pays some of its 
Cuban employees in Cuban currency and some in American dollars. The objective is to 
stimulate efficiency, high productivity and quality, but the corporation also wants to 
create a corporate hierarchy to promote corporate mobility. That is, Sol Meliá retains and 
promotes its best employees by paying them in the highly appreciated, by Cubans, 
American dollars. Cubans seem to like it, but the practice may seem repugnant and 
unacceptable to workers in other nations.    
 As a whole, corporate governance addresses multiple issues, from market 
conditions, geography, scarce resources and local and regional politics to human 
behavior. Corporate governance is above all about making business decisions while 
restraining human impulses, balancing corporate with human interests (Soskice, 1999, p. 
152; Aaronson and Reeves, 2002, p. 129). It involves multiple actors, interests, 
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procedural maneuvering, bureaucratic encroachments and structural imbalances among 
other aspects. It is a very fragile process, one in which personal interests and greed can 
overshadow corporate goals and reputation. At times, corporate rules are bent, codes of 
conduct are twisted, and ethic is ignored, all for the sake of short-term goals. Then, the 
corporate mission gets lost and the corporation loses its way. Corporate governors place 
the corporation in a state of emergency and redefine their own responsibilities. Corporate 
responsibility becomes ‘guaranteeing the survival of the corporation.’ Indeed, corporate 
governance resembles a socio-political construct, but it also reflects the agency dilemma: 
a conflict of interests between the corporation and its own agents resulting from 
imbalances of powers. It usually leads to corporate scandals.  
 In the case of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq, violations of sanctions 
provoked a scandal of political dimensions. First, it affected the UN’s reputation as the 
most important global political institution for it was responsible for enforcing and 
overseeing the sanctions regime. Second, it affected the U.S. as the most powerful global 
superpower and the main sponsor and advocate of the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. 
Yet, it could not control corporate behavior, not even of American corporations. Third, it 
illustrated the limits of sanctions regimes and their inability to deal with global 
corporations and their corporate models. 
 
Corporate Responsibility 
 Should corporations do more than just business? We know that they do politics, 
but should they care about the environment, human rights and work conditions among 
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other sociopolitical issues? Should they comply with sanctions regimes? What is the limit 
of corporate responsibility? What is corporate responsibility? 
 The concept of corporate responsibility emerged during the 1970s, after about 200 
years of capitalism and corporate history. The concept grew out of the Watergate Scandal 
in the U.S. (Hall and Soskice, 1999, p.19; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.11). The scandal 
reveled that corporations had channeled corporate money to political figures at the 
highest level of the American federal government. The decision had been made at the 
highest level of corporations. Some corporations had decided that it was a corporate 
interest -and as such they included it in the corporate agenda- to finance the reelection of 
the President Nixon even if they had to break some American laws. After Watergate, the 
concept of corporate responsibility became a key component of corporate models and an 
intrinsic part of the corporate world. Today, corporate responsibility has strong linkages 
with the structures of global production, branding, marketing, and profitability (Hall and 
Soskice, 1999, p.27; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.41). Yes, corporate responsibility can 
boost profits when integrated into a well-coordinated public relation campaign. For 
instance, many corporations utilize patriotism and nationalism to justify their actions. 
Other corporations talk about corporate responsibility as a mean to eliminate poverty and 
create jobs when in fact they mean profits for themselves. Certainly, in the case of Iraq, 
many corporations claimed that they violated the sanctions regime to help the Iraqi 
people. Some corporations, from the beginning of the sanctions regime, publicly stated 
that they opposed the sanctions on moral grounds. Such a public stand, I would argue, 
legitimized their later violations of the UN sanctions.    
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 There are several definitions of corporate responsibility. Some focus on its legal 
side. Some are business driven.  Others attach ethical and social components to it.  
The legal definition addresses two key issues: jurisdiction and statutes. 
Jurisdictions shield corporations from accountability and lawsuits (Hall and Soskice, 
1999, p.37; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.42). They do it through procedural statutes like 
forum non-convenient and subject matter jurisdiction (Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.45). 
Most American laws utilize those two statues to block transnational litigations. That is 
why corporations based beyond American jurisdictions are not liable to American labor 
and environmental laws, among others. But scholars like Hall and Soskice (1999) depart 
from the assumption that corporations are legal entities bounded by articles of 
incorporation, namely rights and obligations. If statutes protect corporations from people, 
governments and other legal entities, then the same statues shall hold corporations liable 
for their acts with respect to others. Liability should include subsidiaries, parent 
companies and even the activities of subcontractors overseas. Hall and Soskice suggest 
that, “Corporations can be held vicariously liable for the torts of their overseas 
subsidiaries based on theories alter ego, of agent, and respondent superior, and identity. 
Note that European laws follow similar rules” (Hall and Soskice, 1999, p.62).  
 The theory alter ego argues that a corporation and its subsidiaries are equally 
responsible for their acts since they are linked through business and statutes (Hall and 
Soskice, 1999, p.79; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.111). If they share profits, losses, and 
statutes, then they are just one corporation. The theory of agent states that the principal, 
or a corporation, has so much control over the agent, namely its subsidiaries, that the first 
is responsible for the acts of the latter. For its part, the theory respondent superior affirms 
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that liability can be traced from the lowest to the highest corporate authority (Hall and 
Soskice, 1999, p.79; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.111). Lastly, the identity theory argue 
that the interests and ownership of a parent and subsidiary companies overlap so much 
that the subsidiary could legally be considered to as if it does not exist  (Hall and Soskice, 
1999, p.79; Federowicz, Aguilera 2003, p.111). 
 There are other theories, but overall Soskice (1999) claims that “The issue of 
jurisdiction can be tackled through specific evidences of congressional intent to the 
contrary. For instance, U.S. corporations can be directly liable for some wrongful acts 
abroad which are illegal under U.S. laws such as violations of securities’ and exchange 
commission rules and the Sherman Anti-trust laws” (Soskice, 1999, p.124). To which I 
add that the U.S. often employs tax, wire transferring and money laundry laws as well as 
the RICO Act to prosecute corporate wrongdoings. The U.S. used some of those laws to 
prosecute a group of corporations and individuals for violations of the UN sanctions 
regime in Iraq. For instance, we will see here in this Chapter that the U.S. charged Mr. 
Waytt and his corporation of money laundering and conspiracy, but the true crime was 
purchasing oil contracts from Saddam’s regime (New York Times, www.nyt.com, Sep. 
20th, 2007; New York Times, www.nyt.com, April 15th, 2005). According to New York’s 
Court of Appeals, Mr. Waytt did it through a group of front companies and a complicated 
ring of offshore accounts that in the end belonged to his corporation. He was sent to 
prison for two years and fined for $9 million dollars. His two corporations were put on 
probation for three years and ordered to pay restitution (New York Times, www.nyt.com, 
Sep. 20th, 2007; New York Times, www.nyt.com, April 15th, 2005.).  
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  In all, Aronson (2002), Federowicz and Aguilera (2003) argue that ccorporate 
responsibility is about how corporations behave in the marketplace, produce goods and 
services, deal with competitors, overcome market demands and still have positive impact 
on the common good. The concept has evolved over the years. It has come from the pure 
laissez-faire of early capitalism to a “government intervention” in the economy during 
the twenty and twenty-first centuries. In the end, the debate on corporate responsibility 
revolves around the two classic schools of economics: neoliberalism and Keynesianism.  
 For Aronson (2002), businesses have only one responsibility: manage resources to 
create wealth. Aronson (2002), a neoliberal economist and corporate lawyer, argues that 
private expenditures on environmental and social ends are resources that can be 
distributed to employees, entrepreneurs, and stockholders in the form of salaries or 
investments. He assumes that, first, money is what motivates employees and 
entrepreneurs to produce efficiently; second, motivation based on self interest is 
necessary for an effective and well functioning market. The pursuit of social 
responsibility interferes with those two classic market assumptions. But Keynesians, 
economists like Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) state that corporate responsibility can lead 
to innovation, higher efficiency and productivity. Corporate responsibility should be seen 
as an investment: it hurts a corporation’s bottom line in the short run, but it contributes to 
profits at the long run. In addition, corporate responsibility usually translates into sound 
public relations, which is very important in the era of global mass media. Yet, in the end 
both neoliberals and Keynesians share two common denominators. First, they coincide in 
that expenditures versus profits are at the center of the debate. That is corporations would 
not be socially responsible if it affects their bottom line, but they would become socially 
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responsible if responsibility leads to profitability. Second, corporate actions impact public 
relations and trigger governmental policies, which then affect corporations and markets.     
 Next, scholars like Soskice (1999), Streeck (1997) and Hall (1997) attach social 
and cultural features to corporate responsibility. The underlying assumption is that 
corporations are not as autonomous as they claim. They are more than private entities 
protected by legal statutes. They are in fact social creations, and they show all the 
features of social entities. Moreover, they are an intrinsic part of human societies. They 
are highly dependent on human behavior, habits, and actions. As evidence, Soskice 
(1999), Streeck (1997) and Hall (1997) point to the fact that corporate features differ 
across societies. For instance, there is the French model, which is rather socialist, 
meaning that it emphasizes on redistribution of wealth as a means toward social justice 
and equality. There is also the Japanese and Asian model, known as Nippo-Rhenish 
model. It focuses on discipline, organization and loyalty to the corporation in exchange 
for secured long-term employment, decent salaries, stability, and pride. Thirdly, there is 
the Scandinavian, also known as the welfare model. This model is built on the 
assumption that corporations must care for the overall wellbeing the employees. That is, 
the success of the corporation depends on the wellbeing of its employees. Lastly, there is 
the Anglo-Saxon, built on laissez-fair and individualism. More recently, India has put 
forward its own model as it emerges as a world economic power. India incorporated in its 
constitution Gandhi’s idea of trusteeship, which defines corporate responsibility as a 
moral duty and a matter of pride (Sosckice, 1999, p.227).     
 All those models have advantages and disadvantages. Yet, Soskice (1999) and 
other scholars propose that nation-states should renounce certain “cultural and ethnic” 
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features in favor of a uniform global model that takes the Anglo-Saxon as the ideal type. 
But Streeck (1997), Hall (1997) and others repudiate such an idea, arguing that the 
Anglo-Saxon model jeopardizes accountability and lends itself to corruption since: a) it 
excludes employees from decision-making process; b) it focuses on short-term profits; c) 
its vertical hierarchy overshadows distinctions between personal and corporate interests. 
Still, others scholars find no differences whatsoever among those models. They contend 
that the capitalist system has eradicated most of those differences, and that globalization 
will eventually eliminate any vestige of contradiction between the models.  
 Finally, I would argue that corporations are today more conscious about corporate 
responsibility. Most corporations recognize the value of being responsive to the 
environment, human rights, women rights, child labor laws, and fair salaries among other 
issues. Corporations at least acknowledge that there is a global media and a global civic 
society watching them. Reckless corporate behavior can translate into bad publicity, 
which in turn may lead to the loss of customers and market shares. Yet, although there is 
public demand for corporate responsibility, it does not seem to include compliance with 
sanctions regimes. There are sharp disagreements about the issue. Eleven polls conducted 
around the world during 10 years of UN sanctions against Iraq showed that 52% of the 
people opposed the sanctions (CFIJ, 2002, p. 67). Opposition to the sanctions regime was 
so strong that it forced the UN to adopt what then became known as “smart-sanctions”, 
those that targeted products and technologies that could be used for military purposes. 
But even if “smart sanctions” do not cause harm to civilians, I ask: Are sanctions regimes 
fair to corporations? Should corporations comply with a sanctions regime?  
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 This argument is twofold: one approach is economic, and the other is political. 
The economic approach argues that a sanctions regime is basically a political regime. It is 
a group of political measures that target trade to attain a political objective. So a sanctions 
regime is a political instrument that has particular effects on the behavior of economic 
actors. First, sanctions regimes go against two key premises of laissez-faire capitalism: 
open markets and free trade. Second, a sanctions regime is by default a sanctions regime 
on corporations attempting to operate in the sanctioned market, limiting, constraining and 
destroying the creation of wealth not only in that market but also at its adjacent. Third, 
there is yet another paradox: by reducing commerce to a minimum, a sanctions regime 
frees of competition an entire market, and corporations do not like competition. In fact, I 
argue that sanctions regimes create business opportunities, in particular for nascent small 
corporations not really capable of competing in regional and global markets. In the case 
of the sanctions regime in Iraq, I found that most violators of the sanctions were small, 
young corporations from developing nations, mainly from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and 
the Middle East, which in the past, had enjoyed good trade relations with Iraq. Also, 
small young corporations acted as intermediaries since well-known corporations did not 
want to be associated with Saddam’s regime but still wanted to do business with Iraq.   
 The political approach focuses on the feasibility of sanctions regimes as 
instruments of global politics. Enforcement of sanctions regimes is not feasible due to the 
fragmented structures of global trade and corporations. Sanctioned nations can go around 
the sanctions through the numerous agents and means of globalization. In fact, some of 
those who favor sanction regimes acknowledge that the true value of a sanctions regime 
is not economic but political. That is, economic sanctions do not really lead to economic 
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collapse, but they are useful tools for diplomatic negotiations and political maneuvering, 
as in the cases of Libya and North Korea. Libya’s economic and political system did not 
collapse, and nation-states like the U.S. and UK used their sanctions regime against Libya 
as a negotiated way out of their conflict with that nation. The same is true with North 
Korea. Its regime remains strong and defiant, and negotiations of the Five Parties 
Negotiations spin around lifting and/or imposing sanctions regime on North Korea.  
Sanctions regimes are political instruments and corporations are often criticized 
for their involvement in politics. So, the question is, if corporations ought not to engage 
in politics at all, why would they endorse a sanctions regime? Why would they endorse a 
political policy that limits their very nature? There is another aspect here. The sanctions 
regime in Iraq originated in the UN, a political institution with no real legal power over 
corporations. The enforcement of the UN sanctions in Iraq relied solely on the will of 
nation-states and corporations. In fact, the U.S. was the only nation that prosecuted 
corporations and individuals for violating the sanctions, and the U.S. did it not for 
violating the UN sanctions but for breaking American tax laws and the RICO Act. In 
other words, if the sanctions regime was multilateral, its enforcement was unilateral.  
All told, I conclude that it is around the contradictions between business interests, 
corporate governance and corporate responsibility that corporations try to come to terms 
with regulatory regimes, mainly political regimes such as sanctions regimes. Those are 
contradictions that corporate governance must sort out before establishing a corporate 
policy, one that could either strengthen or jeopardize the very existence of the 
corporation. In the next section I present evidence of how corporations circumvented the 
UN sanctions regime in Iraq through corporate models.  
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Corporate Models and the Evasion of the Sanctions Regime in Iraq 
GAO and the IIC estimated that during the period 1996-2002 corporations 
generated $67 billion under the sanctions regime in Iraq (GAO Report, p. 22; IIC Report, 
Chapter I, p. 9). On top, the IIC estimated that Saddam Hussein generated $10.1 billion in 
illegal revenues, $5.7 billion from oil smuggling and $4.4 billion in “surcharges” (IIC 
Report, Chapter I, p.10-11). According to GAO and IIC Reports, those are just estimates 
because no one really knows how much money he generated from illegal trade. But what 
is relevant here is how Saddam managed to circumvent UN sanctions. He could not have 
done it without a helping hand from the corporate world. In fact, the IIC cited 23 case 
studies to illustrate how front and middlemen companies contributed to the breakdown of 
the UN sanctions. Table 6.1 lists corporate models used under the UN sanctions regime.   
 
Table 6.1 - Distribution by Type of Company 
                       
Type of Company   Based in  Based    Total
Nation of Origin Offshore
1-Affiliate 321               586        907       
2-Intermediary 293               531        824       
3-Front Company 236               482        718       
4-Subsidiary 112               546        658       
5-Parent company 158               263        421       
6-Shelf company 67                 161        228       
7-State owned company 27                 31          58         
8-Holding 48                         - 48         
9-Joint Ventures
Total 1,214            2,600     3,862     
Source: IIC Report 
 
Table 6.1 reveals that 3,862 corporations traded with Iraq under the UN sanctions 
regime, and 1,213 operated from their nations of origins while 2,600 chose to operate 
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from offshore. It also shows that corporations employed eight corporate models. The 
table shows that 907 companies operated as affiliates, a model that does not lend itself to 
corporate wrongdoings for it is too close to its parent corporation. But front company is 
the ideal corporate model for corporate wrongdoing. The IIC Report, Annex 1 (pages 54-
55) shows a list of front companies that evaded the UN sanctions against Iraq. Table 6.1 
above shows 718 front companies operated under the UN sanctions regime, and that 
intermediaries were the second main corporate model under the sanctions regime. The 
IIC defines intermediary firms as “third-party purchaser” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 3). GAO 
calls them “middlemen companies” (GAO, p. 11). The IIC explains that “Companies 
with limited access to the Programme used intermediaries to maintain their access to the 
Iraqi market” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 3), to which I add that corporations hired intermediaries 
to circumvent UN inspectors, conceal their profits, and launder their money. Also, most 
intermediaries chose to register and obtain operational licenses in France, Russia, China, 
Germany, Jordan, and Syria. Since those nations were friendly to Iraq, Saddam rewarded 
them with “the most favored” status. It explains why there were so many French 
intermediaries violating UN sanctions. It prompted a French official to argue that 
“Contracts submitted to the French mission…were often formulated by economic entities 
that were not French and whose goods and merchandises were not produced in France 
and had not even transited through France” (Communiqué by the Embassy of France in 
the U.S., October 11, 2004). It means that corporations did not necessarily represent their 
nations of origin but where they registered to operate. France revealed a list of American 
corporations that operated through intermediaries registered in France. Table 6.2 
reproduces a sample of the list.   
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Table 6.2 - American Corporations Trading with Iraq from France 
 
                     
             Company Profits in USD millions
Agco 113,491,600.00                 
Baker 10,611,624.00                   
Becton Dickinson 4,611,828.00                     
Boston Scientific 315,911.00                        
Cameron 5,764,117.00                     
Case France 32,418,805.00                   
Dosapro 1,199,904.00                     
Dow Agroscience 3,856,741.00                     
Dresser International / Dresser Rand 16,136,532.00               
Envirotech 76,372,954.00               
Fisher Rosemount 9,846,413.00                 
Flowserve 19,772,973.00               
FMC Europe 3,327,597.00                 
General Electric 1,181,594.00                 
Grove 9,556,000.00                 
Hexacorp 5,072,602.00                 
Ibex 32,595,435.00               
Ingersonll 62,105,914.00               
Kema-Proser 7,598,562.00                 
Luxor 17,265,777.00               
Marsoneilan 40,480.00                      
Purolite / Baker 357,833.00                    
Sanchez 2,046,178.00                 
Siemens S.A.S. 82,283,149.00               
Toekheim 829,229.00                    
Toekhein 1,234,696.00                 
Tossco 3,025,489.00                 
Trouvay & Cauvin / Mandrel 20,625,320.00               
Wemco / Envirotech 9,064,142.00                 
Wyeth / Lederle 101,849.00                    
Total 552,711,248.00              
Source: Embassy of France in the United States – October 11, 2004 
 
Intermediaries worked between: 1) local and global corporations; 2) Iraqi and 
foreign corporations; 3) banks and corporations; 4) non-state actors and banks. The IIC 
and the CIA found that intermediaries smuggled nearly $1 billion dollars per year 
through the free-trade zones along the Jordan-Iraqi and Syrian-Iraqi borders.      
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 Next, according to the IIC, nation-states and corporations operated 718 front 
corporations under the UN sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter I, and p. 17). Corporations had 
two reasons for doing so. The first one was for business reasons. The IIC stated that, “As 
the price of oil went higher, oil sales increasingly took the form of contracts with front 
companies, backed financially and technically by international trading companies” (IIC, 
Final Report, p. 4). The IIC here refers to corporations that lacked financial and logistical 
expertise to execute import-export contracts. Some of those corporations were really 
small businesses seeking their first opportunities. In fact, we saw in Chapter IV that 
individuals, NGOs, political parties and other NSAs operated through 327 front 
corporations. 
 The second reason was more about public relations than any other issue. The IIC 
explained that corporations “Concerned about public relations opted for hiring front 
companies to avoid being associated with Saddam’s regime” (IIC, Final Report, p. 5). 
This issue –public relations- applied more to large global corporations preoccupied with 
political correctness, public opinion, and their overall global image. As examples, the IIC 
cited transnational corporations such as Shell Corp, Exxon-Mobil, Motorola, Volvo, 
Siemens and Mitsubishi. Note that some nations saw in front corporations a means to 
circumventing the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. These nations owned or co-owned 
front corporations, to which they provided financial, legal and political support. Some 
nations even utilized their embassies and diplomatic prerogatives to cover up their 
relations and activities with their front corporations. In total, 58 nations owned front 
corporations under UN sanctions regime. Table 6.3 below shows the top ten nations that 
sponsored front corporations. 
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Table 6.3 - Top Ten Nations Sponsoring Front Corporations 
 
                                                 
  Countries   # of Front 
Companies
Russia 41
Ukraine 37
Belarus 29
Jordan 29
Syria 26
France 17
China 14
Iraq 13
Germany 9
Vietnam 8
Romania 4
Total 227  
Source: IIC Report    
 
The IIC found that Iraq created and operated two dozen front corporations right 
after the UN established the sanctions regime. The IIC defined Iraqi front corporations as 
“A Company the Government of Iraq secretly owned in part” (IIC, Chapter VI, p. 302). 
Here, “owned in part” means owned in partnership with another corporation, individual, 
nation or any other entity or third party, which seldom included a corporation owned by 
the state of Iraq. In fact, the CIA explained that Iraq had front partnership corporations 
with nations like Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Some other front partnerships included 50-
50% partnerships with private corporations from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, UAE, Lebanon 
and Qatar. The CIA set their overall market value at $4.6 billion dollars and profits at 
$9.3 billion during the 1996-2002 periods (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p.179). The Table 6.4 right below lists 16 of those front partnership 
corporations. I gathered the data from the IIC and the Duelfer Report.    
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Table 6.4 – Iraqi Front Firms in Partnership with Private Firms in the Middle East 
                                            
        
Company      Industry                                   Nation of  Based 
                                Registration    in
The Mudiaf Company General Trade Dubai, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Turkey Jordan
Al-Wadi Al-Akhab General Trade Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar Jordan
Al-Mansurah Company General Trade Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen Jordan
Al-Awabi Company General Trade Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen Jordan
Al-Nid General Trade Dubai, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria Jordan
Al-Wasel & Babel General Trade Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, Turkey Jordan
Al-Hoda General Trade Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Qatar Jordan
Alia General Trade Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, Turkey Jordan
Al-Yarmuk Travel Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, Turkey Lebanon
Al-Dala Travel Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, Turkey Jordan
Al-Huda Religious Tourism Travel Dubai, Egypt, EUA, Jordan, Libya, Qatar, Syria, Yemen Syria
Al-Zaytun Restaurants Jordan Jordan
Al-Riyadh Transportation Jordan, Syria, Turkey Jordan
Al-Riat Unknown Egypt, Jordan, Syria Syria
Al-Manuria Unknown Egypt, Jordan, Syria Syria
Al-Enbuah Unknown Egypt, Jordan, Syria Syria  
   
Source: The Duelfer Report (CIA Report) 
 
Then, 658 subsidiaries traded with Iraq under the sanctions regime. The fact that 
546 of them operated offshore tells us that they sought legal and financial protection 
outside their nations of origin. The most illustrative example is Halliburton, which France 
accused of using French subsidiaries to circumvent the UN sanctions regime. France’s 
embassy in the Washington D.C. revealed that Halliburton’s subsidiaries in France 
conducted business for almost $200 million dollars under the sanctions regime 
(Communiqué by the Embassy of France in the US, Washington, October 11th, 2004). 
The case of Halliburton explains why subsidiaries are not the best means to evade a 
sanctions regime. They are just too “close” to their parent corporation, which could end 
up paying for the violations. For their part, 421 parent corporations participated in the 
sanctions regime, of which 263 were registered offshore from their nations of origin. 
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Table 6.5 below shows that 531 of those companies were incorporated in offshore 
“paradises”.  I collected the data from the IIC Report. 
 
Table 6.5 – Top Ten Corporate Paradises 
                
Nation Companies
Switzerland 97
Lichtenstein 88
Panama 71
Cayman Islands 70
The Bahamas 56
British Virgin Island 41
Qatar 40
Aruba 36
Dubai 32
Total 531  
Source: IIC Report 
 
Many parent entities were large global corporations such as General Electric, 
Siemens S.A., Boston Scientific, Hyundai, Volvo, Lukoil, Gazprom and The Arab 
Establishment (IIC, Chapter I, p. 34). But they did not seize the market for themselves. 
They were not the most profitable either. In fact, mid-size regional corporations 
controlled 61% of the Iraqi market (IIC, Chapter I, p. 37). Among them were Bayoil, 
Taurus, Glencore, and Vitol. These four corporations were the most profitable under the 
UN sanctions regime, accounting for 21% of all revenues (IIC, Chapter I, p. 37). 
 Finally, shelf corporations had a very active participation under the sanctions 
regime, but they served mostly for banking purposes, for issuing and collecting 
payments. Some of them were no more than empty offices with a p.o. box for mailing 
purposes. In total, 228 shelf corporations traded with Iraq under the sanctions regime, and 
161 were offshore (IIC, Chapter I, p. 39). Likewise, most holding companies operated 
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through their affiliates, subsidiaries, intermediaries, parent, and front companies. Their 
direct participation was minimal, rather unnoticed. For the most part, participation of 
holding and parent corporations in the sanctions regime was detected only after thorough 
investigations of front corporations.   
 All in all, I found that corporate models served several purposes. First, they 
helped corporations operate under a sanctions regime that was politically motivated. 
Second, they helped deal with Saddam’s policy of granting contracts to nations friendly 
to his regime. Third, they helped conceal their true identities. In all instances, companies 
evaluated their positions and concluded that utilizing corporate models would minimize 
risks and maximize profits. I explain next through several case studies how corporate 
models really operated and helped corporations evade the UN sanctions regime in Iraq. 
        
Case Studies  
 In this section, I further discuss the hypothesis of this chapter. First, corporations 
are among the main agents of globalization. They are a globalizing force with a direct 
impact on global politics. Second, corporations employ corporate models to circumvent 
regulatory regimes, among which are sanctions regimes. To illustrate this hypothesis, I 
present seven cases that involve several corporate models. They are Alia, Vinafood and 
Vinamilk, Chinochem, Phoenix Investment International, Russian Engineering Company, 
El Paso Corporation, and Vitol International. Those corporations exemplify: a) corporate 
attitudes toward a sanctions regime; b) different facets of the corporate evasion of the 
sanctions regime; c) and more important, how corporations utilized corporate models to 
circumvent UN sanctions.  In particular, I pay special attention to multiple layers and 
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linkages among small corporations, and multiple parallel bank accounts across 
corporations of no apparent relationship. Most of those corporations created small 
corporations, usually with no more than a dozen employees. After two or four 
transactions, they would shut down operations and create new small corporations. Lastly, 
I pay close attention to periodic deposits and withdrawals of large amounts of money. 
Mayer and Califano argued that “Money took circuitous routes that included a chain of 
front companies, complicit or captive banks” (Meyer and Califano, 2006, p. XX). Figure 
6.4 gives us an idea of how Iraq utilized corporate models to evade UN sanctions.   
  
Figure 6.4 – Iraq’s Corporate Modeling to Circumvent the UN Sanctions Regime  
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Figure 6.4 looks intricate and somehow overwhelming, but that is precisely the 
purpose of corporations. They structure their corporate models in such as a way as to 
overwhelm regulatory regimes and law enforcers. If the model in Figure 6.4 seems 
intricate, it is not due to their lack of imagination by corporations but to the nature of the 
business environment they want to circumvent. Indeed, models like the one in Figure 6.4 
were very effective under the UN sanctions regime in Iraq.    
 
Iraqi Government’s Front Corporations 
 The first case study involves the Iraqi government. The UN sanctions regime 
constituted a matter of national security for Iraq. Therefore, dealing with it necessarily 
involved the Iraqi government. Iraq confronted the sanctions regime with a corporate 
model that involved an array of front corporations organized horizontally and through 
multiple layers. This case also involves Alia, the Iraqi conglomerate that led Iraq’s 
offensive against the UN sanctions. Observe in Graph IV that the Iraqi government acted 
as an “umbrella” over Alia and its two front corporations. Business decisions came from 
top to bottom, but all corporations were out in the market to obtain as many businesses as 
possible. That is why some corporations overlapped, and at times their functions 
duplicated.  Also, observe in Figure 6.4 that Iraqi front companies did not deal directly 
with non-Iraqi corporations. Instead, they hired a large number of intermediaries usually 
owned by businessmen from the Middle East and loyal to Saddam’s regime. 
In effect, Alia for Transportation and General Trade, known as Alia, Alia 
controlled 39% of Iraqi trade under the UN sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter I, p. 306). 
Alia was one big front corporation with several subsidiaries and intermediaries 
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disseminated all throughout the Middle East. The most visible were Al-Hoda 
International Trading Co. and Al-Wasel & Babel General Trading LLC.   
The IIC found documents at Iraq’s Ministry of Transportation confirming that the 
said Ministry purposely created Alia as a regional front corporation. The objective was to 
promote and manage Iraqi trade in the Middle East. The Ministry granted Alia the power 
to create other corporations, enter in contracts, finance trade with foreign corporations, 
collect payments and even establish its own bank. Alia’s Articles of Incorporation 
showed that Alia entered in several 50-50 joint ventures with Iraqi private businessmen 
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 306). The first was with Husain Al-Khawam, an Iraqi living in Jordan, 
a close associate of Saddam Hussein. Mr. Al-Khawam registered Alia as a single 
Jordanian corporation in Amman, Jordan, in August 1994 (IIC, Chapter I, p. 306). Its first 
big project was to rebuild Iraq’s naval fleet and ports. It also included recruiting and 
training a naval labor force and purchasing and shipping hardware, trucks, and 
construction equipment to Iraq (IIC, Chapter I, p. 303). Alia reorganized and trained a 
naval labor force in about three years. It also repaired a good portion of its cargo fleet and 
two ports in southern Iraq. That Iraq had a functioning naval cargo fleet and ports is a bit 
ironic. Cargo fleets and ports are means of trade, and the UN sanctions regime banned 
Iraq from foreign trading. In fact, Alia signed contracts with Siemens, Peugeot, and 
Volvo to import spare parts for Iraqi cargo vessels and trucking industry (IIC, Chapter I, 
p. 308). It also signed a contract with Kato Corp, a Japanese manufacturer of industrial 
cranes, and a three-year contract with Toyota to acquire $135.5 million in spare parts for 
Iraq light trucks, the most popular means of cargo transportation in Iraq’s domestic 
market (IIC, Chapter I, p. 308).    
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 Alia also operated as a “debt collector.” The IIC found that “In 1999 the Iraqi 
Ministry of Transportation arranged with Alia to have it act as a…collection agent for 
foreign suppliers” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 303). It was another illegal operation because the 
661 Committee expressly “Prohibited any third party from engaging in financial 
transactions with the government of Iraq except as permitted under Security Council 
resolutions” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 303). In Chapter V, I explicated that the 661 Committee 
designated the French bank BNP-New York as the sole payment collector under the 
sanctions regime. Yet, the Iraqi regime ignored the mandate and ordered Alia to open 
several bank accounts at Arab Land Bank, in Egypt, at Jordan National Bank and 
Rafidain Bank, both in Jordan, allowing Alia to collect about $788 million in different 
currencies from 2000 to 2003 (IIC Report, Chapter I, p. 303). Alia converted the money 
into dollars and submitted it to the Iraqi Ministry of Transportation. The IIC concluded 
that the main source of the money was fees on smuggling through Iraqi ports and free 
trade zones along the Jordan-Iraqi and Syrian-Iraqi borders (IIC, Chapter I, p. 305). 
 Alia had several subsidiaries and intermediaries. Al-Hoda International Trading 
Co. was one of the most active, as a front company though. The Iraqi government 
appointed Hikmat Jergi, an Iraqi citizen living in Syria, as the sole proprietor of Al-Hoda. 
Mr. Jergi registered it in the United Arab Emirates “For the purpose of entering into 
contracts with foreign corporations” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 306). Al-Hoda acted as a 
subcontractor for Alia. On its behalf, it negotiated most of the contracts Iraq entered with 
Middle Eastern corporations under the UN sanctions regime. Al-Hoda specialized in 
long-term contracts with large discounts on medicines, foodstuffs, pesticides and 
agricultural machineries. Al-Hoda spent about $1,220.8 million worth of foodstuffs, 
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construction materials, water tanks, medicines and detergents in just one year (IIC, 
Chapter I, p. 307). Like Alia, Al-Hoda collected payments from importers and exporters, 
only that it collected cash. It deposited it in accounts that the Ministry of Transportation 
had at Arab Land Bank, in Egypt, and at Jordan National Bank and Rafidain Bank in 
Jordan. After that, the money was wire-transferred to the Iraqi State Oil Marketing 
Organization. SOMO’s account receivables show that $92 million dollars were received 
from Al-Hoda from 1999 to 2003, and another $14 million in kickbacks and briberies 
were received from 2002 to 2003 (IIC, Chapter I, p. 308). Sometimes the money was 
carried in cash to Iraqi embassies in Moscow, Amman, El Cairo and Abu Dhabi.  
 Lastly, Al Wasel & Babel General Trading LLC was the third most important 
Iraqi front corporation. It mainly acted as intermediaries between the Ministry of Oil, the 
Ministry of Transportation, and non-Iraqi corporations. Alia created it in a 50-50 joint 
venture with Ibrahim Lootah, a citizen of the United Arab Emirates with long business 
relations with Iraq, where he had a permanent office until the UN established the 
sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter I, p. 308). 
 The IIC found that Al Wasel operated from Abu Dhabi. It had several bank 
accounts at Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and at Jordan National Bank, both in Abu 
Dhabi. Al Wasel instructed its customers to deposit their payments at Abu Dhabi 
Commercial Bank. Al Wasel then wire transferred the money to its account at Jordan 
National Bank, from where it would be transferred to SOMO and the Iraqi Ministry of 
Oil. The IIC and GAO reported that Al Wasel & Babel transferred $800 million to Iraqi 
coffers in just 2 years (IIC, Chapter I, p. 308). 
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 Overall, the Iraqi government took many business risks, but it was cautious in the 
way its corporations operated. Iraq worked hard to keep its front corporations in 
anonymity, to the point that it hired a group of intermediaries for both A-Hadal and Al-
Wasel. One of them was the Belhasa Group, which was a trading conglomerate 
specialized in the distribution of diverse goods and services throughout the world (IIC, 
Chapter I, p. 308-334). It was administered through a holding registered and based in 
Dubai as Belhasa International Co. (IIC, Chapter I, p. 334). Belhasa had four major 
subsidiaries. The first was Belhasa Motors Co. LLC, known as Belhasa Motors, which 
distributed automotive and industrial spare parts. The second was Union Trading Co. 
LLC, better known as Union Trading. It distributed construction technologies, materials 
and combustibles. The third was Al–Rowa’a General Trading Co. LLC, known as Al-
Rowa’a. The fourth was Safire Ltd., or Safire, which invested in real estate and tourism. 
But Belhasa itself did not want to trade directly with Iraqi front corporations. Belhasa’s 
top representatives told the IIC that “Some of the most important Belhasa’s customers in 
the Middle East were not in good terms with the Iraqi government since it had defaulted 
in some businesses” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 335). Therefore, Belhasa hired Ebstikar 
Investment Company LLC and the Hartha Group, both based in Jordan. The Belhasa 
Group became the largest Iraqi trade partner under the sanctions regime. It picked 129 
contracts, worth $742.2 million (IIC, Chapter I, p. 334). 
 Still, Al-Hoda and Al-Wasel played a key role as representatives of the Iraqi 
government in the trade protocol that Iraq signed with Vietnam. It takes us to the second 
case study. This case is relevant because it illustrates how governments can secretly 
create corporations to circumvent a sanctions regime. The governments of Vietnam and 
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Iraq utilized front companies to execute a trade protocol that they had secretly conceived 
and signed (IIC, Chapter I, p. 329). The governments of Vietnam and Iraq created a Joint 
Committee to develop trade partnerships. The Committee was responsible for: a) 
establishing terms of trade and contracts; b) setting prices, volumes and terms of 
deliveries; c) meeting every six months to review compliance with contracts and discuss 
future business deals (IIC, Chapter I, p. 330). Vietnam’s Minister of Trade headed the 
Vietnamese party while the Grain Board, also known as “the Board,” led the Iraqi party. 
Vietnam created two state-owned front companies to engage the Iraqi party. They were 
Vietnam Northern Food Corp. and Vietnam Dairy Joint Stock Company. The Vietnamese 
government registered them in the UN Sanction Commission as Vinafood and Vinamilk 
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 330). For its part, the Iraqi government assigned the trade mission to 
Alia, which in turn delegate it to Al-Hoda, and Al-Wasel.   
 
Vinafood and Vinamilk 
Vinafood was a Vietnamese agro-industrial company that specialized in 
processing, packing and exporting rice, beans, sugar, coffee, ground nuts and other 
commodities. Vinafood illegally sold $891 million in agricultural products to Iraq from 
1996 to 1998. It sold another $429 million in medicines, cloths and school supplies from 
1997 to 1998 (IIC, Chapter I, p. 331). In addition, UN investigators found that Vinafood 
engaged in oil trade. It turned out that Vinafood had created The Nghe An Petro Trading 
Services, a subsidiary through which it could purchase and import oil from Iraq. 
Vinafood paid in cash for the oil, and it used the Vietnamese embassy in Bagdad as 
collection center in plain violation of UN mandates and international law (IIC, Chapter I, 
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p. 331). Records found at the Iraqi Ministry of Oil revealed that Iraq sold to Vinafood an 
average of $700 million worth of oil per year. Iraq sold to Vinafood $1,100 million worth 
of oil to Vietnam in 2001 when trade under the UN sanctions regime was at its highest 
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 331).   
 Like Vinafood, Vinamilk was a state-owned front corporation only that it 
specialized in processing and distributing dairy products. Vinamilk sold to Iraq $517 
million in baby foods from 2000 to 2003 (IIC, Chapter I, p. 332). Vinamilk received its 
payments from Alia through bank accounts at Jordan National Bank in Amman, Jordan. 
The IIC estimated that Vinamilk paid about $23.5 million in bribes and kickbacks to 
businessmen in Jordan and Syria (IIC, Chapter I, p. 332). Those businessmen helped 
Vinamilk smuggled its goods into Iraq through the Jordanian and Syrian borders. The IIC 
could not estimate how much Vinamilk exactly paid for inland transportation, but it put it 
at $32 million in two years. Surprisingly, Vinamilk dared to make a delivery under the 
Coalition Provisional Authority led by the U.S. after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 332). It was its last. Vinamilk sent payments to a bank account 
belonging to State Company for Foodstuffs at Jordan National Bank, but the Coalition 
Provisional Authority seized and reported it to the 661 Committee. The IIC noticed that 
the payment to be 10% above the total value of the contract. It concluded that the extra 
10% was to cover fees that the Iraqi regime imposed on foreign corporations for 
transporting goods in Iraqi territory. The IIC also found $11 million in a second bank 
account at Jordan National Bank in Amman. Vinamilk had deposited the money on Alia’s 
behalf. Vietnam claimed it for itself (IIC, Chapter I, p. 332).           
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 In all, the IIC found that Vinafood and Vinamilk together made near $1.2 billion 
dollars from 1998 to 2001. Iraq made close to $4 billion through its front corporations 
Alia, Al-Hoda and Al Wazel. The Iraqi-Vietnamese trade protocol resulted in a $1.2 
billion yearly trade operation, from 1997 to 2003 (IIC, Chapter I, p. 333).        
 
REC and Its Subcontractors 
 The third case involves Russian Engineering Corporation (REC) and its 
subcontractors. I include them here for three main reasons: a) its corporate models; b) the 
way that corporations from the former Soviet Republics utilized their long trade relations 
between the Soviet Union and Iraq to profit from the sanctions regime; c) how quickly 
nascent ex-Soviet corporations learned their ways into the global economy. Indeed, the 
UN sanctions regime in Iraq was a blessing for ex-Soviet corporations. They purchased 
$19.4 billion worth of Iraqi oil, and in return they exported about $7.1 billion in goods 
and services to Iraq at a time when ex-Soviet republics were going through a severe 
economic crisis (IIC, Chapter I, p. 349).    
 REC was registered in Moscow in 1994 and operated from there. REC inherited 
several military contracts with Iraq from the Soviet era. It did not engineer or 
manufacture anything. It was just an exporter of Russian spare parts to the Middle East, 
and Iraq represented almost 40% of its revenues. Thus, the Iraqi market was crucial for 
its survival, and circumventing the UN embargo became a corporate goal. The IIC 
explained that REC “Always maintained an office in Bagdad with Iraqi personnel, and 
REC Staff members, including Sergei Issakov, Chairman of the Board of Directors, 
frequently traveled to Iraq during the sanctions regime and reportedly met with high-
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level Iraqi officials, including Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein” (IIC, Interview to Andrei 
Okhotking on May 5th, 2004). For his part, Sergei Issakov confessed to the IIC that 
“Since 1997 on he traveled to Iraq four or five times a year” (IIC, Interview to Sergei 
Issakov, May 28th, 2005). REC relied on three front corporations and one intermediary to 
trade with Iraq. In fact, REC does not appear in any document of the Iraqi government. 
The data that I gathered from IIC and Duelfer Report, and the Report from the Coalition 
for International Justice show that Rosnefteimpex, Breton Ventures, North Refineries 
Co., and Bukkehave A/S. REC registered Rosnefteimpex and Breton Ventures in Ukraine 
in 1997. It registered North Refineries Co. in Baiji, in 1996. For its part, Bukkehave A/S 
was a Danish corporation (IIC, Chapter I, p. 349-359). 
Through them, REC secured 40 contracts worth about $210 million. It also struck 
22 “side” deals worth $90 million (IIC, Chapter I, p. 349). REC supplied Iraq with 
foodstuffs, cars and truck, construction materials and industrial equipments, most of them 
manufactured in Germany, Japan, Italy and Russia. The IIC calculated that REC paid Iraq 
about $9 million in kickbacks just for obtaining those contracts. In addition, REC 
obtained contracts to purchase and resell Iraqi oil. According to the data, REC purchased 
24.5 million barrels of oil, worth $517 million (IIC, Chapter I, p. 350).  The money was 
deposited in four different bank accounts owned by Iraq at BNP Genève in Switzerland, 
Arab Land Bank in Egypt, and Rafidain Bank in Lebanon. In addition, REC paid the Iraqi 
government $2.5 million for the right to resell that oil (IIC, Chapter I, p. 350). According 
to the IIC, an Iraqi official testified that “Payments were done in cash and delivered by 
Mr. Issakov in person to the Iraqi embassy in Moscow between February and August 
2002” (IIC, Chapter 1, p. 352). The IIC itself was able to obtain receipts with footnotes 
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confirming that “Payments were also made through the Iraqi embassy in Moscow 
between October and December 2001; receipts for some of these payments reflect that 
Mr. Issakov personally brought the payment money to the embassy” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 
352). The receipt in question is tallied as No.7. It refers to contract M/09/25, dated April 
28, 2001, and signed by Iraqi ambassador in Moscow, Dr. Mazhar No’man Al-Douri 
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 353). 
 IIC’s records show that REC entered in partnership with Bukkehave through 
Breton Ventures (IIC, Chapter I, p. 349). The Iraqi regime was shopping around for spare 
parts for its transportation industry, but it had to be non-Soviet technologies. So it granted 
a contract to Breton Venture, which in turn turned to Bukkehave A/S, the Danish 
distributor of spare parts for buses, trucks, and automobiles. It was not a random pick. 
Bukkehave’ best clients were global giants such as Kenworth, Renault, Mercedes Benz, 
Toyota and Isuzu. Bukkehave had a net of affiliates in the United States, France, 
Germany, Sweden, Brazil, Japan, Mexico and China, but not in the Middle East. 
Bukkehave declared to the IIC that it contracted with Breton Ventures believing that the 
contract was not about Iraq but the Middle Eastern market as a whole (IIC, Chapter I, p. 
349). It was a good deal. Breton Venture obtained 11 contracts worth $731 million during 
four years. Bukkehave financed and supplied all of them. It had a net profit of nearly 
$300 million (IIC, Chapter I, p. 350). Bukkehave also entered “on the side” contracts 
with Iraq. It eventually became an intermediary for Iraq’s front companies. As such, it 
appointed Mr. Peter Post as its regional sales export-import person, and opened offices in 
Amman, Jordan. Mr. Post hired Mr. Riad Marei, a Jordan sales export agent, to act as an 
intermediary between Iraqi front companies and himself. When questioned about the 
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need for an intermediary, Mr. Post argued that Bukkehave was new in the market and that 
it did not have a permanent dealer in the region (IIC, Chapter I, p. 351). Nevertheless, the 
IIC summarized Bukkehave’s modus operandi as follow: Bukkehave opened credit lines 
for Iraqi State Company for Oil Projects, a front corporation of Iraqi Ministry of Oil. In 
turn, Iraq paid Bukkehave through Mr. Marei’s account at Rafidain Bank. Mr. Marei 
channeled the money to bank accounts that Bukkehave had in Rafidain Bank (IIC, 
Chapter I, p. 352).        
 
El Paso Corporation, Coastal Petroleum Company and Mr. Oscar Wyatt 
 The fourth case is exceptional in that it brings together the four agents of 
globalization discussed in this dissertation. They are: 1) nations-states; 2) global non-state 
actors such as empowered individuals; 3) global banks; 4) global corporations. This case 
is about El Paso, a corporation that circumvented the sanctions regime through merger 
and acquisitions, a key means of globalization and a recurrent practice in the global 
economy during the 1990s. Court records in the State of New York show that El Paso 
acquired Coastal Petroleum Company and by doing so it inherited Coastal’s customers 
and, more importantly, access to Iraqi oil (the New York Times, Sep. 20th, 2007). El Paso 
took over Coastal’s secret operations and expanded them. When it was caught, it simply 
blamed it all on Coastal, arguing that it was not aware of Coastal’s previous business 
deals (the New York Times, Sep.10th, 2007).   
 Coastal Petroleum, a Texan firm, had been a key Iraqi customer since Iraq 
nationalized its oil industry early in the 1970s (IIC, Chapter I, p. 191). The owner of 
Coastal was Mr. Oscar Wyatt. By all means, he was one of those empowered individuals 
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described in Chapter IV. The IIC and the New York Times revealed a good deal of Mr. 
Wyatt’s activities related to the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. First, Mr. Wyatt 
lobbied intensely the U.S. government against the American led invasion of Iraq in 1990, 
an act that Saddam Hussein appreciated and did not forget. Second, Saddam invited Mr. 
Wyatt to mediate between Iraq and the UN Security Council. Mr. Wyatt was among the 
main negotiators of the UN sanctions regime in Iraq. Third, Mr. Wyatt had full access to 
the Iraqi political nomenclature and oil industry. Fourth, Coastal Petroleum was the only 
American corporation that Saddam Hussein granted oil contracts under the UN sanctions 
regime (IIC, Chapter I, p. 171; the New York Times, Sep.10th, 2007).   
Court Records published by the New York Times on Sept 10th, 2007, show that 
early in the 1990s Coastal Petroleum hired an Argentine company and made it its “front 
company” to purchase oil from Iraq. According to the Times, the Court does not mention 
the name of the Argentinean Corporation, but it does state that it acquired about $550 
million dollars worth of Iraqi oil. Coastal’s success did not go unnoticed to El Paso, a 
Texan gas trader. El Paso acquired Coastal Petroleum in 1998. Michael J. Garcia, the 
U.S. Attorney for Southern District of New York argued that “The acquisition of Coastal 
seems to have been motivated to avoid successor liability in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions. The timing of the merging itself seems suspicious as it stem from Coastal’s 
illegal activities, of which El Paso was aware” (the New York Times, Sep.10th, 2007).   
Again, citing court records, the New York Times reported that, in the year 2000, 
and following instructions from El Paso, Coastal created Nafta Petroleum and Mednafta 
Trading Co. Nafta Petroleum was incorporated in January 2001 and Mednafta Trading 
Co. in March 2001. Both opened bank accounts at BNP Suisse with the pseudonyms 
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“Cyprus” and “America” respectively. Curiously, when the Court followed Coastal’s 
money, it found a company called NuCoastal, founded, registered and based in Houston, 
Texas. NuCoastal had active deposits worth $40 million, which had been wire-transferred 
from El Paso to Coastal Petroleum, to Nafta Petroleum and Mednafta Trading Co., and 
then to NuCoastal. The money was to pay for one shipment of Iraqi oil. Nafta and 
Mednafta were the beneficiaries. In total, after two years of investigating, the Southern 
District Court of New York found 47 deposits totaling $1.2 billion dollars, all traced back 
to El Paso Corporation (the New York Times, Sep.10th, 2007).   
 
Vitol Group and Vitol France 
The fifth case is different. First, the corporation in question executed and financed 
contracts. To protect itself, it created a corporate model that involved two rings of 
corporations. One ring covered up execution of contracts while the other concealed the 
flow of money. The rings included a conglomerate, two regional subsidiaries, two shell 
firms, a dormant company, two partnerships and a dozen of intermediaries for shipping 
purposes. Second, this case explains a common practice in the global economy, widely 
used to evade sanctions regimes: faking corporate identity and nation of registration. This 
case is about Vitol France, of which the IIC Report stated that “No company called Vitol 
France ever existed” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 158). Vitol was a Swiss company that “Used the 
name to give it a French angle” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 158) since Saddam Hussein favored 
french companies in appreciation for France’s friendly approach to Saddam’s regime.    
Vitol France was in fact Vitol S.A. Geneva, a corporation registered and based in 
Switzerland, a regional subsidiary of Vitol Group, a Swiss conglomerate with 27 
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affiliates and subsidiaries operating in several European nations (IIC, Chapter I, p. 159). 
Vitol Group authorized Vitol S.A. Geneva to provisionally change its name to Vitol 
France, so it could obtain contracts from Saddam Hussein. To masquerade even more the 
scheme, Vitol France created two rings of subsidiaries, intermediaries, front, dormant and 
shelf corporations. It also hired Mr. Serge Boidevaix, a French diplomat, to act as a 
liaison between itself and the Iraqi government (IIC, Chapter I, p.67 and p. 158).     
 Vitol France was officially registered as an oil trader, but it executed and financed 
contracts under the sanctions regime. Vitol France organized a ring of intermediaries 
around itself to which it channeled money and contracts. Some of them were Bayoil, 
Sidanco, Awad Ammora & Co., and about a dozen Russian corporations such as 
Rosneftegazexport, purposely created to ship oil out of Iraq (IIC, Chapter I, p. 160). 
Vitol’s operations went unnoticed for a few years. The IIC traced about $670 million 
back to Vitol France (IIC, Chapter I, p. 160). According to the IIC, it was just half of 
what Vitol France actually invested in the sanctions regime. However, by 1998, Vitol 
France saw itself involved in a dispute over fees, surcharges and revenues with Peakville 
Limited, its financial trustee. Peakville Limited was the financial entity that Vitol France 
hired to channel payments to SOMO. In practice, if there was any linkage between Vitol 
France and the Iraqi government, it was Peakville. But payments and deliveries were 
usually late, for which Vitol France had to pay penalties. Vitol France put the blame on 
its ring of intermediaries, ultimately responsible for executing the contracts. They had 
been confronting issues when chartering vessels to transport their cargoes. In the end, 
Vitol France and Peakville Ltd agreed to pay the Iraqi government, hoping that it would 
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grant some other contracts, but that was not the case. The Iraqi regime collected its 
money and banned both corporations from Iraq (IIC, Chapter I, p. 161).  
After that, Vitol SA Geneva replaced Vitol France with Vitol Asia, another of its 
regional subsidiaries. Vitol Asia operated from Singapore. It approached a corporation 
called Mastek Sdn Bhd and asked it to act as its front corporation. Mastek was a dormant 
Malaysian corporation (IIC, Chapter I, p. 163). Three Malaysian businessmen “revived” 
it in an attempt to access the Iraqi regime for contracts, but they were unsuccessful. So 
they accepted the proposal from Vitol Asia. Mastek soon obtained its first contract. Its 
role was to hire the shipping companies that would execute the contracts. It was also to 
pay the surcharges that the Iraqi government demanded for using Iraqi roads and ports 
(IIC, Chapter I, p. 161). The partnership worked well for a while. Mastek executed $89 
million in imports-exports and paid about $10 million in surcharges to the Iraqi 
government, $30 million to Vitol Asia, and it kept $20 million for itself (IIC, Chapter I, 
p. 162). But by 2001, Mastek was facing illiquidity. Mastek claimed that Vitol Asia was 
not paying enough surcharges and bribes, which the Iraqi government kept raising. The 
Iraqi government considered that there were just too many corporations violating the 
sanctions regime, and UN could find out at any time. Raising the surcharges was a way of 
reducing participants. Even so, Mastek threatened Vitol Asia with going public with its 
secret operations. In February 26, 2002, Vitol Asia paid Mastek an undisclosed sum and 
abandoned the partnership for good (IIC, Chapter I, p. 162). 
 In the end, it all seemed like if Vitol Asia and Mastek never had direct business 
contacts. Vitol Asia had placed two layers of corporations between Mastek and itself. 
First, it placed two shell Malaysian corporations: Cosmos Capital Group Ltd and Keppel 
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Oil. Cosmos was to intermediate between Vitol Asia and Mastek. For its part, Keppel Oil 
was the link between Vitol and SOMO. Second, Vitol Asia hired a corporation called 
Bahrain E.C. to deal with financial transactions involving SOMO and other Iraqi 
institutions. The IIC discovered some transactions linking Bahrain E.C. to Vitol Asia and 
then to Vitol SA Geneva. They were letters of credit that Vitol S.A. Geneva extended to 
corporations trading with Iraq. The common denominator was that they had business 
accounts at JP Morgan-Chase London, in the UK. They led IIC’s investigators to bank 
accounts at Jordan National Bank Amman, where SOMO too had accounts.   
 
Taurus Group 
 The last case to discuss is Taurus Group. It is unique for it shows how American 
corporations evaded Saddam’s ban American companies. Yet, Taurus bought $256 
million of Iraqi oil. It did through a dozen small Russian front corporations (IIC, Chapter 
I, p. 125). For its ingenuity, Taurus is one of the most illustrative cases of corporate 
modeling to deal with a sanctions regime and regulatory regimes in general.      
Mr. Bem Pollmer founded Taurus Group in 1993 after resigning to its high 
executive post at Bayoil Corporation. The decision could not be more opportune. Both 
Taurus and Bayoil began to trade with Iraq very early into the sanctions regime. They 
both were among the most influential corporations lobbying against the sanctions and 
circumventing them. Taurus and Bayoil are examples of a dysfunctional corporate culture 
and governance. They both were found guilty of corporate wrongdoing in a New York 
Court (the New York Times, Sep. 20th, 2007). According to court records published by 
the New York Times, Taurus consisted of two main affiliates. One was Taurus Petroleum 
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Ltd, based in Nassau, Bahamas. The second was Taurus Petroleum Nevis, incorporated as 
a shared ownership between Mr. Pollmer’s sons, who also owned a holding company 
registered in Delaware. Both corporations had bank accounts at UEB Geneva and ING 
Bank Geneva, both banks based in Switzerland. In February 1995, Taurus Group formed 
a French-based company called Aredio Petroleum. In turn, Aredio hired a Liechtenstein-
based financial service firm called ReviTrust to process the creation of two other 
corporations: Fenar Petroleum Ltd. and Alcon Petroleum Ltd. Soon afterwards, Fenan 
and Alcon opened bank accounts at BNP Geneva but not with their names. They used 
Petrocorp AVV and Jabal Petroleum SAL respectively. Iraqi officials working for SOMO 
confessed to the IIC that “They understood Taurus was using Fenar and Alcon as front 
companies to purchase Iraqi crude oil” (IIC, Chapter I, p. 126).  
Fenar purchased oil in its own name, but Alcon hired Reliance Petroleum, a small 
Indian company, to do the purchases. Taurus, in order to conceal even more of its 
operation, ceded the ownership of Fenar Petroleum Ltd to Mr. Musbah Ladki. The 
corporate maneuvering allowed Taurus to extended 92 contracts to 17 small Russian front 
companies such as Sidanco, Machinoimport, Neftegazexport, Rosnefteimpex, Zangas, 
Zarnestservice, and Zarubezhneft. Taurus used some of those companies for just one 
contract. It used others to conceal money or move it from account to account, bank to 
bank. Most of those Russian companies dissolved right after UN ended the UN sanctions 
regime in Iraq. Again, after researching court records, as well as data from the IIC, the 
Duelfer Reports and the CFIJ, I was able to reconstruct Taurus’s operational model under 
the UN sanctions against Iraq. Figure 6.5 exemplifies the intricacy of Taurus’s corporate 
scheme. 
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Figure 6.5 – Taurus’s Intricate Corporate Scheme 
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intricate as its corporate models to evade UN auditors. The ring resembled a spider, 
linking about 50 bank accounts in nine different banks such as Credit Suisse, Banque 
Bruxelles, Lambert S.A., and UEB/BNP (IIC, Chapter I, p. 129). Most of the money 
circulated through wire transfers from two accounts under the names of Petrocorp and 
Jabal at First National Bank in Lebanon. Bank records showed that just between 1999 
and 2000, Petrocorp and Jabal wired $27.6 million from their accounts at First National 
Bank to Mr. Musbah Ladki’s accounts at Cairo Amman Bank (IIC, Chapter I, p. 130). 
The money ended up at UEB, in Geneva, after circulating through seven bank accounts to 
Cairo Amman Bank, in Cairo. For its part, Taurus Nevis wired $9.2 million from its 
accounts at UEB/BNP to Banque Bruxelles in 7 months (IIC, Chapter I, p. 130). And it 
later transferred the funds from Banque Bruxelles to Lambert and Credit Suisse. The IIC 
traced the money to Petrocorp’s accounts at First National Bank, then to Cairo Amman 
Bank, and lastly to SOMO’s accounts in Jordan National Bank. The money was to pay 
for execution of contracts. During the same period, Taurus Nevis wire transferred another 
$4 million dollars to Jabal’s account at First National Bank (IIC, Chapter I, p. 130). The 
money stayed there for two weeks, after which it was transferred to Cairo Amman Bank. 
It ended it up at SOMO’s account at Jordan National Bank.  
From August 1, 2001, to December 31, 2002, the flow of money from Taurus 
took two new itineraries. One began in an account at Credit Agricole Indosuez, in 
Genova. The account belonged to Taurus London, a small affiliate of Taurus Nervis. 
Taurus London moved $6 million to Alcon’s account at UEB/BNP, which then moved 
the funds to Jabal’s account at First National Bank, and from there to Cairo Amman Bank 
and SOMO’s Jordan National Bank (IIC, Chapter I, p. 130). A second itinerary began at 
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Taurus Nevis in Paris and Geneva. From August 2001 to December 2002, Taurus Nevis 
moved $14.3 million to Fenar’s account at UEB, which then wired the money to 
Petrocorp, and from there to Cairo Amman Bank and to Jordan National Bank (IIC, 
Chapter I, p. 130). 
 In all, the operation worked well for a long time. The Taurus Group executed 14% 
of all Iraqi contracts under the sanctions regime (IIC, Chapter I, p. 132). The operation 
involved complex wire transferring and corporate models. Taurus’s operations came to 
illustrate, like no other case, the use of corporate modeling to evade not only a sanctions 
regime but any regulatory regime.    
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter is about key agents and means of globalization: corporations and 
their various corporate models. The argument is twofold. First, I argue that corporations 
are a key agent of globalization, one with enormous influence over regulatory regimes. 
Second, corporations use corporate models to attain efficiency, high productivity and 
expansion, but above all they use corporate models to circumvent regulatory regimes. 
Corporate models were essential for the circumvention of the UN sanctions regime in 
Iraq. On the one hand, the government of Iraq employed corporate models to sell to and 
purchase from corporations and nations. Iraq used corporate models to reach local, 
regional and global markets. On the other hand, foreign corporations interested in the 
Iraqi market employed corporate models to evade UN sanctions and inspectors, conceal 
their wrongdoings, and laundry their profits. I used the first part of this chapter to analyze 
corporate models. I included an analysis of corporate governance and responsibility since 
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they are part of the overall structure of corporate models. In the second part, I present 
specific examples of how corporations employed corporate models to circumvent the UN 
sanctions regime upon Iraq.  
In this chapter we showed how corporations circumvented the UN sanctions 
regime in Iraq though corporate models. In general, the method seems repetitious, but the 
examples illustrate how corporations can deal with not only a sanctions regime but also 
regulatory regimes in general. It is not simple. Corporations do a whole set of corporate 
models and maneuvering mechanisms to avoid regulations, responsibility and 
accountability.  
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VII.  AGENTS AND MEANS OF GLOBALIZATION: THE GLOBAL ASSEMBLY 
LINE, CONTRACT MANUFACTURERS AND VALUE NETWORKS 
  
 “So this is our conference room, probably the largest screen in Asia – this is forty digital screens put 
together- […] Infosys can hold a virtual meeting of the key players from its entire global supply chain for 
any project at any time on that supersize screen. So their American designers could be on the screen 
speaking with their Indian software writers and their Asian manufacturers all at once. We could be sitting 
here, somebody from New York, London, Boston, San Francisco, all live.  And maybe the implementation 
is in Singapore, so the Singapore person could also be live here…   That’s globalization”. 
                                                         Thomas L. Friedman 
 
“Iraqi chemical industry appears to have evolved into a nation-wide, pan-industry, pan-academia merit 
based competition for project ideas and project implementation into an operation of regional proportions”.                                                                                                                                                                                             
   The ISG Report 
      
“By God, spare us your evil. Pick up your goods and leave.  We do not need an atomic bomb. We have the 
dual chemical. Let them take note of this. We have the dual chemical. It exists in Iraq”. 
                                                    Saddam Hussein 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
   
 I examined in previous chapters how Iraq utilized agents and means of 
globalization to circumvent the UN sanctions regime, reach global markets, and engage 
in trade with corporations, banks, financiers, NGOs, political parties and powerful 
individuals. Now I want to address a key question of this Dissertation: whether or not 
globalization allowed Iraq to rebuild its military infrastructure. I argue that Iraq attempted 
to rebuild its military capabilities in three main ways. First, Iraq designed and 
implemented a vast, ambitious procurement program to obtain components and parts for 
its military industry. Second, Iraq rebuilt part of its military industry. Third, Iraq 
outsourced an important portion of its military industry. In working toward these goals, 
Iraq’s plan for rearmament consisted of purchasing technologies, industrial machinery, 
and component parts; rebuilding a grid of assembly lines that were domestic and regional 
in scope; and assembling, researching, testing and storing missiles and WMDs.  
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 I have divided this chapter into two parts. First, I discuss how globalization trends 
of the 1990s brought about a radical transformation of the global economy, precisely at 
the time the UN was enforcing a multilateral sanctions regime against Iraq. Specifically, I 
examine the changes that globalization brought about to productive processes and 
manufacturing models. I then discuss the transition from an international to a 
transnational economy and from the local to the global assembly line. I explain in the 
second part how Iraq took advantage of the new global manufacturing model to rebuild 
its military-industrial complex.  
   
From International to Transnational Production      
 The UN sanctions regime did not allow Iraq to purchase weapons and to rebuild 
its military industry, especially industries linked to missiles and WMDs. Therefore, Iraq 
opted for manufacturing its own weapons. The problem for Iraq then became how to 
rebuild its military industrial complex and organize an efficient and secret production 
process. Basically, Iraq had two main choices. First, Iraq could manufacture its weapons 
in the traditional way: a domestic manufacturing operation based on Fordism or 
centralized assembly line. But such a choice was not feasible because UN inspectors 
could detect and stall the operation. Second, Iraq could do what most big transnational 
manufacturing corporations were already doing at the time: decentralize production 
processes and outsource the assembly line to foreign nations. Iraq opted for this choice. 
Iraq decentralized what was left of its military industrial production, dismantled portions 
of its assembly lines, and outsourced them to nations such as Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. 
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Iraq accomplished this thanks to some important structural changes that occurred in the 
global economy during the 1990s.  
  The globalization process of the 1990s brought about radical structural changes to 
productive processes. The changes applied to almost all economic sectors and industries, 
from agriculture and agroindustrial, to services and manufacturing. Globalization 
converted a) international productive processes into transnational productive processes; 
b) centralized manufacturing into contract manufacturing (CMs); c) lineal assembly lines 
into fragmented ensemble lines; d) local and regional distribution centers into global 
value networks.       
 International production process was the dominant manufacturing model for most 
of the 20th century. International production was “A simple extension of economic 
activities across national boundaries and is essentially a quantitative process” 
(Robinson, 2004, p.14). It accounted for just a few nations within well-defined small 
regional patterns. International production was in essence local, and bilateral in a handful 
of cases. It was rarely regional. But international production brought regional suppliers 
and importers to local production centers. In other words, regional economies were 
integrated into local industries as providers of raw materials and importers of finished 
products. Again, it was so for most of the 20th century. Before the 1950s, there were not 
regional economies at all (Dickens, 1998, p.74). There were no regional economic 
infrastructures, no regional integration, no regional markets and no regional trade treaties. 
Most nations were mainly suppliers of raw materials to the manufacturing centers in the 
U.S., Great Britain, Germany, France and two or three more European nations. With the 
exceptions of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, Latin American nations only embraced large 
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scale manufacturing by mid 1950s. They did it not as a means to integration but to 
substitute importation of industrial products for domestic industrial manufactures 
(Skidmore and Smith, 2008, p. 29). The model, above all, aimed at transforming trade 
relations that Latin American nations had with respect to the U.S. and European nations. 
For its part, most of Asia did not develop a manufacturing industry until 1960s. And even 
today it cannot be said that Africa is manufacturing center. Only South Africa could 
claim to have a manufacturing industry. Latin America, Asia and Africa were the largest 
importers and consumers of American and European manufactures. As a whole, it was 
only during the last 40 years of the 20th century that manufacturing became a 
transnational trend. 
 According to Palloix (1975) and Robinson (2004), transnational production 
processes are radically different from international production processes. Transnational 
production is based on four pillars: a) decentralization of production; b) fragmentation of 
assembly line and distribution centers; c) integration of management and supply chains; 
d) specialization through creation of segments of productions. 
First of all, transnational production is decentralized, fragmented and spatially 
dispersed throughout the global economy, but the fragments remain linked through 
integrated management and a chain of production (Robinson, 2004, p.16). Both are global 
in scope. Transnational production takes local manufacturing centers and imbeds them in 
regional clusters integrated into a global production process. Yet, integration does not 
mean asymmetrical relations between manufacturers on one hand, and suppliers of raw 
materials and importers of finished products on the other, for that was the case of the 
internationalization model. Rather, integration here refers to the production process itself, 
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to the assembly line in particular. Transnational production breaks up the assembly line 
into phases and segments which are then outsourced to independent manufacturers. It 
means that a large number of small companies, namely sweat shops, disseminated 
throughout the globe, participate in the manufacture of just one product. Each shop 
manufactures a piece of the final product. It does not matter which part or piece of the 
final product they produce; all shops are important to the quality and overall cost of the 
final product. Under this model, national borders matter, for the most part, in terms of 
cost differentials due to national economic policies which affect the global structure of 
production. Regional boundaries act as organizational mechanisms, as a means of 
grouping, integration, cost saving, and efficiency. Every segment of the production 
process counts when it comes to minimizing costs and increasing productivity. The entire 
process aims at reconsidering and reconstructing the notion of comparative advantage, a 
process that Krugman (1991) explains in his trade theory.   
 The result is decentralization and fragmentation on a large scale. Yet, note that, as 
Robinson does, that “Worldwide decentralization and fragmentation of the production 
process has taken place together with the centralization of command and control of the 
global economy” (Robinson, 2004, p. 17). Indeed, there is a global chain of production 
and a global chain of command also, one that is highly coordinated even when the 
commanding center, as Friedman (2008) argues, is far away from the production centers. 
For one, no corporation leads the production process even thought there is an inherent 
hierarchy in the form of a pyramid. Brand-name corporations are at the top, followed by 
retail corporations, suppliers and the assembliers. Lately, retail corporations and suppliers 
have been merging as to increase their size, market shares and bargaining power with 
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respect to brand-name corporations and contract manufacturers. In general, brand-name 
corporations, suppliers, retailers and contract manufacturers must be seen as a very 
cohesive structure of independent elements. If one of them fails, the entire operation 
collapses. Note that corporations like to keep little or no inventory at all, so they can save 
money in terms of warehousing, utilities and waste. It means that supply and demand 
must be highly synchronized, to the point that production occurs as actual orders for more 
products come in to the assembly line. The process is known as just in time production. 
The result is a fragmented production process, highly specialized but structurally strong 
and interconnected. Global production allows fragmented global production to work as a 
unit in different latitudes but in real time. 
 The intensification of globalization during the 1990s triggered technological 
innovations which facilitated further fragmentation and decentralization of assembly lines 
and the emergence and proliferation of contract manufactures (CMs) and global value 
networks (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001, p. 15), or as what Castell (2000) calls network 
societies, namely a new form of capitalist economic organization and association.        
 First of all, arguing that globalization transformed the international assembly line 
into a transnational operation actually means that globalization replaced Fordism with 
CMs and value networks (Robinson, 2006, p. 14; Castell, 2000, p. 37). Fordism was one 
of the most important innovations of the 20th century. It was the basis of the 
internationalization of the production process. It took manufacturing from a small scale 
regional operation to a large scale local one. As Berger and Doran argue, “Ford itself was 
a regional corporation before it was a local operation” (Berger and Doran, 1996, p. 74). 
Fordism centralized the entire production process. It put all phases of production 
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together, one after the other, uninterrupted, in a lineal sequence, under just one roof. 
Henry Ford called it the assembly line, consisting of a step by step process in which 
workers performed a specific, repetitious task. The process sought the specialization of an 
uneducated, unskilled labor force. The idea was to create large outputs at the lowest cost 
and at the fastest pace possible. Fordism was about mass production and speed. It 
demanded large volumes of raw materials for its operations and large markets to allocate 
its large outputs. Yet, corporations could not utilize Fordism equally in all nations. They 
had to introduce some structural modifications in the model to adapt it to the specific 
conditions of some nations. For example, Berger and Doran (1996), as well as Robinson 
(2004), argue that Fordism did not work well in small markets where mass production 
often led to high inventories and waste. Fordism even had problems in Japan, a large and 
rich market. Fordism created outputs so large there that it saturated the Japanese market, 
to the point that manufacturers had to sale their products at a loss (Berger and Doran, 
1996, p. 119). It led to massive layoffs and recessions. The transition from Fordism was a 
product of increased global competition for markets that original Fordist firms once 
dominated, and “An effort by these same corporations to lower costs and reverse 
declining rates of profit (from 1965-1985) that had characterized the leading Fortune 
500 companies on the downside of the Fordist production system” (Berger and Doran, 
1996, p. 127; Berger and Lester, 1997, p. 202).  
 The assembly line went through a series of transformations as new technologies 
emerged. The main was the restructuring of the production process dependant on 
parameters such as proximity to raw materials, market shares, access to cheap but 
qualified labor force, and geopolitical stability. Also, manufacturing corporations were 
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very cautions when expanding their operations to other nations. They invested in nations 
with stable macroeconomic indexes and political systems, but they also sought weak 
labor laws since Fordism required intense labor. Thus, the assembly line did not really 
change for many years. Corporations retooled and improved it, but they did it within the 
scope of Fordism. Along the way, corporations created a comparative advantage for 
themselves. Corporations with the most efficient assembly lines reduced more costs and 
saved more money. Logically, corporations with local and regional advantages were 
better positioned to adapt to the changes that came during the 1990s (Castell, 2000, 9. 64; 
Arndt & Kierzkowski, 2001, p. 20).      
   Globalization brought about drastic changes to the corporate world during the 
1990s. This time, it targeted the production processes, the assembly line in particular. In 
Chapter VI, I explicated that corporations decentralized themselves through corporate 
models such as holdings, subsidiaries, and parent and front companies among others. But 
then globalization took corporations a step further toward decentralization. Globalization 
allowed holdings, subsidiaries, and parent companies to decentralize their production 
processes and to dismantle their local assembly lines and take them to regional zones. 
They replaced Fordism, the once vertically highly integrated assembly line, with CMs 
and value networks strategically located across regional centers of productions 
(Robinson, 2004, p. 17; Castell, 2000, p. 36; Luthje, 1997, p. 81).  
 Indeed, first note that consolidation of regional centers of production came after 
the creation of regional trade treaties such as Mercosur and NAFTA, just to mention two. 
It must not be ignored that: 1) manufacturers lobbied strongly for the treaties; 2) it is not 
a coincidence that firms began to move their manufacturing operations to regions like the 
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Mexican-American and Argentinean-Uruguayan borders. Second, fragmentation of 
assembly lines and creation of regional production centers cannot be done without 
transnational flow and accumulation of capital essential, as Robinson (2004) argues, to 
finance production processes. Third, it all underlines Bhagwati’s image of a global 
economy: “The global economy is not just one gigantic unit. It is a group of production 
and trade blocs dispersed across regional lines” (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 47).     
 Arndt and H. Kierzkowski (2001) explain that, under the new paradigm, brand-
name corporations broke up their assembly lines into phases and segments and 
outsourced them to CMs. A cautious study would reveal that CMs are just subassemblies, 
subcontractors, intermediaries, partnerships, and independent suppliers located around 
the world but linked through a contract to a brand-name corporation. As Sturgeon argues, 
“CMs are independent units interconnected by a common denominator: a finished 
product” (Sturgeon, 1997, p.20). CMs are usually under cheap contracts, meaning that 
their values and profits are marginal, but they still provide large outputs at very low cost. 
Some CMs provide logistics, repair services, and distributions at very competitive costs. 
They divide the production chain into multiple segments linked through assembling 
sequences. This idea is based on the theory of value added (Arndt and H. Kierzkowski, 
2001, p. 25; Sturgeon, 1997, p. 22), meaning that each segment of the assembly process 
adds an X value to the product being produced. In the case of Iraq, CMs and value added 
were not to increase sale values but to create trade linkages with Iraq’s neighbors and 
conceal production from UN inspectors. This was particularly vital for Iraq’s military 
industry, for its missile and WMD programs in specific.  
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For Robinson (2004), Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001), and Castell (2000), CMs are 
at the core of the just-in-time-production process. Paradoxically, CMs are not brands. 
They do not stick their names and logos to the finished product they help to produce, 
which explains why they remain unknown to most people even though they are 
everywhere. In fact, as Arndt and Kierzkovski affirm, “An essential feature of 
transnational production process is the relationship between CMs and brand-name 
corporations, which structures the hierarchal relationships that still exist within the 
market” (Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001, p. 17). Brand-name firms are now at the top of 
the value chain. That is, technologies allow brand-name firms to focus on bureaucratic 
functions like management, marketing and investment while delegating to CMs the 
operational portions of the production process. Brand-name firms do not manufacture any 
product. CMs do. Table 7.1 shows some of the most important CMs in the global 
assembly line in terms of specialization and/or division of labor across industries.  
 
Table 7.1 - Some of the Most Important CMs in the Global Assembly Line 
 
 
 
Fabless company – minimal final 
ensemble and testing 
Full scale manufacturing and supply-
chain (engineering & logistics 
Full scale outsourcing of ensemble lines 
and/or plants 
Full scale manufacturing and supply 
chain management 
Large scale final ensemble with high 
volume outsourcing of key components 
Mass production of key components 
Customized final ensemble in key 
markets 
Final ensemble (box-build) including 
local CM partners 
 
Source: IMF, World Bank  
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The new business relationship between brand corporations and CMs emerged for 
the first time during the 1960s although in small scale. In 1981, IBM contracted a “no-
name” small corporation to take over a segment of IBM’s keyboard manufacturing 
process (Berger and Lester, 1997, p. 51). It was a great financial success, so soon other 
brand-name firms began to execute the same model. By the 1990s, new technologies and 
regional trade treaties facilitated the expansion of fragmentation of the assembly line, 
which in turn led to the proliferation and consolidation of CMs. Erickson, the mobile 
phone manufacturer, led the wave of fragmentation, decentralization and outsourcing of 
the 1990s, but Siemens mastered it to levels difficult to outperform (Berger and Lester, 
1997, p. 53). Siemens, a technological innovator itself, invested billions to create 
technologies that facilitated further fragmentation and outsourcing of assembly lines. 
Siemens in turn made billions selling its innovations to brand-name corporations and 
CMs (Berger and Lester, 1997, p. 52). Two cases illustrate how it all works.  
The first example is Coda Automotive, a small car manufacturer headquartered in 
Santa Monica, California. Coda’s owner himself, Kevin Czinger, revealed Coda’s 
production line to the New York Times. Coda only does accounting and marketing, and it 
employs a Chinese assembly line to manufacture its cars. The Chinese assembling firm 
purchases the chassis from Mitsubishi Corporation and the hood, bumpers and lights 
from Porsche. Delphi Corp. provides the power steering and BorgWarner Corp the 
transaxle. Coda makes electric cars that use lithium batteries, so it buys the batteries from 
Tianjin Lishen Battery, a Taiwanese subcontractor to Motorola and Samsung. Coda does 
not have a dealer network. It does not need it for it sells its cars over the internet.  
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The second example is more telling since most people ignore that computer 
brands like Dell and Hewlett-Packard (HP) do not really produce a thing. Pearson and 
Raymond (2006) explain in their reportage about Dell and HP that the two computer 
giants are just brands, or trademarks. They purchase components, meaning hard and 
software, from a number of suppliers around the world. They pay a shipping corporation 
for delivering the components to an assembly line owned by another corporation. Once 
the assembly manufactures the PCs, Dell and HP sell them in the global marketplace. 
Dell sells its products over the internet, so it does not need a net of stores and 
showrooms. HP does it through a global network of retail stores. Table 7.2 shows the 
largest CMs of hard and software in the global PC industry.     
 
Table 7.2 – The Largest CMs of Hard and Software in Global Computer Industry 
 
                 
Company
Revenues in US 
Millions per year
Solectron 16,149$                
Flextronics Int.'l 12,923$                
Sammina SCI 10,830$                
Celestica 10,004$                
jabil Circuit 4,086$                  
Hon Hai Precission 3,562$                  
Elcoteq Network 1,667$                  
Symex 1,620$                  
Manufacturers' Services 1,522$                  
Benchmark Electronics 1,277$                   
Sources: IFM, World Bank 
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It catches my attention that those corporations in Table 7.2 are not really 
recognizable. They never make the headlines. They are almost anonymous to the public 
at large. We ignore their jurisdiction and nations of origin. We do not know if they are 
publicly owned, if they are partnerships or private enterprises. We really know very little 
about them. However, their contractors, Apple, Dell and HP among others, enjoy public 
recognition as computer manufacturers. This is very important to understand how 
vulnerable a sanctions regime is to this new global assembly line. Later in this chapter, I 
will site more examples, but for now I want to mention the case of Huawei Technologies, 
a Chinese firm that started out as a CM but is today among the most recognizable 
Chinese brands. Huawei was a sub-assemblier for Motorola. It manufactured fiber optic 
equipment for radio communication, a technology that Motorola owned. It turned out that 
Huawei sold some of this equipment to Iraq, which then used them for its missile system. 
Huawei is today one of the largest assemblier of smart phones in the world. Its most 
known product is the Android, Google’s smart-phone.         
 In general, CMs guarantee: a) anonymity and dispersed accountability; b) mass 
production at high speed and very low cost; and c) linkage of the production process from 
national to regional and global assembly lines. CMs are by nature transnational network 
builders. The computer industry calls it the Silicon Valley System, but scholars 
knowledgeable of the assembly industry call it the value network paradigm 
 For Pearson and Raymond (2006), and Berger and Lester (1997), there are three 
types of value networks. First, there is the captive value network. It is a CM that depends 
on a brand-name corporation for it survival. CMs are mainly suppliers and intermediaries 
highly reliant on one or two customers. They are so dependent that if they lose a contract, 
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they could go out of business. They are not treated equally; yet, they have no choice but 
to stay captive of their customers. Second, there is the relational value network, in which 
a CM builds a close, long-term business relationship with a brand-name corporation. The 
relationship can be contractual, but cost is not the base of the contract. Instead, trust, 
reciprocity and commitment to efficiency and productivity are the basis for their 
relationship. Relational value networks promote positive corporate culture and norms, as 
well as responsive corporate governance. Thirdly, there is the turn-key value network. 
These are short and/or long- term relations between highly qualified CMs specializing in 
manufacturing different pieces of the same product. Their relations consist in a pledge to 
cooperate and get the job done. Turn-keys networks are intrinsic parts of all productive 
sectors, from banking to infrastructures, chemical and high-tech industries. Saddam 
utilized turn-key networks for two main goals: 1) jump start trade with its neighbors, 
meaning regional trade; 2) obtain political support from contractors and subcontractors, 
any firm that had business relation with Iraq. I mentioned in Chapters II and III that Iraq 
granted contracts to firms and nations that publicly opposed the UN sanctions regime.    
 In addition, Pearson and Raymond (2006), as well as Berger and Lester (1997), 
explicate that corporations often employ turn-key networks to circumvent regulatory 
regimes. On one hand, Pearson and Raymond (2006) argue that turn-key networks are all 
over the global economy. They tend to operate around regional manufacturing centers, 
but they have very low entry-exit requirements, which allow them to move in and out of 
markets with no difficulty. Brand-name corporations often use turn-key value networks to 
enter and exit emergent markets, depending on the macroeconomic conditions of a 
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particular market. Some corporations use turn-key value networks in the developing 
world to take advantage of weak laws and enforcement mechanisms there.  
Berger and Lester (1997), on the other hand, find that turn-key networks over 
time develop solid relations with large numbers of corporations specializing in cross-
cutting operations, which refers to dual use components required to manufacture a 
specific product used in dissimilar industries. That is the case, for example, of certain 
chemicals manufactured for the pharmaceutical and semi-conductor industries, but they 
can also be used to manufacture some electronic components needed to assembly a long-
range missile system. In fact, the U.S. Congress strictly regulates technologies that can 
have a use in military manufacturing industries. The most notable is the nuclear 
technology conceived for civilian purposes but that can be utilized for military ends. 
Though there are others not so notable. For instance, Iraq purchased large quantities of 
spare parts presumably for its trucking industry. The parts ended up in the Iraqi army, for 
its trucks and even tanks. As a whole, value networks take specialization and division of 
labor to levels never attained in the history of assembling and even industrialization. 
Pearson and Raymond (2006), Berger and Lester (1997), Sturgeon (1997) and other 
scholars call it dual fragmentation, or fragmentation of fragmentation, in which a 
corporation outsources some operations to CMs, but then some of those CMs retain a 
portion of their contracts and outsource the other portion to other CMs, and so on. This is 
particularly feasible when cargo transportation is cheap due to low operational costs and 
proximity between production, distribution and consumption centers.  
The model works well for nations linked by bilateral and regional trade. As I 
stated earlier, intensification of globalization during the 1990s coincided with the creation 
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of regional trade blocs and, as result, CMs and value-networks. The intensification of 
globalization led to the emergence of new manufacturing centers, this time aligned to 
regional trade blocs like NAFTA, ASEAN, EU, and MERCOSUR. Thus, as Berger and 
Lester (1997) explain, now Mexico is the manufacturing center in North America; 
Malaysia is the manufacturing hub for Asia and Brazil is for South America. Hungary, 
Poland, the Czech Republic became the manufacturing centers of Europe as soon as they 
entered the European Union. Hungary alone had 8 manufacturing centers in 2001. And of 
course, the obvious exception is China, which has become the manufacturing basket of 
the world. Figure 7.1 below shows some of the largest CMs in the information 
technology industry in the world. The Figure gives us an idea about percentages of 
market shares per nation of manufacturing centers across regions. 
 
  Figure 7.1 – Market Shares of CMs per Nation across Regions 
 
Sources: IMF, the World Bank 
Mexico, 29
Brazil, 26
Malaysia, 21
East Europe, 
16
China, 39
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 Although wages are not the only factors influencing the proliferation and 
consolidation of CM centers, note that the largest CM centers are aligned to the lowest 
labor costs across regions and/or regional trade agreements. For instance, as for 2008, 
IMF and World Bank’s data show that Mexico has the lowest salaries in North America 
and NAFTA. Mexico has the largest CM centers in North America and NAFTA as well. 
In the European Union, Eastern Europe has the lowest salaries and the largest number of 
CM sites. And we can say the same of China in Asia and Brazil in MERCOSUR. 
One notable point here is that the new global manufacturing model does not seem 
to create problems for corporations in terms of cultural, social and political adaptation. 
American corporations work well in Mexico; Argentinean firms do well in Brazil, and the 
same is for British firms in Hungary. Corporations make profits and workers do not seem 
to mind. Of course, such a “stable relations” do not come naturally. In fact, global 
relations require a great deal of lobbying, bargaining and political maneuvering with 
institutions and governments to secure “peaceful” outsourcing. For example, in the case 
of China, the Chinese state works closely with corporations in a political process 
designed to facilitate their relocation and adaptation to China’s political, social and 
cultural environments.   
In all, the new model has brought about the relocation of economic activities and 
the realignment of productive forces. Productive structures and components have come 
together regardless of political systems, economic patterns and geography. Political 
relations still matter, but for the most part the highly centralized micro-managed Chinese 
capitalism has no problem doing business with the highly unregulated decentralized US 
economic system. The German and Japanese coordinated production models work well 
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with the East Asian NICs. They all converge through global linkages, including economic 
and political ties.   
 
Transnational Production and Regulatory Regimes 
Corporations first decentralized corporate operations through corporate models 
such as holdings, subsidiaries, parent companies and others. But as Robinson (2004) and 
Henderson (2005) argue, with CMs and value-networks, they took decentralization and 
fragmentation of production processes to levels never seen before in the corporate world. 
Both decentralization and fragmentation of production processes aimed at minimizing 
costs while maximizing profits, but they also attempt to minimize accountability and 
responsibility at both corporative and national levels. In the Iraqi case, Iraqi corporations 
and Iraq itself were capable of circumventing the UN sanctions regime by adopting 
production processes within the context of bilateral trade agreements and regional trading 
schemes. On one hand, Iraq utilized subsidiaries, intermediaries, and parent and front 
companies to access the global markets, so it could acquire technologies, machineries and 
components for its military industry. On the other hand, Iraq utilized CMs and value-
networks within the context of bilateral trade agreements with neighboring nations to 
rebuild an assembly line for its military industry. The formula seemed perfect for the 
overall objectives of the Iraqi government, which was the circumvention of UN sanctions 
with a minimum of accountability and responsibility.     
Indeed, I find that transnational production presents a direct challenge to 
regulatory regimes precisely due to its level of fragmentation, dispersion and 
specialization, which in turn guarantees a high percentage of anonymity. The problem is 
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that, as Henderson (2005) explains, by default, outsourcing manufacturing contracts 
means outsourcing both legal responsibility and corporate accountability to a third party. 
In fact, it means outsourcing to multiple parties because, as we stated earlier, under the 
new manufacturing scheme outsourcing is about breaking up the entire assembly line and 
selling its pieces to multiple contractors which, in turn, outsource some portions of their 
contracts to subcontractors.  
Under this manufacturing network, corporate accountability is no longer relative 
to internal corporate structures but to external forces and actors. The result is a partition 
of contracts, the dissemination of duties and obligations through an amalgam of obscure 
parties. It all represents a true challenge to international institutions and nation-states in 
terms of supervision, enforcement and litigation. First, tracing evidence and assigning 
responsibilities becomes a true legal challenge for institutions that too often lack legal 
authority to take on transnational corporations. Even the follow the money method 
becomes somehow unfeasible because, as Robinson (2004) argues, transnational 
production liberates transnational money from institutional constrains. Even national 
governments lose control over the movement of money throughout regional and global 
markets. Second, enforcing accountability becomes a gargantuan task. It is so for nations 
with not enough financial resources to enforce their own laws. Poor nations are too 
vulnerable to powerful corporations. In addition, some nations are not really interested in 
holding corporations responsible for wrongdoings. They depend on corporations to create 
jobs, increase exports, and balance their national budgets. In fact, enforcing 
accountability is even difficult for rich nations like U.S., France, U.K, Germany and 
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others. They are often trying to reconcile complicated geopolitical and economic 
dilemmas with rules and legal regimes they have set for themselves.  
 
The Iraqi Case 
 In previous chapters I found that agents of globalization such as corporations, 
NGOs, individuals and nation-states, including Iraq, successfully and consistently 
circumvented the UN sanctions regime. They did it through means of globalization such 
as global trade, global banking, and global corporative models. In this section, I present 
findings that respond to the central questions of this dissertation: Did globalization allow 
Iraq to circumvent the UN sanctions regime and rebuild its missile and WMD programs?  
 There is a key point to observe here. UN inspectors and American troops did not 
find WMDs in Iraq after the invasion of 2003. That is, they did not find the final product, 
and by that I mean no missile, bomb or any kind of ammunition armed, ready to be 
launched, with chemical and bacteriological agents. But the objective of this dissertation 
is not to argue whether or not Iraq had such a final product. Rather, the central question 
here is if globalization facilitates the circumvention of a multilateral sanctions regime and 
if circumvention could in turn lead to rearmament. I find that yes: a) Iraq circumvented 
the UN sanctions regime; b) Iraq utilized the means and agents of globalization to 
circumvent the UN sanctions regime; c) Iraq rebuilt a good portion of its military 
manufacturing infrastructure; d) Iraq organized a regional and global procurement 
program to design, manufacture, and test missiles and WMDs.  
 To present and discuss the evidence, I divide this section into two parts. In the 
first part, I look at Iraq’s procurement effort as a whole. I present a brief history and some 
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accounts about reforms Iraq undertook to adapt to the demands of the UN sanctions 
regime. In the second part, I present two case studies: the Missile Program and the 
Chemical-Bacteriological Program.  
 
Iraq’s Procurement Effort 
 The CIA, the ISG, the IIC, the CFIJ, and other sources coincide in that Coalition 
Forces destroyed most of Iraq’s military infrastructure in 1991. It included about three 
thousand short, medium and long range missiles, and most of its WMD stockpiles. They 
also acknowledged that Iraq never fully recovered its military levels after the American 
led invasion of 1991. Particularly, Iraq did not really manage to replenish the military 
arsenals it had before 1991. But that does not mean that Saddam sat and waited for 
miracles. He was not a religious person after all. After 1991, Saddam worked arduously 
to rebuild Iraq’s military capabilities. He conceived and implemented a plan to 
circumvent the UN sanctions regime.  
Indeed, I revealed in Chapter II how Iraq managed to sell oil by manipulating oil 
prices, imposing arbitrary fees, and bribing nation-states, corporations, individuals and 
NGOs. I explained in Chapter III that Iraq entered trade protocols with Middle Eastern 
nations. In Chapter V, I showed how Saddam reformed Iraq’s banking industry, and that 
he created a network of banks all around the Middle East. In Chapter VI, I provided 
examples of how Saddam created hundreds of corporations throughout the Middle East. 
It was all part of a sound plan to circumvent the UN sanctions regime and rearm Iraq. 
Saddam personally managed the rearmament effort through the Military Industrial 
Commission (MIC), an institution of his own creation (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime 
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Strategic Intent, p. 8). The effort was top secret and enjoyed priority over any other 
governmental plan or activity. The Iraqi government did not hesitate in assigning 
resources to it. Saddam even put Iraq’s intelligence services to work for MIC and the 
procurement effort.    
 According to the Duelfer Report, MIC became a solid institution after numerous 
restructurings. It emerged during the 1980s as SOTI, but it then evolved into MIO, after 
which it became the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI). It 
became MIC in 1991, responsible for planning, financing, and managing Iraq’s military 
industries, including those engaged in the missile, chemical-biological, and nuclear 
programs. MIC managed 95% of all purchases for the Ministry of Defense (Duelfer 
Report, 2004, Regime Strategic Intent, p. 18). But by 1997, after the failure of several 
projects, Saddam introduced several modifications. He made MIC a division of the 
Ministry of Defense, responsible for acquiring components, equipment and technologies 
for the military worth millions of dollars.  MIC was basically the procurement arm for the 
Ministry of Defense. Its budget grew from $7.8 million in 1993 to $2.7 billion in 2002 
(Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Strategic Intent, p. 19). The organization obtained about 
$300 million per year as result of its oil sales through the trade protocols with Syria, 
Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey. A second source of revenues was ARADET, an Iraqi front 
company with plants in most Middle Eastern nations. ARADET produced and sold oil 
derivatives all around the world, with annual revenues of nearly $112.2 million (Duelfer 
Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 37). ARADET also had an 
investment arm to purchase small failing factories in Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Lebanon.    
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 In reality, MIC consisted of hundreds of mid-side military front companies, 
manufacturing plants, and research and training centers dispersed throughout the Middle 
East (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 53). I call them military 
because they only traded products and technologies that had military applications. We 
should not confuse them with civilian front companies studied in Chapter V and VI, 
which traded products for civilian purposes. More importantly, civilian front companies 
did not enjoy the support that military front companies had from IIS and ISS. Civilian 
front companies, moreover, did not enjoy the personal support of Saddam Hussein. 
Military front companies did. Saddam appointed CEOs for military front companies. He 
met with and briefed them weekly, in some instances daily. Saddam even set up 
intelligence offices throughout the Middle East to protect and oversee “his” military front 
companies.  
 Military front companies acted with relative independence. Unlike civilian front 
companies, they could create and dismantle subsidiaries, intermediaries and parent 
companies. They were autonomous, meaning that they sought their own funding. Yet, 
they could not move their money around so easily for they had to report directly to 
Saddam. The number of Iraqi military front companies grew rapidly from 1996 to 2002. 
Their budgets grew as well, reaching $8 billion dollars yearly, a considerable amount for 
an embargoed nation (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 53-54). 
The ISG calculated that the workforce for military front companies amounted to 
approximately 63,000 in 2002 (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, 
p. 54). And as for research front companies, they usually worked closely with universities 
to camouflage their work. They researched mostly missile and bio-chemical technologies. 
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Military research projects grew from 40 in 1994 to about 3,200 in 2002 (See Annex K). 
Below is a list of the most important military companies (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime 
Finance and Procurement, p. 54-55).  
 
Table 7.3 – Most Important Military Companies in Iraq 
 
                
                                       Research Companies
Al Milad General Company Al Quds General Company
Al Battani General Company Al Khawarizmi General Co.
Ibn-Sina' General Company Al Raya General Company
Al Kindi General Company al Basil General Company
Al Fat 'h General Company Al Razi General Company
                             Manufacturing Companies
Jabir Bin-Hayyan General Company Al Hadir General Company
Salah-al-Din General Company Al Zahf Al Kabir General Co.
al Karamah General Company Al 'Izz General Company
Ibn-Firnas General Company Al Salam General Company
Al Mansur General Company Al Nida' General Company
Al Nu'man General Company Sab'a Nissan General Company
Al Yarmuk General Company Al Samud General Company
al Majid General Company Al Faw General Company
Al Walid General Company Al Radwan General Company
Al 'Ubur General Company Tariq General Company
Saddam General Company al Shahid General Company
Hittin General Company Umm-al-Ma'arik General Company
Al Rashid General Company Al Qa'qa General Company
Badr General Company Sinharib General Company
Ibn-Rushd General Company Sa'd General Company
Ibn-Majid General Company Tabuk General Company
Al Nasr Al'Azim General Company
Al Harith General company
                               Front Companies
Al Bashair Al Mufakhir
Armos  
   
Source: ISG and the Duelfer Report  
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I took the data from the ISG Report and the Duelfer Report. The data reflect the 
ranks of Iraqi military companies according to the size of their operational budgets. The 
Reports did not publish the actual numbers, and I could not find them in any other source. 
But digging into Iraqi (ISS and IIS) records, I found that, for example, Al Milad and Al 
Quds had the two largest Iraqi research front companies (ISS, p.116). Al Milad focused 
its research on missile systems while Al Quds focused on WMDs (IIS, p. 71) By the same 
token, among military manufacturing companies, Jabir Bin-Hayyan and Al Hair had the 
largest budgets (ISS, p.35; IIS, p. 78). Jabir Bin-Hayyan was the largest assemblier of 
components and equipment for Iraqi missiles. Al Hadir had the largest laboratories to 
process and test chemical and bacteriological substances in Iraq. For their part, Al 
Bash’ir, Al Mufakhir and ARMOS were procurement companies (ISS, p.42; IIS, p. 66). 
They had the largest procurement budgets among all Iraqi corporations. They procured 
components, equipment and technologies for both the Iraqi missile and WMD programs, 
while Mufakhir procured materials for the short-lived Iraqi nuclear program. Al Bash’ir 
and ARMOS emerged as the two largest, most important Iraqi front companies under the 
UN sanctions regime (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 56). 
They contracted and subcontracted with hundreds of small companies throughout the 
Middle East to design, manufacture, refurbish, test and transport components for missile 
and WMD programs. These contractors had no direct relationship with the Iraqi 
government. They worked separately most of the time without knowing that, in the end, 
they produced for the Iraqi military.  
 MIC created Al-Basha’ir in 1991 (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p. 56-57). Its CEO was Munir Mamduh Awad al-Kubaysi, a former 15-year 
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employee of IIS. The company specialized in assembling. It had nine assembly plants 
dispersed throughout Iraq, some of them camouflaged in bunkers. It had another 19 
assembly plants in Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Egypt, the four nations with which Iraq had 
Trade Protocol agreements (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 
56-67). Al-Basha’ir had one problem and one virtue. Its problem was that it was short of 
funding compared to its large, ambitious projects. Its virtue was that it was a great 
innovator in a nation so centralized that it left too little room for innovations. A careful 
research revealed that Al-Bashra’ir’s main innovation was outsourcing. Through 
subcontractors, Al-Bashra’ir exported oil and, with the proceeds, purchased and imported 
military equipment and technologies, which it then channeled to its contracted 
manufacturers   (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 56-67). 
 According to the Duelfer Report, Mr. Munir, the CEO, established the Syrian 
Division through his friend Dr. Asif Shalish and his family. This Syrian family owned 
SES International, a procurement corporation with a dozen small companies in Syria 
(Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 74). Munir wanted SES to 
open more companies, not only in Syria but also throughout the Middle East and even in 
Europe if possible. For that end, Munir granted 89% of all Iraq’s military procurement 
contracts to SES. Al-Basha‘ir became the largest investor to SES, and Syria became the 
center of illicit procurement to Iraq’s military industry. The company’s name was found 
in hundreds of contracts to purchase technologies, weapons, “dual-use” materials as well 
as legitimate goods and supplies. SES smuggled the merchandise through the Syrian-Iraqi 
border with the complicity of Iraq‘s intelligence and secret services. This in part explains 
why it went undetected by UN inspectors (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and 
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Procurement, p. 74). Also, Al Basha’ir was the first Iraqi company to use humanitarian 
missions to smuggle military equipment into Iraq. Al-Basha’ir used a Bulgarian NGO 
known as JEFF Company to obtain spare parts for T-72 tank, artillery, and trucks. The 
NGO shipped the cargoes by air via Syria, Jordan and Turkey. Al-Basha’ir tallied those 
shipments as “Spare parts for air conditioning for hospitals” (Duelfer Report, 2004, 
Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 74-75; Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 59).  
 Fort its part, ARMOS was a front company that Al-Baha’ir created in 1998 in a 
joint-venture with Russia. ARMOS accounted for about 15 to 20% of Al-Baha’ir 
procurement contracts (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 74). 
The Company’s mission was to account for all military contracts with Russia. This 
included vital procurements for the Iraqi air force, helicopters, and missile defense 
systems. ARMOS purchased from Russia planes and helicopter engines in pieces to 
assembly them in Iraq (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 116). 
ARMOS contracted an NGO to purchase components for the Iraqi missile project. The 
NGO was “The Russian Nuclear Disaster Victims Fund Institution” from Russia (Duelfer 
Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 116). By 2003, ARMOS had spent $3 
billion dollars in Russian military products for Iraq‘s numerous military programs 
(Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 116; Albright and Khidhir, 
1997, p. 60). ARMOS even expanded to markets like Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine. 
There it spent about $700 million in parts and components. ARMOS purchased from 
Poland 250 engines for Volga missiles (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p. 121-123). In 2002, ARMOS paid $70 million to a Cypriot firm to acquire 
and ship to Iraq a Bulgarian made electro-chemical lab. Other purchases, through the 
349 
Cypriot intermediary, included about 65 types of substances for “fertilizers” and the 
petro-chemical industry (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 139; 
Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 59). 
 According to the IIC, the Duelfer Report, and the CFIJ, Iraq used four main routes 
for its procurement programs. First, Iraq utilized Iranian territorial waters. Ironically, it 
did it with the consent of its archenemy: the Iranian government. Iranian coastguards 
even escorted the ships all throughout the zone. Second, Iraq utilized the Iraqi-Jordanian 
border. To camouflage this military operation, Iraq contracted the Land Transport 
Company, a front company Iraq created to carry out the terms of the Jordanian-Iraqi trade 
agreement of 1998 (Duelfer Report, 2004, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 137-
142). Third, Iraq utilized the Iraqi-Syrian border. Again, Iraq assigned the operations to a 
civilian company created under the Syrian-Iraqi trade agreements. I should point out that 
there was a sharp increase of smuggling though this route when in 2001 Syria and Iraq 
reopened the rail tracks between Mosul in Northern Iraq and Aleppo in Syria. In June 10, 
2002, the Times of London reported in headlines that Baghdad was using new rail tracks 
in Syria to smuggle military hardware. According to the article, the cargoes included old 
Bulgarian tanks, Czech-made Scud missile guidance systems, and surface-to-air missiles 
(Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p. 198; Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 59).   
 In all, Al-Basha’ir created hundreds of front companies to evade the UN sanctions 
and inspectors. The ISG accounted for nearly 230 such companies. Most of them closed 
operations after conducting just one or two transactions. Iraqi front companies were 
instrumental in procuring the materials necessary for the three primary military programs 
established by Saddam Hussein: the missile, chemical and biological programs.  
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Two Case Studies on Iraq‘s Rearmament: Missile and Chemical Programs 
 Iraq’s rearmament included conventional and non-conventional weapons, but my 
research focuses on non-conventional. Specifically, in this section I look at the missile 
and chemical programs. I examine how Iraq utilized agents and means of globalization to 
circumvent the UN sanctions regime and procure materials for its missile and chemical 
programs. I selected these two programs for four main reasons. First, the two programs 
complemented each other, meaning that Saddam wanted missiles armed with chemical 
agents. Second, by Saddam’s own accounts, both programs were key parts of Iraqi 
deterrence policy toward Iran and Israel. The irony is that it did not deter the United 
States. Third, the programs required significant logistical, technical, and financial 
commitments from Iraq. Iraq’s missile and chemical programs demonstrated that Iraq 
was capable of evading UN sanctions and inspectors. Fourth, they were the most 
scrutinized of all Iraqi rearmament efforts. They were scrutinized by the media, UN 
inspectors on the ground, intelligence services from the U.S. and Israel in particular, and 
two no-fly zones over Iraq  enforced by American and British air forces. 
 
The Missile Program 
 Iraq’s missile program was the result of a 30-year effort by the Iraqi regime. It 
was a secret that everyone knew. The UN knew about the program. The CIA and Israeli 
secret agencies knew about it. In fact, Iraq itself made it known as a means to deter Iran, 
Saddam‘s main security concern. Iraq began to build missiles in 1972 when it signed 
contracts with the Soviet Union. Iraq first focused on short-range missile systems, 
spending about $8 billion from 1974 to 1988. Iraq also signed contracts with Yugoslavia, 
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North Korea, Brazil and Argentina during 1980s (Duelfer Report, 2004, Delivery 
Systems, p. 3; Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 42). It was the “war of the cities” between 
Bagdad and Teheran that convinced Saddam of the need for long-range missiles and 
missiles armed with WMDs. This second aspect is important because, according to the 
CIA and ISG, at the time Iraq already had WMDs. Yet, all attempts to transport and drop 
them over Iranian territories had failed miserably. But the Independent IIC, after the Iraq-
Iran War Iraq had serious difficulties replenishing its missile stockpiles. The effort was 
too costly, mainly when oil prices were so low, and oil was Iraq’s main source of 
revenue. Thus, Iraq chose to design and assembly its own missiles. The CIA and the ISG 
assure us that, by 1988, Iraq had its own assembly line ready to start production (Duelfer 
Report, Delivery Systems, p. 3-4). Iraq purchased enough components to assembly 1000 
Scud-B missiles, most of them acquired from the Soviet Union, North Korea, Yugoslavia, 
and France (ISG, p. 229). Iraq bought components from the Soviet Union to assembly 
400 Scud-B missiles and ground support equipment in two years. By 1991, Iraq had the 
technological capabilities to arm the Scuds with WMDs. The American led invasion of 
1991 destroyed most of them (Duelfer Report, Delivery Systems, p.3-4; Albright and 
Khidhir, 1997, p. 53). The UN sanctions forced Iraq to rethink its rearmament.   
 UN Security Council Resolution 687 ordered Iraq to dismantle its long-range 
missile programs, but Resolution 687 allowed Iraq to develop and possess some types of 
missiles provided that they did not exceed the 150 km range (Duelfer Report, Delivery 
Systems, p. 17). The proposal came from Russia. China and France backed it up. The 
U.S. and United Kingdom agreed in an effort to get Russia, France and China to vote for 
the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. The U.S. imposed as condition that Iraq deploys its 
352 
missiles along the Iraq-Iran border, pointing at Iran at all times. It was a great opportunity 
for Iraq because now it could legally work on missile projects it had put on hold for some 
years. Once the UN passed the new resolution, Iraq set itself two goals, which included 
rebuilding plants to manufacture missiles and establishing a procurement operation to 
acquire technologies, components and machinery. This takes us back to the central 
question of this dissertation: how would Iraq establish and implement its procurement 
program? Would globalization help? To answer this question, I examine the case of the 
Al Samud II missile.  
The ISG always suspected that Iraq was secretly rebuilding its missile capabilities 
beyond 150 km. It confirmed it when Husayn Kamil deserted the Iraqi regime in 1995. 
Kamil was Saddan’s son-in law and, more importantly, Chairman of the MIC. He was in 
charge of the missile and WMD programs. Kamil confirmed that Iraq had already rebuilt 
9 plants, which employed about 3,000 technicians and engineers working on eight 
assembly lines for three different missile models. Kamil also stated that Iraq had 
outsourced portions of the assembly lines to Syria and Egypt, and that Iraq was buying 
parts and machinery from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, China and North Korea, Bulgaria, 
Yugoslavia and even American corporations (ISG, Annual Report, 1997, p. 91). Of 
course, UN inspectors and American intelligence services did not confirm everything 
Kamil said. They assumed that Kamil would inflate his information to obtain some 
benefits from it. UN inspectors investigated the allegation that American corporations 
were selling equipment and technologies to Iraq. This led to a paper trail followed up and 
published by the New York Time on September 16th, 2002. The trail connected the Iraqi 
regime to Huawei, a Chinese contract-manufacturer (CM) that operated with technologies 
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licensed by American corporations such as IBM, Digital Equipment Corp, Sun 
Microsystems, Qualcomm, and Motorola, among others. The Clinton Administration had 
granted permission to American firms to sell their technologies to Chinese entities, and 
Huawei was one of the beneficiaries. Another Chinese corporation, stated-owned, 
purchased some of Huawei’s products and sold them to Iraq. Some of the products were 
microelectronics, transmission lines, fiber optics, receptors and respondent devices. They 
all are used in the missile industry.    
 UN inspectors later found that the Iraqi missile program had begun as early as 
1993 when Saddam Hussein asked his most important scientists and engineers to work on 
a missile system capable of striking beyond 150 km (Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p. 
17; Cordesman, 1998, p. 14). Saddam’s project was both politically and financially risky; 
politically because it was a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and 
financially because it was going to be expensive due to the costs of circumventing the 
sanctions regime. Saddam did not mind. He secretly brought in engineers and technicians 
from nations such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, North 
Korea, China, France, Argentina, South Africa, and India (Duelfer Report, Delivery 
System, p. 79; New York Times, Sep. 16th, 2002; Cordesman, 1998, p. 21; Albright and 
Khidhir, 1997, p. 61). Those technicians and engineers, along with Iraqi engineers, 
immediately began to work on a first project directly assigned by Saddam Hussein. The 
project consisted in a 400-1,000 km range solid propellant missile. Saddam Hussein 
called it Al Samud II. To procure the project, Saddam created the front company Al 
Karamah State Establishment, also known as Al Karamah General Company. The 
company included 16 plants in Iraq and dozens of contractors and subcontractors in 
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Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. At some point, Al Karamah employed about 2,500 workers, 
including Iraqis and non-Iraqis (Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p. 166; Cordesman, 
1998, p. 22; Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 61). Table 7.4 rights below represents the 
organizational assembly lines for the Iraqi missile Al Samud II. For the Table, I 
reproduced obtained from both the ISG and the Duelfer Report. 
 
Table 7.4 – Organizational Assembly Line of an Al Samud II Missile 
 
 
                                                                  
Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report, 
  
The Table reveals that three factories and seven companies participated in 
assembling Al Samud II missiles, but in reality there were many more factories involved. 
The chart does not include them for two main reasons. First, a company can own several 
factories or plants. Second, and more importantly, Iraqi companies outsourced operations 
to private contractors or CMs to minimize costs and mislead UN inspectors and 
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American intelligence services. The plants operated independently, and management and 
operators did not know each other. The plants were rather small with an average of 10-20 
employees who were not aware of final product they produced (Cordesman, 1998, p. 79; 
Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 71). And the plants were located throughout Iraq, Syria, 
and Egypt. For example, data collected from the Duelfer Report and the Iraqi Survey 
Group (ISG) show that Al Ma’mun was located in Iraq, but its owner was a Christian 
Syrian émigré, living in Iraq for over 30 years. Al Ma’mun was the center of the 
manufacturing process, from research to manufacture and testing. But Al Ameen and Al 
Fida’a were based in Syria while Al Mutassem was based Egypt. They had Syrian and 
Egyptians employees, but the management was Iraqi, members of the Iraqi Intelligence 
Services (IIS). Still, note that each company specialized in assembling a piece of the 
missile, and only one plant would see the missile completely manufactured. This plant 
was Al Mutassern Factory at Al Mussayyib. It was responsible for putting together the 
final pieces of the missile and testing it (Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p. 172).  
It is central to mention the role that former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia played 
in the Al Samud II project. The Duelfer Report and the ISG found data confirming that 
the government of Yugoslavia owned Yugoimport, a corporation that repaired and 
managed 32 small plants or shops to assembly portions of Al Samud II missiles. The 
government of Yugoslavia financed the operations (Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p. 
181; ISG, p. 271; Cordesman, 1998, p. 29; Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 61). 
Data collected from the Duelfer Report and ISG indicate that delegations from 
Yugoslavia and Iraq met from February 25th to March 2nd of 1999 in Bagdad. The Iraqi 
Minister of Defense headed the Iraqi delegation, and Major General Jovan Cekovic, 
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Director General of Yugoimport, headed the Yugoslav party. The delegates signed a trade 
protocol. According to the Protocol, Yugoimport was to repair at least 21 Iraqi plants to 
assembly portions of Al Samud II missiles, for which Yugoimport would provide 
equipments and tools. For their part, the Iraqis had two proposals for the Yugoslavs. First, 
they wanted to manage the Protocol through the Iraqi-Syrian and Iraqi-Jordanian 
Protocols. Second, they wanted to pay not with currency but with crude oil and some of 
its derivatives. The Yugoslavian government agreed. They financed the operation through 
loans obtained from Infobank, the Belarusian state-owned bank. The Bank, in turn, issued 
bonds that the Yugoslavian government backed up. Yugoimport appointed Colonel Krista 
Grujovic as its representative in Bagdad.  Colonel Grujovic traveled to Amman, Jordan, 
in 1998, where he opened several bank accounts for Yugoimport FDSP. He later named 
the accounts to MIKA, and later to MEGA, both Lebanese companies registered in 
Amman. In all, the operation lasted for about three years, during which the Iraqis 
manufactured and tested 70 missiles in cooperation with engineers and technicians from 
Yugoslavia (Duelfer Report, Delivery System, p. 166; ISG, p. 274; ISG, p, 129). 
Next, I examine the second part of the missile program: the procurement 
operation. The operation was based on three pillars: purchase scrapped parts, target parts 
and products of dual use and, through the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS), recruit 
businessmen, military men, engineers and any individuals willing to go around the world 
buying components and technologies for Iraqi missile programs. As the Michigan Project 
commented in June 2002, “Saddam went in a shopping spree for his missile program.”  
 Indeed, following the advice of his top engineers, Saddam authorized the 
purchase of scrap parts. My research shows that Saddam set up a procurement operation 
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that targeted 271 corporations, businessmen, universities and NGOs from 31 nations 
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 154; Cordesman, 1998, p. 47; 
Albright and Khidhir, 1997, p. 65). I present here specific cases in which individuals, 
corporations, banks, NGOs, and nations worked together to circumvent UN sanctions and 
inspectors. These examples seem repetitious and similar at times, but it is okay: repetition 
and uniformity guarantee low costs, rapidness and efficiency in the global economy. I 
collected the data from multiple and diverse sources such as the CIA (Duelfer Report), 
the IIC, the ISG, CFIJ, the Brooking Institute, and Arms Control Today (ACT).  
I start with Mr. Wiham Garbiyah, a Palestinian businessman. The particularity of 
this case consists in that Mr. Garbiyah was one among dozens of businessmen that the IIS 
recruited to help Iraq evade UN sanctions and inspectors. The IIS recruited Mr. Garbiyah 
for his 20 years experience as an importer of electronic devices and components from 
Asian nations like Taiwan, Japan, Singapore and South Korea. The ISG in fact found that 
“Illicit trade between South Korean companies and Mr. Garbiyah was largely limited to 
contracts signed for high technologies, such as military computer equipments, 
sophisticated communication and radar systems” (Duelfer Report, Vol.1, p. 47). The ISG 
also stated that “There is no evidence to suggest that the South Korean Government was 
complicit in illegal trade between Mr. Garbiyah and South Korean companies” (Duelfer 
Report, Vol. 1, p. 47).  
Mr. Garbiyah began to work for Iraq in 1998 when he traveled to South Korea as 
the head of a group of engineers working for Al-Basha’ir Company, an Iraqi front firm. 
He closed a deal to purchase components to assembly communications systems for the Al 
Samud II missile. The deal was worth $51 million dollars. The assembly plant was in 
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Syria (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 47). In 2000, Mr. Garbiyah returned to South Korea. He 
struck a deal worth $44.4 million dollars in which Techmec, a South Korean corporation, 
was to design for the Iraqis a computer to test missile launches and flights (Duelfer 
Report, Vol. 1, p. 47-48). The contract included building a $22 million dollars facility in 
Bagdad to assembly circuit boards, integrated circuits and other microelectronic 
components. Also in 2000, Mr. Garbiyah mediated between the South Koreans and 
United Commodities, a front company from India. United Commodities purchased, on 
Iraq’s behalf, components from South Koreans to assembly radios, radars, transponders 
and receivers. United Commodities also trained Iraqi engineers working for Salah-Al-Din 
General Company, a small Iraqi contract manufacturer (CM) to do the assemblage. In 
2001, Mr. Garbiyah negotiated with LG Innotec, a South Korean corporation, a contract 
to purchase optical fibers, digital exchanges and CPU systems. The contract was worth 
$22 million. Slah-al-Din General Company, an Iraqi shipping company operating under 
Lebanese flag, transported the cargo into Iraq (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 47). In 2002, 
Mr. Garbiyah met with representatives from Shinsung, Armitel, and Unimo, all South 
Korean companies. He negotiated several deals for Iraq’s missile programs.  
 I could go on listing Mr. Garbiyah’s business deals with South Korean 
corporations. In all, the ISG concluded that Mr. Garbiyah negotiated about $300 million 
dollars with South Korean companies in a period of four years (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 
50). The Michigan Project set the amount at $316 million dollars (the Michigan Project, 
p. 132). But those amounts do not include what Mr. Garbiyah made through business 
deals with Russian corporations.    
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 I have explained throughout this dissertation that Russia played a distinctive role 
in Iraq’s economic survival under the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. Russia was 
among Iraq’s most important trading partners under the UN sanctions regime. Russia’s 
outstanding trade relations with Iraq are linked to the former Soviet Union, which had 
been Iraq’s second trade partner since the 1970s. The Soviet Union was the premier 
supplier of weapons to Iraq during the 1980s, accounting for 50% of all Iraqi military 
purchases from 1981 to 1991. Since Russia was the economic and military engine of the 
former Soviet Union, it inherited the long-standing trade relations, including military 
relations that the Soviets had with Iraq. Consequently, Iraq became dependent on 
Russia’s ability to supply spare parts, equipment and technologies. But Russia suddenly 
fell into an economic crisis during most of the 1990s, which affected its ability to supply 
spare parts to Iraq. Russian’s military industrial output fell to almost zero. Russia was so 
short of money that it began to rely on the U.S. to safeguard its nuclear arsenals. To raise 
money, Russia began to sell its vast inventories of conventional weapons and 
technologies. Russian’s decision coincided with Saddam’s decision to purchase scrap 
parts for his missile programs. The ISG and the CIA calculated that Iraq purchased from 
Russia about $900 million dollars worth of inventories and scrap parts from 1993 to 
2003, and it was just for missile projects. Purchases included parts for anti-tank guided 
missiles, electronic jamming equipment, communication and guiding systems, start 
rotors, engines, launchers and radars (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 102). And Mr. Wiham 
Garbiyah was the mastermind of the negotiations.  
Indeed, in September of 1994, Mr. Garbiyah visited Zagorsk, a city near Moscow 
and house of Mars Rotor, a Russian military conglomerates with long experience with 
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guidance equipments (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 107). Mars Rotor was famous for having 
designed and manufactured the short mid-range missile SS-N-18. Iraqi technicians 
determined that they could use some of the SS-18 components for their Scuds and Al 
Hussein missiles. At the time, Mars Rotor was selling its inventories, particularly 
scrapped parts. So Garbiyah closed the deal with representatives of Mars Rotor. UN 
records show that on July 15, 1995, Garbiyah made his first shipment to Amman, Jordan 
(Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 108). UN inspectors detected and intercepted it. But after that, 
Mr. Garbiyah successfully smuggled into Iraq 28 fiber-optic gyroscopes, 40 ring laser 
gyroscopes, 100 Volga rotors, 100 Volga starters, and 380 missile thermal batteries 
(Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 102). Mr. Garbiyah kept making deals with the Russians 
throughout the 1990s, until 2001 when the Russian government banned him from 
entering Russia. The Russian decision was a reprisal to Iraq’s ban on Mr. Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky, the nationalist Russian legislator and head of the Russian National Party but 
who had failed to pay Saddam millions of dollars for oil purchases.     
  Iraq also had Yuri Orshansky, a three-star Ukrainian general now purchasing 
scrapped parts from Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic and Poland. 
UN inspectors found out about it in details in the year 2000 when they returned to Iraq to 
resume inspections of Iraq’s military capabilities. UN inspectors found about 300 files 
concealed, apparently, in an abandoned office of a military manufacturing plant at Al 
Kawthar. One file revealed that the IIS recruited Yuri Orshansky to “Gain access to 
Ukraine’s significant military production facilities, including plants in Ukrainian soil but 
that belonged to former Soviet space and rocket industries” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 
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119). For 5 years, Gen. Orshansky served as an intermediary between the IIS and various 
military corporations from ex-Soviet Republics and nations in Eastern Europe.  
General Orshansky secured a deal with Aviation Trading House, a Russian small 
corporation specialized in export-import of military industrial equipments and 
machineries. For the enterprise, Gen. Orshansky created a small firm named Montelect, 
and he registered it as an industrial auditor. Livinvest, the financial arm of Ukrainian Air 
Force, financed the operations. The Lebanese shipping company Amsar Trading Co 
transported the cargo into Iraq. The deal accounted for six shipments of scrapped parts 
for short and long range missiles, totaling $21 million each in 15 months. The shipment 
included $7 million dollars worth of equipments for a small chemical plant that was 
going to manufacture tiethylamine (TEA) and other ingredients required to produce 
combustible for missiles (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 119). The plant in question was being 
rebuilt at a cost of $26 million dollars. Iraq obtained the funds from Financial and 
Investment Bank of Jordan and the Central Bank of Syria.  
Gen. Orshansky also helped the Iraqis obtain access to military corporations in 
Belarus and Bulgaria. Gen. Orshansky had been stationed in Belarus and Bulgaria as 
military attaché during the 1990s. He had many friends there. And he knew well the 
political terrain of those two nations. So he visited Belarus in July of 1995 with a 
delegation from Badr State Establishment, an Iraqi front company (Duelfer Report, Vol. 
1, p. 122). The objective of the visit was to negotiate the purchase of high precision 
machineries to refurbish scrapped parts. Badr was the Iraqi manufacturer of some 
components utilized for the Iraqi Al Hussein missiles, launched against Tel Aviv during 
the invasion of 1991. Badr’s delegates paid special interest to Belstroyimpex and Visoky 
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Vacuum Co., two Belarusian small firms that produced diamond-cutting tools, powder 
metallurgy, and highly sensitive plasma sprays to protect missiles from corrosion and 
heat. Badr and Belstroyimpex signed seven contracts with Iraq. Trading Company, a 
Syrian financial firm, loaned $70 million dollars to finance the operations in exchange for 
a 10-12% margin profit. The Belarusian Infobank kept an escrow account for the 
transactions. Also, Al Zarka Trading Co, a Syrian shipping firm, transported the cargoes 
from Belarus to Iraq via the free-trade zones of Aqaba, in Jordan (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, 
p. 122-123). 
Later in 1998, Gen. Orshansky and Badr’s delegates traveled to Sofia, Bulgaria, 
where he introduced Iraqi delegates to JEFF, a Bulgarian corporation. According to the 
Duelfer Report, Mr. Orshansky’s trip was private, and he claimed that he did not 
represent the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. However, Iraqi records showed that the 
Ministry did cover the expenses of the trip and that the Iraqis later reimbursed the 
Ministry.  
Bulgarians and Iraqis met for two days. They agreed that a delegation from JEFF 
was going to travel to Bagdad to “Evaluate the situation on the ground” (Duelfer Report, 
Vol. 1, p. 123-126). JEFF’s personnel traveled to Bagdad two months later. They met 
with delegates of Basha’ir Corp, a leading Iraqi military corporation. Basha’ir proposed 
the used Iraq-Syrian trade Protocol as an umbrella for the deal. Basha’ir purchased from 
JEFF tandem warheads, launcher units, thermal imagers, testing and simulators software. 
SES International, a Syrian financier, paid for purchasing and operational costs. JEFF 
sold to Basha’ir $80 million dollars worth of dual use machines (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, 
p. 1123-126). The next Table shows some of them. 
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Table 7.5 – Dual Use Machines and Technologies 
 
                     
 
Source: Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) 
 
  
The UN created a list of codes for all goods allowed to export to Iraq under the 
UN sanctions regime. The name of the list was the Goods Review List (GRL). UN 
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inspectors audited and approved each good upon arrival to Iraqi soil. But the goods in the 
chart had a use in both civilian and military industries. For example, the machines in the 
chart have a use in the oil industry, but the Iraqis found a use for them in the missile 
industry. They utilized some of those precision machineries to reshape metals and 
polytetrafluorethylene (PTEE), which is a special type of plastic used for rocket motor 
cases and propellant tanks. Machineries like CNC served to mold special patterns on 
metals. The Iraqis utilized them to reproduce and, particularly, refurbish scrapped parts 
for old discontinued missiles they were purchasing from the Russians, Ukrainians, 
Belarusians and others (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 127).   
 Gen. Orshansky also worked with Polish corporations. One of those corporations 
was Evax Corp, from which Gen. Orshansky purchased components for 380 engines for 
the Al-Rawa missile model (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 123-126). The shipments were to 
arrive through the port of Tartus, in Syria; yet, at an Iraqi port UN inspectors detected a 
shipment of 32 Volga rocket engines and 750 different types of components that included 
water and air pressure valves, radars, radio transmitters, and tow trucks to transport 
missiles (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 123-126). Additionally, Gen. Orshansky and Evax 
acted as intermediaries between two Australian corporations and Rabban Safina, an Iraqi 
front company. On Gen. Orshansky’s behalf, Evax purchased from the Australians 
American-made 100 WAE-342 engines, 29 servomechanisms, 70 mechanical 
gyroscopes, and 20 MP2000 and 3200 VG autopilot systems. Evax sold them to Rabban 
Safina (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p.123-126). In another deal, Gen. Orshansky purchased 
military components and weapons systems on Iraq’s behalf from Metropol Ltd, a Czech 
corporation. In a letter to Metropol, dated October 2001, the General expressed his 
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interests –Iraq’s interests- for industrial parts. Metropol responded that it had access to 
“Old Russian missiles and other equipments” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 123-126). The 
Czech government wanted to get rid of its missiles because it could not maintain and did 
not need them. The Duelfer Report quoted an Iraqi official as saying that “After all the 
Czechs would not need the obsolete Russian arsenals for it’ll soon be a member of 
NATO” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 1, p. 129). Gen. Orshansky purchased from Metropol 60 
portable GPS jamming systems, radios and radars for cruise missiles (Duelfer Report, 
Vol. 1, p. 128). 
 Next, one the 300 files found at Al Kawthar revealed in detail how Iraqi engineers 
envisioned yet another approach to circumventing the UN sanctions regime and 
procuring components for Iraq’s missile programs (Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and 
Procurement, p. 57). The approach consisted of purchasing parts of dual use in the global 
market from well-established global corporations. Note first that the UN sanctions regime 
defined “dual use” as “items that might be of use to the military, but were not specially or 
originally designed or modified for military use; the term dual-use can be contrasted with 
military goods that were specially or originally designed for use by the military” 
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Welfare, p. 18). This included 
equipments, chemicals, raw materials, spare parts, technologies and software.     
 Here too the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) were involved. The IIS recruited 
businessmen and supervised procurement operations. For example, according to the files, 
two Iraqi engineers recruited by the IIS needed a high precision electronic switch to 
create “controlled” electrical pulses to activate missile warheads once in the air. After 
searching through numerous catalogs, they found the switchers in a lithotripter, a 
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machine designed to disintegrate kidney stones. They could care less about kidneys and 
stones. They needed about 3000 switchers, six per warhead. So they contacted Siemens, 
the German transnational. Siemens and Iraq had had a long trade relationship, so it was 
not hard for them to work out a deal. They did it under humanitarian licenses granted by 
the UN and sponsored by French-Arab Friendship, a French NGO. Siemens sold the 1200 
switchers to the NGO. Siemens never confirmed nor denied the transactions, but the most 
important issue here is the novelty of the approach to procurement via goods of dual use 
(Duelfer Report, Regime Finance and Procurement, p. 61). Purchases like the one just 
described became a common practice for Iraqis. Every time they needed a component, 
they searched for products of civilian ends. They would contact the manufacturer and 
purchase a large quantity of the product. That was in effect the reason for the UN to boost 
the sanctions to goods of dual-use, which Iraq evaded anyway.  
For example, the IIS recruited Mr. Xu Govan, a member of the Chinese High 
Committee for Electronic Warfare and a Professor in a Chinese university. Xu was an 
expert in electro-optics. The IIS recruited Xu in May 17th, 2001 for a monthly salary of 
$7,500 and a bonus of $500 per month (Duelfer Report, Vol.1, p. 428). The IIS filmed the 
recruitment. Xu’s boss was Abd - Al Wahab, the head of the IIS at the Iraqi embassy in 
Beijing and director of the Iraqi procurement effort in China. Initially, Xu’s job consisted 
in collecting information on products of dual use but related to missile technologies, 
communication in particular. Xu located infrared cameras, so Iraqi engineers could watch 
mid-range missiles while flying at long distances. He also located electronic equipment in 
Taiwan to test communication and guidance systems for Iraqi missiles. But in 2002, the 
IIS created a front company for Xu, so he could purchase parts and technologies for 
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Iraq’s missile programs. They named the company CIEC Corp. Through it, Xu purchased 
laser tracking systems and infra-red cameras for radars for “civilian” aviation. He labeled 
the equipment as children’s computer software (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report 
on WMDs, p. 428).   
 All in all, I would safely conclude that the Iraqi procurement operations allowed 
Saddam to begin assembling missiles around December 2001. Saddam’s goal was to 
produce 10 missiles per month, an ambitious quantity for an embargoed nation. The files 
found at Al Karamah also showed that an Iraqi subcontractor had assemblied 20 Al 
Samud II missiles during the first two quarters of 2002 (Duelfer Report, Report on 
Delivery Systems, p. 439). Testing showed that it could reach 183 km, a technical success 
for an embargoed nation. 
In addition, during the period 1998-2002, Iraqi technicians worded on the Al 
’Ubur SAM missile project. The missile carried an Al Fat’h rocket engine. With a single-
stage ballistic launcher, it could exceed the 200 km range, 50 km more that what UN 
allowed under the sanction regime. Saddam Hussein ordered the design of a new missile 
that could range from 650 to 725 km. Saddam wanted the missile ready in about one year. 
The project was terminated in 1999 due to poor technical feasibility, but it was 
resuscitated in 2001 with the Sa’d, a project to develop a missile of 250-400 km range 
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on WMDs, p. 439). Iraqi scientists and 
technicians worked on the project until 2002 when, under pressure from the international 
community, Saddam Hussein accepted UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and 
allowed UN inspectors to return to Iraq. The table below represents some of the missile 
components that UN inspectors found when they finally came back to Iraq.  
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Table 7.6 – Parts of Iraqi Missiles Accounted by ISG, CIA, and IIC 
         
        
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
Warheads 18 24 61 79 86 102 127 127 109 733
Motors 7 28 57 92 106 110 119 121 122 640
Airframes 13 1 66 78 100 109 120 141 149 777
Sent to QC inspections 0 9 24 53 60 88 82 90 72 478  
 
Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report, IIC, the Michigan Project 
 
 
I draw three main conclusions from the data above. First, Iraq began recording 
this data in 1995. It is very unusual for a regime that, like most dictatorships, regarded 
record-keeping a means to survive political plots and purges. Since no data were recorded 
before 1995, I assume that, as the ISG and the Duelfer Report argued, Iraq did not 
purchase components for missile projects before 1995. After all, 1992-1995 was a period 
of deep financial and economic crisis for Iraq. Therefore, perhaps Iraq did not even have 
an ongoing missile project before 1995. If it did, it was in small in scope and used 
scrapped parts from missiles that Coalition Forces destroyed in 1991. Secondly, 
purchases show not only that Iraq had money but also that it managed to circumvent the 
sanctions regime. Third, observe that procurement consistently increased from 1998 on, 
precisely the year that Saddam Hussein expelled UN weapon inspectors from Iraqi soil. 
Also, note that despite the large purchases, Iraq sent 478 missiles to quality control (QC) 
for testing. Those are just too many missiles for a nation under a multilateral sanctions 
regime. Still, I assume that many missiles failed the testing process, after which they did 
not become operational and were not accounted for in the chart above. The next chart 
shows the number of missiles that the IIS, CIA, and Michigan Project accounted for as 
“operational” after the fall the Saddam in 2003. 
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Table 7.7 – Iraqi Missiles Accounted as Operational by IIS, CIA and Michigan Project  
 
 
                             
Missiles available 260 256 259
Missiles fired 12 16 16
Missiles damaged/destroyed 74 77 72
Missiles captured 159 147 143
Unaccounted for 167 187 191  
 
Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report, IIC, the Michigan Project 
 
  
 
First, note that the data do not vary significantly from source to source. There are 
three main reasons. On one hand, UN inspectors never had full access to Iraq’s military 
arsenal because Saddam kept fooling them until he finally decided to expel them from 
Iraq. Saddam considered UN inspectors American and British spies. On the other hand, 
the American army seized most of Iraq’s records and archives after the invasion of 2003. 
The CIA and other American intelligence services had full access to Iraqi archives while 
investigators from the ISG, IIC, Michigan Project and others worked with second hand, 
“contaminated” information, which they often shared. Nonetheless, what is notable here 
is that the Iraqi army had had between 256 and 260 missiles at its disposal in 2003. That 
is a number a bit high for a nation under a 12 year-old multilateral sanctions regime. 
More importantly, Iraq manufactured its missiles through a net of civilian contractors and 
subcontractors closely watched by Iraq Intelligence Services (IIS). 
 In sum, the evidence suggests that Iraq did rebuild a good portion of its missile 
defense after 1991. The ISG and the CIA concluded that Iraq had rebuilt one-third of the 
capacity that existed in 1991. The Michigan Project assures us that, by 2003, Iraq’s 
missile capabilities were 25% short of what it had been in 1991. But here I am not 
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concerned about Iraq’s operational missiles, although settling on a final number of 
missiles could constitute a good measure of Iraq’s ability to circumvent the UN sanctions 
regime and the scrutiny of U.S. intelligence services. That is, manufacturing 200 missiles 
under a multinational sanctions regime is a big deal. It could us enough about how 
efficient and useful the sanctions regime might be. It could tell s us enough about the 
utility of conceiving and enforcing a sanctions regime in a global economy. Nevertheless, 
the key question here is how Iraq managed to acquire whatever amount of missiles it had 
from 1991 to 2003. In fact, the question is: how Iraq circumvented UN inspectors and 
American intelligence services? Evidences cited here suggest that Iraq relied on the 
agents and means of globalization to evade UN sanctions. Iraq utilized a network of 
secret agents, NGOs, banks and bank accounts, businessmen, corporations and corporate 
models, and even universities and scientists to circumvent the UN sanctions regime. 
Through them, Iraq purchased technologies, parts and machinery for its missile programs. 
In the next section I examine how Iraq attempted to rebuild its WMD program.    
  
Chemical and Biological Programs 
 There are contrasting findings with respect to Iraq’s possessions of WMDs during 
the UN sanctions regime. For example, the ISG found “No credible indications that 
Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter the 1991 Persian Gulf, a 
policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, 
or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered in Iraqi soil” (Duelfer Report, 
Vol. 3, p. 1). However, the ISG acknowledged that “Based on available chemicals, 
infrastructures, and scientist debriefings, Iraq probably had a capability to produce large 
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quantities of WMDs”, and that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) “Maintained 
throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test 
various chemicals and poisons” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 3). UN inspectors confirmed 
that “Baghdad’s declarations vastly understated the production of biological agents and 
we estimate that Iraq actually produced two-to-four times the amount of agents that it 
acknowledged producing” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 3-4). For its part, the CIA 
recognized that “ISG did not discover chemicals or production units configured to 
produce key precursors or CW and BW agents” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 3-4). The CIA 
cited ISG’s own findings to affirm that “Site visits debriefs revealed that Iraq maintained 
its ability for reconfiguring and ‘making-do’ with available equipments as substitutes for 
sanctioned items” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 4). 
Note that in this report (Report on WMDs) the CIA’s language is rather moderate, 
somehow opened for future findings and conclusions. In fact, later in the Duelfer Report 
the CIA reported that “Although Iraq’s WMD was crippled by the Gulf war, its chemical 
industry began to recover in the mid 1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of 
key military and civilian organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources, 
provided Iraq with the ability to reinvigorate its industrial base, its military in 
particular” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 14).  
 My findings coincide with ISG’s and CIA findings. Coalition Forces did destroy 
most of Iraq’s WMD stockpiles during the Persian Gulf War of 1991, and thereafter UN 
inspectors kept Iraq in check, limiting for the most part Iraq’s ability to complete any 
project related to WMDs. I also found that Iraqi claims of having destroyed WMDs 
unilaterally were true only in part. Iraq kept some of its infrastructure in conditions 
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suitable enough to allow Iraqi engineers to return to WMD projects some time later. Yes, 
I found that from 1991 to 2003, Iraq neither possessed nor fully developed WMDs of any 
kind. But I emphasize the word fully because although Iraq did not succeed, it did attempt 
to develop WMDs. Yet, Iraq’s WMD program after 1991 was not as vast as some 
“experts” predicted. Iraq itself was largely responsible for such failed predictions and the 
perception that the world had about its possession of WMDs even though evidences 
suggest that the Bush administration exaggerated Iraq’s WMD capabilities to legitimize 
its invasion to Iraq. After all, most Iraqi officials, under interrogation, declared that 
Saddam too exaggerated the scope of Iraq’s WMD programs to fool Iran and Israel 
(Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 11). 
 There were still enough factual reasons to believe Saddam though. For example, 
the ISG calculated that Iraq invested about $3.5 billion dollars from 1991 to 2003 to 
rebuild factories, purchase parts and equipments, and recruit scientists to produce WMDs 
(Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 16). At some point, Iraq had about 2,000 engineers and 
technicians working on activities related to WMDs. Iraq spent nearly $400 million dollars 
in research and development of chemical and bacteriological agents (Duelfer Report, Vol. 
3, p. 22). Yes, $3.5 billion dollars is not really enough considering that WMDs are 
expensive. It is actually a luxury of few rich nations such as the U.S., Great Britain, and 
France, which in fact develop and possess WMDs. But $3.5 billion dollars is indeed a 
considerable amount of money for Iraq if we take into account that it was a nation under 
a multinational sanctions regime, apparently, heavily enforced and scrutinized.    
 Iraq’s WMD Programs had three main phases: 1) the Edict of 1993 and the 
centralization of research in universities and labs; 2) the Edict of 1997 and the 
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centralization of petrochemical, fertilizing and pharmaceutical industries; 3) the 
establishment of a procurement program.  
 
First Phase: The Edict of 1993 
The first phase officially began with the Edict of 1993, through which Saddam 
Hussein forced all Iraqi universities to conduct research for WMD Programs. The Edict 
consolidated all universities under an office of the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS). It also 
asked universities to search for funding in the private sector, although the Ministry of 
Defense and Saddam himself provided enough resources as to keep them busy. The 
Edict, as a result, triggered a nationwide competition among companies, universities, 
institutions and scientists for funding. As the ISG put it, “With the Edict of 1993, the 
IIC’s Program for the Indigenous Production of Chemicals appears to have evolved into 
a nation-wide, pan-industry, pan-academia merit-base competition for projects, ideas 
and project implementation” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 12-13). 
 Two universities in particular took over WMD research: the University of 
Baghdad and Saddam University. The University of Baghdad was the center of research 
for Variola (smallpox), Newcastle virus, chicken eggs vaccines and other pathogenic 
viruses. For its part, Saddam University was particularly relevant because Saddam 
personally funded and directed it. He would show up regularly without previous notice. 
He would ask questions, demand results, and punish those who failed.  
 The Edict of 1993 forced hundreds of Iraqi engineers and technicians to work in 
the WMD programs. Iraqi scientists and technicians had strong incentives to join the 
programs. First, the Iraqi government paid well. Second, Iraqi scientists did not really 
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have a choice: they either worked for the government or Saddam would kill them. The 
ISG and the Michigan Project coincided in that “The issue of retaining scientists in Iraq 
was a Regime policy. Given the nature of the Iraqi economy, which offered limited 
possibilities for work at private chemical companies, it is not surprising that most key 
personnel from the former CW program remained employed in the government chemical 
sector” (Duelfer Report, Vol. 3, p. 12-13). Nonetheless, the Edict financed the 
recruitment of hundreds of scientists and technicians from other nations, especially from 
former Soviet Republics and Egypt. I have previously mentioned that, at the time, most 
former Soviet Republics were going through a severe economic crisis, which affected all 
economic sectors, including universities and research institutions. Saddam paid well, so 
many former Soviet scientists were happy to join Saddam’s laboratories and universities. 
Second, Saddam for many years relied on Soviet technologies and scientists. In fact, the 
three top Iraqi scientists, in charge of Iraq’s WMD programs, obtained their PhDs at the 
Chemical Warfare Academy in Moscow, former Soviet Union. They were: Dr. Imad 
Husayn ‘Abdallah Al ‘Ami, Chair of Research and Development; Dr. Salah-al-Dim-
Abdallah, Chair of Weapons Design and Toxicity Research; Dr. Hammad Shakir, Chair 
of Weapons Preparation and Planning.  
Conversely, Egyptian and Iraqi scientists had worked together before. They 
worked to develop various WMD projects during the 1980s. For example, in 1983, they 
modified the 122 mm multiple launch rocket system to arm it with chemical agents. In 
1984, Egypt sold Iraq rockets of the Grad model, capable of carrying chemical agents. In 
1987, Iraq brought in Egyptian scientists to oversee research of Sarin and CW agents. 
Nationals and foreign technicians worked side by side in Iraq’s WMD programs.     
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Second Phase: The Edict of 1997 
 The second phase of Iraq’s WMD program began in 1997 when Saddam issued 
yet another Edict to create the National Project for Pharmaceuticals and Pesticides 
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 24). Through NPPP, 
Saddam centralized all Iraqi industries that utilized chemicals in any way. The main 
objective was to guarantee what Saddam Hussein called the breakout capability (Duelfer 
Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 24), namely the ability of Iraq’s 
chemical industrial sector to produce and test CWs as needed. He argued that all 
industries, not only the chemical, had to be able to move rapidly from civilian to military 
production and back to civilian. NPPP supposedly focused on drugs and pesticides, but in 
reality NPPP’s plants and procurements had dual purposes, meaning civilian and military. 
Iraq’s industrial investments ensured such a duality, but, basically, Iraq halted chemical 
production for civilian purposes, and Iraqi engineers were told to “cannibalize” chemical 
plants to ensure production capabilities for military ends. As the ISG stated, “By 
cannibalizing production and equipments from civilian chemical facilities, it was possible 
for Iraq to ensemble production plants for chemical weapons (CW). Alternatively, 
equipments that were less suitable were reconfigured at an existing site and used for 
short-term limited production of civilian use” (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on 
Chemical Warfare, p. 26). I found evidences suggesting that, in effect, Iraq was on its 
way to accomplishing its breakout capability policy.  
One example is the case of Al-Dawrah, a small plant built during the 1980s to 
produce a vaccine for foot-mouth disease. American war planes bombed it in 1991. In 
1996, Saddam asked the UN for permission to repair it, so it could produce a vaccine to 
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fight a sudden outbreak of “foot and mouth” virus in some Iraqi rural areas. The UN 
objected, arguing that the organization could sell the vaccine to Iraq at a preferential 
price. But Saddam insisted and UN granted permission. One year later, UN inspectors 
found BW agents in the plant (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical 
Warfare, p. 29). Other examples include the Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute and 
the Fallujah III Castor Oil Production, which did produce several types of engine oil. But 
UN inspectors were always suspicious about the plant for two reasons (Duelfer Report, 
Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 45-50). First, it was situated next to an 
industrial park well-known as a center for research, testing and production of CW agents. 
Second, Iraq had in the past created resin-toxin, a key ingredient for BW and CW agents, 
from engine oil residuals. In 1997, UN inspectors found residuals of psychomimetic, 
mustard and nerve agents in the plants. And in 1998, UN inspectors found that work 
conducted on a biopesticide (Bacillus thuringiensis) and single protein (SCP) at Al 
Hakam was in fact a cover up for a research on dry anthrax spores (Bacillus anthracis) 
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p.45-50).  
Those findings were so important that they eventually led to serious tensions 
between UN inspectors, the Clinton Administration, and the Iraqi government. The 
tension escalated in 1998 when UN inspectors discovered and unveiled the infamous Air 
Force Document, an Iraqi report that revealed extensive evidence of numerous Iraqi 
plants engaging in research, testing and production of chemical vectors and biochemical 
agents (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemicals Welfare, p. 13). The 
Michigan project argues that “The discoveries of 1998 and Saddam’s subsequent 
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demonstration of anger contributed to Saddam’s decisions to suspend cooperation with 
UNSCOM and IAEA and expel UN inspectors from Iraq” (The Michigan Project, p. 74).  
In effect, UN inspectors left Iraq in 1998. When they left, NPPP had just 4 
companies, which in turn controlled about 9 small plants and a dozen very small 
laboratories. When they came back in 2001, they found that Iraq’s chemical and 
petrochemical industries were booming, literally. When they came back, they found that 
NPPP had grown into a huge conglomerate of 70 companies and hundreds of small 
plants, laboratories, contractors and subcontractors. The Complex, as Saddam liked to 
call it, had a Board of Directors known as Research and Development Directorate 
(R&DD). The ISG concluded that “Iraq was successful in procuring, constructing, and 
commissioning complete state-of-the-art chemical facilities, notably from 1998 to 2003 
as its economy grew and UN inspectors left Iraq” (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive 
Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 11). NPPP was a true big enterprise with operations even 
outside of Iraq. So, the questions to ask are: how did Iraq do it? Where did it get the 
money? How did it acquire equipment, machineries, raw materials, entire plants? How 
did it smuggle into Iraq? I found evidences suggesting that Iraq did it by exploiting the 
means and agents of globalization. Indeed, in previous chapters, I showed evidences of 
how and why the Iraqi economy began to improve in 1997 as result factors such as: 1) the 
Oil for Food Program; 2) the emergence of domestic and regional black markets; 3) 
smuggling; 4) Iraq’s ability to make allies willing to trade with Iraq; 5) Iraq’s own ability 
to circumvent UN inspectors; and 6) Iraq’s ability to manage scarce resources.  
In 1998, NPPP led a major effort to rebuild Iraq’s chemical and petrochemical 
industries. It began by creating Al-Furat State Company for Chemical Industries and the 
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State Enterprise for Petrochemical Industries. These were two major complexes of small 
plants, labs and warehouses to produce fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and other 
products. Consequently, Iraq’s capacity to produce nitric acid tripled between 1998 and 
2003, plastic production increased by 12% in 2000, and PVC production increased by 
105%, just to mention a few examples  (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on 
Chemical Warfare, p. 30-36). Also in 1998, Iraq repaired and rebuilt: 1) Al Tariz, two 
plant at Fallujah to produce chlorine, benzyl alcohol, acetyl chloride, and phenols; 2) a 
plant to produce sulfuric acid and corrosion resistant metals at Al Qa-Qa’a ; 3) a plant for 
nitric acid, another one for sodium  hydroxide, aluminum hydroxide, calcine, ortho-
chloroanaline, ferrous chloride, and phosphorous in Karbala, 4) and another, known as 
Samara Drug Industries, for animal oils and mono-chloro-acetic acids at Samarra 
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 32-36).  
Iraq could not do it alone. The Duelfer Report stated that Iraq built seven 
chemical plants and repaired another 9, in some instances with foreign collaboration 
(Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 40. For instance, Iraq 
rebuilt the Al Tariq complex with French collaboration. This plant processed about 60 
different substances for the pharmaceutical and agricultural industries. UN inspectors 
visited the plants on several occasions. They found that the company imported 
concentrated pesticides used to produce nerve agents, and that (Duelfer Report, 
Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 32-36). Iraq purposely produced 
pesticides that carried substances similar to nerve agents. In addition, the Iraqi company 
Al Majid rebuilt a chemical plant in collaboration with the Germans to process 
multipurpose controllers of chemical mixes. The plant complied with the UN sanctions 
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regime, but the production process enabled Iraq to divert resources and substances to labs 
and smaller plants working on WMD projects (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on 
Chemical Warfare, p. 45-54). For example, the plant converted phosphate rock and white 
phosphate into a nerve agent precursor. The Germans helped Iraq to rebuild a second 
plant, known as Hutin Munitions Production and Storage Facility, where UN inspectors 
found about 30 gallons of phosphorus like the one used to produce phosphorus 
illumination rounds (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report on Chemical Warfare, p. 45-
54). In 1999, Iraq hired the Indian company NEC Engineers Private to rebuild a chlorine 
production line. A group of Iraqi technicians traveled to India to train on how to operate 
the plant. The plant became operational by 2000, although I found no evidence of the 
plant being used to produce CW and BW agents. Finally, the Italians helped Iraq rebuild 
the Al-Qaim Superphosphate Plant. The plant converted phosphate into phosphoric acid 
and phosphorus compounds for highly reactive agents. Iraqi paid $41 million for the 
repair (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive Report, Chemical Warfare, p. 45-54). 
 
Third Phase: Procurement Program 
 The third phase of Iraq’s WMD program included a procurement operation. 
Through it, Iraq managed to purchase a significant amount of chemicals to produce BW 
agents to arm its short, mid and long-range missiles called the Al Husayan Missile 
Project. During this period, Iraq was busy working on other projects as well, such as the 
Fahad-300, Fahad-500, Al Rohma (Javwelin) SAM, the G-1 and SA-1. They all were 
redesigned to carry biological agents. But the Al Husayan was without doubt the most 
important because it eventually became the core of Iraq’s deterrence policy toward Iran 
380 
and Israel. Ironically, the plan to arm the Al Husayan missile with biological agents did 
not deter the United States. Instead, the United States used it as the main reason for 
invading Iraq in 2003. The procurement program targeted 1,000 substances which Iraqi 
engineers considered vital to produce CW and BW (Duelfer Report, Comprehensive 
Report on Chemical Warfare, p.12). The list of substances were labeled according to 
order of importance, or as Saddam called it, order of emergency. So there was a “first,” 
“second”, and “third” order emergency. Below is the list of “first order emergency.”  
 
Bacillus anthracis (‘Agent B’)  
Clostridium botulinum (Botulinum toxin, ‘Agent A’) 
Clostridium perfringens (‘Agent G’) 
Afl toxin (‘Agent C’) 
Brucella 
Ricin 
Wheat Cover Smut (‘Agent D’) 
Viruses 
Camel Pox 
Smallpox 
Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever 
Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis (Enterovirus 70) 
Rotavirus 
Thionyl chloride 
Thiourea 
 
 
 Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report, the Michigan Project 
  
 
 Here, it is central to note that all those substances are of dual use, and as the 
British Intelligence Services asserted, “Almost all components and supplies used in 
WMDs and ballistic missile programs are of dual-use. For example, any major 
petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health organization will have 
legitimate need for most materials and equipments required to manufacture chemical and 
biological weapon” (British Assessment on Iraq, Report on WMD Program, p. 27). The 
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CFIJ argued that Iraq’s WMD production is difficult to trace for “All key components are 
dual use items and can be used for peaceful medical purposes, food processing, and 
include everything from bio-medical equipment and micro-encapsulation equipment and 
food storage equipments” (CFIJ, Sources of Saddam’s Money, p.7 7). Further, the 
Michigan Project found that “Iraqi research and production efforts can be widely 
dispersed and can be concealed in relatively small buildings, particularly if the 
government is willing to take moderate risks of the kind widely taken by the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War” (Michigan Project, Report on WMD, p. 167). Here, I should 
mention that the Iraqi WMD Program resembled very much the Soviet’s in terms of 
design, components and scope. Iraq actually purchased must of equipment and chemical 
agents from the former Soviet republics. I have stated earlier, the most prominent Iraqi 
scientists working for Iraq’s WMD program went to Soviet universities to train there.  
 
Combustible Materials for Missiles 
A central part of the Iraqi missile project was to procure combustible, or 
propellant, materials for missiles. Propellant was difficult and expensive to acquire, so 
Iraq decided to manufacture it. Since manufacturing required dozens of chemical 
compounds, the Iraqi regime assigned it to the WMD program under the supervision of 
IIS. Based on my research, I conclude that the project was multinational in scope, and 
that global commerce facilitated the use of a multinational procurement network where 
Iraq could acquire most of what it needed to manufacture propellants.  
 Iraq used two types of propellants: solid and liquid. I focus on liquid propellant 
because it seems to have been the most important for Iraq in terms of money invested and 
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type of missile projected for manufacturing. Iraq invested $70 million in two plants and 
one research lab for liquid propellant (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 
68). The figure below shows Iraqi plants and labs engaged on research, production and 
testing of liquid propellant.   
 
Figure 7.2 – Iraqi Plants and Labs for Liquid Propellant 
 
 
                      
  
 
 
Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report, the Michigan Project 
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Eight plants participated in the project. Three were located in Iraq, three in Syria, 
and two in Egypt. The plants had German technology. Iraq purchased them from Karl 
Kolb, a German firm. The ISG described the plants as “General multi-purpose pilot 
plants, which provided Iraq with plausible deniability regarding the plants and 
distancing Karl Kolb from being implicated in contributing to WMD programs” (Duelfer 
Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 69).  In effect, the plants had been designed to 
process chemicals for fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and petrochemicals, but now utilized 
parts of their facilities to manufacture liquid propellant.  
I observed two points here. First, unlike before 1991, most of the new plants were 
rather small, employing from seven to ten employees. Small plants guaranteed discretion 
and flexibility, the ability to conceal illegal operations and to move from military to 
civilian production quickly in preparation for unexpected, unannounced visits by UN 
inspectors. Second, the products they produced were just a part or portion of a larger 
product, so employees would not know the true purpose of the products they produced. 
One individual, Dr. Mahmud Faraj, managed the entire project through a small Syrian 
corporation subcontracted by Al-Basil (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 
66-74). Here too the process was decentralized, secretive and compartmented.   
 Iraq had to cope with the problem of procuring ingredients to produce the 
propellant. Once again, Iraq returned to the agents and means of globalization. For 
example, several contracts show that Iraq turned to Inaya Trading Company, a Chinese 
corporation, to acquire Diethylenetriamine (DETA), Hydrazine, Hydrogen, Xylidene and 
Triethlanmine, the main ingredients to produce liquid propellant for the mid-range 
missile AZ-11 (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 66-74). On the other 
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hand, Iraq hired NEC, an Indian corporation, to act as intermediary. NEC established an 
office in Bagdad, in the same building as the Iraqi corporation Al Qa’qaa General Co. 
had an office. Al Qa’qaa was the Iraqi front company created to deal with NEC 
exclusively. NEC purchased 20 tons of methyl aziridinyl phosphate oxide (MAPO) from 
China to then sell them to Iraq through Al Qa‘qaa. NEC purchased from France 200 tons 
of perchlorate (AP) and 120 tons of aluminum powder that were then sold to Iraq. NEC 
also acquired chloride, nitric acid, and unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) from 
a state-owned plant in India that was then sold to Iraq (Duelfer Report, Report on 
Delivery Systems, p. 64-74). 
 Below is a list of chemicals, part of a shipment belonging to NEC that UN 
inspectors intercepted and confiscated near the Iraqi-Syrian border.  
 
Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) 
Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) 
Aluminum Powder 
Hydroxyl Terminated Poly Butadiene (HTPB) 
Dioctyl Azelate (DOZ) - or - Dioctyl Adepate (DOA) 
Ferric Oxide 
Toluene Disocyanate (TDI) 
TriMethyl Aziridiny or Phosphine Oxide (MAPO) 
 
 
Source: ISG, the Duelfer Report, the Michigan Project 
 
  
After this incident, NEC proposed a new plan. NEC wanted Iraq to bring back 
production of those products to an Iraqi plant that had been bombed during the US-led 
invasion in 1991. NEC offered itself to repair the plant. Iraq granted permission to the 
NEC, along with a $52 million loan drawn from an Iraqi account in Jordan National Bank 
(Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 69). By 2000, the plant was already 
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producing small quantities of substances like ferric oxide, dioctyl, chlorine and caustic 
soda. However, they could not use them because they did not meet quality standards. 
Then Iraqi engineers turned to Aerofina, a military firm based in Romania specialized in 
the production of liquid-propellant. Experts from the Iraqi firms Ibn Al Haytham and Al 
Karama signed contracts with Aerofina to purchase 25 tons of some of the substances 
(Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 69-71). As part of the deal, Romania’s 
Industrial Group of the Army agreed to purchase, if needed, more of those substances 
from Russia. Romtechnica and Turbomechanica, parent companies of Romania’s 
Industrial Group, executed the freight-forwarding and shipping to Lebanon, where GIA-
RA, an intermediary, smuggled it into Iraq (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, 
p. 68). 
 For their part, Iraqi front companies purchased directly from French, Italian, and 
Brazilian corporations. For example, the ISG found that Iraqi front companies Al 
Sharquivah, Al Maghib and Al ‘Ayan, all of them established in Syria, purchased 126 
tons of aluminum powder from France. The Iraqi front company Al Sharquiyah, based in 
Jordan, purchased 40 tons of hydroxyl-polybutadience (HTPB) from an Italian 
petrochemical. Al Sharquiyan also purchased 60 tons of dioctylazelate (DOZ from a 
Japanese intermediary and 10 tons of resin-phenol from South Africa (Duelfer Report, 
Report on Delivery Systems, p. 57-67). This last purchased caught the attention of UN 
inspectors, members of ISG, because Iraq actually had a plant north of Baghdad that 
produced resin-phenol. It seemed that Iraq preferred to import the product than to 
manufacture it itself. Nevertheless, Iraq also paid $80 million to a Brazilian corporation 
for carbon fiber filaments (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 69). This 
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material is a key ingredient for missile construction. It has unique material properties like 
weight, flexibility, and durability. It stands well the heat of the dessert. This is important 
because carbon fiber filaments are used, among other things, to ignite engines and 
warheads. Eventually, Iraq built a plant with Russian and French technologies to produce 
carbon fiber. The plant began production in August 2002 (Duelfer Report, Report on 
Delivery Systems, p. 69). 
 
The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project and WMDs  
 Another key part of the missile and WMD programs was a project for an 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) armed with chemical and/or bacteriological agents. The 
CSIS said of this Program that “UAV and slow flying civilian aircraft make excellent 
delivery systems of WMDs. They do not produce major indications of testing and 
development, and are inherently difficult to detect and track to a given source and 
location” (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 42).  
The UAV was a very ambitious and challenging project for a nation under a 
multilateral sanctions regime. Even the U.S., the richest nation in the world, had not yet 
fully developed an unmanned aerial vehicle, today known as “drones”. In fact, at the 
time, Israel was working on a UAV, which later proved useful to the U.S. in designing its 
own UAV. But for Iraq, a UAV constituted a technological puzzle, a procurement 
nightmare at a huge financial risk, none of which it could afford. The UAV project was a 
caprice of a dictator.    
 Iraq did not mind. I found that Iraq had first tried to develop a UAV before 1991 
as part of its overall military strategy toward Iran. Iraqi engineers experimented with the 
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Russian fighter jet MIG-21. They promptly abandoned it due to technical difficulties that 
they could not reconcile. The jet was too heavy to lift up when armed with liquid 
chemicals, and it was too fast to drop them on time to hit its target. According to SIPRI, 
Iraqi engineers tried for a while with the French Exocet missile technology and Mirage 
jets, but they gave it up as well. Then, after 1991, and despite the UN sanctions regime, 
Saddam Hussein kept funding the program. This time they tried with an L-29, a plane 
that the Russians used to train pilots. It was a success. Even the CIA stated that “Given 
the time, most likely (Iraq) would have produced some UAVs even with greater payload 
capabilities” (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 42).   
 Evidences show that Russian technicians gave a big boost to the Iraq’s UAV 
program. But after long discussions, Iraqi technicians opted for the advice of Dr. Olga 
Vladimirovna, from Ukraine. She reasoned that, given the unstable economic and 
political situation in Russia, Iraq should not rely solely on Russian procurements. Russia 
in fact was having problems complying with the several procurement contracts that it had 
with Iraq at that very moment. Dr. Vladimirovna further recommended that Iraq should 
design a UAV capable of using components from different sources, particularly from 
China, North Korea, and France (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p.4 2).     
 The Duelfer Report and SIPRI found, in separate researches and reports, that Iraq 
never really managed to assembly more than two UAVs, but it did purchase most of the 
parts and components needed to build 12. It purchased them from 14 nations. For 
instance, the Iraqi UAV model Al Musayara-20, posted by the Duelfer Report in its 
website, was really a Russian L-29 with British WAE-342 piston engines, French 
MP2000 and 3200VG Micropilots, German embedded GPS cards, Chinese guidance 
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software, Taiwanese radios, and Argentinean radars. The launching ramps were North 
Korean, Russian and Ukrainian. The testing equipment was Brazilian made, and the 
simulators were from Belarus (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 42-54). 
The entire project could not be more multinational.       
 Yugoslavia played a key role in procuring materials for the UAV project. The 
Duelfer Report reported in 2000, a group of American soldiers found 60 computer hard 
drives while searching a military base at Bijeljin, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among other 
things, the hard drives revealed discussions between Yugoslavian and Iraqi officials 
related to procurement for Iraq’s UAV project. Just to mention three examples, the two 
delegations discussed the sale to Iraq of 20 R13-300 and R25-300 overhauled jet engines. 
ORAO Aviation Company from Yugoslavia made the sale, worth $70 million dollars 
(Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 57-58). Yugoimport, another 
Yugoslavian company, sold to Iraq parts and equipments to test the jet engines. The deal 
was worth $18.5 million dollars. The Iraqi company Al-Basha’ir paid a Lebanese 
shipping firm to transport the cargo from Bosnia to Turkey and then to Iraq. Al-Basha’ir 
paid $300,000 for transportation (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 58-59). 
The hard drives also revealed financial records related to the operations, and that the 
President of Yugoslavia had a bank account in the Bank of Jordan which did not have a 
specific name. All it said was “the President of Yugoslavia.” The Iraqi front company Al-
Basha’ir made 12 consecutive deposits of $2 million dollars on that account, from where 
it was directed to an account that belonged to the Yugoslavian embassy in Amman, 
Jordan (Duelfer Report, Report on Delivery Systems, p. 57-58).    
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 In all, I found that Iraq did not really go beyond planning and trying to recreate 
the WMD program it had before 1991. Iraq had a WMD program in the form of a 
procurement program to acquire materials and equipment necessary to rebuild its 
chemical industry, which in turn would allow the production of WMD agents. However, 
Iraq never came near producing the final product, meaning a CW and/or BW readied to 
kill. Such a contradiction is reasonable: Iraq had a WMD plan to deter its archenemy 
Iran; but it never implemented it to avoid provoking the U.S.   
 
Conclusion 
  
 
In this chapter, I examined a key question of this dissertation: whether or not the 
agents and means of globalization allowed Iraq to rebuild its missile defenses and acquire 
WMDs. With respect to the missile program, the Duelfer Report stated that “After the 
flight of Husayn Kamil in 1995, Iraq admitted that it had hidden Scud-variant missiles 
and components to aid future reconstitution of missile defenses” (Duelfer Report, 
Delivery Systems, p. 1). The ISG argued that “Between 1991 and 1998, Iraq had 
declared development programs underway for liquid and solid propellant ballistic 
missiles and unnamed aerial vehicles (UAVs)” (Duelfer Report, Delivery Systems, p. 
74). I found that Iraq utilized agents and means of globalization to rebuild both its missile 
and WMD program. In this chapter I showed an array of cases in which Iraq and 
companies, banks, NGOs, secret services, universities, businessmen, scientists and others 
actively participated in violations of the UN sanctions regime. In particular, I found that 
Iraq utilized globalization, meaning the agents and means of globalization, to purchase 
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technologies, industrial machineries, components and spare parts. Iraq also utilized 
globalization to decentralize its domestic military manufacturing industry and instead 
build regional networks of ensemble lines.     
With respect to the WMD Program, the ISG found that “Given the circumstances 
“Iraq’s WMD program grew tremendously during the 1996-2003. Iraq was able to 
conceive a procurement network, regroup skilled scientists and technicians, and work on 
projects financially and technically challenging for an embargoed nation” (Duelfer 
Report, Comprehensive Report on WMDs, p. 18). For my part, our findings pretty much 
coincide with that assessment. Iraq did attempt to rebuild its WMD programs. I showed 
in this chapter evidence of how Iraq employed its IIS, universities, companies, 
businessmen, scientists and even other nations to acquire equipment, labs, and chemicals 
to attempt to produce WMDs. Note that I emphasize “attempt.” I do it because I did not 
find any evidence that Iraq produced, obtained, and stored WMDs. No one found WMDs 
in Iraq after the U.S. invasion of 2003.     
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I examine the limits of multilateral sanctions regimes as 
instruments of foreign policy. I argue that the political economy of contemporary 
globalization jeopardizes the overall efficacy of multilateral sanctions regimes. In 
particular, I hypothesize that six key features of globalization undermine the effectiveness 
of a sanctions regime. They are: 1) intense global competition among nation-states for 
strategic raw materials; 2) the nature of global trade fragmented by  bilateral and regional 
trade agreements; 3) proliferation of global non-state actors such as NGOs, religious 
organizations, banks and corporations equipped with global instruments such as 
transportation, communication and mass media; 4) the nature of an international banking 
system built on transnational credit, electronic moneys, offshore accounts, and other 
means of moving capital throughout global markets; 5) proliferation of global corporate 
models such as subsidiaries, dormant, shell, and parent companies; 6) the global 
production process, reconfigured around a global assembly line linked to contract 
manufactures and regional manufacturing centers. Those six aspects form two specific 
blocs of features: agents and means of globalization. Agents of globalization are: 
corporations, NGOs, political parties, empowered individuals and others. Means of 
globalization are: global trade, the global banking system, corporate models, and the 
global manufacturing process or the global assembly line. To test my hypothesis, I utilize 
as case study the multilateral sanctions regime that the UN imposed on Iraq. I ask two 
central questions: 1) whether or not globalization allowed Iraq to circumvent the 
sanctions regime; 2) Did globalization allow Iraq to rearm and acquire or manufacture 
WMDs?   
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My findings support the hypothesis of this Dissertation. On the first question, I 
find that globalization does undermine the efficacy of a sanctions regime. Globalization 
allowed Iraq to circumvent UN sanctions and inspectors. On the second question, I find 
that globalization allowed Iraq to access regional and global markets where it purchased 
technologies and components for its rearmament programs, including its missile and 
WMD programs.  
For example, my findings in Chapter I show that a global demand for oil 
constituted a central motive for nation-states to violate the UN sanctions against Iraq and 
purchase Iraqi oil. In particular, geopolitics among permanent members of the UN 
Security Council, namely their interests in securing access to Iraqi oil wells, weakened 
the scope of the sanctions and the efficacy of enforcing them. Also, national interests 
contradicted corporate interests. For instance, whereas the British and U.S.’s 
governments were the leading voices behind the UN sanctions regime, British and 
American corporations were among the leading profiteers despite the sanctions. Then, I 
find in Chapter III that the fragmented nature of global trade allowed Iraq to circumvent 
UN sanctions. Iraq accessed global trade through a number of trade agreements it signed 
with about 25 nations, particularly with Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and Syria. Those 
Agreements opened two-way trade routes: Iraq shipped its oil to global markets through 
Jordan, Egypt, Turkey and Syria. In turn, those nations attracted trade from all around the 
world, which Iraq accessed through its trade protocols. Here, geography, history, a 
common language and traditional trade ties facilitated the circumvention of sanctions. 
Iraq also utilized geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East to attract support against the 
UN sanctions regime.  
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Next, in Chapter IV I find that NSAs contributed to violations of the sanctions 
regime against Iraq. Individuals, NGOs, political and religious groups, banks and 
businesses of all sorts worked together, and in many cases with Saddam’s regime, to 
evade the sanctions and profit from them. Here, one key finding is that political and civic 
activists, NGOs, religions organizations and political parties did not have the required 
expertise to finance and carry out the contracts they obtained from Saddam’s regime. 
They passed their contracts on to banks and corporations. They ultimately executed the 
operations, which I discuss in Chapters V and VI. For instance, in Chapter V I examine 
the global banking system and how it financed trade under the UN sanctions regime 
against Iraq. I conclude that the current global banking system allowed nation-states, 
banks, investors, speculators, corporations, and nonstate actors in general to operate and 
profit under the UN sanctions regime. On one hand, I show evidences of how the Iraqi 
banking system actually expanded throughout the Middle East under the UN sanctions 
regime. Iraq utilized domestic and regional banking to reach global banking. It is worth 
noting that when the UN conceived and implemented its sanctions against Iraq, it 
basically ignored the hawala, the credit system that Iraq and most Middle Eastern nations 
had been using for centuries. The hawala system was essential to finance small 
businesses that sought to trade under the UN sanctions regime. On the other hand, I 
conclude that corporations, traders, speculators and even nation-states such as Belarus, 
Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria, and Vietnam utilized banks and the global banking system to 
conceal their wrongdoings and launder money. They did it through banking instruments 
such as letters of credit, wire transferring, offshore accounts, and multiple layers of bank 
accounts for their affiliates, subsidiaries, and parent companies.  
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For its part, Chapter VI is about corporations and their various corporate models. 
Corporations, including Iraqi’s, utilized corporate models to circumvent the UN sanctions 
regime in Iraq. On the one hand, the government of Iraq employed corporate models to 
operate in local, regional and global markets. On the other hand, foreign corporations 
employed corporate models to evade UN sanctions and inspectors and reach the Iraqi 
market. Both the Iraqi government and corporations utilized corporate models to conceal 
their wrongdoings and laundry their profits. That is precisely why corporations intricate 
corporate models and their modus operandi. They aim at outmaneuvering governments, 
regulatory institutions and regulators. They want to avoid responsibility and 
accountability. In fact, one thing that UN and the US can learn from corporate the UN 
sanctions regime against Iraq is how corporations operate under globalization and global 
regulatory regimes such as WTO, GATT and sanctions regimes as instruments of foreign 
policy. Knowing how corporations operate the modus operandi, policy makers can target 
specific trends and models. Law enforcers would know where to look at and how to trace 
and gather evidences.   
 Finally, in Chapter VII I examined a key question of this dissertation: whether or 
not the agents and means of globalization allowed Iraq to rebuild its missile defenses and 
acquire WMDs. I conclude that globalization, namely the agents and means of 
globalization, allowed Iraq to access the global market, purchase technologies, industrial 
machineries, components and spare parts, and hire technicians and engineers from around 
the world. Globalization also allowed Iraq to decentralize its military manufacturing 
industry and disseminate it’s a regional network of ensemble lines to ensemble, research 
and test its missiles. With respect to the WMD Program, my findings show that Iraq did 
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attempt to rebuild its WMD programs. I showed evidences of how Iraq employed its IIS, 
universities, companies, businessmen, scientists and even other nations to acquire 
equipment, labs, and chemicals to attempt to produce WMDs. Note that I emphasize 
“attempt.” I do it because I did not find any evidence that Iraq produced, obtained, and 
stored WMDs. No one found WMDs in Iraq after the U.S. invasion of 2003. But the 
objective of this Dissertation is not to find WMDs in Iraq. Rather, the main goal was to 
find evidences of whether or not globalization undermines the effectiveness of a 
sanctions regime and, in the case of Iraq, how globalization could have helped Iraq 
circumvent UN sanctions and inspectors to rebuild its WMD programs. According to my 
findings, the answer is positive. Globalization undermined UN sanctions against Iraq, and 
thanks to globalization Iraq acquired enough technologies, components and technicians to 
rebuild the infrastructures of its missile and WMD programs to levels unacceptable to 
UN resolutions on the issue and US’s policy toward Iraq and the Middle East.        
Overall, my findings have direct relevance with respect to the current U.S. policy 
of economic sanctions as a means to force Iran to give up its nuclear program. The policy 
could face setbacks in terms of diplomacy. That is, like in the Iraqi case, the U.S is 
confronting serious difficulties when trying to obtain support for a multilateral sanctions 
regime against Iran. For example, the U.S has not found support in the UN Security 
Council, where France, China, and Russia adamantly oppose such a regime against Iran, 
a nation in which they hold of economic interests. Also, the U.S has not found support 
from Middle Eastern nations against Iran. In addition, like in the Iraqi case as well, Iran 
can circumvent sanctions regime through neighboring nations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and the ex former Soviet states in the north.   
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In fact, the US has been confronting serious obstacles when enforcing a sanctions 
regime against Iran. Diplomatic dispatches recently leaked to the public by Wikileak 
confirmed what the Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Financial Times and Fox 
News have been reporting for quite some time: China, Russia, France and North Korea 
have been selling to Iran technologies and components for Iran’s nuclear industry. The 
problem is that they can also be used for military nuclear purposes. For example, in 2010, 
the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran purchased hardware to enrich uranium from a 
Chinese company. Note that the Chinese company complicated its transaction just like 
many corporations did under the UN sanctions regime against Iraq. That is, the Chinese 
company bought the hardware from a French firm, which in turn had purchased it from a 
subsidiary of Tyco International, a U.S. industrial conglomerate. Another Wikileak’s 
cable revealed that in 2009, US diplomats blocked a deal between a Russian and Chinese 
corporations that wanted to sell to Iran 66,000 pounds of tungsten copper. The mineral is 
a central element for missile-guidance systems. Wikileak also reported that “China 
brushed off several U.S. requests to stop Iran-bound shipments of technology and 
materials that could be used in ballistic-missile and chemical-weapons programs” 
(Cablegate, www.wikileaks.com). Another cable confirmed that “China declined to act 
on multiple U.S. requests that it stop shipments of ballistic-missile components from 
North Korea to Iran on commercial flights via the Beijing airport in 2007” (Cablegate, 
www.wikileaks.com). Still a third cable described how Secretary of State Mrs. Clinton 
asked China to prevent Chinese corporations from selling to Iran gyroscopes and carbon 
fiber for Iran’s ballistic missiles. What it is more striking is that the Chinese government, 
in its reply to Mrs. Clinton, argued that “China, just like the US and other nations, cannot 
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control its exports and enforce its exports laws under globalizations” (Cablegate, 
www.wikileak.com). 
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